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LIFE 



CAMPAIGNS 



GEORGE B. MOCLELLAN 



MAJOR-GENERAL U.S. ARMY. 



G. S, HILLARD, 




PHILADELPHIA: 

.T. T\. LIPPINOOTT ^ 00. 

1804. 



,1 



Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1864, by 

J. B. LIPPINCOTT & CO. 

in the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States for the 

Eastern District of Pennsylvania. 



2- A] ^"1 



TO THE 






WHOSE COURAGE, CONDUCT, AND PATRIOTISM 

BEAR RECORD ALIKE TO THEIR OWN GLORY AND TO 

THEIR UNSHAKEN DEVOTION TO THE 



BMt (fSimmmmtltv 



WHO WAS PERMITTED, FOR A TIME, WITH CONSUMMATE 

WISDOM AND ABILITY, 

TO LEAD THEM ONWARD IN THE PATHS ALWAYS 

OF HONOR AND OFTEN OF VICTORY. 



^> 




PREFACE. 



The purpose of this work is to exhibit General 
McClellan's title to the gratitude and admiration 
of his countrymen by simply telling them what 
he has done. The treatment he has received has 
made it, indeed, necessary sometimes to take the at- 
titude of controversy, and to assail others in order 
to do him justice. But this has been done no more 
than the interests of truth required. 

G. S. H. 

Boston, August, 1864. 



1* 



CONTENTS. 



CHAPTER I. 

PAGE 

Birth and Parentage — Early Education — West Point — 
Enters the Army — Services in the Mexican War.... 9 



CHAPTEK II. 

Fort Delaware — Captain Marcy's Expedition to the 
Upper Red River — Texas — Pacific Railroad Sur- 
vey — Secret Expedition to the West Indies 81 

CHAPTEE III. 

Military Commission to Visit Europe — Report on the 
Armies of Europe — Retirement from the Army 59 

CHAPTEE lY. 
The Campaign in Western Virginia in 1861 82 

dHAPTEE y. 
Organization of the Army of the Potomac 104 

(JHAPTEE YI. 

Commencement of the Peninsular Campaign or 18G2.... 133 



8 CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER YII. 

PA«B 

Siege of Yorktown — Battle of Williamsburg — March 
TO Richmond — Merrimac and Monitor — General Jack- 
son's Campaign in the Valley of the Shenandoah — 
Battle of Fair Oaks .^ 1G9 

CHAPTER YIII, 
«'The Seven Days" 232 

CHAPTER IX. 
The Army of the Potomac withdrawn from Richmond... 261 

CHAPTER X. 

Campaign in Maryland — Battle of South Mountain — 
Battle of Antietam 280 

CHAPTER XI. 

Differences with the Administration — Removal from 
the Command of the Army 307 

CHAPTER XII. 
Farewell to the Army — Reception at Trenton — ^Visit 
to Boston in the Winter of 1863 — Oration at West 
Point in June, 1864 " 330 

CHAPTER XIII. 
Concluding Reflections -848 

APPENDIX. 
Oration at West Point 375 



LIFE 



MAJOR-GENERAL M^CLELLAN. 



CHAPTEE I. 



THE name of McClellan, common in many parts 
of the United States, is borne by the descendants 
of a Scotch family, the head of which was Lord 
Kirkcudbright. The last nobleman of this name 
died April 19, 1832, when the title became ex- 
tinct. Three brothers of the name emigrated to 
America about the middle of the last century. 
One went to Maine, one to Pennsylvania, and one 
to Connecticut : from the last of these the subject 
of this memoir is descended. 

George Brinton McClellan was born in Phila- 
delphia, December 3, 1826. He was the third child 
and second son of Dr. George McClellan, a distin- 
guished physician, a graduate of Yale College, and 
the founder of Jefferson College, who died in May, 
1846. His mother, whose maiden name was Eliza- 
beth Brinton, is stilt living. The eldest son. Dr. 
J. H. B. McClellan, is a physician in Philadelphia ; 



10 WEST POINT. [1S42. 

and the youngest, Arthur, is a captain in the 
army, attached to the staff of General Wright. 

The first school to which George was sent was 
kept by Mr. Sears Cook Walker, a graduate of 
Harvard College in 1825, and a man of distin- 
guished scientific merit, who died in January, 1853. 
He remained four years under Mr. Walker's charge, 
and from him was transferred to a German teacher, 
named Schipper, under whom he began the study of 
Greek and Latin. He next went to the preparatory 
school of the University of Pennsylvania, which 
was kept by Dr. Crawford, and in 1840 entered 
the University itself, where he remained two years. 
He was a good scholar, and held a high rank in his 
class, both at school and in college; but he was not 
a brilliant or precocious lad. His taste was for 
solid studies : he made steady but not very rapid 
ppogress in every thing he undertook, but he had 
not the qualities of mind that make the show-boy 
of a school. 

In June, 1842, he entered the Military Academy 
at West Point, being then fifteen years and six 
months old. He went there in obedience to his 
general inclination for a military life. He had no 
particular fondness for mathematical studies, and 
was not aware that they formed so large a part of 
the course of instruction at the Academy. Having 
a modest estimate of his own powers and attain- 
ments, it was a source of surprise as well as pleasure 
to him to find, at the examination in January, 1843, 
that he was coming out one of the best scholars in 
the class. 



Age I O.J COURSE AT THE ACADEMY. 11 

The Academy was at that time under the charge 
of Colonel De Eussey. Among his classmates were 
Beveral persons who have served with distinction 
in the army of the United States, as well as some 
whose mistaken sense of duty led them at the 
breaking out of the civil war into the ranks of the 
Confederates. sAmong these latter was that remark- 
able man, Thomas Jonathan Jackson, better known 
by his far-renowned name of Stonewall Jackson, 
who in his brief military career seems to have 
combined all the dash and brilliancy of one of 
Prince Eupert's Cavaliers, with the religious en- 
thusiasm of one of Cromwell's Ironsides. 

Young McClellan was a little under the pre- 
scribed age when he entered the Academy; but his 
manly character and sound moral instincts were 
a sufficient protection against the dangers incident 
to all places of education away from the pupil's 
own home, and from which the vigilant care and 
absolute power of the Government cannot entirely 
guard the young men committed to its charge at 
AVest Point. He showed at the start a more careful 
intellectual training than most of the youths ad- 
mitted to the Academy. His conduct and bearing 
throughout his whole course were unexceptionable. 
His deportment then, as always, was singularly 
free from that self-assertion which is frequently 
seen, but not always pardoned, in men of superior 
powers. He showed perseverance, a strong will, 
and resolute habits of application. His acquisi- 
tions were not made without hard work, but, when 
made, they were securely held. At the close of 



12 PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS. [1864. 

the course at West Point, he stood second in general 
rank in the largest class which had ever left the 
Academy. In Engineering and Geology he was first. 
The highest scholar in the class was Charles G. 
Stewart, now a major of engineers. He came out 
first because he was more uniformly strict in 
complying with the rules and regulations of the 
Academy, as well as more attentive to its regular 
studies. 

McClellan was graduated in the summer of 
1846, before he had completed his twentieth year. 
Few young men have ever left West Point better 
fitted by mental discipline and solid attainments 
for the profession of arms than he. He had also a 
precious gift of nature itself, in that sound health 
and robust constitution which are large elements 
of success in every department of life, but without 
which distinction in a military career is almost 
hopeless. He was of middle height, and his frame 
was well proportioned, with broad shoulders and 
deep chest. His muscular strength and activity 
were very great, and all manly exercises came 
easy to him. He was patient of heat and cold, 
capable of severe and long-continued apj^lication, 
and able to sustain fatigues and exposures under 
which most men w^ould have broken down. Such 
he was at the age of twenty, and such he is now. 
Aided by strictly temperate habits, his body has 
always been the active and docile servant of his 
mind. In all the toils and exposures of his mili- 
tary life, in sickly climes and at sickly seasons, 
he has preserved uninterrupted good health. He 



Age 20.] MEXICAN WAR. 13 

could to-day discharge with ease the duties of a 
common soldier in any arm of the service ; and in 
the shock of encountering steel, few men would 
be more formidable, whether on horseback or on 
foot. 

At the close of his student-life, a new impulse 
had been given to the military spirit of the coun- 
try, and of the army especially, by the breaking 
out, a few weeks previously, of the Mexican War. 
The brilliant victories of Palo Alto and Eesaca de 
la Palma (May 8 and 9, 1846), gained against im- 
mense odds, had shed new lustre upon American 
arms, and opened to the officers of the army the 
prospect of a more congenial and animating em- 
ployment than the dreary monotony of a frontier 
post or a harbor fort. McClellan went at once 
into active service as brevet second lieutenant 
of engineers, and was assigned to duty as junior 
lieutenant of a company of sappers and miners* 

* Sappers and miners form a part of the Corps of Engineers. 
They are employed in building and repairing permanent forti- 
fications, in raising field redoubts and batteries, in making ga- 
bions and fascines, in digging trenches and excavating galleries 
of mines during sieges, and also in forming bridges of rafts, 
boats, and pontoons. Their duties require higher qualities, 
mental and physical, than those of the common soldier. A 
sapper and miner must have a strong frame, a correct eye, 
steady nerves, and a certain amount of education. It may be 
well to add, for the benefit of civilians, that gabions are baskets 
made of twigs, which are filled with earth and used as screens 
against an enemy's fire ; that fascines are bundles of twigs, 
fagots, and branches of trees which are used to fill up ditches, 
form parapets, &c. ; and that pontoons are a kind of flat-bot- 

2 



14 SAPPERS AND MINERS. [1846. 

then in the course of organization at West Point, 
under charge of Captain A. J. Swift. The first 
lieutenant was G. W. Smith, now a general in the 
service of the Confederate States. Captain Swift 
had studied the subject in Europe -, and he instructed 
his lieutenants, and the latter drilled and exercised 
the men. The summer was spent in training the 
company, and in preparing their equipments and 
implements. It was a branch of service till that time 
unknown in our country, as since the peace of 1815 
our army had had no practical taste of war, except 
in an occasional brush with the Indians, where the 
resources of scientific warfare were not called into 
play. 

The duties in which Lieutenant McClellan now 
found himself engaged were very congenial to him, 
and he devoted himself to them with characteristic 
ardor and perseverance. In a letter written in the 
course of the summer to his brother. Dr. McClellan, 
with whom his relations have always been of the 
most affectionate and confidential nature, he says, 
" I am kept busy from eight in the morning till 
dinner-time. After dinner, I have to study sap- 
ping and mining until the afternoon drill, after 
which I go to parade. After tea, we (Captains 
Swift, Smith, and myself) generally have a con- 
sultation. Then I go to tattoo. The amount of 
it is that we have to organize by the 1st of Sep- 
tember the first corps of engineer troops that have 

tomcd boat carried along with an army for the purpose of 
making temporary bridges. 



Age 20.] TAMPICO. 15 

ever been in the country. The men are perfectly 
raw, so that we have to drill them; and we are now 
(to-day) commencing the practical operations to 
prepare us for the field. Smith and I have been 
in the woods nearly all the morning, with the men, 
cutting wood for fascines, gabions, &c. We have 
now fifty men, and fine men they are too. I am 
perfectly delighted with my duties." 

Lieutenant McClellan sailed with his company, 
seventy-one strong, from ^ew York, early in Sep- 
tember, 18-i6, for Brazos Santiago, and arrived there 
immediately after the battle of Monterey. They 
then moved to Camargo, where they remained 
for some time. Thence they were transferred to 
Matamoras in November, and from this point 
started on their march to Yictoria, under the 
orders of General Patterson. Before leaving Ma- 
tamoras, Captain Swift was taken ill, and the 
company was left under command of Lieutenant 
Smith. 

At Yictoria the company joined the forces under 
General Taylor, and were assigned to the division 
of regulars under command of General Twiggs, 
with whom, in January, 1847, they marched to 
Tampico. The distance from Matamoras to Tam- 
pico is about two hundred miles. The intervening 
country is unfavorable for the march of an army; 
and every thing necessary for the support of the 
troops had to be carried with them. The sappers 
and miners found frequent occasion^r the exercise 
of their skill in making and repairing roads and 
bridges. They did excellent service, and were as- 



16 VERA CRUZ. [1847. 

sisted by men detailed from other corps, for that 
purpose, from time to time. 

The company arrived at Tampico in the latter 
part of January, and remained there about a month, 
and then sailed for Yera Cruz. They landed, 
March 9, with the first troops which were disem- 
barked, and immediately began to take an active 
part in all the operations of the siege. The officers 
and men did a large part of the reconnoitring 
necessary to determine the plan of the siege, the 
officers reporting immediately to Colonel Totten, 
the chief of engineers, and executing in detail the 
works subsequently prescribed by orders from 
head-quarters. The corps of engineers, including 
the company of sappers and miners, encountered 
great difficulties in drawing the lines of invest- 
ment and in constructing batteries, arising from 
the nature of the ground, which was broken into 
innumerable hills of loose sand, with dense forests 
of chapparal between. In common with all the 
troops, they suffered from scarcity of water and 
the excessive heat of the weather. But nothing 
could exceed the zeal of the officers or the cheerful 
obedience of the men. Their valuable services 
were duly recognized by the able and accomplished 
chief of the department of the service to which 
they were attached, as appears by a letter addressed 
to the commander-in-chief, as follows : — 



Camp Washington, before Veka Cruz, 
March 28, 18-17. 



} 

Sir: — Before leaving camp with the despatches in 
which you inform the President of the United States of 



Age 20.] VERACRUZ. 17 

the brilliant success which has attended your attack 
upon this city and the Castle of San Juan d'Ulloa, I 
seize a moment to solicit your attention to the merits and 
services of the officers of engineers who have been en- 
gaged in that attack. 

If there be any thing in the position, form, and arrange- 
ment of the trenches and batteries, or in the manner of 
their execution, worthy of commendation, it is due to the 
ability, devotion, and unremitting zeal of these officers. 
By extraordinary and unsparing effi)rts, they were en- 
abled, few as they were, to accomplish the work of many ; 
and, so far as the success of your operations before this 
city depended on labors peculiar to their corps, no words 
of mine can overrate their services. 

The officers thus engaged are Major John L. Smith, 
Captains R. E. Lee and John Sanders, First Lieutenants 
J. L. Mason, P. G. T. Beauregard, and I. I. Stevens, Se- 
cond Lieutenants Z. B. Tower and Gr. W. Smith, Brevet 
Second Lieutenants G. B. McClellan and J. Gr. Foster. 

The obligation lies upon me also to speak of the highly 
meritorious deportment and valuable services of the sap- 
pers and miners attached to the expedition. Strenuous 
as were their exertions, their number proved to be too 
few, in comparison with our need of such aid. Had their 
number been fourfold greater, there is no doubt the labors 
of the army would have been materially lessened and the 
result expedited. 

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obe- 
dient servant, Jos. Gr. Totten, 

Colonel and Chief Engineers. 
Major-General W. Scott, 

Commanding the Army of the United States, Mexico. 

The city of Vera Crnz and Castle of San Juan 
d'Ulloa were surrendered to the American forces 

2* 



18 CERRO GORDO. [1847. 

on the 29th day of March, 1847, the articles of 
capitulation having been signed two days before. 
On the 8th of April, the army, with the exception 
of a regiment of infantry left behind to serve as a 
garrison, began its march into the interior, num- 
bering in all about eight thousand five hundred 
men. They were soon made to feel that their 
path of progress was not without difficulties and 
dangers. At Cerro Gordo, sixty miles from Yera 
Cruz, a Mexican army, thirty-five thousand strong, 
under the command of General Santa Anna, 
was found posted in a mountain-pass^ a position 
of great natural strength, fortified and defended 
by powerful batteries, bristling with cannon. But. 
in spite of superior numbers and of almost im- 
pregnable defences, the enemy's position was as- 
saulted and carried, and his forces utterly routed, 
on the 18th of April, by the American army, in 
one of the most brilliant battles on record, in 
which the skilful plans of the commander-in-chief 
were carried out and crowned with success by the 
zeal and energy of all the subordinate officers and 
the splendid courage of the men. The company 
of sappers and miners had reached the place on 
the day before the battle, and shared in the dangers 
and honors of the field. Lieutenant McClellan, 
with ten of his men, was with General Pillow's 
brigade on the left, with directions to clear away 
the obstacles in front of the assaultiug columns. 
This was a service of no common danger, as the 
heavy and well-served Mexican batteries in front 
swept the space before them with a most destructive 



Age 20.] AMOZOQUE. 19 

fire, under which Pillow's command, mostly com- 
posed of volunteers, reeled and fell into confusion. 
General Pillow, in his official report to the com- 
mander-in-chief, says, '' Lieutenants Tower and 
McClellan, of the Corps of Engineers, displayed 
great zeal and activity in the discharge of their 
duties in connection with my command." 

After the battle of Cerro Gordo, Lieutenant 
McClellan accompanied the advance corps under 
General Worth on the march to Puebla, passing 
through Jalapa and Perote, and arriving at Amo- 
zoque, a small town twelve miles from Puebla, on 
the 13th of May. Our officers did not dream of 
finding any portion of the enemy here, and the 
usual precautions adopted to guard against surprise 
were somewhat relaxed. On the morning of the 
14th, the soldiers were busily occupied in cleaning 
their arms and accoutrements, in order that they 
might enter Puebla in good trim, when a drummer- 
boy, who had strayed in advance of the pickets, 
ran in and gave the alarm that the enemy was 
approaching in force. The staif-officers mounted 
and galloped to the front, and discovered the ad- 
vance of a body of Mexican lancers from twenty- 
five hundred to three thousand in number. The 
long roll at once called the troops to arms, and the 
different regiments were quickly paraded. Lieu- 
tenant McClellan, who was in a house on the side 
of the town nearest the enemy, at once sprang 
upon his horse and rode out to observe them. 
After riding a few hundred j^ards, at the turn of a 
street he came upon a Mexican captain of cavalry 



20 PUEBLA. [1847. 

riding into the town to reconnoitre. Each was 
alone, and both were armed with sabres and pistols. 
The Mexican officer turned; but his opponent, being 
better mounted, pursued, overtook him, and com- 
pelled him to surrender. The two went back toge- 
ther, and, while on their way, the Mexican officer 
suddenly put spurs to his horse and attempted to 
draw his pistol ; but Lieutenant McClellan caught 
him again, and gave him to understand that if he 
renewed the attempt to escape, he should be obliged 
to put a bullet through him. After this the tw^o 
rode together quietly, and Lieutenant McClellan 
surrendered his prisoner to his commanding officer. 
The Mexican cavalry were checked by the well- 
served guns of our artillery, and retired without 
doing us any damage. 

At Puebla a pause of several weeks was made 
in the progress of the army, in order that its 
numbers might be increased by reinforcements and 
that due preparations might be made for a march 
upon the city of Mexico. And here seems a fitting 
place to introduce that portion of the official 
annual report of Colonel Totten to the Secretary 
of War in which he speaks of the services of the 
company of sappers and miners and their officers, 
though it was not drawn up until a somewhat later 
period : — 

"The law adding the company of sappers, miners, 
and pontonniers (otherwise called engineer soldiers) 
to the Corps of Engineers, was passed on the 15th 
of May, 1846. On the 11th of October following, 
this company, seventy -two strong, landed at Brazos 



Age 20.] COLONEL TOTTEN'S REPORT. 21 

Santiago; having in the interim been enlisted by- 
great exertions on the part of several engineer 
officers, and been organized and drilled by Captain 
A. J. Swift and Lieutenants G. ^Y. Smith and Mc- 
Clellan, of the Corps of Engineers. The captain 
being disabled by sickness at Matamoras, Lieu- 
tenant Smith led the company, as part of Major- 
General Patterson's division, in the march from 
that place to Tampico, — a march in which the 
services of the company, constantly in advance 
and engaged in removing impediments and making 
the road practicable, were of great value. The 
company landed with the first line on the A^eaeh at 
Vera Cruz, being then again under the command of 
Captain Swift ; who, in his desire to lead in its dan- 
gers and toils, strove nobly, but vainly, against an 
inexorable disease. A too ardent sun prostrated 
him at once, depriving the country of his services 
at a moment when his high and peculiar attain- 
ments would have been of the greatest value. 
During the siege of Vera Cruz, I was a witness to 
the great exertions and services of this company, 
animated by, and emulating, the zeal and devotion 
of its excellent officers, Lieutenants Smith, Mc- 
Clellan, and Foster. Since the surrender of that 
place, we have no official accounts giving the par- 
ticular employments or engagements of the com- 
pany. We know only that it has been on the march 
with General Scott's army to the city of Mexico. 
I will venture to say, however, that the oppor- 
tunities of that service have been profited of, by 
the sergeants and rank and file, as well as by the 



22 MARCH TO MEXICO. [1847. 

commissioned officers, to display the highest qua- 
lities as soldiers, demonstrating, at the same time, 
the great advantage to armies, however engaged 
in the field, of possessing troops well grounded in 
the peculiar exercises of engineer soldiers." 

On the 7th of August the American army, num- 
bering not quite eleven thousand men, began their 
march from Puebla, starting upon an enterprise 
w^hich would have been pronounced extremely 
rash had it not been crowned with success, but 
which, having been successful, ranks among the 
most daring and brilliant in the annals of war. 
A mere handful of men, volunteers and regulars, 
undertook to capture a city of nearly two hundred 
thousand inhabitants, strong in its natural defences, 
and protected by numerous works, constructed by 
able engineers, in conformity with the most ap- 
proved rules of military science. Around it was 
distributed an army of thirty-five thousand men, 
composed of regular troops and volunteers, and 
comprising artillery, cavalry, and infantry. These 
were by no means despicable soldiers, and they 
often fought with a courage which extorted the 
respect of their enemies. Their artillery in par- 
ticular was well served and effective, as our troops 
often learned to their cost. The weak points in 
the Mexican army were the want of courage and 
want of capacity in its officers, just as the weak 
point in the civil history of that unhappy country 
has been the want of rulers who were at once 
honest and able. Had the Mexican officers been 
men and soldiers like our own, history might have 



Age 20.] VALLEY OF MEXICO. 23 

had a different record to make upon the event of 
the Mexican War. 

Lieutenant McClellan's company of sappers and 
miners was attached to the second division of re- 
gulars, under command of General Twiggs, which 
formed the advance of the army. Soon after 
leaving Puebla, they were joined by General Scott, 
the commander-in-chief. Our troops entered the 
Yalley of Mexico on the 10th, and General Scott 
fixed his head-quarters for the time at Ayotla, a vil- 
lage on the northeastern edge of the Lake of Chalco, 
about nine miles east of the fortified position of 
El Penon, which was carefully reconnoitred on the 
12th and its great strength fully discovered. On 
the next day, another reconnoissance was pushed 
upon the route by Mexicalcingo. This was pro- 
nounced by General Scott the most daring recon- 
noissance of the whole war, as the small corps of 
observation was obliged to pass close by the strong 
position of El Penon and to leave it for a con- 
siderable space in the rear. In both of these re- 
connoissances Lieutenant McClellan took part; and 
in one of them he was saved from probable death 
or captivity at the hands of about a dozen Mexican 
lancers by Lieutenant Beauregard and three dra- 
goons. 

When, in consequence of the great strength of 
the defences at El Penon, the project of advancing 
upon Mexico by the great road from Puebla, and 
assaulting it upon the eastern side, was abandoned, 
and it w^as determined to march round the south- 
ern shore of Lake Chalco and attack the city on 



24 BATTLE OF CONTRERAS. [1847. 

the south and west, the company of sappers and 
miners was transferred to General Worth's divi- 
sion, which now took the lead, and the conapany 
moved at its head to San Angustin, occasionally 
repairing the roads as far as was practicable. As 
soon as General Santa Anna learned this movement 
of the American forces, he withdrew the greater 
portion of his troops, with several pieces of artil- 
lery, from El Penon and Mexicalcingo, where he 
had been expecting the first shock of battle, and, 
establishing his head-quarters at the hacienda (ham- 
let) of San Antonio, began to labor upon the lines 
of defence in that vicinity. 

On the morning of the 18th, General Worth's 
division was moved forward a couple of miles on 
the causeway leading from San Augustin to San 
Antonio, and took up its position in front of the 
latter place, the men encamping on both sides of 
the road. Here a careful reconnoissance was made 
of the defences of San Antonio, in which Lieu- 
tenant McClellan took part. His company was 
then transferred to General Twiggs's division, and 
moved at its head, across the Pedregal, to Con- 
treras. During the first day of the battle of Con- 
treras (August 19), Lieutenant McClellan, while 
reconnoitring, ran into a Mexican regiment, and 
had his horse shot under him by a musket-ball. 
On the same day, while posting Magruder's bat- 
tery, he had another horse killed under him by a 
round shot. Still later, while in temporary com- 
mand of a section of the same battery whose officer 
had been mortally wounded, he was knocked down 



Agk 20.] PAD TERN A. 25 

by a grape-shot which struck plump upon the hilt 
of his sword. " Stonewall" Jackson, who belonged to 
Magruder's battery, relieved Lieutenant McClellan 
from command of the section, and the latter then 
took charge for some time of a battery of mountain- 
howitzers whose officer had been wounded, and, 
after a day of severe toil and great exposure, re- 
joined his company, which was at San Geronimo, a 
small village on the western edge of the Pedregal,* 
a little north of Contreras. 

At a very early hour the next morning (August 
20) the intrenched camp of General Valencia at 
Padierna was stormed and carried at the point 
of the bayonet by the left wing of the American 
army, under the command of General P. F. Smith. 
This was the battle of Contreras, of which Gene- 
ral Scott says, in his official report, "I doubt 
whether a more brilliant or decisive victory — 
taking into view ground, artificial defences, bat- 
teries, and the extreme disparity of numbers, 
without cavalry or artillery on our side — is to be 
found on record." In this battle Lieutenant Mc- 
Clellan's company of sapj)ers and miners led Gene- 
ral Smith's brigade of regulars in its attack on the 
flank of the enemy, and is thus mentioned in the 
report already quoted from : — " In the mean time, 



* The Pedregal is a field of broken lava, about nine milea 
south of Mexico, nearly circular in form, and about two miles in 
diameter, entirely impracticable for cavalry or artillery except 
by a single mule-path, and only practicable for infantry at a 
few points. 

3 



26 RETORT OF GENERAL TWIGGS. [1817. 

Smith's own brigade, niiclcr the temporary com- 
mand of Major Dimmick, following the movements 
of Riley and Cadwallader, discovered opposite to 
and outside of the w^orks a long line of Mexican 
cavalry, drawn up as a support. Dimmick, having 
at the head of the brigade the company of sappers 
and miners under Lieutenant Smith, engineer, who 
had conducted the march, was ordered by Bri- 
gadier-General Smith to form line faced to the 
enemy, and, in a charge against a flank, routed the 
cavalry." 

In the reports of the officers immediately com- 
manding, honorable mention is made of Lieutenant 
McClellan and his corps. General Twiggs says, 
" Lieutenant G. B. McClellan, after Lieutenant 
Callender was wounded, took charge of and managed 
the howitzer battery (Lieutenant Reno being de- 
tached with the rockets) with judgment and suc- 
cess, until it became so disabled as to require 
shelter. For Lieutenant McClellan's efficiency and 
gallantry in this affair, I present his name for the 
favorable consideration of the general-in-chief." 
And again, " To Lieutenant G. W. Smith, of the 
engineers, who commanded the company of sappers 
and miners, I am under many obligations for his 
services on this and many other occasions. When- 
ever his legitimate duties w^ith the pick and spado 
were performed, he always solicited permission to 
join in the advance of the storming-party with 
his muskets, in w^hich position his gallantry, and 
that of his officers and men, was conspicuously 
displayed at Contreras as well as Cerro Gordo." 



Age 20.] CHAPULTEPEC. 27 

General P. F. Smith, in his report, says, "Lieu- 
tenant Gr. AY. Smith, in command of the engineer 
company, and Lieutenant McClellan, his subaltern, 
distinguished themselves throughout the whole of 
the three actions. Nothing seemed to them too bold 
to be undertaken, or too diflicult to be executed; 
and their services as engineers were as valuable 
as those the}^ rendered in battle at the head of 
their gallant men." 

General Smith, it will be noticed, speaks of " three 
actions" in which the officers of the company of 
sappers and miners distinguished themselves. These 
include the battle of Churubusco, which was foup-ht 
on the same day (August 20) w^ith the battle of 
Contreras, and in which the company took part, 
both in the preliminary reconnoissances and in the 
conflict itself. 

After the battles of Contreras and Churubusco, 
hostilities were suspended by an armistice w^hich 
lasted till September 7. On the 8th the severe 
and bloody battle of Molino del Eey was fought, 
at which Lieutenant McClellan w^as not present. 
On the 13th the Castle of Chapultepec was taken 
by assault, in which also he did not take part, but 
during the night of the 11th, and on the 12th, he built 
and armed, mostly in open daylight and under a 
heavy fire, one of the batteries whose well-directed 
and shattering fire contributed essentially to the 
success of the day. 

Immediately after the fall of Chapultepec, and 
on the same day, the company of sappers and 
miners was ordered to the front, and took the lead 



28 SAN cos ME G A RITA. [1847. 

of General "Worth's division in one of tho most 
difficult and dangerous movements of the assault 
upon the city of Mexico, — the attack of the San 
Cosme garita, or gate. Of the nature of the im- 
portant services performed by the company and its 
officers at this point, and also after the capture of 
the city, a correct notion may be formed from the 
statement contained in the rej^ort of Major J. L. 
Smith, of the Engineer Corps : — 

" Lieutenant Gr. ^Y. Smith, commanding the sap- 
pers, arrived on the ground some time after this, 
while our troops were in front of the battery at 
the garita, — the other batteries on the road up to 
that point having been carried. Being the senior 
engineer present, lie was ordered to reconnoitre in 
front and ascertain the state of the enemy's forces, 
and particularly whether it would be necessary to 
move our heavy artillery forward. He reported 
his opinion that the advancing of the heavy pieces 
should be suspended, and that the sappers should 
advance under cover of the houses, by openings 
made in the walls of contiguous houses; and, this 
being approved, he proceeded, in the manner pro- 
posed, until he reached a three-story house about 
forty yards from the battery, and was enabled 
from the roof to open a fire upon the battery v/hich 
drove away the enemy's troops, who in their re- 
treat succeeded in carrying away one of ^e guns. 
Part of his force then descended to the road to 
secure the battery, but was anticipated by a body 
of our troops, which entered on the right as the 
sappers were about entering on the left. The sap- 



Age 20.] STREET-FIGHTING. 29 

pers were then moved forward until they reached 
strong positions on both sides of the rear, capable 
of affording shelter to our troops, although the 
enemy occupied in force a large convent, one hun- 
dred and fifty ^^ards in advance, and had batteries on 
the next cross-street. These facts being reported, 
a brigade was sent to occupy the strong positions 
referred to, and at ten p.m. further operations were 
suspended for the night. 

" At three o'clock next morning, a party of the 
sappers moved to the large convent in advance, 
and found it unoccupied. Lieutenant McClellan 
advanced with a party into the Alameda, and re- 
ported at daylight that no enemy was to be seen. 
The sappers then moved forward, and had reached 
two squares beyond the Alameda, when they were 
recalled. The company during the day, until 
three p.m., were engaged in street-fighting, and 
particularly in breaking into houses with crow- 
bars and axes. In this service they killed a 
number, and made prisoners of many suspicious 
persons. 

"Lieutenant McClellan had command of the com- 
pany for a time in the afternoon, while Lieutenant 
Smith was searching for powder to be used in 
blowing up houses from which our troops had been 
fired upon, contrary to the usages of war. During 
this time, while advancing the company, he reached 
a strong position, but found himself oj^posed to a 
large force of the enemy. He had a conflict with 
this force, w^hich lasted some time; but the ad- 
vantage afforded by his position enabled him at 



so SANCOSMEGARITA. [1847. 

length to drive it oft*, after having killed more than 
twenty of its number." 

A few words may here be added, to explain a 
little more in detail the proceedings of the sappers 
and miners in making their way through the houses 
to which Major Smith refers. At the gate of the 
city a powerful and well-served battery swept the 
street with continued discharges of grape-shot, so 
that it was impossible to move down directly in 
front of it. The problem was to take the battery or 
to drive the Mexicans from their guns. The houses 
on both sides were built mostly in continuous blocks, 
with an occasional interval or vacant lot. The walls 
of the houses were of adobe, or light volcanic stone. 
The operation of breaking through them was thus 
conducted. A detachment of the sappers and miners, 
led by an officer, entered a house at the outer end 
of the street, with the proper tools and implements, 
and made a breach in the party or division wall large 
enough for a man to go through to the next house, 
and so on successively. Lieutenant McClellan led 
the party on one side of the street. It was a highly 
dangerous service, as every house had Mexican 
soldiers in it, and there w^as continuous fio-htincr 
until the Americans drove out the occupants. It 
was Lieutenant McClellan's duty — or at least he 
considered it to be so — to pass first into the open- 
ing. In one instance, where it was necessary to 
cross a vacant space between two houses which 
did not join, he nearly lost his life by falling into 
a ditch of stagnant water. The party at length 
forced their way through the houses till they 



Age 21.] CLOSE OP THE MEXICAN WAR. 31 

reached those which overlooked the batteiy, and 
w4iere they could fire upon the Mexicans who 
manned the guns. These having been shot or 
driven aw^ay, the Americans descended from the 
houses, took the guns, and turned them on the 
gate, which was forced, and the city entered. 

On the 14th day of September, 1847, General 
Scott, with six thousand five hundred men, the 
wdiole of his effective army remaining in the field, 
entered and took possession of the city of Mexico. 
AYith the exception of a few slight skirmishes, 
this was the close of the war in that part of the 
country. 



CHAPTEE XL 

No minute and detailed account has been given 
of those military operations in Mexico in which 
Lieutenant McClellan was engaged, — which, indeed, 
could not have been done without swelling this 
part of the memoir to a disproportionate bulk. 
Our aim has been merely to present a continuous 
and intelligible narrative of what was done by him. 
The movements of the campaign, its sieges, assaults, 
and battles, were planned by others; and he can 
claim no higher merit — though this is not incon- 
siderable — than that of having faithfully executed 
the orders received from his superiors in rank. Nor 
has the moral element involved in the Mexican War 
— the question how far it was provoked or unpro- 



o2 TACTICS or THE MEXICAN WAR, [1S47. 

voked, or how far we w^ere right or wrong — been 
taken into consideration. Such an inquiry has now 
become as obsolete as w^ould be a discussion of the 
moral judgment to be passed upon the conspirators 
who took the life of Julius Cajsar. But no candid 
person, whatever he may think of the merits of 
the contest, can deny that the conduct of the war 
and its results reflected the highest honor upon the 
courage of the American army, both regulars and 
volunteers, as well as upon the skill and accom- 
j)lishments of our officers. Not that there were not 
grave errors committed, both at Washington and 
in the field; not that the volunteers did not some- 
times show the infirmities of raw troops; but these 
shadows in the picture were as nothing to its lights. 
The whole campaign was especially remarkable for 
the brilliant, dashing, and reckless courage dis- 
played in it, — for that quality which the French 
call elan, which is so captivating to civilians, and 
for the w^ant of which so much fault has been found 
with our ofiicers and soldiers in the present civil 
war. Eut the tactics in the Mexican War were 
founded upon and regulated by an accurate know- 
ledge of the enemy; and the distinguished and 
veteran soldier who led our armies in that cam- 
paign would never have taken the risks he did had 
the Mexican soldiers been like those in the South- 
ern army, and the Mexican officers men like Lee, 
Johnston, Jackson, and Beauregard. 

The public mind judges of military movements 
and of battles by the event : the plan that fails is 
a bad plan, and the successful general is the great 



Age 21.] TACTICS OF THE MEXICAN 

general. Without doubt, this is a correct judgment 
in the long run; but in particular cases the rule 
could not always be applied without injustice. 
Hannibal was defeated by Scipio at Zama, and 
Napoleon was defeated by the Duke of Welling- 
ton at Waterloo; but it does not follow that Scipio 
was a greater general than Hannibal, or the Duke 
of Wellington than Napoleon. Mexico was taken 
by a series of rapid and daring movements, and 
Richmond has not yet been taken; and thus the 
inference is drawn that, had the latter city been 
assailed in the same way as the former was, it too 
would have fallen, as Mexico did. But those who 
reason thus forget the sharp lesson we learned at 
Bull Run, — a disastrous battle forced upon the army 
by a popular sentiment which ignorantly clamored 
for the dash and rapidity which accomplished such 
brilliant results in the Yalley of Mexico. Nelson 
won the battle of Aboukir by a very daring and 
dangerous plan of attack, which had the good for- 
tune to be successful. Cooper, in his preface to the 
last edition of " The Two Admirals," says that had 
he attacked an American fleet in the same way he 
would have had occasion to repent the boldness of 
the experiment; but then Nelson, who, like all great 
commanders, was a man of correct observation and 
sound judgment, would probably not have tried such 
an experiment w^ith an American fleet. 

To Lieutenant McClellan his year of active ser- 
vice in Mexico was of great value in his professional 
training; for it was a period crowded with rich op- 
portunities for putting into practice the knowledge 



34 LIEUT. MCCLELLAN's conduct. [1848. 

lie bad gained at West Point, and which was Btill 
fresh in his mind. The corps of engineers at- 
tached to the army was so small that much work 
was of necessity exacted from each ofi&cer, and 
higher responsibilities were devolved upon the 
younger men than would have been the case in 
any European army. Lieutenant McClellan had an 
unusually large experience both of field-work and 
in the investment of fortified places. And it is no 
more than just to him to add that he p)i'Oved him- 
self equal to every trust laid upon him. His know- 
ledge of his profession was shown to be thorough, 
exact, and ready, and his coolness and self-possession 
on " the perilous edge of battle" was like that of 
the bronzed veteran of a hundred fights. The num- 
ber of men in our country — indeed, in any country 
— comj^etent to pass a correct judgment upon mili- 
tary measures and military men, is not large; but 
upon this select body Lieutenant McClellan had 
made his mark during the Mexican War, and he 
ivvas recognized by them as a soldier upon whose 
courage, ability, and devotion his country might 
confidently repose in her hour of need. 

Lieutenant McClellan remained with his com- 
pany in the city of Mexico, in the discharge of 
garrison-duty, till May 28, 1848, w^hen they were 
marched down to Yera Cruz and embarked for 
home, arrivino; at West Point on the 22d of June. 
After his return he was brevetted first lieutenant for 
conduct at Contreras, and afterwards captain for 
conduct at Molino del Pey, which latter honor he 
declined, as he had not been present in the battle. 



Age 24.] RETURN TO WEST POINT. 35 

He was afterwards brevet ted captain for conduct 
in the capture of Mexico, and his commission was 
dated back to that period. 

Upon his return, his company was stationed at 
West Point, and he remained there with them till 
June, 1851, much of the time in command. His 
leisure hours were spent in studies connected with 
his profession. Among other things, he prepared 
an elaborate lecture upon the campaign of ZsTapoleon 
in 1812, which Avas read before a literary society. 
Of this discourse he thus speaks in a letter to his 
sister-in-law: — "Well, it is over at last; and glad 
I am of it. I read the last part of my Napoleon 
paper last night. I have been working hard at it 
ever since my return, and the ink was hardly dry 
on the last part w^hen it was read. The affair 
amounted to one hundred and eleven pages in all; 
and they compliment me by saying that it gave a 
clear explanation of the campaign : so I am con- 
tented. I hardly know, but I have an indefinite idea 
that we have had fine w^eather since I returned. I 
have some indistinct ideas of sunshine, and some of 
rain; but I have been so intently occupied with the 
one subject that I have thought of but little else. 
!Now I must go to work with my company. I've 
enough to do to occupy half a dozen persons for a 
w^hile; but I rather think I can get through it. I 
have had no time to read any of Schiller; but now 
I will go at it. I have some thought of writing a 
paper on the Thirty Years' War for our club." 

His familiar letters breathe a strong desire for a 
more stirring and active life than that he was now 



o6 MANUAL OF BAYONET EXERCISE. [1849 

leading, the monotony of which was the more 
keenly felt from its contrast with the brilliant ex- 
citements of the Mexican campaign. In one of his 
letters he tells his correspondent that his highest 
pleasure is to fall in with some comrade of the war, 
and talk over its hardships, perils, and successes 
and revive their impressions of the glorious scenery 
of Mexico. And yet he was never idle. Here is a 
specimen of his habits of work, taken from a letter 
to his brother, Dr. McClellan, dated January 10, 
1849: — "On Christmas day, orders were received 
here from the Chief Engineer, requiring plans and 
estimates for several buildings to be furnished him 
for the Military Committee of the House, by to- 
day at latest. Among those required w^as a barrack 
for our company ; and I had to make all the draw- 
ings : the barrack had to be planned and drawn in 
the short time allotted; and from two weeks from 
to-day until last Saturday night at twelve o'clock, 
I drew ever}'- day, morning, afternoon, and night, 
working Sundays, New-Year's day, and all. I had 
to make eight different drawings on the same large 
sheet, fifty-two inches by thirty-two, all drawn ac- 
curately to a scale, all the details, &c. painted : so, 
you may imagine, I had my hands full." 

In the winter of 1849-50, he prepared for the 
use of tlie army a Manual of Bayonet Exercise, 
mostly taken from the French of Gomard. This 
was submitted by General Scott, the commander-in- 
chief, to the Secretary of War, in which he strongly 
recommended 'its being printed for distribution to 
the army, and that it should be made, by regula- 



Age 25.] RED RIVER EXPEDITION. 37 

tion, a part of the system of instruction. The re- 
commendation was adopted by the War Depart- 
ment, and the manual was officially printed. It 
forms a small duodecimo volume of about a hundred 
pages, w^th a number of plates in outline. 

In June, 1851, Captain McClellan was ordered to 
Fort Delaware, as assistant to Major John Sanders 
in the construction of the works there. Here he 
remained till near the close of the ensuing winter. 

Early in March, 1852, Captain Eandolph B. Marcy, 
of the Fifth Infantry, was directed by the War 
Department to make an exploration of^ the country 
embraced within the basin of the Upper EM Eiver; 
and Captain McClellan was assigned to duty with 
the expedition. The other officers accompanying 
it were Lieutenant Updegraff and Dr. Shumard. 
Captain J. H. Strain, of Fort Washita, and Mr. J. 
E. Suydam, were also with it, but not in any offi- 
cial capacity. The private soldiers were fifty-five in 
number. There were also five Indians, serving as 
guides and hunters. Up to this time the region 
round the head-waters of the Eed Eiver had been 
unexplored by civilized man; and the only informa- 
tion we had as to the sources of one of the largest 
rivers in the United States was derived from In- 
dians and semi-civilized Indian hunters. 

The expedition started from Fort Belknap, upon 
the Brazos Eiver, on the 2d of May, and marched 
to Eed Eiver at the mouth of the Little Witchita, 
and up the right bank of the latter stream to the 
mouth of the Big AYitchita, where they crossed Eed 
Eiver. Proceeding westward, between Eed Eiver 



38 CAPTAIN MARCY's REPORT. [1852. 

and a branch of Cache Creek, they struck the north 
fork of Eed Kiver at the west end of the Witchita 
Mountains, and followed that stream to its source 
in the Llano Estacado, or Staked Plain. Here an 
excursion was made to the valley of the Canadian 
River, at Sand Creek, in order to verify the position 
of the party by the survey which had been made 
along that stream by Captain Marcy in 1849. They 
then travelled south to the Kech-ah-que-ho, or main 
Red River, and, leaving their train at the place 
where the river comes out from the bluif of the 
Llano Estacado, ascended it to the spring which 
forms its source. From this they returned down 
the left bank of the river to the Witchita Mountains, 
which were examined, and tlience they proceeded to 
Fort Arbuckle, on the Washita River, in the Indian 
Territory, arriving there July 28. Here the expedi- 
tion terminated. 

Captain Marcy brought back his command with- 
out the loss of a man. In his Report he says, "I 
feel a sincere regret at parting with the compan}^, 
as the uniform good conduct of the men during the 
entire march of about a thousand miles merits my 
most sincere and heart-felt approbation. I have 
seldom had occasion even to reprimand one of them. 
All have performed the arduous duties assigned 
them with the utmost alacrity and good will; and 
when (as was sometimes the case) we were obliged 
to make long marches, and drink the most disgust- 
ing water for several days together, instead of mur- 
muring and making complaints, they were cheerful 
and in good spirits. I owe them, as well as the 



Age 25.] FORTARBUCKLE. 39 

officers and gentlemen who were with me, my most 
hearty thanks for their cordial co-operation with 
me in all the duties assigned to the expedition. It 
is probably in a great measure owing to this har- 
monious action on the part of all persons attached 
to the expedition that it has resulted so fortunately." 
Of Captain McClellan the introduction to the Eeport 
speaks thus : — " The astronomical observations were 
made by Captain George B. McClellan, of the En- 
gineer Corps, who, in addition to the duties properly 
pertaining to his department, performed those of 
quartermaster and commissary to the command. 
An interesting collection of reptiles and other speci- 
mens, in alcohol, was also made under his super- 
intendence, and put into the hands of Professors 
Baird and Girard, of the Smithsonian Institution, 
whose reports will be found in the appendix. For 
these and many other important services, as well 
as for his prompt and efftcient co-operation in what- 
ever was necessary for the successful accomplish- 
meut of the design of the expedition, I take this 
opportunity of tendering my warmest acknow- 
ledgments.'^ 

The party were received with peculiar warmth 
of welcome by the garrison at Fort Arbuckle; for 
they were supposed to have been, all massacred b}^ 
the Comanche Indians. The account was brought 
by a Keechi Indian, and was so circumstantial and 
minute in every particular, and showed so perfect a 
knowledge of the movements of the expedition, as 
well as of its numbers and equipment, that it was 
believed to be true. The report was carried to the 



40 CAPTAIN MARCY's REPORT. [1852. 

United States; and for several weeks the relatives 
of Captain McClellan mourned him as dead. 

Captain Marcy's Eeport was published by order 
of Congress, and is one of those books which many 
receive, but few read. And yet it is well worth 
reading; for it has that fresh and sj^ontaneous charm 
of style which we so often observe in the writings 
of superior men who are not men of letters by 
training and profession, and who tell us in a plain 
Avay of what they have seen and done. Besides a 
graphic and animated description of the country 
traversed by the expedition, it contains an excellent 
account of the Indian tribes that roam over it, — not 
that impossible creature, 'Hhe noble savage" of the 
poet, the sentimental red man of the novelist, nor 
yet the degraded outcast that withers in the shadow 
cast by the white man and grafts upon his own 
wild stock all the vices of civilization ; but the In- 
dian as he really exists, — a mingled web of virtues 
and vices, and certainly holding no low place upon 
the'seale of savage and nomadic life. 

And the remark which has just been made as to 
Captain Marcy's Keport may be further extended; 
and it may be said that comparatively few persons 
know any thing of what may be called the civil 
victories of the American army. How few there 
are who are aware of how much has been done 
for science, and especially for geographical science, 
during the last thirty or forty years, by the able 
and accomplished officers of the regular army! — 
what toils and hardships they have endured, what 
perils they have met, and what laurels, unstained 



Age 25.] TEX AS E XPEDI'TIO N. 41 

by blood and tear^, they have won! One might 
feel indignant at the injustice which deals out what 
is called fame with so unequal a hand, were it not 
for the reflection that men who are competent to 
add to the intellectual wealth of the world, and en- 
large the domain of knowledge, have learned to 
take popular applause at its true value, and to find 
in the faithful discharge of honorable duty a satis- 
faction which is its own reward. 

After his duties upon Captain Marcy's expedition 
had ceased, Captain McClellan was ordered to 
Texas as chief engineer on the staff of General 
P. F. Smith. He sailed from New Orleans, accom- 
panying General Smith, August 29, and arrived at 
Galveston on the 31st. In a letter to his brother, 
dated September 3, he says, " Galveston is pro- 
bably the prettiest and most pleasant town in 
Texas. It is built on a perfectly level island, which 
forms a portion of the harbor, and near the point. 
The houses are all of frame, with piazzas, and 
very pretty and neat: all are surrounded with 
shrubbery. They have there the most beautiful 
oleanders I ever saw: they, with many other 
flowers, the banana, china-tree, orange, lemon, 
palm, &c. &c., present, you may imagine, a charm- 
ing relief to the monotony of the level site. There 
is almost always a fine breeze and an elegant surf. 
The roads were excellent when we were there, on 
account of the frequent rains, which pack them 
down." 

From Galveston he accompanied General Smith 
in a tour of military inspection^ visiting Indianola, 

4-* 



42 CORPUS CIIRISTI. [1852. 

St. Joseph's, and Cori^us Christi. Of this last place 
lie writes, '' Corpus is about two miles from the head 
of Corpus Christi Bay, which is separated from 
Nueces Bay by a reef of sand. The shore makes 
a beautiful curve, near one end of which the town 
is built. The old camp of General Taylor was on 
the beach where the town stands, and extended some 
mile and a half or two miles above it. The positions 
of the tents are still marked by the banks of sand 
thrown up to protect them against the Northers. 
It is a classical spot with the army, there are so 
many old associations, traditions, and souvenirs of 
many who are now no more. The country round 
Corpus is very beautiful. Below, towards the bay 
(gulf, rather), it is a rather flat country, alternately 
prairie and chapparal, the prairies interspersed with 
* motts'* of live-oak and mesquite,f covered withal 
by a luxuriant growth of grass. The chapparal is 
the prettiest growth of that nature I remember to 
have seen. It is, of course, tropical, — that is, com- 
posed of the cactus and the stiff thorn-covered 
bushes peculiar to the Southern latitudes; but the 
ground even now is covered with a great variety 
of beautiful flowers, and the whole makes up a very 
pretty country." 

From Corpus Christi they proceeded tjo Fort 
Merrill, thence to San Antonio, and from there to 
Camp Johnston, on the Concho Eiver, where they 
arrived October 24. 



* "Mott," a local word, meaning a grove, or clump, of trees, 
f "Mesquite," an indigenons tree of the acacia kind. 



Age 26.] COAST SURVEY. 43 

Here Captain McClellan found orders relieving 
him from duty on General Smith's staif, and as- 
signing him the charge of the surveys for the im- 
provement of the harbors on the coast of Texas 
from Indianola to Eio Grande, embracing Brazos 
Santiago, Corpus Christi, Lavacca, and the San 
Antonio Eiver. This change of employment, trans- 
ferring him from the land to the sea, was not ex- 
actly to his wish • but he set about his new duties 
with his usual promptness and energ}^. We find 
him at Corpus Christi in January, 1853, diligently 
at work upon estimates and reports; and on the 
13th of that month he addressed to the Chief 
Engineer, General Totten, a letter giving a general 
description of the bars on the coast. For the 
rest of the winter and far into the spring he was 
hard at work. Here is a taste of his experiences, 
taken from a letter dated Corj)us Christi, March 
9, 1853:— "I left here on the 22d of February, 
one of the most beautiful mornings I ever saw, 
bright, clear, and mild, with a nice breeze just in 
the right direction. I congratulated myself on the 
fine start I made, and felt in fine spirits. Things 
went on finely for an hour or so. Then the breeze 
became so strong that I had to double-reef all my 
sails, and on we went, still handsomely. But pre- 
sently the breeze changed into the most violent 
gale of the winter. The sea ran in young moun- 
tains. Down we brought the mainsail; and if ever 
a boat did run under a foresail, I rather think 
mine did that day. How it did blow ! The spray 
dashed in your face like hail. The boat is a mag- 



44 A A L E F W I N D. [1853. 

nificent sailer, and a splendid sea-boat: so we still 
kept on beautifully, though it was slightly humid. 
Just as we were about to anchor, before reaching 
the mud-flats, we lost the way; for the spray flew 
so that we could not see, and the first thing we 
knew we were driven about four hundred yards 
up on one of the aforesaid flats, and rather halted. 
Nothing could be done : so we turned in as best 
we could, and waited for morning. When morning 
came, there was not an inch of water within three 
hundred yards, — could not even float the skifl". A 
sand island some six hundred yards off was the 
nearest dry place, and in walking to it you would 
sink over the knee in mud. In that delightful 
place my boat remained about ten days. After the 
first three, I went on board the Government steamer 
at Aranzas, some four miles ofl", and went to work 
at the bar in her whale-boat. When I got through, 
I found there was no use in waiting for the water 
to rise : so I took the steamer's crew and dug a canal, 
through which, after two days' hard work, we floated 
the Alice into deep water. I then at once ran down, 
by the outside passage, the Gulf, to Corpus Christi 
Pass, satisfied myself very quickly of its utter 
worthlessness, and came here, with flying colors, 
yesterday. I have finished this harbor and its two 
passes: by the end of the month I shall have com- 
pleted the Brazos surve}', and will then run up 
towards Indianola, finishing the inland channel and 
the San Antonio and Guadalupe Elvers by the end 
of April, if I have any thing like ordinary good 
luck. In May I shall finish Paso Cavallo Harbor, 



Age 26.] PACIFIC RAILROAD SURVEY. 45 

and hope to finish the field-work by the end of that 
mouth at furthest. Then I shall sell out my boats, 
and go to Galveston and make out my reports and 
maps." 

On the 18th of April, Captain McClellan ad- 
dressed to General Totten a report of the result 
of the surveys on the coast of Texas, as far as they 
had then been completed. It embraces the bars 
along the coast from Paso Cavallo to the mouth of 
the Eio Grande, the harbors of Brazos Santiago, 
Corpus Christi, Aranzas, and Paso Cavallo, and the 
inland channel from Matagorda Bay to Aranzas 
Bay. It is printed in the Executive Documents 
of the first session of the Thirty-Third Congress, 
■ — a brief and business-like document, containing 
plans and suggestions for improving the harbors 
designated, with estimates of the probable ex- 
penses. 

But before the date of his Eeport he had received 
information of his having been assigned to a more 
congenial field of duty ; for in a letter to his brother, 
dated Indianola, April 7, 1853, he tells him that he 
has been offered the charge of a portion of one 
of the Pacific Eailroad surveys recently author- 
ized by Congress, to start from Puget Sound 
and to go through the Cascade Mountains to 
St. Paul on the Mississippi, and adds, "As the 
results of the surveys are to be presented to 
Congress during the ensuing February, the time 
will be limited; and I can never have a better op- 
portunity of seeing California and Oregon: so 1 
did not hesitate a moment in determining to accept 



46 PACIFIC RAILROAD SURVEY. [1853. 

the position. I am told that 'the exploration ia 
arduous, and will bring reputation.' Hard work 
and reputation will carry me a long way." 

The expedition to which he was attached was 
under the general supervision of Governor Isaac I. 
Stevens, of Washington Territory, formerly of the 
army, who, to the great loss of his country, met a 
glorious death in the battle near Chantilly, Fair- 
fax county, Virginia, September 1, 1862. It was 
charged with the duty of examining the lines of 
the forty-seventh and forty-ninth parallels of north 
latitude; and the special object of the exploration 
was the determination of a railroad-route from the 
head-waters of the Mississippi to Puget Sound. 
One party, under the immediate direction of Gov- 
ernor Stevens, was to proceed from the Mississippi 
westward, survey the intermediate country, and 
examine the passes of the Eock}^ Mountains. Cap- 
tain McClellan, at the head of a separate party, was 
to explore the Cascade Eange of mountains. 

Immediately on receiving official news of his ap- 
pointment, he set out for the Pacific coast, via the 
Isthmus, arrived at Fort Yancouver on the 27th 
of June, began to make preparations for the expedi- 
tion, and started on the 24th of July. His party 
consisted of Lieutenant Duncan, Third Artillery, 
astronomer, topographer, and draughtsman; Lieu- 
tenant Hodges, Fourth Infantry, quartermaster and 
commissary; Lieutenant Mowry, Third Artillery, 
meteorologist; Mr. George Gibbs, ethnologist and 
geologist; Mr. J. F. Minter, assistant engineer, in 
charge of courses and distances; five assistants iu 



Age 26.] FIELD OF EXPLORATION. 47 

observations, carrying instruments, &c.; two ser- 
geants, two corporals, and twenty-four privates 
of the Fourth Infantry. Two chief packers, three 
hunters and herders, and twenty packers, com2:)leted 
the party. There were one hundred and seventy- 
three animals with the command, — seventy-three 
for the saddle, one hundred for packing. 

The field of Captain McClellan's exploration 
lies in the western part of A\^ashington Territory. 
The river Columbia from Fort Okinakane, at about 
the forty-eighth degree of north latitude, flows in 
a southerly direction, a little inclining to the east, 
till it reaches Fort Walla-Walla. Then it makes 
a sudden turn to the west, and runs to the Pacific 
in a course nearly at right angles to its former 
current. The space enclosed between these two 
arms of the river on the south and east respect- 
ively, and the ocean on the west, is partly filled 
up by the Cascade Mountains, a continuation of the 
Sierra Nevada Range in California, and deriving 
their name from the fact that the Columbia breaks 
through them in a series of falls in its passage 
to the ocean. Captain McClellan's course from 
Fort Vancouver was in a northeasterly direction, 
along the dividing line between the stream flow- 
ing westwardly into the Pacific and eastwardly 
to form the Yakima, which is an affluent of the 
Columbia. 

The party, starting from Fort Vancouver July 
24, as has been said, reached the river Wenass 
on the 20th of August, having travelled one hun- 
dred and sixty-two miles. Here a pause of sorao 



48 TAKIMA PASS. [1853. 

days was made. Lieutenant Hodges was despatched 
to Fort Steilacoom, to procure provisions, exchange 
their pack-horses for mules, if possible, and examine 
the intermediate route. Lieutenant Duncan was 
directed to cross to the main Yakima, examine the 
Hipper part of that valley, and obtain all possible 
information in relation to the surrounding country, 
especially towards the north, Mr. Gibbs was in- 
structed to examine the valley of the Yakima to 
its junction with the Columbia. Captain McClellan 
himself, -with Mr. Minter and six men, made an 
examination of the Nahchess Pass. Lieutenant 
Mowry was left in charge of the camp at Wenass. 

By the 31st of August all these separate parties, 
except that under Lieutenant Hodges, had accom- 
plished their tasks and returned to the camp. Here 
Captain McClellan determined to reduce the num- 
ber of his party; and, accordingly, on the 2d of 
September Lieutenant Mowry was sent back to 
the Dalles, on Columbia Elver, with seventeen men, 
of whom but two were to return with him. He 
took with him the collections made up to this time, 
and every thing that could be dispensed with. 

On the 3d of September the depot camp was 
moved from the Wenass to Ketetas, on the main 
Yakima. On the 4th, Captain McClellan left the 
camp, with Mr. Gibbs, Mr. Minter, and six men, to 
examine the pass at the head of the main Yakima, 
and returned to the camp on the 12th. While on 
this separate examination, he wrote a letter to his 
mother, dated September 11, from which an extract 



Age 26.] VALLEY OF THE NAHCII^SS. 49 

is here made, giving an account of his movements 
for the previous fortnight : — 

" On about the 23d of August I started from the main 
camp on the Wenass River, to examine what is called the 
Nahchess Pass, having on the previous day sent in some 
fifty pack-animals by the same pass to Steilacoom, for pro- 
visions, so that I might start from this vicinity (after ex- 
amining the passes) with three months' provisions. I took 
with me my assistant, Minter, three hunters, one packer, 
one of my Texas men to carry the barometer, and my 
Mexican boy Jim. The first day's work was of no par- 
ticular interest: we travelled some six miles up the valley 
in which we were camped, and struck over the divide to 
the southwest into the valley of the Nahchess, where we 
camped, after a hot march of some eighteen miles over a 
rough, mountainous country, — the last fifteen without 
water. Next day we travelled about seventeen miles up 
the valley of the Nahchess, — that is, wherever there was 
any valley; for the stream, frequently running through 
canons, often threw us back into the mountains, where 
the trail was very rough, stony, and steep. These canons 
are generally through masses of basaltic rock, varying in 
height from fifty to five hundred feet, and generally per- 
fectly vertical, — the whole width occupied by the bed of 
the stream. The scenery here is singularly wild and bold. 
Most of the hills and mountains, being of volcanic rocks, 
have the sharp, bold outlines peculiar to the formation. 
Our next march, of about equal length, and over a rather 
worse country, brought us to the divide, — that is, the point 
where the waters run in one direction towards the Sound, 
in the other towards the Columbia above Walla- Walla. 
By ascending a high, bare mountain, called by the In- 
dians Aiqz, we had a fine view of the mountains. The 
range had now become exceedingly rough, and the moun- 
tains large. We were but a short distance from Mount 

5 



50 SINAIIOMISPASS. [1853. 

Ranier, — a magnificent snow peak, — and could count 
around us some thirty mountains, with more or less snow 
upon them. We remained one day at the divide, exa- 
mining the country on foot, and then returned by about 
the same route we had before taken. The day after I 
reached the main camp I received an express from the 
officer I had sent into Steilacoom, informing me that most 
of his animals (horses) had broken down, and that there 
were no mules at Steilacoom to replace them. Therefore 
I at once determined to reduce the size of the party. I 
sent in the whole escort, and others the next day, so as 
to reduce the number from sixty-nine to thirty. I have 
mules enough to carry ninety days' provisions for this num- 
ber, and can now travel much more rapidly. The day 
after the escort left, I moved camp from the Wenass River 
to the main Yakima, — about fourteen miles northward, — 
and started the next day, with the same party as before 
(with the addition of Mr. Gibbs), to examine the Sina- 
homis Pass. Our first two marches were of no peculiar 
interest, — passing through a rather wide valley covered 
with an open growth of pines. In the third march we 
struck the mountains, (the valley giving out), and had a 
terrible road, much obstructed by fallen timber and 
brush, and with some very respectable mountains to pass 
over. We passed by the foot of a beautiful lake (Kitche- 
las) in which this river heads: it is some four or five miles 
long, and about one mile wide, surrounded by very lofty 
mountains. About two-thirds of the way up the last moun- 
tain we ascended, we passed between two small lakes, and, 
looking down from the top, saw at our feet, some one 
thousand feet below us, still another, — Willailootzas. We 
passed over the mountain and encamped some distance 
down on the farther side, in the bed of an old lake. You 
may imagine what kind of weather there is among the 
mountains, when I tell you that nearly every morning at 
sunrise the thermometer stands at 32°. We remained at 



Age 26.] MOUNTAIN LAKES. 51 

this mountain one day, trudging around on foot. Next day 
I sent the animals back by the trail, and started on foot 
to examine the divide and Willailootzas. I had a very 
rough climb for some six hours, discovered another small 
and very pretty lake, from which the water runs both 
ways, and found my mule waiting for me on the trail at 
about two o'clock. 

A ride of about sixteen miles, over a horrible trail, 
brought me into camp just before dark and fully pre- 
pared for a respectable cup of coffee. Next day we went 
back about three miles on the trail, and then struck off 
to visit the largest lake of all, — Kahchess, — about eight 
miles long. It is very beautiful, situated, like the others, 
in the midst of the mountains. Yesterday we travelled 
about sixteen miles, to visit another large and beautiful 
lake, — Kleallum. These are all in the mountains, and 
on the heads of different branches of the main Sahawa, 
— most of them fully as beautiful and picturesque as 
many celebrated in the fashionable world. I doubt 
whether any whites ever saw any of them before: cer- 
tainly they were unknown to the settlers. Whether 
steamboats will ever run on them, or Saratogas be estab- 
lished in their vicinity, is with me a matter of exceeding 
doubt. The only things we have seen of much interest 
are the mountains and the lakes, — both fine in their 
way, but rather hard to get at. To-morrow I shall go into 
the main camp, and hope to find things about ready for 
me to start into the town incognito to the northward. I 
shall send an express in a day or two with reports to the 
Secretary of War, and this at the same time. I hope to 
reach Mt. Baker in about twenty days from here. Where 
I will go to then, circumstances must determine, — I think 
to Colville, — perhaps thence to the Rocky Mountains.'' 

Lieutenant Mowry had returned from the Dalles 
on the 2d of September, and on the 16th Lieutenant 



52 RETURN TO FORT VANCOUVER. [185.".. 

Hodges arrived from Steilacoom, bringing twenty- 
nine pack-horses loaded with provisions. Prepara- 
tions were now made to move northward: thirty- 
two broken-down horses were sent back, under 
charge of three men, to the Dalles, and the com- 
mand was reduced to thirty-six persons, with forty- 
two riding-animals and fifty-two pack-animals. 
They started on the 20th, and moved in a north- 
easterly direction. On the 9th of October they 
reached their most northerly camp, about thirteen 
miles south of the " Great Lake," in latitude 49° 26'. 
They then moved west to the Columbia Eiver, 
which they crossed at Fort Colville. Thence they 
proceeded southerly across the Great Plain of the 
Columbia River, and arrived at Walla-Walla on the 
7th of November, at Port Dalles on the 15th. Prom 
Port Dalles they went down by water to Port Van- 
couver, which they reached on the 18th. An extract 
from a letter to his brother, dated November 28, 
may be here appropriately introduced : — 

"From that place [the Yakima valley] we crossed a 
rather high mountain-ridge (running nearly east and 
west), and struck the Columbia not far above Buck- 
land's Eapids, and a little distance below the mouth of 
the Pischas. My journal written that night says, 'Soon, 
descending a little, you arrive at the edge of the sudden, 
precipitous descent that borders the valley of the Colum- 
bia. Words can hardly convey an idea of the view from 
this mountain. Somewhat to the north of west is a hand- 
some snow peak, part of a long snow ridge. This has no 
name, and is probably seen by whites for the first time. 
To the north of that the Cascade Range is in full view, the 
main range coming directly to the Columbia, and crossing 



Age 26.] VALLEY OF THE COLUxMBIA. 53 

it, until it sinks towards the east into a vast, elevated table- 
land. In the distance, to the north, is seen a long blue 
range, at the foot of which the Columbia runs from Col- 
ville to Okonogan. To the northeast and east, as far as 
the eye can reach, extends the beau-ideal of the sublimity 
of desolation, a vast plain (as it appears from the height 
and distance), without one indication of water, one spot 
of green to please the eye. It is generally of a dead yel- 
lowish hue, with large "clouds"%f black blending into 
the general tinge. It must be a sage-desert, with dry 
burnt grass and outcroppings of basalt. Not a tree or 
bush is to be seen upon it. The valley of the Columbia 
is very deep and exceedingly narrow: it is connected 
with the great plain by steps of basaltic rock, — most of 
them narrow ledges, and varying in height from fifty to 
three hundred or four hundred feet. The great river 
looks like a narrow blue thread or ribbon. It seems as if 
our only means of travelling farther to the north would 
be to follow the valley of the river until it leaves the moun- 
tains. Forward we must go : the means will perhaps pre- 
sent themselves when we reach the valley.' Sure enough, 
we were obliged to follow the valley six days, at the end 
of which we reached Okonogan. During this time we 
had some very bad and dangerous places to pass over. On 
one occasion we made but one and three-quarter miles 
from morning till night, — had two mules instantly killed 
by falling off a precipice, and two others badly hurt. 

"Mt. Okonogan (Okinakane) is delightfully situated on 
a gravel flat, without a blade of grass or any thing else 
for some distance from it. A little Frenchman is the only 
apology for a white man there. He was very kind to us ; 
and he and I misunderstood each other most beautifully 
in all our conversations. From there I went westward 
into the mountains, in vain hopes of finding another pass, 
and finally returned to Okonogan, whence I went as far 
north as the Urcat Lake Okonogan. There is little or no 



54 OLYMPIA. [1854. 

timber in the valley : small parts of it are tolerably good, 
but the greater part worthless. From the forks up to the 
Great Lake it is, in fact, nothing but a series of lakes of 
different sizes. The Great Lake is some two miles wide 
and about seventy in length. The scenery around it is 
more remarkable for its desolation than its beauty. In 
fact, the whole of this region has something very lonely and 
dispiriting about it : you see a very few miserably squalid 
Indians, and no other ^ns of animal life : an occasional 
wolf, with now and then a lonely badger, are all you see. 
From the forks we struck over^to the Colville Eiver, and 
followed it down to the Columbia opposite Fort Colville. 
The valley of this little river was about the prettiest we 
saw, — fine larch timber, and a good deal of yellow pine, 
the valley very narrow, the stream a bold and pretty one ; 
no Indians ; and not even any salmon in it. At Colville 
we crossed the Columbia, swimming the animals, and 
ferrying ourselves and * traps' in canoes." 

At Fort Yancouver the party was broken up, 
and the portion required for office-work was sent 
to Olympia, where Captain McClellan arrived on 
the 16th of December. On the 23d he started with 
a small party to endeavor to complete the barome- 
trical profile of the main Yakima Pass and examine 
the aj^proaches on the western side; but he was 
obliged to return without having accomplished his 
purpose, mainly on account of the great depth of 
snow and the impossibility of procuring Indian 
guides. 

Some weeks were spent in office-work at Olym- 
pia. From that j^lace, on the 8th of February, 
1854, Captain McClellan addressed to Governor 
Stevens a brief report on the railroad-practicability 



Age 27.] RETURN HOME. 55 

of tho passes examined by him; and his general 
report, sent to the Secretary of War, bears the date 
of February 25. Both of these reports appear 
in the first volume of the official publications on 
the Pacific Railroad route, made by order of 
Congress. His general conclusions were that be- 
tween the parallels of 45° 30' and 49° north lati- 
tude there are but two passes through the range 
practicable for a railroad, — that of the Columbia 
Eiver and that of the Yakima River; that the latter 
was barely practicable, and that only at a high 
cost of time, labor, and money, while the former 
was not only undoubtedly practicable, but remark- 
ably favorable. 

The Secretary of War, in his report to Congress, 
dated February 27, 1855, says, "The examination 
of the approaches and passes of the Cascade Moun- 
tains, made by Captain McClellan, of the Corps of 
Engineers, presents a reconnoissance of great value, 
and, though performed under adverse circumstances, 
exhibits all the information necessary to determine 
the practicability of this portion of the route, and 
reflects the highest credit on the capacity and re- 
sources of that officer." 

In addition to his duties upon the railroad-survey. 
Captain McClellan had been directed by the Sec- 
retary of War to superintend the construction of 
the military road from Walla-Walla to Steilacoom. 
This road was built after he had left the Pacific 
region; but the contracts and arrangements were 
made by him before his departure. 

He returned home in the spring of 1854. In the 



56 SAM ANA. [1854 

Bummer of that year he was sent on a secret ex- 
pedition to the West Indies, the object of which 
was to select a harbor and procure a site suitable 
for a coaling-station. It Avas a service of some 
danger, as it exposed him to the influences of a 
tropical climate in the hottest season of the year. 
He went out in a United States vessel under the com- 
mand of Lieutenant Eenshaw, a gallant and excel- 
lent officer, who w^as killed at Galveston, January 1, 
1863, by the blowing up of the Westfield. Captain 
McClellan selected the bay and promontory of 
Samana, on the northeast coast of the island of 
Hayti, as the most desirable site for the object pro- 
posed. It is a spot of much historical interest. 
Columbus, returning to Spain after his first disco- 
very of the New World, anchored in this bay, 
having first sailed round the promontory and given 
names to two of its headlands. Here some of his 
crew had an affray with the natives, in the course 
of which, much to the grief of the great navigator, 
two of the latter were wounded, — the first time that 
native blood was shed by white men in the New 
World. At a later period, the peninsula, — which 
in the old maps is laid down as an island, — as well 
as the rocky islets in the harbor, of which there 
were several, became haunts of the buccaneers. On 
one of these islets, or cays. Jack Banister, a cele- 
brated English pirate, at the close of the seventeenth 
century, defended himself successfully against two 
English frigates sent to capture him, — in conse- 
quence of which the name of Banister Cays was 
given to the group. Upon the promontory aro 



Age 27.] SCHOMBURGK'S MEMOIR. 57 

some negro villages, occupied by the descendants 
and survivors of a colony of free colored persons 
who went from New Jersey under Bo^^er's adminis- 
tration.* 

* Part of the information in the text is taken from a memoir 
on the peninsula and bay of Samana in the "Journal of the 
London Geographical Society" for 1853, by Sir R. H. Schom- 
burgk, H. B. M. Consul at the Dominican Republic. The con- 
cluding paragraphs are as follows : — 

"I have purposely dwelt long and in detail upon this narrow 
strip of land, called the Peninsula of Samand, and upon its 
adjacent magnificent bay. In its geographical position its 
greatest importance is centred. The fertile soil is fit for the 
cultivation of all tropical productions ; its spacious bays and 
anchoring-places offer a shelter to the navies of the world ; 
and its creeks afford facilities for the erection of arsenals and 
docks, while the adjacent forests yield the requisite woods 
for naval architecture: still, its chief importance does not con- 
sist in these advantages alone, but in its geographical position, 
forming, as it does, one of the principal keys to the isthmus 
of Central America and to the adjacent Gulf of Mexico. Mr. 
Lepelletier de Saint-Remy says, 'Samana is one of those mari- 
time positions not often met with in a survey of the map of 
the world. Samana is to the Gulf of Mexico what Mayotta ig 
to the Indian Ocean. It is not only the military, but also 
the commercial, key of the Gulf; but the latter is of infinitely 
greater importance, under the pacific tendencies of European 
politics.' 

"The Bay of Saman4 being placed to the windward of 
Jamaica, Cuba, and the Gulf of Mexico, and lying, moreover, 
almost due northeast of the great isthmus which now so power- 
fully attracts the attention of the world, the French author 
just quoted may well call it 'la tete-du-pont' to the highway 
from the Atlantic to the Pacific." 

Captain McClellan had never seen or heard of this memoir 
at the date of his visit to the West Indi s; and it is creditable 



58 RAILWAY REPORT. [1854. 

Captain McClellan drew up two reports, one on 
the harbor and its defences, and one forming a 
general memoir on the island. They have never 
been printed, and are probably still on file in the 
archives of the War Department. Our Govern- 
ment entered into negotiations with the Dominican 
Eepublic for the cession of the bay and peninsula; 
but they Avere not crowned with success. It may 
be surmised that the influence of France and Eng- 
land, exerted through their representatives, may 
have prevented it. 

After returning home from the West Indies, 
Captain McClellan was stationed at Washington, 
employed on duties connected with the Pacific Eail- 
road surveys. In the autumn of 1854, he drew up 
a very elaborate memoir on various practical points 
relating to the construction and management of 
railways, which was published in the same volume 
with the reports of his explorations. The Secre- 
tary of War remarks upon it as follows: — "Cap- 
tain McClellan, of the Corps of Engineers, after 
the completion of his field-operations, was directed 
to visit various railroads, and to collect informa- 
tion of facts established in the construction and 
working of existing roads, to serve as data in de- 
termining the practicability of constructing and 
working roads over the several routes explored. 
The results of his inquiries w^ill be found in a very 
valuable memoir, herewith submitted." 

to liis sagacity to have selected, as the result of his own un- 
aided observation, a site which so competent an authority as 
Sir Uobert H. Schomburgk speaks of in such terms as the above. 



Age 28.] CRIMEAN WAR. 59 

In the spring of 1855, Captain McClellan received 
the appointment of captain in the First Cavalry 
Eegiment, then under the command of Colonel 
Sumner. 



CHAPTEE III. 



In the spring of 1855, while the Crimean War 
was raging, the Government of the United States 
determined to send a military commission to 
Europe, to observe the warlike operations then in 
progress, to examine the military systems of the 
great Powers of Europe, and to report such plans 
and suggestions for improving the organization and 
discipline of our own army as they might derive 
from such observation. The officers selected for 
this trust were Major — now Colonel — Delafield, of 
the Engineers, Major Mordecai, of the Ordnance, 
and Captain McClellan. The last was by some 
years the youngest of the three. Colonel Delafield 
having been graduated at West Point in 1818, and 
Major Mordecai in 1823. The selection of so young 
a man for such a trust is a proof of the high reputa- 
tion he had made for himself in the judgment of 
those by whom the choice was made; and it may 
be here mentioned that he was in the first instance 
designated for the commission by President Pierce 
himself, who had had an opportunity in the Mexican 
War to observe Avhat manner of soldier and man ho 
was. Of the three officers, he, too, was the only 
one who had seen actual service in the field. 



60 secretary's letter. [1855. 

The exact nature of the duties assigned to the 
commission may be learned from the letter of the 
Secretary of War, the essential parts of which are 
as follows : — 

"War Department, Washington, April 2, 1855. 

"Gentlemen: — You have been selected to form a com- 
mission to visit Europe, for the purpose of obtaining in- 
formation with regard to the military service in general, 
and especially the practical working of the changes which 
have been introduced of late years into the military sys- 
tems of the principal nations of Europe. 

"Some of the suhjects to which it is peculiarly desirable 
to direct your attention may be indicated as follows : — 

" The organization of armies and of the departments for 
furnishing supplies of all kinds to the troops, especially 
in field-service. The manner of distributing supplies. 

"The fitting up of vessels for transporting men and 
horses, and the arrangements for embarking and disem- 
barking them. 

"The medical and hospital arrangements, both in per- 
manent hospitals and in the field. The kind of ambu- 
lances, or other means, used for transporting the sick and 
wounded. 

" The kind of clothing and camp equipage used for ser- 
vice in the field. 

"The kind of arms, ammunition, and accoutrements 
used in equipping troops for the various branches of ser- 
vice, and their adaptation to the purposes intended. In 
this respect, the arms and equipments of cavalry of all 
kinds will claim your particular attention. 

"The practical advantages and disadvantages attending 
the use of the various kinds of rifle arms which have been 
lately introduced extensively in European warfare. 

"The nature and efficiency of ordnance and ammuni- 
tion employed for field and siege ojoerations, and the 



Age 28.] ENGLAND AND FRANCE. 61 

practical effect of the late changes partially made in the 
French field artillery. 

*' The construction of permanent fortifications, the ar- 
rangement of new systems of sea-coast and land defences, 
and the kind of ordnance used in the armament of them, 
— the Lancaster gun, and other rifle cannon, if any are 
used. 

" The composition of trains for siege-operations, the kind 
and quantity of ordnance, the engineering operations of 
a siege in all its branches, both of attack and defence. 

"The composition of bridge-trains, kinds of boats, 
wagons, &c. 

" The construction of casemated forts, and the effects 
produced on them in attacks by land and water. The 
use of camels for transportation, and their adaptation to 
cold and mountainous countries. 

* * * * -X- 4i- * 

" Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
''Jefferson Davis. 
"Major E. Delafield, 
"Major A. Mordecai, 
'•'Captain Gr. B. McClellan, 

" United States Army." 

The ofiScers composing the commission sailed 
from Boston on the 11th of April. On arriving 
in England, they were courteously received by 
Lord Clarendon, Secretary of State for the Foreign 
Department, — Lord Panmure, the Secretary of War, 
being disabled by illness, — and furnished with 
letters of introduction to Lord Eaglan, Sir Edward 
Lyons, the admiral of the Baltic fleet, and the offi- 
cers in command at Constantinople. In France a 
difficulty arose on account of an imperative rule in 
the French military service that no foreign officer 

6 



62 WARSAW. [1855^ 

could be permitted to go into their camp and after- 
wards to pass into that of the enemy, and that, 
therefore, it would be necessary for the members of 
the commission to give a promise that they would 
not go from the French camp to any other part of 
the Crimea, even although they might first go to St. 
Petersburg. This pledge the commission were not 
prepared to give, and the matter remained for some 
time in abeyance. But the most ample facilities 
were extended to them for visiting such military 
and naval establishments as they desired to inspect. 

On the 28th of May, the commission left Paris, 
intending to proceed to the Eussian camp in 
the Crimea by the way of Prussia, starting first for 
Berlin, in order to confer with the Eussian Minister 
in that city. Baron de Budberg, to whom the 
Eussian Minister at Washington had given them a 
letter. Their object was to go from Berlin to the 
Crimea by the way of Warsaw and Kiev, on the 
Danube; and Baron de Budberg gave them pass- 
ports and letters to Baron Ivrusentcin, a Eussian 
official at Warsaw. But on arriving at Warsaw 
they learned that no person there — not even the 
veteran hero Paskievitch, with whom they had an 
interview, and who treated them with much courtesy 
— had the power to grant them permission to go from 
Warsaw direct to the Crimea, and that there was 
nothing to be done but to proceed to St. Petersburg. 
During their stay in Warsaw, they examined the 
fortifications of that city and of Modlin. 

It was very annoying to the officers of the com- 
mission to find their progress blocked by ceremo- 



Age 28.] POLAND. 63 

nials and formalities which they might have escaped 
if they had been civilians and private citizens and 
gone direct from Constantinople to Scbastopol, as 
so many idlers and amateurs had done; but, having 
presented themselves in an official capacit}-^, they 
could do no less than bear its burdens and encum- 
brances; and so they went on to St. Petersburg, 
Avhere they arrived June 19. A few extracts from 
a letter written by Captain McClellan to his younger 
brother — now Captain Arthur McClellan — the day 
after his arrival in the Eussian capital, give some 
of his first impressions of the country and people : — 

" We left Warsaw at six p.m. on the evening of the 13th, 
and reached here at about the same hour last evening, 
having travelled constantly day and night, merely stop- 
ping a few minutes for meals. 

"In Poland the country is either flat or slightly rolling, 
the soil improving as you approach the Niemen, but in 
many places very poor. There are no towns of any con- 
sequence on the road, which, you will observe, passes near 
the Prussian frontier, but many villages, which are gene- 
rally of wood and presenting a dirty, squalid appearance. 
The villages are mostly inhabited by Jews, — as dirty 
and wretched a race as you ever saw, — worse than any 
you ever saw. The appearance of the Poles is any thing 
but favorable ; they look like a stupid, degraded race, — 
are dirty and ugly. It is difficult to imagine how they 
ever fought as they have done in the past. Ostrolinha 
was the site of a great battle in the revolution of 1831. 
It is a small wooden town on the Narew [Nareff), which is 
here a rapid stream some fifty yards wide. A large monu- 
ment commemorates the victory gained by the Russians. 
Kouno is a town of good size, mostly built of plastered 
brick. A portion of it is very old, v.diile the new suburbs 



64 RUSSIA. [1855. 

are handsome and well built. It presents the appearance 
of a flourishing place, there being many small vessels in 
the Niemen, and immense trains of carts constantly ar- 
viving here from the interior of Kussia. They bring down 
tallow, hemp, &c., and carry back cotton, groceries, &c. 
As the Niemen empties in Prussian territory, a glance at 
the map will show you the importance of this place 
whilst the Eussian ports are blockaded. The Niemen is 
here two hundred and twenty yards wide, — a bold and rapid 
stream, crossed by a raft-bridge. It was near and at this 
place that the great mass of the French army crossed the 
Niemen in June, 1812; and it was at the gate of this 
same town that in the retreat Marshal Ney fought so 
desperately, forming in his own person the rear-guard of 
the Grand Army. Of course I went to the spot during 
the short time we remained here. You now enter the 
great forests of Kussia. As far as Vilkomir there is but 
little cultivation, the country being mostly covered by pine 
and beech forests. I should have mentioned that in the 
public square of Kouno there is a huge iron monument, 
bearing in Russian an inscription to the effect that out of 
seven hundred thousand French who crossed the Niemen 
in June, 1812, but seventy thousand recrossed in December. 
As far as Dunaburg (on the river Duna, or, as some of the 
maps have it, Bwina) the country is quite rolling, — almost 
broken ; very different from the idea I had formed of it. 
You pass through a number of small towns and villages. 

"Dunaburg appears to be a small town, presenting no- 
thing of peculiar interest. There are some defensive works 
here. 

" Before reaching Dunaburg, we passed through one town 
(a small one, perhaps hardly deserving the name of more 
than a village), called Novo Alexandrowsky, which is re- 
markably pretty. It is situated on the high banks of a 
large and handsome lake broken by little green islets. 
The houses and people were remarkably good-looking. 



Age 28.] ST. TETERS BU R G. 65 

Rigitza is also a pretty little place: there is here a ruined 
castle of long, long ago. Country now not so much 
rolling as near Dunaburg, but still by no means flat: it is 
fertile and well cultivated. Ostroff is another handsome 
little place: the road here cro.^^es the river on a very fine 
suspension-bridge ; and on an island in the river is a very 
extensive ruined castle, perhaps of some of the Teutonic 
knights. Pscov, near which we passed, seems to be espe- 
cially blessed with churches, the gilded domes of which 
shone from afar. The country near here, and, in fact, from 
here to St. Petersburg, is low and level, the soil generally 
good, — sometimes poor, and sometimes very fertile. 

"Pscov is the capital of a province, and at the head of a 
large lake. Near Ploosa is a swampy district of consider- 
able extent, and many large lakes. Nothing of very great 
interest until one reaches Gatchina, where is the hunting- 
palace of the Emperor: it seems to be a very grand es- 
tablishment. From there to this city the country is very 
flat, the soil not very good, but settlements increasing 
as you draw near. 

"The general appearance of the portion of Russia I have 
seen is much superior to that of Poland ; and I like the 
aj^pearance of the people very much. 

■X- -K- -X- * -K- * -K- 

" This is truly a most magnificent city, — wide streets, fine 
private houses, magnificent public buildings. Thus far 
I have, of course, merely had a glance at the exterior of 
things, and will not pretend to describe any thing, more 
than to say that it fully equals my expectations. We are 
very comfortably fixed at the Hotel de Pussie, — good 
rooms, good meals, plenty of ice, &c. 

"The road from Warsaw here is truly a magnificent one, 
— especially the portion of it in Poland. It is all mac- 
adamized; and they are now hard at work improving the 
Russian part, so that in a couple of months it will be 
throughout as fine a road as any in the world. Think of 
6^^ 



66 ST. PETERSBURG. [1855. 

the immense length, — one thouscand and seventy-four 
versts, or seven hundred and sixteen miles! 

"So great is the traffic upon it at present that it is lite- 
rally covered from one end to the other with trains of 
wagons passing in both ^ directions. The trade which 
formerly passed down the Baltic now seeks its outlet into 
Prussia by this route. 

"So great is this now that it seems hardly possible that 
Eussia can feel the effect of the blockade very sensibly. 
New channels are opened, and immense additional num- 
bers of men, animals, and capital are now employed in 
the land-transportation. 

* * -x- * * 

''June 20 and 21, Midnight. — I write this paragraph in my 
room by the natural light, — no candle or any thing what- 
ever : you may imagine the darkness of the night here." 

During their residence at St. Petersburg, the 
officers of the commission were treated with much 
courtesy by the civil and military authorities, 
and all possible facilities were afforded to them for 
examining the various military establishments in 
the vicinity. They were presented to the Emperor, 
at his request, and graciously received by him. But 
they did not succeed in obtaining permission to go 
to Sebastopol, because the officers in command there 
had requested that no strangers should be per- 
mitted to come there, as such visits occasioned them 
a great deal of embarrassment; and though the 
Emperor, of course, might overrule such objections, 
yet he felt bound to defer to the strongly-expressed 
wishes of officers placed in such responsible posi- 
tions. Nothing could be urged in reply to this; 
and, disappointed as they were, they could not, as 



Age 28.] BALAKLAVA. 67 

military men, fail to respect the Emperor's defer- 
ence to the views of his subordinates. 

On the 19th of July the commission proceeded to 
Moscow, and examined whatever was of interest 
in a military point of view there. Hastening back 
to St Petersburg, they left that city on the 2d of 
August, and arrived at Berlin on the 25th, having 
in the interval observed the fortifications and de- 
fences at Konigsberg, Dantzig, Posen, and Schwedt. 
At Berlin the various military establishments in 
that city and at Spandau were carefully inspected. 

From Berlin they determined to go to the Cri- 
mea by the way of Dresden, Laybach, Trieste, and 
Smyrna, and found themselves at last on the line of 
operations of the allied army at Constantinople, 
on the 16th of September. To the courtesy of the 
English naval authorities they were indebted for a 
passage in the first steamer that sailed for Bala- 
klava, where they arrived on the morning of Oc- 
tober 8. Here every possible facility and kindness, 
official and personal, was extended to them by the 
officers of the English army, including Sir George 
Simpson, the commander. It was hoped that the 
French Government w^ould relax the rule they had 
laid down in the spring; but the new authorization 
to visit their camps and army, received at Bala- 
klava, contained substantially the same condition 
as had been before exacted, and the commission 
could not avail themselves of the permission to 
which such terms were attached. The result w^as 
that they confined their examination to the camps, 
depots, parks, workshops, &c. of the English, Sar- 



68 TOULON. [185G. 

cliniiin, and Turkish armies, never entering the 
French camps in the Crimea except on visits of 
courtesy. 

On the 2d of November they left BalakUxva in an 
English steamer, and spent some days in Constan- 
tinople and Scutari, inspecting the hospitals and 
depots of the allies. From Constantinople they 
proceeded to Yienna, examining on their route the 
defences of Yarna and the remarkable triumphs 
of civil engineering in the works on the Soemmer- 
ing Railroad. 

On the 16th of December they reached Yienna, 
and spent some days in a careful observation of the 
Austrian military establishments, and, after leaving 
Yienna, went to Yenice, Yerona, Mantua, and Milan, 
examining the military and naval establishments in 
each place. At Yerona they were most kindly re- 
ceived by the veteran hero Marshal Radetzky, who 
contributed in every way to the attainment of their 
wishes as well as to their personal gratification. 
Colonel Delafield — from the introduction to whose 
Report this account of the movements of the com- 
mission is abridged — speaks in the warmest terms 
of the peculiar and uniform courtesy extended to 
them by the authorities and functionaries of Austria. 
That Government seemed to have quite forgotten 
the Martin Koszta affair. 

On the 2d of February, 1856, they arrived at 
Toulon, and, with the authority previously obtained 
from the French Government, examined the mili- 
tary and naval defences of that important depot. 
But the onl}- facility extended to them was that 



Age 29.] R E T U R N H O M E. 69 

afforded by a printed ticket of admission trans- 
mitted from Paris, which did no more than com- 
mand the services of a porter to conduct them 
through the buildings, docks, and vessels, and gave 
them no opportunity to converse with any of the 
officers. From Toulon they visited in succession 
Marseilles, Lyons, Belfort, Strasbourg, Eastadt, 
Coblentz, and Cologne, observing their fortresses 
and defences, — in the last three places, however, 
without the advantage of any special authority. 

The 24th and 25th of February were spent at 
Liege, where their time was occupied at the na- 
tional foundry for artillery and another for small- 
arms, both on a more extended scale than any cor- 
responding establishments in Europe at that time. 

On the 1st of March the commission was at Paris 
again. Two days were devoted to an examination 
of the fortress at Yincennes; and several of the mili- 
tary establishments in Paris were also inspected. 
They were unable, however, to obtain the requisite 
authority for seeing those relating to the artillery. 

On the 18th of March the commission proceeded 
to Cherbourg and examined the works there. On 
the 24th of March they arrived at London, and 
afterwards visited the arsenal and dockyards at 
Woolwich, the vessels at Portsmouth, and the de- 
fences near Yarmouth, on the Isle of Wight, receiv- 
ing every courtesy and facility they could desire 
from the military and naval officers at those sta- 
tions in furthering the object of their visit. On 
the 19th of April they embarked for home. 

The above is a brief record of the labors of a 



70 MCCLELLAN's report. [1856. 

very busy year, in which, however, much precious 
time was lost from delay in obtaining the necessary 
official permissions to inspect military establish- 
ments. And it must be added that in many cases 
the commission failed to receive those facilities 
which assuredly would have been extended in our 
country to a similar board sent from any Govern- 
ment in Europe. It may be too much to expect 
that nations should be governed in their relations 
towards each other by the precepts of Christian 
morality, but surely it is not too much to ask that 
they should conform to the code of courtesy and 
good breeding recognized among gentlemen in the 
intercourse of social life. 

After their return, each of the officers upon the 
commission made a report to the Secretary of War 
of the results of their tour of observation; and 
these reports were in due time officially published 
by Congress in a quarto form, and pretty widely 
distributed. They were recognized by all compe- 
tent judges as productions of great merit, reflect- 
ing the highest credit upon their respective authors, 
and amply vindicating the sagacity of the Govern- 
ment which selected them. In October, 1861, Cap- 
tain McClellan's report was republished by the pub- 
lishers of the present Avork, in an octavo volume, 
with illustrations, with the title, " The Armies of 
Europe: comprising Descriptions in detail of the 
Military System of England, France, Russia, Prus- 
sia, Austria, and Sardinia, adapting their Advan- 
tages to all Arms of the United States Service, 
and embodying the Eeport of Observations in 



Age 29.] 



SEBASTOPOL. 71 



Europe during the Crimean War, as Military Com- 
missioner from the United States Government in 
1855-56." 

Its contents are as follows. The first thirty-five 
pages are occupied with an able and interesting 
summary of the warlike operations in the Crimea, 
in which the plans and movements both of the 
Eussians and the allies are criticized without a 
touch of arrogance, and yet with a manly decision 
of tone which reveals a sound military judgment 
and thorough military training. Its merits can 
be fully perceived only by a professional reader ; 
but the general reader cannot fail to recognize in 
it the marks which show the writer to be a man of 
vigorous understanding and excellent powers of 
observation, as well as an accomplished ofiicer. The 
style is simple, 2)crspicuoug, and direct, the style 
of Washington, Collingwood, and Wellington; — in 
other words, that good style which a man of sense 
will always write who has something to say and 
writes on without thinking about his stylo at all. 
As the work, from the nature of its contents, can 
never have been generally read, two extracts from 
this portion of the volume are here appended, — 
enough, it is believed, to justify the commendation 
which has been bestowed upon it. The first is a 
brief criticism of the defences of Sebastopol : — 

" From the preceding hasty and imperfect account of 
the defences of Sebastopol, it will appear how little found- 
ation there was for the generally received accounts of the 
stupendous dimensions of the works, and of new systems 
of fortifications brought into play. The plain truth is 



72 ATTACK OF THE REDAN. [1S56. 

that these defences were simple temporary fortifications 
of rather greater dimensions than usual, and that not a 
single new principle of engineering was there developed. 
It is true that there were several novel minor details, 
such as the rope mantelets, the use of the iron tanks, 
&c. ; but the whole merit consisted in the admirable 
adaptation of well-known principles to the peculiar locality 
and circumstances of the case. Neither can it be asserted 
that the plans of the various works were perfect. On 
the contrary, there is no impropriety in believing that, 
if Todtleben were called upon to do the same work over 
again, he would probably introduce better close-flanking 
arrangements. 

" These remarks are not intended to, nor can they, detract 
from the reputation of the Russian engineer. His labors 
and their results will be handed down in history as the 
most triumphant and enduring monument of the value 
of fortifications, and his name must ever be placed in the 
first rank of military engineers. But, in our admiration 
of the talent and energy of the engineer, it must not be 
forgotten that the inert masses which he raised would 
have been useless without the skilful artillery and heroic 
infantry who defended them. Much stronger places than 
Sebastopol have often fallen under far less obstinate and 
well-combined attacks than that to which it was subjected. 
There can be no danger in expressing the conviction that 
the siege of Sebastopol called forth the most magnificent 
defence of fortifications that has ever yet occurred." 

The next is a description of the final assault: — 

" A few minutes later than the assault upon the Malakoft', 
the English attacked the Redan. The Russians being 
now upon the alert, they did not pass over the open space 
before them without loss ; but the mass succeeded in 
crossing the ditch and gaining the salient of the work. 



Age 29.] ENGLISH AND FRENCH ASSAULTS. 73 

Finding themselves entirely unsupported, they at once 
took shelter behind the traverses, whence the example 
and efforts of their officers did not avail to draw them, in 
order to occupy the work closing the gorge. Having in 
vain used every effort, having despatched every officer 
of his staff to the rear urging that supports should be 
at once sent up, and seeing that the Russians were now 
beginning to assemble in force, the commander of the 
English storming party reluctantly determined to pro- 
ceed himself to obtain reinforcements. Scarcely had he 
reached the trenches, and at last obtained authority to 
move up the required succor, when, upon turning to lead 
them forAvard, he saw the party he had left in the work 
rapidly and hopelessly driven out at the point of the 
bayonet. No further effort was made to carry the work. 
It would, in all probability, have failed, and would only 
have caused a useless sacrifice of men. 

"The failure of the English assault may be attributed 
partlj^ to the fact that their advanced trenches were too 
small to accommodate the requisite force without confu- 
sion, in part to their not being pushed sufficiently near the 
Redan, but chiefly to that total absence of conduct and 
skill in the arrangements for the assault which left the 
storming party entirely without support. Had it been 
followed at once by strong reinforcements, it is almost 
certain that the English would have retained possession 
of the work. 

"The two French attacks on the west of the central ravine 
were probably intended only as feints : at all events, the 
parties engaged were soon driven back to their trenches 
with considerable loss, and effected nothing. Their at- 
tempts upon the Little Redan, and the works connect- 
ing it with the Malakofi', met with even less success than 
the English assault. The Russians repulsed the French 
with great loss, meeting with the bayonet the more ad- 
venturous men who reached the parapet. Thus, in five 
7 



7-4 FRENCH ASSAULT. [1856. 

points out of six, the defenders were fully victorious; but, 
unfortunately for them, the sixth was the decisive point. 

" In their admirable arrangements for the attack of the 
Malakoff, the French counted on two things for success : — 
first, they had ascertained that the Eussians were in the 
habit of relieving the guard of the Malakoff at noon, and 
that a great part of the old guard marched out before the 
new one arrived, in order to avoid the loss which would 
arise from crowding the work with men ; in the second 
place, it was determined to keep up a most violent verti- 
cal fire until the very moment of the assault, thus driving 
the Russians into the bomb-proofs, and enabling the storm- 
ing party to enter the work with but little opposition. 
The hour of noon was therefore selected for the assault, 
and the strong columns intended for the work were at an 
early hour assembled in the advanced trenches, all in ad- 
mirable order, and furnished with precise instructions. 

"The mortars maintained an unremitting fire until the 
moment appointed. The very instant the last volley 
was discharged, the storming party of Zouaves rushed 
over the thirty paces before them, and were in the work 
before the astonished Russians knew what had happened. 
It was stated that this party lost but eleven men in enter- 
ing the work. Other troops advanced rapidly to the sup- 
port of the storming party, a bridge was formed by rolling 
up five ladders with planks lashed to them, a communi- 
cation was at once commenced between the advanced trench 
and the bridge, brigade after brigade passed over, the re- 
doubt was at once occupied by the storming party, and thus 
the Malakoff, and with it Sebastopol, was won. The few 
Russians remaining in the work made a desperate resist- 
ance. Many gallant attempts were made by Russian 
columns to ascend the steep sloj^e in rear and regain the 
lost work ; but the road was narrow, difficult, and ob- 
structed, the position strong, and the French in force. 
All their furious efforts wore in vain, and the Malakoff 



Ace 29.] LENGTH OF THE SIEGE. 75 

remained in the possession of those who had so gallantly 
and skilfully won it. With regard to the final retreat 
to the north side, it can only be said that a personal ex- 
amination of the locality merely confirms its necessity, 
and the impression so generally entertained that it was 
the finest operation of the war: so admirably was it 
carried out that not a straggler remained behind ; a few 
men so severely wounded as to be unfit for rough and 
hurried transportation were the sole ghastly human 
trophies that remained to the allies. 

"The retreat, being a more difficult operation than the 
assault, may be worthy of a higher admiration ; but the 
Russian retreat to the north side and the French assault 
upon the Malakoff must each be regarded as a master- 
piece of its kind, deserving the closest study. It is difficult 
to imagine what point in either can be criticized ; for both 
evinced consummate skill, discipline, coolness, and cou- 
rage. With regard to the artillery, I would merely remark 
that the Russian guns were not of unusual calibre, con- 
sisting chiefly of twenty-four-, thirty-two-, and forty- 
two-pounders, and that the termination of the siege was 
mainly due to the extensive use of mortars finally re- 
sorted to by the allies. If they had been employed in 
the beginning as the main reliance, the siege would have 
been of shorter duration. 

"The causes of the unusual duration of this siege natu- 
rally resolve themselves into three classes : the skilful 
disposition of the Russians, the faults of the allies, and 
natural causes beyond the control of either party. Among 
the latter may be mentioned the natural strength of the 
position and the severity of the winter. In the first class 
there may be alluded to : — the skill with which the Rus- 
sian engineers availed themselves of the nature of the 
ground ; the moral courage which induced them to un- 
dertake the defence of an open town with a weak garri- 
son ; the constant use they made of sorties, among which 



76 FRENCH ZOUAVES. [1S56. 

may j^roperly be classed the battles of Balaklava, Inker- 
mann, and the Tchernaya; the ready ingenuity with 
which they availed themselves of the resources derived 
from the fleet ; the fine practice of their artillery ; their 
just appreciation of the true use of field-works, and the 
admirable courage they always evinced in standing to 
their works, to repel assaults at the point of the bayonet ; 
the employment of rifle-pits on an extensive scale ; finally, 
the constant reinforcements which they soon commenced 
receiving, and which enabled them to fill the gaps made 
in their ranks by disease and the projectiles of the allies. 
" The evidences of skill on the part of the allies, as well 
as the apparent faults on all sides, having been already 
alluded to, it is believed that the means have been fur- 
nished to enable any one to draw his own conclusions as 
to the history of this memorable passage of arms." 

Next after the observations on the Crimean War 
follow twenty pages on the European engineer 
troops, to which succeed twenty-eight pages on the 
French, Austrian, Prussian, and Sardinian infantry. 
A brief description of the French Zouave will be of 
interest to the reader : — 

" The dress of the Zouave is of the Arab pattern : the 
cap is a loose fez, or skull-cap, of scarlet felt, with a tassel ; 
a turban is worn over this in full dress ; a cloth vest and 
loose jacket, which leave the neck unencumbered by 
collar, stock, or cravat, cover the upper portion of his 
body, and allow free movement of the arms ; the scarlet 
pants are of the loose Oriental pattern, and are tucked 
under gaiters like those of the foot rifles of the guard ; 
the overcoat is a loose cloak, with a hood ; the chasseurs 
wear a similar one. The men say that this dress is the 
most convenient possible, and prefer it to any other. 

" The Zouaves are all French ; they are selected from 



Age 29,] FRE N C H Z O U A V E S. 77 

among the old campaigners for their fine physique and 
tried courage, and have certainly proved that they are 
what their appearance would indicate, — the most reck- 
less, self-reliant, and complete infantry that Europe can 
produce. 

"With his graceful dress, soldierly bearing, and vigilant 
attitude, the Zouave at an outpost is the beau-ideal of a 
soldier. 

" They neglect no opportunity of adding to their personal 
comforts : if there is a stream in the vicinity, the party 
marching on picket is sure to be amply supplied with 
fishing-rods, &c. ; if any thing is to be had, the Zouaves 
are quite certain to obtain it. 

"Their movements are the lightest and most graceful I 
have ever seen ; the stride is long, but the foot seems 
scarcely to touch the ground, and the march is apparently 
made without effort or fatigue. 

" The step of the foot rifles is shorter and quicker, and 
not so easy and graceful. 

"The impression produced by the appearance of the 
rifles and of the Zouaves is very different: the rifles look 
like active, energetic little fellows, who would find their 
best field as skirmishers ; but the Zouaves have, combined 
with all the activity and energy of the others, that solid 
ensemble and reckless dare-devil individuality which would 
render them alike formidable when attacking in mass, or 
in defending a position in the most desperate hand-to- 
hand encounter. Of all the troops that I have ever seen, 
I should esteem it the greatest honor to assist in defeating 
the Zouaves. The grenadiers of the guard are all large 
men, and a fine-looking, soldierly set." 

Two hundred and ten pages — nearly one-half of 
the whole volume, the Appendix included — are next 
given to the Russian army, its organization, recruit- 
ing, rations, kc. 



78 COSSACKS. [1856. 

The following is a description of the Eussian 

Cossacks : — 

" There are two peculiarities which cannot fail to arrest 
the attention and command the reflection of the observer 
of the Kussian cavalry : these are, the general division of 
the cavalry into regulars and irregulars; and the corps 
of dragoons. 

" The irregulars may be comprehended in the general 
name of Cossacks. Yet their peculiarities of armament, 
costume, and action are as varied as their origin; while 
the sources of the latter are as multifarious as the tribes 
which compose the mass of Russian nationality, and the 
circumstances which, through centuries of warfare, have 
finally united into one compact whole a multitude of con- 
flicting and heterogeneous elements. But, with all this 
diversity, there are important and peculiar characteristics 
which pervade the mass, and are common to every indi- 
vidual, with as much uniformity and certainty as that with 
which the firm government of the Czar is now extended 
over them. These peculiarities are: intelligence, quick- 
ness of vision, hearing, and all the senses; individuality ; 
trustworthiness on duty ; the power of enduring fatigue, 
privation, and the extremes of climate ; great address in 
the use of weapons ; strong feeling for their common 
country ; caution, united with courage capable of being 
excited to the highest pitch: in short, the combination 
of qualities necessary for partisan troops. The events of 
more than one campaign have proved, besides, that these 
irregulars can be used successfully in line against the best 
regular cavalry of Europe. 

" Circumstances of geography and climate have given 
to these men a race of horses in every way adapted to 
their riders; the Cossack horse is excelled by none in 
activity and hardiness. 

"The Cossack neglects no opportunity of feeding his 



Age 29.] COSSACKS. 79 

horse ; during short halts, even under fire, he gives him 
whatever is to be had ; the horse refuses nothing that is 
offered him, and eats whenever he has the opportunity, 
for he has not acquired the pernicious habit of eating 
only at regular hours. Some idea may be formed of the 
power of endurance of the Cossacks and their horses 
from the fact that, in a certain expedition against Khiva, 
there were three thousand five hundred regular Russian 
troops and twelve hundred Cossacks : of the regulars but 
one thousand returned, of the Cossacks but sixty perished. 

"The tendency of events, during the present century, 
has been to assimilate the organization of the Cossacks 
to that of the regulars, to a certain extent : whether the 
effect of this has been to modify or destroy their valuable 
individual characteristics may yet remain to be proved in 
a general war; the events of the campaign of Hungary 
are said to indicate that more regularity of action has by 
no means impaired their efficiency. 

"This brief description of the qualities of the irregular 
cavalry indicates at once the use made of them in war : 
they watch while the regulars repose. All the duty of 
advanced posts, patrols, reconnoissances, escorting trains, 
carrying despatches, acting as orderlies, &c., is performed 
in preference by the Cossacks: the consequence is, that, 
on the day of battle, the regular cavalry are brought upon 
the field in full force and undiminished vigor. Under 
cover of these active irregulars, a Russian army enjoys 
a degree of repose unknown to any other ; while, on the 
other hand, it is difficult for their antagonists to secure 
their outposts and foil their stealthy movements. 

"The rapidity and length of their marches are almost 
incredible; a march of forty miles is a common thing: 
they will make forced marches of seventy miles ; in a 
thickly-settled country they have, in two days, made six 
marches of ordinary cavalry without being discovered. 

" In concluding this subject, it is impossible to repress 



80 CAVALRY. [1856. 

the conviction that in many of the tribes of our frontier 
Indians, such as the Delawares, Kickapoos, &c., we pos- 
sess the material for the formation of partisan troops fully 
equal to the Cossacks : in the event of a serious war on 
this continent, their employment, under the regulations 
and restrictions necessary to restrain their tendency to 
unnecessary cruelty, would be productive of most import- 
ant advantages. 

"In our contests with the hostile Indians, bodies of 
these men, commanded by active and energetic regular 
officers and supported by regular troops, would undoubt- 
edly be of great service.'' 

The cavalry of Prussia, Austria, France, England, 
and the United States are next considered, the 
■whole occupying about one hundred pages; and an 
Appendix, of the same extent, contains a system of 
regulations for the field service of cavalry in time 
of war. This arm engages the author's particular 
attention, naturally enough, as he was a captain of 
cavalry at the time. 

Besides its other merits, the volume is a record 
of the most faithful and persevering industry, and 
contains the results of an immense amount of hard 
work. It embraces accounts of military schools, 
forts, museums, camps, hospitals, and garrisons. 
The arms, dress, and accoutrements of the men, 
and the equipments of the horses, are minutely 
described, down to the most exact details. It is il- 
lustrated with several hundred engravings, making 
every thing plain to the eye where a visible repre- 
sentation is needed. In short, no one can look at this 
volume without seeing that the author has one of 
those happily constituted minds which neither over- 



Age 30.] LE A VES T H E AR M Y. . 81 

looks nor despises details, and yet is not so hampered 
by them as to be incapable of wide views and sound 
generalizations. No man can be a great officer who 
is not infinitely patient of details; for an army is an 
aggregation of details, a defect in any one of which 
may destroy or impair the whole. It is a chain of 
innumerahle links; but the whole chain is no stronger 
than its weakest link. 

In January, 1857, Captain McClellan resigned his 
commission and retired from the army. He had 
then been fifteen years in the service, — years of busy 
activity and energetic discharge of professional 
duty. We may suppose him to have been moved 
to this step by the consideration that the future 
held out no promise of congenial employment and 
seemed to open no adequate sphere to honorable 
ambition. A dreary life upon some distant frontier, 
the monotonous discharge of routine duty, a re- 
nunciation of all the attractions of civilized life 
without the excitement of ennobling adventure or 
heroic struggle, presented an uninviting prospect to 
a man like him, in the prime of early manhood, 
and with unworn energies alike physical and in- 
tellectual. He thought, too, that in case of war his 
chances of occupation and promotion would be 
quite as good in civil life as if he had remained 
in the army. The rapid growth and material de- 
velopment of the country created a demand for 
capacities and accomplishments like his; and im- 
mediately upon his resignation he was appointed 
chief engineer of the Illinois Central Eailroad, 
then just opened, and went to Chicago to reside. 



82 • FORT SUMTER. [1861. 

In a few weeks ho was made vice-president of 
the corporation, and took general charge of all the 
business of the road in Illinois. In this capacity 
he first made the acquaintance of Mr. Lincoln, now 
President of the United States, then a practising 
lawyer in Springfield, lUinois, and occasionally em- 
ployed in the conduct of suits and other professional 
services on behalf of the company. 

In May, 1860, Captain McClellan was married to 
Miss Ellen Marcy, daughter of General E. B. Marcy, 
his former commander in Texas, and the chief of 
his staff during the Peninsular campaign. 

In August, 1860, he resigned the vice-presidency 
of the Illinois Central Eoad, in order to accept 
the presidency of the Ohio & Mississippi Railroad, 
which post he held, residing in Cincinnati, till the 
war broke out. 



CHAPTER ly. 



The guns which opened upon Fort Sumter on 
the memorable 12th of April, 1861, did not merely 
crumble the walls of that fortress, but they also 
shattered all hopes of a peaceful solution of the 
problems which were then before the country. 
Civil war was now a sad necessity. The Presi- 
dent's proclamation of the 15th called forth the 
militia for objects entirely lawful and constitu- 
tional; and it was responded to with a patriotic 
fervor which melted down all previously existing 



Age 34.] CIVIL WAR. 83 

party lines. This " uprising of a great people," as 
it was well termed by a foreign writer, was a kin- 
dling and noble spectacle. The heart of the whole 
land throbbed like the heart of one. But we can- 
not now look back upon that brilliant and burning 
enthusiasm without a touch of sadness, because 
there was mingled with it so much ignorance, not 
merely of the magnitude of the contest before us, 
but of the nature of war itself The spirited 
young men who, at the call of patriotic duty, 
thronged to swell the ranks of our volunteer force, 
marched off as gayly as if they had been going to a 
hunting-party or a picnic excursion. The rebellion 
was to be put down at once, and by little more than 
the mere show of the preponderating force of the 
loyal States; and the task of putting it down was 
to be attended with no more of danger than was 
sufficient to give to the enterprise a due flavor 
of excitement. War was unknown to us except 
by report : the men of the Eevolution had j^assed 
away, and even the soldiers of the War of 1812 had 
become gray-haired veterans. We had read of 
battles; we had seen something of the pride and 
pomp of holiday soldiers; but of the grim realities 
of war we were absolutely ignorant. Indeed, not 
a few had come to the conclusion that w^ar was a 
relic of barbarism, which the world had outgrown, 
and that modern civilization could dispense with 
the soldier and his sword. 

It need hardly be added that we were w^holly un- 
prepared for the gigantic struggle that was before 
us. Our regular army was insignificant in num- 



84 OHIO. [1S6J. 

bers, and scattered over our vast territory or 
along our Western frontier, so that it was impossi- 
ble to collect any considerable force together. Our 
militia system had everywhere fallen into neglect, 
and in some States had almost ceased to have any 
real existence. The wits laughed at it, and the plat- 
form-orators declaimed against it, to such a degree 
that it required some moral courage to march 
through the streets at the head of a company. 

The South had been wiser, or, at least, more pro- 
vident, in this respect. The military spirit had 
never been discouraged there. Many of the political 
leaders had long been looking forward to the time 
when the unhappy sectional contests Avhich were 
distracting the country would blaze out into civil 
war, and preparing for it. In some of the States 
there had been military academies, where a mili- 
tar}' education had been obtained: so that they 
had a greater number of trained officers to put into 
their regiments. This gave them a considerable 
advantage at the start. Happily for us, graduates 
of West Point were scattered all over the North : 
to them the civil authority looked for assistance, 
and they rendered an assistance which cannot be 
too highly estimated. 

Ohio was as unprepared as other States. There 
was a small force of militia nominally organized; 
but the Constitution and laws of the State provided 
that all its officers should be elected by the men, 
and the Governor was limited, in his selection of 
officers in case the militia was called out, to the 
parties so chosen. In an emergency like this, it was 



Age 34.] GOVERNOR DENNISON. 85 

fortunate that Ohio had so efficient a Governor as 
Mr. William Dennison. He at once turned to Cap- 
tain McClellan for assistance, and sent a request to 
Washington that the latter might be restored to 
his old rank in the army and the duty of organizing 
the Ohio volunteers assigned to him. To this re- 
quest no answer was received : indeed, the commu- 
nications with Washington were generally inter- 
rupted, and the several Governors were thus left 
to their own resources. 

Governor Dennison summoned Captain McClellan 
to Columbus; and he at once applied himself to the 
work of organizing the numerous regiments offered. 
A bill was also introduced into the Legislature, and 
rapidly passed, authorizing the Governor to select 
officers for the volunteers outside of the State militia. 
Under this act, on the 23d of April, 1861, Captain 
McClellan was commissioned major-general of the 
Ohio "Militia Yolunteers." 

Under the proclamation of the President of April 
15, calling out the militia, thirteen regiments of 
infantry were demanded from Ohio for three 
months, and afterwards the same number for 
three years. To obtain men was then easy enough, 
but to find suitable officers was exceedingly difficult; 
and arms and equipments were entirely wanting. 
A "Department of the Ohio" was formed on the 
3d of May, consisting of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, 
and placed under General McClellan's command, 
who thus had under his charge the forces of two 
other States besides his own. He organized his 
troops in spite of all obstacles, and within two 



86 VIRGINIA AND SECESSION. [1861. 

months of the time of his leaving his peaceful 
avocations he took the field for the first campaign 
of the war. 

Secession placed no State in so embarrassing a 
position as the great Commonwealth of Virginia. 
Separated from the capital only by a river, and ex- 
tending from the ocean to the Ohio, it lay mid- 
way between the two contending parties, and early 
promised to be what it has since become, — the 
Belgium of the war. There is no doubt that the 
great body of its citizens were oj^posed to the 
State's seceding; but they were equally opposed 
to the coercion of the States which had already 
seceded, and sympathized with many of their 
alleged grievances. A State convention at Eich- 
mond, on the 17th of April, when it was evident 
that war must ensue, passed an ordinance of se- 
cession. Although this was not to go into force 
until it had been ratified by the people, the in- 
habitants of the eastern and southern portions of 
the State immediately began hostilities. 

In the portion of the State Ij^ing west of the 
Alleghany Mountains, and known as Western Vir^ 
ginia, the feelings of the people were ver^^ different. 
They owned but few slaves, and their soil and 
climate were unfitted for those branches of indus- 
try in which slave-labor is profitable. While dis- 
approving of the slavery agitation in the North, 
they had no particular interest in the extension 
of that institution, and were strenuously opposed 
to secession for its sake; and they also had some 
grievances regarding alleged inequalities of taxa- 



Age 34.] C A M P DEN N ISO N. 87. 

tion between Eastern and Western Virginia, which 
had probably caused many of them ah-eady to look 
forward to the organization of a separate State. 
In this conjuncture, a convention of the people of 
Western Virginia was called to assemble at Wheel- 
ing on the 11th of June, to consider the alarming 
condition of public affairs. 

Early in May, General McClellan received applica- 
tions for j)rotection from the people of this region, 
but w^as not then prepared to accede to their wishes. 
Afterwards, however, it became evident that the 
Virginia authorities contemplated occupying this 
coui^ry, and to secure, by so doing, the command 
of t$ie Baltimore & Ohio Ilaih'oad, the importance 
of 'which was appreciated by both j)arties. Gov- 
ernor Letcher had already called out the State 
militia, and not only Western Virginia, but Southern 
Ohio also, might soon be invaded by them. 

A small body of Virginia militia had actually 
advanced, and were encamped at Grafton, on the 
Baltimore & Ohio Eailroad. On the 24th of May, 
the Secretary of War and General Scott tele- 
graphed to General McClellan, informing him of 
this camp, and asking him whether its influence 
could not be counteracted. General McClellan 
replied in the affirmative. This was the sole order 
which he received from Washington regarding a 
campaign in Virginia. 

General McClellan had formed his principal ren- 
dezvous at Camp Dennison, near Cincinnati; while 
bodies of troops w^ere also at Gallipolis, Bellaire, 
and Marietta, on the Ohio Eiver, opposite Vir- 



88 PROCLAMATION. [1S61. 

ginia. At Wheeling the loyalists were organizing 
a regiment under Colonel B. F. Kelley. The men 
were wretchedly provided for, having nothing but 
muskets; but they did good service before the end 
of summer. On the 26th of May, intelligence was 
received at Camp Dennison that the enemy were 
advancing from Grafton upon Wheeling and Par- 
kersburg, for the purpose of destroying the railroad. 
General McClellan at once telegraphed to Colonel 
Kelley to move his regiment (since known as the 
First Yirginia) early the next day along the line of 
railroad towards Fairmount, in order to prevent 
any further destruction of the bridges and to pro- 
tect the repair of those already injured. Two Ohio 
regiments, under Colonels Irwin and Stedman, were 
also directed to cross over into Virginia, one to co- 
operate with Colonel Kelley and the other to occupy 
Parkersburg. On the same day, General McClellan 
issued the following proclamation and address: — 



"Head-Quarters Department of the Ohio, 1 

May 26, 1861. j 

" To the Union Men of Western Virginia. 

" Virginians : — The General Government has long enough 
endured the machinations of a few factious rebels in your 
midst. Armed traitors have in vain endeavored to deter 
you from expressing your loyalty at the polls. Having 
failed in this infamous attempt to deprive you of the exer- 
cise of your dearest rights, they now seek to inaugurate a 
reign of terror, and thus force you to yield to their schemes 
and submit to the yoke of the traitorous conspiracy 



Age 34.] PROCL A iM AT 10 N. 89 

dignified by the name of the Southern Confederacy. 
They are destroying the property of citizens of your 
State and ruining your magnificent railways. The Gene- 
ral Government has heretofore carefully abstained from 
sending troops across the Ohio, or even from posting them 
along its banks, although frequently urged to do so by 
many of your prominent citizens. It determined to await 
the result of the late election, desirous that no one might 
be able to say that the slightest effort had been made 
from this side to influence the free expression of your 
opinions, although the many agencies brought to bear 
upon you by the rebels were well known. You have now 
shown, under the most adverse circumstances, that the 
great mass of the people of Western Virginia are true 
and loyal to that beneficent Government under which we 
and our fathers have lived so long. As soon as the result 
of the election was known, the traitors commenced their 
work of destruction. The General Government cannot 
close its ears to the demand you have made for assistance. 
I have ordered troops to cross the Ohio Eiver. They 
come as your friends and brothers, — as enemies only to 
the armed rebels who are preying upon you. Your 
homes, your families, and your property are safe under 
our protection. All your rights shall be religiously re- 
spected, notwithstanding all that has been said by the 
traitors to induce you to believe that our advent among 
you will be signalized by interference with your slaves. 
Understand one thing clearly. Not only will we abstain 
from all such interference, but we will, on the contrary, 
with an iron hand, crush any attempt at insurrection on 
their part. Now that we are in your midst, I call upon 
you to fly to arms and support the General Government. 
Sever the connection that binds you to traitors ; pro- 
claim to the world that the faith and loyalty so long 
boasted by the Old Dominion are still preserved in 



90 ADDRESS. [l^fil- 

Western Virginia, and that you remain true to the Stars 
and Stripes. 

"Geo. B. McClellan, 
''Major-General U. S. A., Com'd'g DepHJ' 

"Head-Quarters Department of the Ohio, | 
Cincinnati, May 26, 1861. ) 

"Soldiers: — You are ordered to cross the frontier and 
enter upon the soil of Virginia. 

"Your mission is to restore peace and confidence, to pro- 
tect the majesty of the law, and to rescue our brethren 
from the grasp of armed traitors. You are to act in con- 
cert with Virginia troops, and to support their advance. 
1 place under the safeguard of your honor the persons 
and property of the Virginians. I know that you will re- 
spect their feelings and all their rights. 

"Preserve the strictest discipline. Remember that each 
one of you holds in his keeping the honor of Ohio and 
the Union. If you are called upon to overcome armed 
opposition, I know that your courage is equal to the task ; 
but remember that your only foes are the armed 
traitors,— and show mercy even to them when they are 
in your power, for many of them are misguided. When, 
under your protection, the loyal men of Western Virginia 
have been enabled to organize and arm, they can protect 
themselves ; and you can then return to your homes with 
the proud satisfaction of having saved a gallant people 
from destruction. 

*'Geo. B. McClellan, 
" Major-Gencral U. S. A., Com'd'gr 

(jreneral McClellan also wrote full particulars to 
the President of what be had done, but, receiving 
no reply, inferred that his course was approved of. 

Colonel Kelley reached Grafton on the 13th of 
May. The enemy retreated at his approach, and ho 



Age 34.] BATTLE OF PIIILIPPI. 91 

repaired the bridge, and established railroad-com- 
munications with Wheeling. Soon after, Colonel 
Stedman occupied Clarksburg, and established com- 
munications with Colonel Kelley. The enemy fell 
back from Grafton upon Philippi, on the high-road 
from Wheeling to Staunton, in Central Yirginia. 
General McClellan in the mean time had despatched 
three Indiana regiments, under Brigadier-General 
Morris, to Grafton. They arrived on the Slst of 
May; and General Morris at once assumed the chief 
command. Hardly six weeks had elapsed since 
Captain McClellan had been first called upon by 
Governor Dennison for assistance; and in that time 
he had actually created an army and begun the first 
campaign ! 

The first encounter of the war took place at 
Philippi, a small town two hundred and ten miles 
from Eichmond. On the 2d of June, General 
Morris determined to endeavor to drive from this 
town the rebel force there, under Colonel Porter- 
field. The attacking force consisted of five regi- 
ments, formed in two columns, — the first under 
Colonel Kelley, the second under Colonel Dumont, 
accompanied by Colonel (afterwards the lamented 
General) Lander. Colonel Kelley's column moved 
towards Philippi by way of Thornton, a distance 
of twenty-seven miles, partly by railroad. The 
other column moved directly on Philippi in front. 
This one reached its destination early on the 3d, 
notwithstanding deep mud and heavy rain, and 
at once opened fire from two pieces of artillery 
upon the enemy, who began a retreat, which was 



92 PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT. [1861. 

turned into a complete rout when Colonel Kelley, 
(who had been greatly impeded by the state of the 
roads) came up and joined in the attack. The 
enemy left behind them their camp-eqnipage, 
seven hundred stand of arms, and several horses. 
They lost about fifteen men killed and wounded. 
On the Federal side, Colonel Kelley was severely 
wounded, but recovered. 

General McClellan now pushed the Ohio regi- 
ments on into Virginia as rapidly as they could be 
decently equipped. But the great deficiency which 
still existed in all military necessaries much re- 
tarded him. The loyalists, on the 13th of June, 
formed a provisional government at Wheeling, with 
the Hon. Francis H. Pierpoint as Governor. But Old 
Virginia was determined not to lose the fine country 
bej^ond the Alleghanies without a struggle. Large 
reinforcements arrived at Beverly, on the Staunton 
road, the head-quarters of the enemy; and with 
them came General Eobert Selden Garnett, the 
former commandant at West Point, and an officer 
of high reputation, to assume the chief command. 
Upon learning this. General McClellan thought it 
time to move; and, his preparations being so far 
advanced as to justify it, he left Cincinnati on the 
20th of June, and arrived at Grafton on the 22d. 

He still received no orders from Washington, and 
was even left ignorant of the plan for the campaign 
in Eastern Virginia. His own department was very 
extensive, and the simple administrative cares con- 
nected with it extremely arduous. Besides, not only 
in Virginia, but in Kentucky and Tennessee, the 



AOK 34.] WESTERN VIRGINIA. 93 

enemy were very active, and it could not be known 
how soon he might be called upon to plan a cam- 
paign for the defence of the Union interests in those 
States. 

The country which now became the scene of ope- 
rations was that part of Western Virginia lying 
between the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad on' the 
north, the Ohio Eiver on the west, the Little Ka- 
nawha Eiver on the south, and the Cheat Eiver on 
the east. The region is broken and mountainous, 
and cut into numerous ravines and valleys by the 
many little streams which form the head-waters of 
the Monongahela, Great Kanawha, Little Kanawha, 
and other rivers. The roads are few in number 
and very indifferent in quality^ the valleys only are 
cultivated, the rest of the country being covered 
with dense forests, and a luxuriant growth of 
bushes which makes the woods almost impassable. 
A turnpike road runs from "Wheeling southeasterly 
to Staunton, through Philippi, Leedsville, Beverly, 
and Huttonsville. From Beverly another turnj)ike 
runs westerly, at an acute angle with the Wheeling 
road, to Buckhannon, where it branches off to Clarks- 
burg on the north and Weston on the west. A 
mountainous ridge crosses the two roads from Bev- 
erly to Philippi and Buckhannon; and at the inter- 
section the enemy were strongly intrenched, — Gene- 
ral Garnett commanding in person at Laurel Hill, 
on the Philippi road, a little north of Leedsville 
and fifteen miles north of Beverly, and Colonel 
Pegram at Eich Mountain, on the Buckhannon 
road, five miles west of Beverly. General Gar- 



94 GENERAL MCCLELLAN's PLANS. [18G1. 

nett's force was about ten thousand men, and Colo- 
nel Pegram's about four thousand. Their natural 
retreat was by way of Beverly and Huttonsville 
through the Cheat Mountain Pass, as it is called. 
North of this there is no road over the Alleghanies 
passable for artillery until the circuitous road run- 
ning' northeasterly from Leedsville through St. 
George and West Union to Moorfield is reached. 
If, therefore, by the capture of Beverly the road by 
Cheat Mountain Pass (and with it any other road 
south of it) were cut off, this north road was the 
only retreat open to General Garuett. 

General McClellan's plans are best described in 
his own language. On the 23d of June he wrote 
a letter to General Scott. " I stated," says he, 
"that it was now certain that the enemy had a 
force of some kind near Huttonsville, with a 
strong advanced party intrenched near Laurel Moun- 
tain, between Philippi and Beverly, and that their 
chief object seemed to me to be to furnish and pro- 
tect guerrilla parties, w^hich were then doing much 
mischief; also that the apprehensions which had ex- 
isted on the part of our people of an attack by this 
party of the enemy were not well founded; that, 
as soon as my command was well in hand and my 
information more full, I proposed moving with 
all my available force from Clarksburg on Buck- 
hannon, thence on Beverly, to turn entirely the de- 
tachment at Laurel Hill, the troops at Philippi to 
advance in time to follow^ up the retreat of the 
enemy in their front. That, after occupying Bev- 
erly, I would move on Huttonsville and drive the 



Age 34.J PROCLAMATION. 95 

enemy into the mountains, whither I did not pur- 
pose to follow them unless certain of success." 

In pursuance of this plan, the main body of his 
army, numbering about ten thousand men, were 
transferred to Clarksburg. It consisted of two 
brigades, under Brigadier-Grenerals Rosecrans and 
Schleich, with a small body of cavalry, a company 
of regular artillery, and two batteries of volunteer 
artillery. Another body, under General Morris, 
was stationed at Philippi, and a body of reserve, 
under Brigadier-Greneral Hill, of the Ohio militia, 
was stationed at Grafton. Before leaving Grafton, 
General McClellan issued the following proclama- 
tion and address: — 

"IIead-Quakters, Department of the Ohio, ) 
Graftox, Va., June 23, 1861. J 

*'Tb the Inhabitants of Western Virginia. 

"The army of this department, headed by Virginia 
troops, is rapidly occupying all Western Virginia. This 
is done in co-operation with and in support of such civil 
authorities of the State as are faithful to the Constitution 
and laws of the United States. The proclamation issued 
by me under date of May 26, 1861, will be strictly main- 
tained. Your houses, families, property, and all your 
rights will be religiously respected; we are enemies to 
none but armed rebels and those voluntarily giving them 
aid. All officers of this army will be held responsible 
for the most prompt and vigorous action in repressing 
disorder and punishing aggression by those under their 
command. 

"To my great regret, I find that enemies of the United 
States continue to carry on a system of hostilities pro- 
hibited by the laws of war among belligerent nations, 
and, of course, far more wicked and intolerable when di- 



96 ADDRESS. [1861. 

reeled against loyal citizens engaged in the defence of 
the common government of all. Individuals and maraud- 
ing parties are pursuing a guerrilla warfare, — firing upon 
sentinels and pickets, burning bridges, insulting, injuring, 
and even killing citizens because of their Union senti- 
ments, and committing many kindred acts. 

"I do now, therefore, make proclamation, and warn all 
persons, that individuals or parties engaged in this species 
of warfare, — irregular in every view which can be taken of 
it, — thus attacking sentinels, pickets, or other soldiers, 
destroying public or private property, or committing in- 
juries against any of the inhabitants because of Union 
sentiments oj; conduct, will be dealt with, in their persons 
and property, according to the severest rules of military 
law. 

"All persons giving information or aid to the public 
enemies will be arrested and kept in close custody; and 
all persons found bearing arms, unless of known loyalty, 
will be arrested and held for examination. 

"GrEO. B. McClellan, 
" Major- General U. S. A. Com'd'gr 

"Head-Quarters Departmext of the Ohio, 
Grafton, Va., June 25, 1861. 

" To the Soldiers of the Army of the West. 
"You are here to support the Government of your 
country, and to protect the lives and liberties of your 
brethren, threatened by a rebellious and traitorous foe. 
No higher and nobler duty could devolve upon you ; and 
I expect you to bring to its performance the highest 
and noblest qualities of soldiers, — discipline, courage, and 
mercy. I call upon the officers of every grade to enforce 
the strictest discipline ; and I know that those of all grades, 
privates and officers, will display in battle cool heroic 
courage, and will know how to show mercy to a disarmed 
enemy. 



Age 34.] ADDRESS. 97 

" Bear in mmd that you are in the country of friends, 
not of enemies, — that you are here to protect, not to de- 
stroy. Take nothing, destroy nothing, unless you are 
ordered to do so by your general officers. Remember 
that I have pledged my word to the people of Western 
Virginia that their rights in person and property shall 
be respected. I ask every one of you to make good 
this promise in its broadest sense. We come here to 
save, not to upturn. I do not appeal to the fear of pun- 
ishment, but to your appreciation of the sacredness of 
the cause in which we are engaged. Carry with you into 
battle the conviction that you are right and that God is 
on your side. 

"Your enemies have violated every moral law: neither 
God nor man can sustain them. They have without cause 
rebelled against a mild and paternal Government; they 
have seized upon public and private property ; they have 
outraged the persons of Northern men merely because 
they came from the North, and of Southern Union men 
merely because they loved the Union ; they have placed 
themselves beneath contempt, unless they can retrieve 
some honor on the field of battle. You will pursue a 
different course. You will be honest, brave, and merci- 
ful ; you will respect the right of private opinion ; you 
will punish no man for opinion's sake. Show to the 
world that you differ from our enemies in the points of 
honor, honesty, and respect for private opinion, and that 
we inaugurate no reign of terror where we go. 

"Soldiers, I have heard that there was danger here. 
I have come to place myself at your head and to share 
it with you. I fear now but one thing, — that you will not 
find foemen worthy of your steel. I know that I can 
rely upon you. 

"Geo. B. McClellan, 

*^ Major-General CorrCdlg.^^ 



98 RICH MOUNTAIN. [1861. 

Buckhannon was occupied on the 30th by Gene 
ral Eosecrans, and a regiment was sent to take 
possession of Weston. General McClellan and 
staff and General Schleich's brigade reached Buck- 
hannon on the 2d of July. Before advancing on 
the enemy, General McClellan had to give direc- 
tions regarding an independent portion of his de- 
partment. Generals Wise and Floyd had invaded 
the country south of the Little Kanawha Eiver, 
with a large force. To meet these, General Mc- 
Clellan directed Brigadier-General J. Dolson Cox 
to proceed thither from Ohio with five regiments, 
and assigned to him the district between the Great 
and Little Kanawha Elvers. 

On the 9th, the main column of the army reached 
Eoaring Fork, beyond Buckhannon, and two miles 
from Colonel Pegram's intrenchments. A bridge 
which had been destroyed had to be rebuilt. On 
the 10th, Lieutenant Poe was sent out with a de- 
tachment to reconnoitre the enemy's position. This 
reconnoissance was pushed within two hundred 
yards of the enemy's works. Colonel Pegram, it 
was found, was strongly intrenched near the foot 
of Eich Mountain and on the west side of it. The 
position was surrounded by dense forests, and its 
natural strength had been increased by rough in- 
trenchments and by felhng trees. 

As an attack in front would be followed by a serious 
loss of life, and its success with raw troops, to say 
the least, was doubtful. General McClellan's plan 
was to turn Colonel Pegram's position to the south, 
endeavor to cut off his retreat, and, should he sue- 



Age 34.] RICH MOUNTAIN. 99 

ceed in so doing, to push on to Beverly and cut off 
General Garnett's retreat by Staunton, forcing him 
to retire by the northeasterly road to Moorfield- 
The duty of turning the enemy^s works was as- 
signed to G-eneral Eosecrans. His instructions were 
to make a circuit to the south and endeavor to 
reach and occupy the top of the mountain, get 
command of the turnpike road from Beverly to 
Buckhannon, and then move on the rear of Pe- 
gram's defences. His further order, constantly to 
communicate with General McClellan, General Eose- 
crans does not seem to have been able to carry out. 
General Eosecrans set out, with a force of eigh- 
teen hundred infantry and a small body of cavalry, 
at four o'clock on the morning of the 11th of July, 
to execute these orders. After a fatiguing march 
through a country saturated with rain and covered 
with dense woods, he reached the summit of Eich 
Mountain about one o'clock. The enemy had in- 
tercepted some letters, and thus obtained intimation 
of this movement, and had stationed a considerable 
force, with two pieces of artillery, at the top of the 
mountain, where some rude intrenchments had been 
thrown up. Eosecrans formed his command, and 
had proceeded a short way towards the turnpike, 
when he came upon a party of skirmishers, who 
were driven back upon the main body. The enemy 
now opened fire from their artillery. A spirited 
attack soon carried the intrenchments, and the 
rebels retreated in confusion upon Colonel Pegram, 
leaving their artillery in possession of the Federals. 
The success of the movement was complete; but 



100 DESPATCH FROM RICH MOUNTAIN. [1861. 

his troops, unused to such exertions, being greatly 
fatigued, General Eosecrans halted. 

No communication was received at head-quarters 
from Eosecrans after eleven o'clock. The firing at 
Eich Mountain was distinctly heard ; but great 
fears were entertained that the attack had failed. 
"Soon after the cessation of the distant firing," 
says General McClellan, "an officer was observed 
to ride into the intrenchments and address the 
garrison. We could not distinguish the words he 
uttered, but his speech was followed by prolonged 
cheering, which impressed many with the belief 
that it had fared badly with our detachment." 

General McClellan determined to attack the enemy 
in front, and Lieutenant Poe was sent to select a 
proper position for the artillery. Upon his report- 
ing one, a party was despatched to cut a road to it. 
It was now too late in the day to begin an attack; 
but one was resolved upon early the next morning, 
in hopes of relieving Eosecrans if he were hard 
pressed by the enemy. The next morning, how- 
ever, the pickets reported that Colonel Pegram had 
deserted his works and fled over the mountains. 
Leaving Eosecrans at Eich Mountain, General 
McClellan pushed on to Beverly. He thus effectu- 
ally cut off General Garnett's communications with 
Staunton. His despatch was as follows : — 

"Rich Mountain, Va., 9 a.m., July 12. 
" Colonel E. D. Townsend, Assistant Adjutant-Oeneral : — 

"We are in possession of all the enemy's works up to 
a point in sight of Beverly. We have taken all his guns, 
a very large amount of wagons, tents, &c., every thing he 



Agk 34.J BEVERLY. 101 

had, and also a large number of prisoners, many of whom 
are wounded, and amongst whom are several officers. 
They lost many killed. We have lost in all perhaps 
twenty killed and forty wounded, of whom all but two 
or three were in the column under Colonel Rosecrans, 
which turned the position. The mass of the enemy 
escaped through the woods, entirely disorganized. Among 
the prisoners is Dr. Taylor, formerly of the army. Colonel 
Pegram was in command. 

" Colonel Rosecrans's column left camp yesterday morn- 
ing and marched some eight miles through the moun- 
tains, reaching the turnpike some two or three miles 
in the rear of the enemy. He defeated an advanced 
force, and took a couple of guns. I had a position ready 
for twelve guns near the main camp, and as the guns 
were moving up I ascertained that the enemy had re- 
treated. I am now pushing on to Beverly, — a part of 
Colonel Rosecrans's troops being now within three miles 
of that place. Our success is complete, and almost blood- 
less. I doubt whether Wise and Johnston will unite and 
overpower me. The behavior of our troops in action 
and towards prisoners was admirable. 

''Gr. B. McClellan, 
* ' Major- General commanding.'* 

On the night of the 11th, General Garnett, learn- 
ing of the disaster at Eich Mountain, fell back on 
Beverly; but, finding his retreat that way cut oif, 
he retraced his steps, and took the northern road 
by St. George and West Union. In accordance with 
orders, General Morris followed hinp, and overtook 
him at Carrick's Ford, on the main fork of Cheat 
River. The enemy were posted in a tolerably 
strong position, but did not withstand the attack, 
led by Captain Bonham, and retreated in confusion. 

9* 



102 ADDRESS. [1861. 

General Garnett was himself killed while endeavor- 
ing to rally his troops. With soldier-like generosity, 
General Morris directed the remains to be carefully 
removed, and afterwards forwarded them to the 
family in Yirginia. 

The enemy lost in these engagements about two 
hundred killed, besides wounded and prisoners, 
seven or eight pieces of artillery, and large military 
stores. General Hill failed to carry out the direc- 
tions sent to him to pursue General Garnett's force, 
and they escaped. Colonel Pegram, however, find- 
ing that Garnett had retreated, fell back on Beverly, 
and was compelled to surrender at discretion, on 
the 13th, with about six hundred men. General 
McClellan occupied Huttonsville and the Cheat 
Mountain Pass, thus gaining the key to "Western 
Virginia. On the 19th of July he issued the fol- 
lowing address to the army : — 

"Soldiers of the Army op the West: — 

" I am more than satisfied with you. You have anni- 
hilated two armies, commanded by educated and expe- 
rienced soldiers, intrenched in mountain-fastnesses, and 
fortified at their leisure. You have taken five guns, 
twelve colors, fifteen hundred stand of arms, one thou- 
sand prisoners, including more than forty officers. One 
of the second commanders of the rebels is a prisoner ; 
the other lost his Hfe on the field of battle. You have 
killed more than two hundred and fifty of the enemy, 
who has lost all his baggage and camp-equipage. All this 
has been done with the loss of twenty brave men killed 
and sixty wounded on your part. 

"You have proved that Union men fighting for the pre- 
servation of our Government are more than a match for 



Age 34.] SUMMONS TO WASHINGTON. 103 

our misguided and erring brothers. More than this, you 
have shown mercy to the vanquished. You have made 
long and arduous marches, with insufficient food, fre- 
quently exposed to the inclemency of the weather. I 
have not hesitated to demand this of you, feeling that I 
could rely on your endurance, patriotism, and courage. 
In the future I may have still greater demands to make 
upon you, still greater sacrifices for you to offer. It shall 
be my care to provide for you to the extent of my ability ; 
but I know now that by your valor and endurance you 
will accomplish all that is asked. 

"Soldiers, I have confidence in you, and I trust you 
have learned to confide in me. Remember that discipline 
and subordination are qualities of equal value with cou- 
rage. I am proud to say that you have gained the highest 
reward that American troojjs can receive, — the thanks of 
Congress and the applause of your fellow-citizens. 

"Geo. B. McClellan, Major- General^ 

In the mean time, affairs looked perilous in Gene- 
ral Cox's department, south of the Little Kanawha 
Eiver. General McClellan was preparing to take 
command there in person, when, on the 22d of July, 
he received orders to hand over his command to 
General Eosecrans and report at Washington, where 
a wider field awaited him. 

Thus ended the campaign in Western Virginia. 
It seems insignificant by the side of some of the 
bloody contests which have since taken place 3 but 
its moral effect was remarkable. It was the first 
trial that the raw troops of the ^North were put 
to, and its success was most encouraging. This is 
shown by the general satisfaction with which, in the 
midst of the gloom created by the battle of Bull 



104 WASHINGTON. [1861. 

Eun, the intelligence was received that General 
McClellan was summoned to Washington. 

In organizing the Western Army, General Mo- 
Clellan's services were of great value. No pre- 
parations had been made beforehand for the strug- 
gle; and it is his deserved honor that, finding the 
West unprepared, he organized the germ of that 
brave army which has since gained such renown 
in Kentucky, Tennessee, and Mississippi. 



CHAPTEE Y. 



When General McClellan assumed command in 
Washington, on the 27th of July, the whole number 
of troops in and around the city was a little over 
fifty thousand, of whom less than a thousand were 
cavalry, and about six hundred and fifty were ar- 
tillery-men, with nine imperfect field-batteries of 
thirty pieces. They were encamped in places se- 
lected without regard to purposes of defence or 
instruction; the roads were not picketed, and there 
was no attempt at an organization into brigades. 
The works of defence were very limited in number 
and very defective in character. There was nothing 
to prevent the enemy's shelling the city from 
heights within easy range, and very little to pre- 
vent their occupying those heights had they been so 
disposed. The streets of Washington were crowded 
with straggling officers and disorderly men, absent 
from their stations without authority, whose be- 



Age34.] labors of GENERAL M^CLELLAN. 105 

havior indicated a general want of discipline, aggra- 
vated by the demoralizing influences of the recent 
disaster at Bull Eun, July 21, 1861. 

The task of the commanding officer was one of 
no common magnitude. He had the materials for 
an army, — and excellent materials, too, but still only 
materials. He had no more than the block out 
of which an army was to be carved. There were 
courage, patriotism, intelligence, physical energy, 
in abundance; and to these invaluable qualities 
were to be added discipline, the instinct of obe- 
dience, precision of movement, and the power of 
combination. A tumultuary military assemblage 
was to be organized into brigades, divisions, and 
corps, and brought into proper relations with their 
commanders. An adequate artillery establishment 
was to be created, and a sufficient force of engineers 
and topographical engineers was to be provided. 
The medical department, the quartermaster's, the 
subsistence, the ordnance, the provost-marshal's 
departments, were all to be set in movement. A 
signal corps was to be formed, and instructed in 
the use of flags by day and lights by night; and, to 
keep pace with the march of scientific improvement, 
a body of telegraphic operators could not be for- 
gotten. 

To these gigantic labors General McClellan ad- 
dressed himself with unwearied diligence ; and he 
was ably seconded by a most efficient stafl", with 
numbers increased from time to time as necessity 
required. The new levies of infantry, upon ar- 
riving in Washington, were formed into provi- 



106 MEMORANDUM ON THE WAR. [1861. 

sional brigades, and placed in camp in the suburbs 
of the city for equipment, instruction, and discipline. 
Cavalry and artillery troops reported to ofl&cers 
designated for that purpose. Order was restored 
in Washington by a military police bureau, at the 
head of which were a provost-marshal and a body 
of efficient assistants. New defensive works were 
projected and thrown up. Everywhere the hum 
of active, organized, and harmonious industry was 
heard. A preliminary organization was made of 
the troops on hand into twelve brigades. These 
were all volunteers, except two companies of 
cavalry and four of artillery; but all the com- 
manding officers had been educated at West Point, 
with the single exception of Colonel Blenker, who 
had had a good military training in Europe. 

On the 4th of August, 1861, General McClellan 
addressed to the President of the United States, 
at his request, a memorandum upon the objects of 
the war, the principles on which it should be con- 
ducted, and the operations by which it might be 
brought to a speedy and successful termination. 
As this is an important document in the history of 
the war, which should be carefully read by all who 
desire to understand its subsequent course, and still 
more by those who would do justice to a command- 
ing officer whose military capacity and even whose 
loyalty and patriotism have been called in question 
in high places, it is here inserted in full : — 

*' The object of the present war differs from those in 
which nations are usually engaged mainW in this: tliat 



Age 34.J xMEMORANDUM ON THE WAR. 107 

tlie purpose of ordinary war is to conquer a peace and 
make a treaty on advantageous terms ; in this contest it 
has become necessary to crush a population sufficiently 
numerous, intelligent, and warlike to constitute a nation. 
We have not only to defeat their armed and organized 
forces in the field, but to display such an overwhelming 
strength as will convince all our antagonists, especially 
those of the governing aristocratic class, of the utter im- 
possibility of resistance. Our late reverses make this 
course imperative. Had we been successful in the recent 
battle (Manassas), it is possible that we might have been 
spared the labor and expense of a great effort. 

" Now we have no alternative. Their success will 
enable the political leaders of the rebels to convince the 
mass of their people that we are inferior to them in force 
and courage, and to command all their resources. The 
contest began with a class; now it is with a people: our 
military success can alone restore the former issue. 

"By thoroughly defeating their armies, taking their 
strong places, and pursuing a rigidly protective policy as 
to private property and unarmed persons and a lenient 
course as to private soldiers, we may well hope for a perma- 
nent restoration of a peaceful Union. But in the first 
instance the authority of the Government must be sup- 
ported by overwhelming physical force. 

"Our foreign relations and financial credit also impera-., 
tively demand that the military action of the Grovern- 
ment should be prompt and irresistible. 

"The rebels have chosen Virginia as their battle-field; 
and it seems proper for us to make the first great struggle 
there. But, while thus directing our main efforts, it is 
necessary to diminish the resistance there offered us, by 
movements on other points, both by land and water. 

" Without entering at present into details, I would ad- 
vise that a strong movement be made on the Mississippi, 
and that the rebels be driven out of Missouri. 



108 MEMORANDUM ON THE WAR. [1861. 

"As soon as it becomes perfectly clear that Kentucky 
is cordially united with us, I would advise a movement 
through that State into Eastern Tennessee, for the pur- 
pose of assisting the Union men of that region, and of 
eeizing the railroads leading from Memphis to the East. 

"The possession of those roads by us, in connection 
with the movement on the Mississippi, would go far 
towards determining the evacuation of Virginia by the 
rebels. In the mean time, all the passes into Western 
Virginia from the east should be securely guarded ; but 
I would advise no movement from that quarter towards 
Richmond, unless the political condition of Kentucky 
renders it impossible or inexpedient for us to make the 
movement upon Eastern Tennessee through that State. 
Every effort should, however, be made to organize, equip, 
and arm as many troops as possible in Western Virginia, 
in order to render the Ohio and Indiana regiments avail- 
able for other operations. 

"At as early a day as practicable, it would be well to 
protect and reopen the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad. 
Baltimore and Fort Monroe should be occupied by garri- 
sons sufficient to retain them in our possession. 

"The importance of Harper's Ferry and the line of 
the Potomac in the direction of Leesburg will be very 
materially diminished so soon as our force in this vicinity 
becomes organized, strong, and efficient ; because no capa- 
ble general will cross the river north of this city, when 
we have a strong army here ready to cut off his retreat. 

" To revert to the West. It is probable that no very 
large additions to the troops now in Missouri will be ne- 
cessary to secure that State. 

"I presume that the force required for the movement 
down the Mississippi will be determined by its com- 
mander and the President. If Kentucky assumes the 
right position, not more than twenty thousand troops will 
be needed, together with those that can be raised in that 



Age 34.] MEMORANDUM ON THE WAR. 109 

State and Eastern Tennessee, to secure the latter region 
and its railroads, as well as ultimately to occupy Nash- 
ville. 

"The Western Virginia troops, with not more than five 
or ten thousand from Ohio and Indiana, should, under 
proper management, suffice for its protection. 

"When we have reorganized our main army here, ten 
thousand men ought to be enough to protect the Balti- 
more & Ohio Railroad and the Potomac, five thousand 
will garrison Baltimore, three thousand Fort Monroe, and 
not more than twenty thousand will be necessary at the 
utmost for the defence of Washington. 

"For the main army of operations I urge the following 
composition : — 

250 regiments of infantry, say 225,000 men. 

100 field-batteries, 600 guns., 15,000 " 

28 regiments of cavalry 25,500 " 

5 regiments engineer troops 7,500 " 

Total 273,000 " 

"The force must be supplied with the necessary en- 
gineer and pontoon trains, and with transportation for 
every thing save tents. Its general line of operations 
should be so directed that water-transportation can be 
availed of from point to point, by means of the ocean 
and the rivers emptying into it. An essential feature of 
the plan of operations will be the employment of a strong 
naval force to protect the movements of a fleet of trans- 
ports intended to convey a considerable body of troops 
from point to point of the enemy's sea-coast, thus either 
creating diversions and rendering it necessary for them 
to detach largely from their main body in order to pro- 
tect such of their cities as may be threatened, or else 
landing and forming establishments on their coast at any 
favorable places that opportunity might offer. This naval 

10 



110 MEMORANDUM ON THE WAR. [1861. 

force should also co-operate with the main army in its 
efforts to seize the important seaboard towns of the rebels. 

"It cannot be ignored that the construction of railroads 
has introduced a new and very important element into 
war, by the great facilities thus given for concentrating 
at particular positions large masses of troops from remote 
sections, and by creating new strategic jjoints and lines 
of operations. 

"It is intended to overcome this difficulty by the par- 
tial operations suggested, and such others as the parti- 
cular case may require. We must endeavor to seize places 
on the railways in the rear of the enemy's points of con- 
centration, and we must threaten their seaboard cities, 
in order that each State may be forced, by the necessity 
of its own defence, to diminish its contingent to the Con- 
federate army. 

"The proposed movement down the Mississippi will 
produce important results in this connection. That ad- 
vance and the progress of the main army at the East Avill 
materially assist each other, by diminishing the resistance 
to be encountered by each. 

"The tendency of the Mississippi movement upon all 
questions connected with cotton is too well understood 
by the President and Cabinet to need any illustration 
from me. 

"There is another independent movement that has 
often been suggested, and which has always recommended 
itself to my judgment. I refer to a movement from 
Kansas and Nebraska, through the Indian Territory, upon 
Red River and Western Texas, for the purpose of pro- 
tecting and developing the latent Union and free-State 
sentiment well known to predominate in Western Texas, 
and which, like a similar sentiment in Western Virginia, 
will, if protected, ultimately organize that section into a 
free State. How far it will be possible to support this 
movement by an advance through New Mexico from Call- 



Age 34.] MEMORANDUM ON THE WAR. Ill 

fornia, is a matter which I have not sufficiently examined 
to be able to express a decided opinion. If at all practi- 
cable, it is eminently desirable, as bringing into play the 
resources and warlike qualities of the Pacific States, as 
well as identifying them with our cause and cementing 
the bond of union between them and the General Govern- 
ment. 

"If it is not departing too far from my province, I will 
venture to suggest the policy of an intimate alliance and 
cordial understanding with Mexico : their sympathies and 
interests are with us, — their antipathies exclusively against 
our enemies and their institutions. I think it would not 
be difficult to obtain from the Mexican Government the 
right to use, at least during the present contest, the road 
from Guaymas to New Mexico: this concession would 
very materially reduce- the obstacles of the column 
moving from the Pacific. A similar permission to use 
their territory for the passage of troops between the 
Panuco and the Rio Grande would enable us to throw 
a column of troops by a good road from Tampico, or 
Bome of the small harbors north of it, upon and across 
the Rio Grande, without risk and scarcely firing a shot. 

"To what extent, if any, it would be desirable to take 
into service and employ Mexican soldiers, is a question 
entirely political, on which I do not venture to offer an 
opinion. 

" The force I have recommended is large ; the expense is 
great. It is possible that a smaller force might accomplish 
the object in view ; but I understand it to be the purpose 
of this great nation to re-establish the power of its Govern- 
ment, and to restore peace to its citizens, in the shortest 
possible time, 

"The question to be decided is simply this: shall we 
crush the rebellion at one blow, terminate the war in one 
campaign, or shall we leave it for a legacy to our de- 
scendants ? 



112 MEMORANDUM ON THE WAR. [1861. 

" When the extent of the possible line of operations is 
considered, the force asked for the main army under 
my command cannot be regarded as unduly large. Every 
mile we advance carries us farther from our base of opera- 
tions, and renders detachments necessary to cover our 
communications, while the enemy will be constantly con- 
centrating as he falls back. I propose, with the force 
which I have requested, not only to drive the enemy out 
of Virginia and occupy Richmond, but to occupy Charles- 
ton, Savannah, Montgomery, Pensacola, Mobile, and New 
Orleans ; in other words, to move into the heart of the ene- 
my's country and crush out the rebellion in its very heart. 

"By seizing and repairing the railroads as we advance, 
the difficulties of transportation will be materially di- 
minished. It is perhaps unnecessary to state that, in 
addition to the forces named in this memorandum, strong 
reserves should be formed, ready to supply any losses that 
may occur. 

"In conclusion, I would submit that the exigencies of 
the treasury may be lessened by making only partial pay- 
ments to our troops when in the enemy's country, and 
by giving the obligations of the United States for such 
supplies as may there be obtained. 

"George B. McClellan, 

" Major- General." 

G-eneral McClellan, speaking of this memoran- 
dum in his Eeport, written two years after, says, — 

"I do not think the events of the war have proved 
these views upon the methods and plans of its conduct 
altogether incorrect. They certainly have not proved my 
estimate of the number of troops and scope of operations 
too large. It is probable that I did underestimate the 
time necessary for the completion of arms and equip- 
ments. It was not strange, however, that by many civi- 



Age 34.] CHARACTER OF THE MEMORANDUM. 113 

Hans intrusted with authority there should have been an 
exactly opposite opinion held in both these particulars." 

This simple and modest statement is read with 
melancholy interest by the light of the events 
which have transpired since the date of the memo- 
randum. And that portion of the American people — 
we believe, the larger portion — which is willing to 
hear before it judges, will not fail to recognize in 
the memorandum itself the sagacious and compre- 
hensive views of a man who has carefully studied 
the problem before him, and believe that he had 
found a solution for it. It steers clear of the safe 
generalities in which mediocrity takes refuge, as 
well as the wild predictions that rash self-confidence 
is apt to make. His conclusions are drawn from a 
wide and patient survey of the field before him. 
Here is a plan broad in its scope and well con- 
sidered in its details. It may be that the event 
might not, under any circumstances, have responded 
to his expectations; it may be that the soldier might 
not have had the means to execute what the states- 
man had conceived : it is enough to know that the 
opportunity was never given him to try the experi- 
ment fairly. When he spoke of the possibility of 
ending the war by a single campaign, he j^erhaps 
underestimated both the moral and material forces 
arrayed against him ; but, in the multitude of pre- 
dictions as to the duration of the war which have 
not come to pass, an anticipation like this will not 
be treasured up against him. 

For some weeks after the date of the above 
memorandum, the work of organizing and arranging 

10^ 



114 ball's bluff. [1861. 

the troops went on diligently and uninterruptedly, 
and on the 15th of October the grand aggregate of 
the forces in and around Washington was one hun- 
dred and fifty-two thousand and fifty-one, of whom 
one hundred and thirty-three thousand two hundred 
and one were present and fit for active duty. The 
infantry was arranged in brigades of four regiments 
each, and divisions of three brigades each were 
gradually formed, with artillery and cavalry at- 
tached to each division as far as was practicable. 
The formation into corps was to be postponed until 
the army had been for some time in the field, as 
were recommendations for the promotion of officers 
to the rank of major-generals till actual trial in ser- 
vice had shown who were best fitted for these im- 
portant posts. 

On the 15th of October, the main body of the 
Army of the Potomac was in the immediate vicinity 
of Washington, with detachments on the left bank 
of the river as far down as Liverpool Point and as 
far up as Williamsport and its vicinity. General 
Dix was at Baltimore, General Banks at Darnes- 
town, and General Stone at Poolesville. 

On the 2l8t of October, the disastrous engage- 
ment at Ball's Bluff took place. Efforts have been 
made to connect the name of General McClellan 
with this affair; but the facts in the case, and es- 
pecially the testimony taken by the Congressional 
Committee on the Conduct of the War, show that the 
reconnoissances directed by him had been brought 
to a close during the preceding day, and that the 
movements which led to the battle of the 21st were 



Age 34.] GENERAL SCOTT. 115 

not ordered by him. It is enough to say that the 
responsibility of the day does not rest upon General 
McClellan, without going further and inquiring to 
whom it does belong; but it may be added that 
the battle of Ball's Bluff is one of the many enter- 
prises of this war which are held to be brilliant if 
successful, and rash if unsuccessful. The praise 
in one event and the blame in the other are alike 
exaggerated. A great stake is played for, but the 
rule of the stern game of war requires that in such 
cases a great stake must be laid down. 

On the 31st day of October, 1861, Lieutenant- 
General Scott addressed a letter to the Secretary 
of "War, in which he requested that, on account of 
his increasing infirmities and the necessity of re- 
pose of mind and body, his name might be placed 
on the list of army officers retired from active ser- 
vice. The letter was laid before a Cabinet meeting, 
and General Scott was placed on the retired list of 
the army, with the full pay and allowance of his 
rank; and on the same day the President, accom- 
panied by the members of the Cabinet, jDroceeded 
to his residence and read to him the official order 
which gave to the decision the force of law. The 
venerable commander-in-chief expressed his ac- 
knowledgments in words and with a manner which 
betokened strong emotion, and the President an- 
swered in appropriate terms. In the official order 
announcing General Scott^s retirement, the Presi- 
dent of the United States said, in language the 
justice and propriety of which were universally 
felt,— 



116 GENERAL ORDER. [1861. 

*'The American people will hear with sadness 
and deep emotion that General Scott has withdrawn 
from the active control of the army, while the 
President and unanimous Cabinet express their own 
and the nation's sympathy in his personal affliction, 
and their profound sense of the important public 
services rendered by him to his country during his 
long and brilliant career, among which will ever 
be gratefully distinguished his faithful devotion to 
the Constitution, the Union, and the flag, when as- 
sailed by parricidal rebellion." 

Upon the retirement of General Scott, General 
McClellan, by a general order dated November 1, 
was directed to assume the command of the army 
of the United States, with his head-quarters at 
Washington, and on the same day the new com- 
mander-in-chief issued the following order: — 

" General Order No. 19. 

"Head-Quarters of the Army, 

''Washington, D.C, Nov. 1, 1861. 

"In accordance with General Order No. 94, from the 
War Department, I hereby assume command of the 
armies of the United States. 

" In the midst of the difficulties which encompass and 
divide the nation, hesitation and self-distrust may well 
accompany the assumption of so vast a responsibility; 
but confiding, as I do, in the loyalty, discipline, and cou- 
rage of our troops, and believing, as I do, that Providence 
will favor ours as the just cause, I cannot doubt that suc- 
cess will crown our efforts and sacrifices. 

"The army will unite with me in the feeling of regret 
that the weight of many years, and the effect of increasing 
mfirmities, contracted and intensified in his country's 



Age 34.] GIFT OF A SWORD. 117 

service, should just now remove from our head the great 
soldier of our nation, — the hero who, in his youth, raised 
high the reputation of his country on the fields of Canada, 
which he sanctified with his blood ; who, in more mature 
years, proved to the world that American skill and valor 
could repeat, if not eclipse, the exploits of Cortez in the 
land of the Montezumas; whose whole life has been de- 
voted to the service of his country ; whose whole efforts 
have been directed to uphold our honor at the smallest 
sacrifice of life ; — a warrior who scorned the selfish glories 
of the battle-field, when his great qualities as a statesman 
could be employed more profitably for his country; a 
citizen who, in his declining years, has given to the world 
the most shining instance of loyalty in disregarding all 
ties of birth and clinging to the cause of truth and honor. 
Such has been the career of Winfield Scott, whom it has 
long been the delight of the nation to honor as a man 
and a soldier. 

"While we regret his loss, there is one thing we cannot 
regret, — the bright example he has left for our emulation. 
Let us all hope and pray that his declining years may be 
passed in peace and happiness, and that they may be 
cheered by the success of the country and the cause he 
has fought for and loved so well. Beyond all that, let us 
do nothing that can cause him to blush for us. Let no 
defeat of the army he has so long commanded embitter 
his last years, but let our victories illuminate the close of 
a life so grand. 

"Geo. B, McClellan, 
" Major-General commanding, U. S. A." 

On the next day, JSTovember 2, General McClellan 
received a sword which had been voted to him by 
the City Councils of Philadelphia, a deputation of 
which went to Washington and gave the sword to 



118 LETTERS OF INSTRUCTION. [186]. 

him in person, at his house. In a very brief reply 
to the complimentary address which accompanied 
the gift, he said, " I ask in the future forbearance, 
patience, and confidence. With these we can ac- 
complish all." 

On the 7th, 11th, and 12th days of November, 
1861, respectively, letters of instruction were ad- 
dressed by the commander-in-chief to General Buell, 
in charge of the Department of the Ohio, and Gene- 
ral Halleck, in that of the Department of Missouri. 
These were general in their scope, rather indicating 
what it was desirable to accomplish, and pointing 
out certain principles of government and adminis- 
tration, than going into details which had been 
matters of oral discussion between him and these 
officers. A brief extract from the letter to Gene- 
ral Buell, of the date November 7, will give an 
impression of their spirit and purpose : — 

"It is possible that the conduct of our political affairs 
in Kentucky is more important than that of our military 
operations. I certainly cannot overestimate the import- 
ance of the former. You will please constantly to bear 
in mind the precise issue for which we are fighting: that 
issue is the preservation of the Union, and the restora- 
tion of the full authority of the General Government 
over all portions of our territory. We shall most readily 
suppress this rebellion and restore the authority of 
the Government by religiously respecting the constitu- 
tional rights of all. I know that I express the feelings 
and opinions of the President when I say that we are 
fighting only to preserve the integrity of the Union and 
the constitutional authority of the General Govern- 
ment." 



Age 34.] CAPTURE OF NEW ORLEANS. 119 

These letters of instruction should be read in 
connection with two others written subsequently 
by General McClellan, one dated February 14, 1862, 
addressed to General Sherman, commanding at 
Port Eoyal, giving directions as to movements 
against Fort Pulaski, Fernandina, Savannah, Fort 
Sumter, and Charleston, and one dated February 
23, 1862, addressed to General Butler, containing 
instructions as to military movements in the South- 
west. From this letter an extract is here sub- 
joined ; — 

"The object of your expedition is one of vital import- 
ance, — the capture of New Orleans. The route selected 
is up the Mississippi River, and the first obstacle to be 
encountered (perhaps the only one) is in the resistance 
offered by Forts St. Philip and Jackson. It is expected 
that the navy can reduce these works: in that case, you 
will, after their capture, leave a sufficient garrison in 
them to render them perfectly secure ; and it is recom- 
mended that, on the upward passage, a few heavy guns 
and some troops be left at the pilot-station (at the forks 
of the river), to cover a retreat in the event of a disaster. 
These troops and guns will, of course, be removed as soon 
as the forts are captured. 

"Should the navy fail to reduce the works, you will 
land your forces and siege-train, and endeavor to breach 
the works, silence their fire, and carry them by assault. 

"The next resistance will be near the English Bend, 
where there are some earthen batteries. Here it may be 
necessary for you to land your troo23S and co-operate with 
the naval attack, although it is more than probable that 
the Navy, unassisted, can accomplish the result. If these 
works are taken, the city of New Orleans necessarily falls. 
In that event, it will probably be best to occupy Algiers 



120 NEW ORLEANS. [1861. 

with the mass of your troops, also the eastern bank of 
the river above the city. It may be necessary to place 
Bome troops in the city to preserve order ; but, if there 
appears to be sufficient Union sentiment to control the 
city, it may be best, for purposes of discipline, to keep 
your men out of the city. 

"After obtaining possession of New Orleans, it will be 
necessary to reduce all the works guarding its approaches 
from the east, and particularly to gain the Manchac Pass. 

*' Baton Rouge, Berwick Bay, and Fort Livingston will 
next claim your attention. 

"A feint on Gralveston may facilitate the objects we 
have in view. I need not call your attention to the ne- 
cessity of gaining possession of all the rolling stock you 
can on the different railways, and of obtaining control 
of the roads themselves. The occupation of Baton Rouge 
by a combined naval and land force should be accom- 
plished as soon as possible after you have gained New 
Orleans. Then endeavor to open your communication 
with the northern column by the Mississippi, always 
bearing in mind the necessity of occupying Jackson, 
Mississippi, as soon as you can safely do so, either after 
or before you have effected the junction. Allow nothing 
to divert you from obtaining full possession of all the ap- 
proaches to New Orleans. When that object is accom- 
plished to its fullest extent, it will be necessary to make 
a combined attack on Mobile, in order to gain possession 
of the harbor and works, as well as to control the railway 
terminus at the city. In regard to this, I will send more 
detailed instructions as the operations of the Northern 
column develop themselves. 

"I may briefly state that the general objects of the ex- 
pedition ance—^rst, the reduction of New Orleans and all 
its approaches; then Mobile and its defences ; then Pen- 
sacola, Galveston, &c. It is probable that by the time 
New Orleans is reduced, it will be in the power of the 



Age 34.] COMPREHENSIVE TLAN. 121 

Government to reinforce the land forces sufficiently to 
accomplish all these objects. In the mean time, you will 
please give all the assistance in your power to the army 
and navy commanders in your vicinity, never losing sight 
of the fact that the great object to be achieved is the cap- 
ture and firm retention of New Orleans." 

The remarkably sagacious foresight shown in the 
instructions to General Butler as to the mode of 
attack upon New Orleans can be fully apprehended 
only after reading in detail the account of the 
brilliant capture of that city, by the combined 
military and naval forces of the United States, 
a few weeks later. 

The several letters above referred to are given in 
full in General McClellan's Keport, and, when read 
together, will be found to indicate a plan which 
embraced in its scope all the armies of the Union 
and the whole region occupied by the Confederates. 
It was the purpose of the commander-in-chief that 
the various parts of the plan should be carried 
out simultaneously, as far as was possible, and in 
co-operation along the whole line of movement. 
In this general scheme the Army of the Potomac 
was to bear its j)art, — a leading part, it is true, but 
still a part in concert with other forces of the 
Union. This should be borne in mind in order to 
explain and justify the delay which was necessary 
to enable that army to perform its share in the 
execution of the whole work. 

From what has been said, it is easy to see how 
trying was the position of General McClellan during 
the closing weeks of the year 1861, and how 

11 



122 DIFFICULT POSITION. [L861. 

painful was the weight of responsibility resting 
upon him. He was a young man, whose name 
until recently had been unknown to the public, 
suddenly set at the head of military operations 
which extended over a space and were upon a 
scale to tax the strategical skill and vast organiz- 
ing genius of JSTapoleon himself The Army of the 
Potomac, which was immediately under him, was 
ten times larger than any army that had ever been 
under the command of one man upon the soil of 
the United States since the Eevolution; and the 
difficulty of commanding armies increases in much 
more than a direct ratio with their numbers, — or, 
in other words, it does not follow that among ten 
men fit to command ten thousand men there will 
always be found one fit to command a hundred 
thousand. Even the Duke of Wellington never led 
an army of a hundred thousand men.* 

His position was thus in itself one of great respon- 
sibility; but there were extrinsic elements which 
added to its burdens. The American people are 
easily elated and easily depressed, and they had 
passed through both of these states of feeling 
during the eventful year 1861. At the breaking 
out of the war, amidst the magnificent uprising of 
the nation to sustain the Government, we had ex- 
ulted in the confident expectation that the rebellion 

* "Napoleon was of tlie opinion that lie and the Archduke 
Charles were the only men in Europe who could manoeuvre 
one hundred thousand men : he considered it a very difficult 
thing." — General Heintzelman. [Report on the Conduct of the 
War, Part I. p. 118.) 



Age 34.] PUBLIC IMPATIENCE. 123 

would at once be crushed and broken into fragments 
by the irresistible force arrayed against it. But 
the disastrous battle of Bull Eun and the untoward 
affair of Ball's Bluff had blighted these fervid 
hoj)es, and a despondency had taken possession of 
the public mind which was as unreasonable as the 
previous assurance had been. This rising and sink- 
ing of our spirits had tended to aggravate that im- 
patience which must be admitted to be one of our 
national traits; and in the autumn of 1861 a strong 
desire had taken possession of the public mind that 
some decisive step should be taken, some vigorous 
blow should be struck. The people murmured and 
chafed at the delay that clogged the movements of 
the Army of the Potomac; the press, with its myriad 
voices, gave utterance to the feeling, and the cry 
" On to Eichmond !" became the symbol and motto 
of the hour. This was a very natural sentiment, 
and, to some extent, commendable, — because it 
caught its warmth in part from the j)atriotism of 
the people and their earnest wish to have the 
Union restored. They desired to see some re- 
sults commensurate with their efforts and sacrifices. 
But strong feeling is apt to be unjust, especially 
when it is general as well as strong; and our igno- 
rance of war — that happy element in our lot — had 
an influence in the same direction. We had read 
of armies, but practically we knew nothing about 
them. The battles of the War of 1812 and of the 
war with Mexico had been fought with small and 
manageable bodies of men; but so immense an army 
as that which was encamped in and around Wash- 



124 IGNORANCE OF WAR. [ISGl. 

ington was a wholly new thing to us. Wo knew 
nothing of the vast amount of transportation ne- 
cessary to supply a hundred thousand men with 
food, — especially on the bountiful scale upon which 
our troops are fed, — how dependent such a body 
is, in a country like Eastern Virginia, on its base 
of operations, and how it must keep up an unin- 
terrujjted connection wath a navigable stream or a 
railway. We knew little or nothing of the obstacles 
presented to the advance of a great army by the 
nature of the country, — its woods, its swamps, its 
streams, and its mud. From some of the articles 
which appeared in the [N'orthern papers, one would 
have thought that the writers supposed the soldiers 
had wings and could live without food. Their ex- 
perience would have been enlarged, and their judg- 
ment corrected, had they been required to trans- 
port a single battery of siege-guns over the roads 
of Eastern Yirginia in a rainy December.* 

* "Again, the public treat the army as a man or a horse, to 
whom it is only necessary to say 'go' and motion follows. 
They fancy that a fight can be witnessed from a hill-top, as 
a boxing-match can be viewed from a third-story window. 
They forget that this army, say of sixty thousand men only, 
must eat at least one hundred thousand meals a day, and, if 
the army is to be kept in prime order, must sleep at least six 
hours out of the twenty-four. Where there are turnpike roads, 
artillery can get along very well. Where there are no turnpikes, 
and the weather is wet, the last carriage of a single company 
of artillery — the thirteenth — often mires where the first car- 
riage — a gvin, technically — has found no difficulty. What, then, 
must it be when two or three hundred pieces of artillery, 
each one accompanied by a caisson, or ammunition-wagon, 



Age 34.] GEN. McCLELLAN's FRIENDS NOT WISE. 125 

And it must be admitted tliat the friends of Gene- 
ral McClellan themselves, or some of them, ^Ycre 
unwise in the lavish praise they heaped uj)on him, 
by which they awakened such wild hopes and im- 
jDOSsible expectations. He was commended not for 
what he had done, but for what he was about to do; 
and what he did and said, and still more what he 
was going to do, was paraded before the public 
gaze in a way that to no one could be more dis- 
tasteful than to him, an essentially modest man, 
who knew better than anybody else the weight of 
the burden that was upon him. The highest kind- 
ness to him at that time would have been to let him 
alone and say as little about him as possible. To 
a manly and truthful nature, nothing is less welcome 
than undeserved praise. Undeserved blame is 
bitter, but undeserved praise is sickening. Besides, 

and every six with a forg«, — making six hundred and fifty car- 
riages that go into a battle, — have to be carried, in wet weather, 
through a swampy country, like that, for example, on the 
Chickahominy ? This is mere fighting-material; to which add 
two or three thousand wagons for feeding-purposes, and you 
begin to have an idea of what has to be moved when an army 
moves, to so-y nothing of the cattle by thousands that have to 
be driven along, and a horde of camp-followers of all kinds. 
I am not speaking noAV of a corps of ten or twenty thousand 
men who start on a foray with nothing but their shirts, panta- 
loons, and boots to carry, besides their arms, but of an army 
which, when a victory is gained, is prepared to retain what is 
w^on in an enemy's country, — just such an army as McClellan 
had in the Peninsula." — From ^^ Three Great Battles'^ (a pam- 
phlet printed, but not published), by J. IT. B. Latrobe, Esq. 

ll-c 



126 POLITICS. [18G1. 

extravagant commendation is sure to j)roducc a 
reaction, sooner or later. 

The newspaper-correspondents who bedaubed 
him with flattery, who described his person and 
features with the minuteness of a passport, who 
chronicled all his movements, w^ho named him the 
Young Napoleon, — he being of the same age as the 
Emperor was at the date of the battle of Austerlitz, — 
were moved by a friendly spirit, mingled with that 
hero-worship which is so decided an American trait; 
but they were doing him any thing but a kindness. 
Indeed, they were playing directly into the hands 
of his enemies and ill-wishers, political and per- 
sonal. 

Nor was this all. General McClellan was as little 
of a politician as a citizen of the United States 
well can be. The subject of politics had never oc- 
cupied his mind. His time and attention had been 
Avholly given to the duties of his profession while 
he remained in the army, and afterwards to the 
duties of his business. It had so happened that 
he had never but once, since reaching the legal 
age, been in a position to exercise the right of 
voting. But he had opinions upon the political 
issues of the time; and these opinions were not 
those of the party into whose hands the people 
had committed the government of the country; and 
the only time he had ever voted was in the memora- 
ble contest in Illinois between Mr. Lincoln and Mr. 
Douglas, when he had preferred the latter; but in our 
country, sooner or later, every thing is swept into 
the gulf of politics; and thus General McClellan'a 



Age 34.] CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE. 127 

military capacit}^, his courage, even his patriotism, 
began to be looked at from a political point of view, 
and to be called in question by heated political par- 
tisans. 

When Congress assembled, in December, 1861, 
President Lincoln announced the appointment of 
General McClellan to the post of commander of 
the army, in these terms, which were generally re- 
ceived as expressing no more than the exact truth : — 

" With the retirement of General Scott came the exe- 
cutive duty of appointing in his stead a general-in-chief 
of the army. It is a fortunate circumstance that neither 
in council nor country was there, so far as I know, any 
difference of opinion as to the proper person to he selected. The 
retiring chief repeatedly expressed his judgment in favor 
of General McClellan for the position; and in this the 
nation seemed to give a unanimous concurrence. The 
designation of General McClellan is, therefore, in a con- 
siderable degree, the selection of the country, as well as 
of the Executive; and hence there is better reason to 
hope there will be given him the confidence and cor- 
dial support thus, by fair implication, promised, and 
without which he cannot with so full efficiency serve the 
country.'' 

Within a few days after the meeting of Congress, 
the vague discontent and restless impatience of the 
community found expression in the shape of a Con- 
gressional Committee on the Conduct of the War, 
consisting of three members of the Senate and four 
members of the House of Eepresentatives. The 
first motion towards the formation of the com- 
mittee was made in the Senate on the 9th day of 



128 CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE. [ISGl. 

December, and the first meeting of tlie committee 
was held on the 20th of the same month. From 
that time until the close of April they sat nearly 
every day; and there were several meetings during 
the months of May, June, and July. Had the com- 
mittee confined their inquiries and investigations 
to past transactions, and considered themselves as 
charged with the duty of collecting and recording 
testimony to be used by future historians of the 
war, their labors might have been of value to the 
country; but they did not take this limited view 
of tlfe scope and sphere of their operations. In 
their judgment, the future as well as the past was 
committed to their trust. For instance, the very 
first witness examined before them was General 
I. B. Eichardson, and the second was General S. P. 
Heintzelman, and both were examined on the same 
day, December 24. General Eichardson's examina- 
tion was short, and not very important. The first 
question put to General Heintzelman by the chair- 
man began thus : — " We have inquired a little about 
the past: now we want to inquire a little about the 
present and the future, which is, perhaps, more 
important. As you are a military man of great 
experience, we want some of your opinions on 
some matters." As to the "opinions" of the wit- 
ness which they wanted, one or two questions and 
answers may suffice to show : — 



(' Ques. — 'I would inquire whether there has been any 
council of war among your ofiicers and the commander- 
in-chief.' 



Age 34.] CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE. 129 

"Ans. — * I have never been consulted upon any military- 
subject/ 

•x- * -X- -K- ■?{• * 

*'Ques. — 'You think a council of war among the chief 
officers might be beneficial?^ 

'^Ans. — ' I thought so. Certainly it would be very satis- 
factory to some of them, I know. We have been very 
anxious to know what is proposed to be done. I should 
act with more confidence if I knew.' 

*^Ques. — 'Is there any feeling among officers that they 
are not consulted, — that they are slighted f 

'^Ans. — 'Yes, sir: I suppose there is some,' " &c. &c.^ 

This particular grievance — the reserve of the 
commander-in-chief, and his not consulting with 
his inferior officers — was a frequent point of inquiry 
on the part of the committee during the winter 
months, but by no means the only one. The gene- 
ral plan of the campaign, the policy which delayed 
a forward movement, the organization of the army, 
the proportion of cavalry to the other arms, the 
defences about "Washington, the number of men 
requisite to make it secure, were also among the 
subjects to which the inquiries of the committee 
were directed. Their investigations were moulded 
and colored by a spirit not friendly to the com- 
mander-in-chief. Day after day, general officers, 
and sometimes those of inferior rank, were called 
before them, and invited, not to say encouraged, 
to give their opinions upon the plans of the com- 
mander-in-chief, his military views, and the man- 
ner in which he discharged his duties, and thus to 

* Report on the Conduct of the War, Part I. pp. 117-121. 



130 CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE- [1861. 

enter upon a, line of discussion which, if not di- 
rectly forbidden by the Army Eegulations,* was 
unfavorable to discipline and tended to injure the 
relations between the .commander-in-chief and his 
subordinates. 

* The following is the 26th Article of the Revised Regula- 
tions for the Army: — 

"Deliberations or discussions among any class of military 
men, having the object of conveying praise or censure or any 
mark of approbation toward their superiors or others in the 
military service, . . . are strictly prohibited." 

Some of the ofl&cers examined seemed conscious of the diffi- 
cult position in which they stood between their duty as sub- 
jects and their duty as officers. General Lander, for instance, 
was asked this question: — 

"'If you will give us your opinion as a military man on 
that subject [the plan of the campaign], I will be obliged to 
you.' 

"^4n5. — *It is against the Army Regulations and laws of 
Congress to discuss the views and plans of your superior offi- 
cer. In answering this question,' " &c. — Report on the Conduct 
of the War, Part I. p. 160. 

General Fitz-John Porter was asked, — 

"'Should' the army 'retire into winter quarters, or should 
it attempt an enterprise to dislodge the enemy?' 

"-dns, — 'That is a question I cannot answer.' 

^'Qucs. — 'I merely ask your military opinion.' 

*'Ans. — 'I decline to give a military opinion on that point. 
I am in possession of information in regard to intended move- 
ments, — rather, a portion of General McClellan's plans, a 
small portion only; and I decline giving any information 
whatever in regard to future movements, or what they ought 
to be. I do not think it my business to do so, and we are 
forbidden by our regulations to discuss or express opinions 
on these matters.' " — Report on the Conduct of the War, Part I. 
p. 171. 



Age 34.] CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE. 131 

It is fair to state that at the very first meeting 
of the committee " it was agreed that, as a matter 
of honor, none of its members should reveal any 
thing that transpired in committee until such time 
as the injunction of secrecy should be removed;" 
but such a determination, by the cloud of mystery 
it threw around their proceedings, could only give 
rise to conjectures probably more injurious in their 
influence than the truth w^ould have been if fully 
revealed. Besides, Congressional committees are 
human, and not hermetically sealed against the 
transmission of that kind of knowledge which has 
the charm of being forbidden. 

ISTor did the committee confine themselves to the 
task of taking and recording testimony, and the free 
discussion in their own room of military plans and 
movements, but, as they say in their Keport, "they 
were in constant communication with the President 
and his Cabinet, and neglected no opportunity of at 
once laying before them the information acquired 
by them in the course of their investigations.^' It 
is fair to presume that they gave advice as well as 
information; and, indeed, the journal of their pro- 
ceedings show^s that they did; and their advice was 
probably of weight in the conduct of the campaign. 
The following is an extract from the journal of the 
committee:— 

"February 26, 1862. 
"Pursuant to previous arrangement, the committee 
waited upon the President at eight o'clock on Tuesday 
evening, February 25. They made known to the Presi- 
dent that, having examined many of the highest military 



132 CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE. [1861. 

officers of the army, their statements of the necessity of 
dividing the great Army of the Potomac into corps d'arm^e 
had impressed the committee with the belief that it was es- 
sential that such a division of that army should be made, — 
that it would be dangerous to move upon a formidable 
enemy with the present organization of the army. The 
application was enforced by many arguments drawn from 
the usages in France, and every other military nation in 
Europe, and the fact that, so far as the committee could 
learn, all our military officers agreed that our army would 
not be efficient unless such an organization was had. 
The President observed that he had never considered 
the organization of the army into army corps so essential 
as the committee seemed to represent it to be: still, he 
had long been in favor of such an organization. General 
McClellan, however, did not seem to think it so essential, 
though he had at times expressed himself as favorable 
to it. The committee informed the President that the 
Secretary of War had authorized them to say to him that 
he deemed such an organization necessary. 

" General McClellan was in favor of an organization 
into corps, but only proposed deferring it till time should 
show what officers were best fitted for corps commanders, 
— which seems reasonable enough. It was a measure 
which surely might have been postponed till the army 
had taken the field, at least.'' 

Whatever may have been the motives of the 
committee, or however earnest may have been 
their desire to see the war brought to a speedy 
and successful termination, it is certain that, in 
point of fact, they were only aiding the enemy; 
for the interference of such a body, direct or in- 
direct, with the conduct of the campaign, could 



Age 35.] CONFEDERATE FORCES. 133 

have no other effect than to impair the unity of 
action and concentration of purpose which are so 
essential to the success of an army. 



CHAPTEE YI. 



We are now brought to the close of the year 
1861 and the opening of 1862. The positions and 
numbers of the Confederate army in Eastern Vir- 
ginia were as follows. At Norfolk and Yorktown 
there was a considerable force, — probably over thirty 
thousand men. The army before Washington occu- 
pied an extended line running from the southeast 
to the northwest. The left wing was at Leesburg 
and its vicinity, in force about forty-five hundred; 
and there were about thirteen thousand in the valley 
of the Shenandoah. The main body, comprising 
about eighty thousand men, was at Manassas and 
Centreville. At these points the positions were na- 
turally very strong, with impassable streams and 
broken ground, affording ample protection to their 
flanks, and with lines of intrcnchment sweeping all 
the available approaches. The right was at Brooks's 
Station, Dumfries, Lower Occoquan and vicinity, 
numbering about eighteen thousand. This wing 
of the army formed a support to several batteries 
on the Lower Potomac, extending from High Point 
and Cockpit Point to the Chopawampsic Creek. 
These batteries, greatly obstructing the navigation 
of the river, and to this extent practically block- 
12 



134 FORWARD MOVEMENT DESIRED, [1862. 

ading Washington, were a source of great annoy- 
ance to the Administration and of mortification to 
the people, and a strong desire was felt that a 
movement should be made to destroy them; but 
General McClellan w^as of the opinion that such an 
attempt would be attended with danger, and that 
the destruction of these batteries by our army 
w^ould afford but temporary relief unless we were 
strong enough to hold the entire line of the Poto- 
mac. The desired end could be secured either by 
driving the enemy from Manassas and Acquia 
Creek by superior force, or by manoeuvring to 
compel him to vacate the position. The latter 
course was finally adopted, w^ith success. 

That an onward movement should be made to 
Bichmond, and the rebellion be there attacked in 
its heart, was a point on Avhich the public, the 
Administration, and the commander-in-chief w^ere 
agreed; but by what route to make the approach — 
whether by the Lower Potomac and the Peninsula, 
or by a direct attack upon the positions at Manassas 
and Centreville — formed a fruitful subject of debate 
in the newspapers and among military men; and 
the discussion was all the more animated from the 
fact that whatever plans General McClellan had 
formed, or was forming, he did not make them 
known to others. 

Thus far nothing had, apparently, disturbed the 
relations between General McClellan and the Ad- 
ministration, or changed the friendly feeling which 
had inspired the paragraph w^hich has been quoted 
from the President's message. On the 14th day of 



Age 35.] SECRETARY STANTON. 135 

January, 1862, Mr. Simon Cameron resigned his 
position as Secretary of War, and Mr. Edwin M. 
Stanton was appointed to fill his place. Mr. Stanton 
had not been in political life, and was known only 
as a lawyer in large practice, of strong grasp of 
mind and great capacity for labor. He had been 
a member of the Democratic party; and the selec- 
tion of an able and honorable political opponent 
for such a place, at such a time, seemed an act alike 
of wisdom and magnanimity, which gave general 
pleasure. Thus the appointment was hailed with 
universal favor, and the highest hopes were enter- 
tained of an improved administration of the War 
Department, under a man fresh from the people, 
unscarred and unstained by political strife^- But, 
in whatever other respects the country may have 
been a gainer by the introduction into the Cabinet 
of a man of Mr. Stanton's energy, it is certain that 
the hands of General McClellan were not strength- 
ened by the change, and that the confidence reposed 
in him by the Administration was not thereby in- 
creased.* V^ 



■^ The following is an extract from the journal of the Con- 
gressional Committee on the Conduct of the War, under date 
of January 21, 1862, a few days after Mr. Stanton's appoint- 
ment: — 

*'Sir: — I am instructed by the Joint Committee on the Con- 
duct of the present War to inquire of you whether there is 
such an office as commander-in-chief of the army of the 
United States, or any grade above that of major-general. If 
so, by what authority is it created? Does it exist by virtue 



136 INTERVIEW WITH THE SECRETARY. [18C2. 

General McClellan had been taken ill at Christ- 
mas-time, 1861, and was confined to his bed about 
three weeks. Upon his recovery, in the middle of 
January, he says in his Beport that he found that 
an excessive anxiety for an immediate movement of 
the Army of the Potomac had taken possession of 
the Administration. He had an interview with the 
new Secretary of War, soon after the appointment 
of the latter, in which he explained verbally his 
design as to the part of the campaign to be exe- 
cuted by the Army of the Potomac; and this was, to 
attack Richmond by the Lower Chesapeake. )f The 
Secretary instructed him to develop his plan to the 
President, — which he did. Unfortunately, it did 
not meet with the approbation of the latter; and 



of any law of Congress, or any usage of the Government? 
Please give us the information asked for, at your convenience. 
*'I remain, &c., 

"B. F. Wade, Chairman. 
"Hon. Edwin M. Stanton, 

'■'■ Secretary of TFar." 

This seems hardly respectful to the President of the United 
States, after his announcement in his Annual Message that he 
had appointed General McClellan to the very office which the 
committee insinuate does not exist; and had Abraham Lincoln 
been Andrew Jackson, he would have been a bold man who 
would have addressed such a letter to the Secretary of War. 
But we may infer that such a communication would not have 
been sent to Mr. Stanton unless the committee had surmised 
it would be welcome, — which inference is strengthened by the 
fact that the committee, on the preceding day, January 20, 
had had a conference with the Secretary, at his request, of 
several hours' duration. 



Age 35.] PRESIDENT LINCOLN. 137 

from that moment there began on the part of the 
President an active interference with the move- 
ments of the army, frequently without conference 
with the commander, which much increased the 
difficulties of the latter, and were most untoward 
in their influence upon the results of the campaign. 
The President's course can be shown out of his own 
mouth to have been unwise; for in his Annual 
Message of December 3, 1861, he says, immedi- 
ately after the paragraph which has been already 
quoted, announcing the appointment of General 
McClellan as commander-in-chief, — 

" It has been said that one bad general is better than 
two good ones ; and the saying is true, if taken to mean 
no more than that an army is better directed by a single 
mind, though inferior, than by two superior ones at vari- 
ance and cross-purposes with each other. 

"And the same is true in all joint operations, wherein 
those engaged can have none but a common end in view, 
and can differ only as to the choice of means. In a 
storm at sea, no one on board can wish the ship to sink : 
and yet, not unfrequently, all go down together, because 
too many will direct, and no single mind can be allowed 
to control.'^ 

This is well put: it is good sense, enforced by 
pertinent illustration; and the question naturally 
rises, why did not the President "reck his own 
rede"? "Without impugning his patriotism, it may 
be presumed that he yielded his own judgment to 
the force of that mj^sterious influence called '-press- 
ure/' — " a power behind the throne, greater than the 

12^s 



138 PRESIDENT LINCOLN. [1862. 

throne/' — which has done so much harm and so little 
good in the conduct of the war. 

The President's practical exercise of his constitu- 
tional functions as commander-in-chief began with 
the issuing of the following order, which, be it 
always borne in mind, was done without consulta- 
tion with General McClellan: — 



("President's General War Order, No. 1.) 

"Executive Mansion, | 

Washington, January 27, 1862. j 

" Ordered, That the 22d day of February, 1862, be the 
day for a general movement of the land and naval forces 
of the United States against the insurgent forces. That 
especially the army at and about Fortress Monroe, the 
Army of the Potomac, the Army of Western Virginia, the 
army near Munfordsville, Kentucky, the army and flotilla 
at Cairo, and a naval force in the Gulf of Mexico, be 
ready to move on that day. 

"That all other forces, both land and naval, with their 
respective commanders, obey existing orders for the time, 
and be ready to obey additional orders when duly given. 

"That the heads of departments, and especially the 
Secretaries of War and of the Navy, with all their sub- 
ordinates, and the general-in-chief, with all other com- 
manders and subordinates of land and naval forces, will 
severally be held to their strict and full responsibilities 
for prompt execution of this order. 

"Abraham Lincoln." 

The President, as has been said, disapproved of 
General McClellan's plan of attacking Eichmond 
by the Lower Chesapeake, and substituted one of 
his own, by a new order, as follows; — 



Age 35.] PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S ORDERS. 139 

("President's Special War Order, No. 1.) 

•'•Executive Mansion. ] 
"WAsniNGTON, January 31, 18G2. J 

" Ordered, That all the disposable force of the Army of 
the Potomac, after providing safely for the defence of 
"Washington, be formed into an expedition for the im- 
mediate object of seizing and occupying a point upon the 
railroad southwestward of what is known as Manassas 
Junction, all details to be in the discretion of the com- 
mander-in-chief, and the expedition to move before or on 
the 22d day of February next. 

"Abraham Lincoln." 

These two orders should be considered together 
and carefully pondered by every candid man who 
desires to form a correct judgment as to the past, 
irrespective of political prepossessions. The out- 
posts of an army mark the line where the sphere 
of party politics ends. A general is a good 
general or a bad general, a cautious general or a 
rash general; but no military critic will speak of a 
tory general or a whig general, a Eep>ublican gene- 
ral or a Democratic general. The President of 
the United States is a civilian, without military 
training or experience; and he is, moreover, of 
necessity, greatly occupied with important civil du- 
ties, and thus unable to give his time and thoughts 
exclusively to military matters. The second in 
date of the above orders, by a stroke of the pen, 
directs that a most momentous campaign should be 
conducted upon a plan which the commanding 
officer, charged with the duty and responsibility 
of carrying it out, had, after great deliberation, 



140 PRESIDENT LINCOLN. [1S62. 

decided to be inexpedient. It is easy to see bow 
unequal, under sucb difference of opinion, is tbe 
contest between tbe President of tbe United States 
and tbe general wbo acts under peremptory orders 
to take a certain step, but bas tbe " details" in bis 
own "discretion." Does be succeed? it is because 
tbe plan was good; does be fail? it is because tbe 
"details" were not zealously and ably executed.* 

But tbe first of tbese orders deserves more 
consideration even tban tbe second. Tbe Presi- 
dent appoints a certain future day for a general 
movement of tbe land and naval forces of tbe 
country, as if it were tbe marsballing of a civic 
procession or tbe arranging of a mock battle on 
tbe stage. No man can venture to say tbat a 
great army sball move or a great fleet sball sail 



* It may be a consolation for ns to know that the interference 
of civilians in the plans of military commanders has been an 
evil in other countries besides ours. A respectable English 
writer, speaking of their Peninsular campaign, says, "We may 
here observe how hard is the fate of an English general sent 
out in command of an expedition. With the single exception 
of the first Earl of Chatham, England never has possessed an 
able war-minister. Ministers, in general, are far better skilled 
in parliamentary tactics and political intrigue than in history, 
geography, and the other sciences connected with war. Yet 
they will boldly take upon them to plan campaigns, and will even 
order impossibilities to be performed, and the whole blame of 
failure is laid upon the unfortunate commander. What, for 
example, can be conceived more absurd than a Castlereagh, a 
Canning, or a Frere, directing a Moore or a Wellington? 
Such things, however, were." — Keightley: History of England^ 
vol. iii. p. 507. 



Age 35.] PRESIDENT LINCOLN. 141 

on a fixed future day, unless he be endowed with 
the gift of prophecy. And the 22d day of Febru- 
ary was named for the combined movement, it may 
be presumed, simply because it was the birthday 
of Washington. Thus a sort of melodramatic grace 
was attempted to be throw^n over the stern aspect 
of war, and the corps of fine writers who were in 
attendance upon the army were furnished with a 
theme for a sensation paragraph. It is melancholy 
to think that the lives and blood of brave men 
were under the control of those who could be 
moved by so trumpery a consideration as this. 

General McClellan, on receiving the order of 
January 3, asked the President whether it was 
to be regarded as final, or whether he could be per- 
mitted to submit in writing his objections to the 
plan of the Executive and his reasons for preferring 
his own. Permission was granted, and a letter 
was addressed to the Secretary of War, under date 
of February 3. But, before it had been submitted 
to the President, General McClellan received from 
him the following note : — 



"Executive Maxsiox, 1 
Washington, February 3, 1862. J 

"My dear Sir: — You and I have distinct and different 
plans for a movement of the Army of the Potomac, — yours 
to be done by the Chesapeake, up the Eappahannock to 
Urbana, and across land to the terminus of the railroad 
on the York River: mine to move directly to a point on 
the railroad southwest of Manassas. 

" If you will give me satisfactory answers to the follow- 
ing questions, I shall gladly yield my plan to yours: — 



142 LETTER TO THE SECRETARY. [1862. 

*' 1st. Does not j'-our plan involve a greatly larger ex- 
penditure of time and money than mine? 

"2d. Wherein is a victory more certain by your plan 
than mine? 

"3d. Wherein is a victory more valuable by your plan 
than mine? 

"4th. In fact, would it not be less valuable, in this, 
that it would break no great line of the enemy's commu- 
nications, while mine would? 

"5th. In case of disaster, would not a retreat be more 
difficult by your plan than mine? 

"Yours, truly, 

"Abraham Lincoln. 

"Major-General McClellan." 

These questions were substantially answered in 
the letter to the Secretary of War above referred 
to, which appears in General McClellan's Eeport; 
but its length forbids its being copied in full, and 
only an abstract of its contents can be given. 

He begins with a brief statement of the condition 
of the troops when he assumed the command in 
July, 1861, and of the defenceless position of the 
capital at that time, and thus recapitulates what 
had been accomplished up to the date of writing : — 

"The capital is secure against attack; the extensive 
fortifications erected by the labor of our troops enable a 
small garrison to hold it against a numerous army ; the 
enemy have been held in check ; the State of Maryland 
is securely in our possession ; the detached counties of 
Virginia are again within the pale of our laws, and all 
apprehension of trouble in Delaware is at an end; the 
enemy are confined to the positions they occupied before 
the disaster of the 21st of July. More than all this, I have 



Age 35.] LETTER TO THE SECRETARY. 143 

now under my command a well-drilled and reliable army, 
to which the destinies of the country may be confidently 
committed. This army is young and untried in battle; 
but it is animated by the highest spirit, and is capable 
of great deeds. 

"That so much has been accomplished and such an 
army created in so short a time from nothing, will here- 
after be regarded as one of the highest glories of the Ad- 
ministration and the nation.'' 

After telling the Secretary that he has not yet 
under his command such a force as he asked for in 
his earliest papers submitted to the President, he 
thus proceeds : — 

"When I was placed in command of the armies of the 
United States, I immediately turned my attention to the 
whole field of operations, regarding the Army of the Po- 
tomac as only one, while the most important, of the 
masses under m}^ command. 

"I confess that I did not then appreciate the total ab- 
sence of a general plan which had before existed, nor did 
I know that utter disorganization and want of prepara- 
tion pervaded the Western armies. 

" I took it for granted that they were nearly, if not quite, 
in condition to move towards the fulfilment of my plans. 
I acknowledge that I made a great mistake. 

"I sent at once — with approval of the Executive — 
officers I considered competent to command in Kentucky 
and Missouri. Their instructions looked to prompt 
movements. I soon found that the labor of creation 
and organization had to be performed there : transporta- 
tion, arms, clothing, artillery, discipline, all were want- 
ing. These things required time to procure them. 

"The generals in command have done their work most 
creditably ; but we are still delayed. I had hoped that a 



144 LETTER TO THE SECRETARY. [1S62. 

general advance could be made during the good weather 
of December: I was mistaken. 

" My wish was to gain possession of the Eastern Ten- 
nessee Kailroad, as a preliminary movement, then to 
follow it up immediately by an attack on Nashville and 
Kichmond as nearly at the same time as possible. 

*'I have ever regarded our true policy as being that of 
fully preparing ourselves, and then seeking for the most 
decisive results. I do not wish to waste life in useless 
battles, but prefer to strike at the heart.'' 

He next proceeds to state that tvs^o bases of ope- 
ration presented themselves for the advance of 
the Army of the Potomac, — first, that of Washing- 
ton, its present position, involving a direct attack 
upon the intrenched positions of the enemy at 
Centreville, Manassas, &c., or else a movement to 
turn one or both of those positions, or a combina- 
tion of the two plans. The relative force of the 
two armies would not justify an attack on both 
flanks of the enemy; and an attack on his left flank 
alone would involve a long line of wagon-commu- 
nication, and could not prevent him from collecting 
for the decisive battle all the detachments now on 
his extreme right and left. 

He next sets forth in great detail the difflcalties 
and dangers of an attack upon the right flank, by 
the line of the Occoquan, and a crossing of the 
Potomac below that river, showing a minute know- 
ledge of the localities of the region, and demon- 
strating to his correspondent the great advantage 
possessed by the enemy in the central position he 
occupied, with roads diverging in every direction, 



Age 35.] LETTER TO THE SECRETARY. 145 

and a strong line of defence, enabling him to await 
an attack with a small force on one flank, while he 
concentrates every thing on the other for a decisive 
action. Among other difficulties, he speaks of " the 
present uni:)recedented and impassable condition of 
the roads.'' But, supposing the movement in this 
direction to be successful, the results, he thinks, 
would be confined to the possession of the field of 
battle, the evacuation of the line of the Upper Po- 
tomac by the enemy, and the moral effect of the 
victory, — important results, it is true, but not de- 
cisive of the war, or securing the destruction of the 
enemy's main army or the capture of Eichmond. 

The second base of operations available for the 
Army of the Potomac is that of the Lower Chesa- 
peake Bay, which afibrds the shortest possible land- 
route to Eichmond and strikes directly at the heart 
of the enemy's power in the East. In favor of this 
plan he thus reasons : — 

"The roads in that region are passable at all periods of 
the year. 

"The country noAV alluded to is much more favorable 
for offensive operations than that in front of Washington 
(which is very unfavorable) , — much more level, more cleared 
land, the woods less dense, the soil more sandy, and the 
spring some two or three weeks earlier. A movement in 
force on that line obliges the enemy to abandon his in- 
trenched position at Manassas in order to hasten to cover 
Richmond and Norfolk. He must do this; for, should he 
permit us to occupy Richmond, his destruction can be 
averted only by entirely defeating us in a battle in which 
he must be the assailant. This movement, if successful, 
gives us the capital, the communications, the supplies, 

13 



146 LETTER TO THE SECRETARY. [1862. 

of the rebels ; ISTorfolk would fall, all the waters of the 
Chesapeake would be ours, all Virginia would be in our 
power, and the enemy forced to abandon Tennessee and 
North Carolina. The alternative presented to the enemy- 
would be to beat us in a position selected by ourselves, 
disperse, or pass beneath the Caudine forks. 

"Should we be beaten in a battle, we have a perfectly 
secure retreat down the Peninsula upon Fort Monroe, 
with our flanks perfectly covered by the fleet. 

*' During the whole movement our left flank is covered 
by the water. Our right is secure, for the reason that the 
enemy is too distant to reach us in time; he can only op- 
j)Ose us in front ; we bring our fleet into full play. 

"After a successful battle, our position would be — 
Burnside forming our left, Norfolk held securely, our 
centre connecting Burnside with Buell both by Kaleigh 
and Lynchburg, Buell in Eastern Tennessee and North 
Alabama, Halleck at Nashville and Memphis. 

"The next movement would be to connect with Sher- 
man on the left, by reducing Wilmington and Charles- 
ton; to advance our centre into South Carolina and 
Georgia; to push Buell either towards Montgomery or to 
unite with the main army in Georgia ; to throw Halleck 
southward to meet the naval expedition from New Orleans. 

"We should then be in a condition to reduce at our 
leisure all the Southern sea-ports, to occupy all the avenues 
of communication, to use the great outlet of the Mis- 
sissippi, to re-establish our Government and arms in Ar- 
kansas, Louisiana, and Texas, to force the slaves to labor 
for our subsistence instead of that of the rebels, to bid 
defiance to all foreign interference. Such is the object I 
have ever had in view ; this is the general plan which I 
hope to accomplish. 

"For many long months I have labored to prepare the 
Army of the Potomac to play its part in the programme. 
From the day when I was placed in command of all our 



Age 35.] LETTER TO THE SECRETARY. 147 

armies, I have exerted myself to place all the other armies 
in such a condition that they too could perform their 
allotted duties.^' 

He then tells his correspondent that, if it should 
be determined to operate from the Lower Chesa- 
peake, the best point of landing would be Urbana, 
on the Lower Eappahannock, and states his reasons 
for the opinion; but, if circumstances should render 
it advisable not to land there, either Mobjack Bay 
or Fort Monroe might be resorted to. A large 
amount of cheap water transportation would be 
requisite to move the army to whatever point 
might be selected as a base of operations; and he 
gives some details in relation to this important 
point. The letter thus concludes : — 

"The total force to be thrown upon the new line would 
be, according to circumstances, from one hundred and ten 
thousand to one hundred and forty thousand. I hope to 
use the latter number by bringing fresh troops into Wash- 
ington and still leaving it quite safe. I fully realize that, 
in all projects offered, time will probably be the most valu- 
able consideration. It is my decided opinion that, in that 
point of view, the second plan should be adopted. It is 
possible — nay, highly probable — that the weather and state 
of the roads may be such as to delay the direct movement 
from Washington, with its unsatisfactory results and great 
risks, far beyond the time required to complete the second 
plan. In the first case, we can fix no definite time for an 
advance. The roads have gone from bad to worse. No- 
thing like their present condition was ever known here 
before : they are impassable at present. We are entirely at 
the mercy of the weather. It is by no means certain that 
we can beat them at Manassas. On the other line I re- 
gard success as certain by all the chances of war. "We 



148 LETTER TO THE SECRETARY, [1S62. 

demoralize the enemy by forcing him to abandon his pre- 
pared position for one which we have chosen, in which 
all is in our favor and where success must produce im- 
mense results. 

"My judgment, as a general, is clearly in favor of this 
project. Nothing is certain in war; but all the chances 
are in favor of this movement. So much am I in favor 
of the southern line of operations, that I would prefer 
the move from Fortress Monroe as a base, as a certain 
though less brilliant movement than that from Urbana, 
to an attack upon Manassas. 

"I know that his Excellency the President, you, and I, 
all agree in our wishes, and that these wishes are, to 
bring this war to a close as promptly as the means in our 
2)Ossession will permit. I believe that the mass of the 
people have entire confidence in us. I am sure of it. 
Let us, then, look only to the great result to be accom- 
plished, and disregard every thing else." 

This carefully-prepared and well-reasoned letter, 
and the many verbal conferences which followed 
it, seem to have induced the President to give up 
his own "plan;" for the execution of his order was 
not insisted upon, — though, as it was not revoked 
so formally as it had been issued. General McClel- 
lan stood before the public in the awkward position 
of a general officer declining to execute an order 
of the commander-in-chief still apparently in force. 
But from this time General McClellan's "plan" of 
attacking Richmond by way of the Peninsula was 
assented to, or acquiesced in, by the President; and 
no further conflict of opinion took place between 
them on this point. 

The plan of operations being settled, the next 



Age 35.] PLAN OP OPERATIONS. 149 

thing was to devise ways and means to carry it 
into execution. Secrecy and despatch were to be se- 
cured, as far as was practicable. An immense army 
was to be moved by water from a point or points 
in the neighborhood of Washington, and the plan 
of the campaign was to be kept from the know- 
ledge of the enemy till the latest possible moment. 
Immediate measures were taken to provide a force 
of steamers and sailing-vessels necessary for the 
contemplated object.* 

•^ In the order of time, the following letter of the Secretary 
of War may be appropriately introduced here, as showing his 
feeling towards General McClellan and the Army of the Poto- 
mac: — 

"War Department, 1 

Washington, February 17, 1862. J 
*'To Brigadier-General F. W. Lander: — 
"The President directs me to say that he has observed with 
pleasure the activity and enterprise manifested by yourself 
and the officers and soldiers of your command. You have 
shown how much may be done, in the worst weather and 
worst roads, by a spirited officer, at the head of a small force 
of brave men, unwilling to waste life in camp when the ene- 
mies of their country are in reach. Your brilliant success is 
a happy presage of what may be expected when the Army of 
the Potomac shall be led to the field by their gallant general. 

*' Edwin M. Stanton, 
^^ Secretary of War.^^ 

A few days after, the Secretary wrote another letter, ad- 
dressed to the editor of the New York "Tribune," which is as 
follows: — 

" Washington, February 20, 1862. 
"Sir: — I cannot suffer undue merit to be ascribed to my 
o^cial action. The glory of our recent victories belongs to 
13* 



150 LETTER PROM THE SECRETARY. [18G2. 

About the 20th of Februaiy, measures were 
taken to secure the reopening of the Baltimore & 

the gallant officers that fought the battles. No share of it 
belongs to me. 

*'Much has been recently said of military combination and 
organizing victory. I hear such phrases with apprehension. 
They commenced in infidel France with the Italian campaign, 
and resulted in Waterloo. Who can organize victory ? Who 
can combine the elements of success on the battle-field ? We 
owe our recent victories to the Spirit of the Lord, that moved 
our soldiers to dash into battle, and filled the hearts of our 
enemies with terror and dismay. The inspiration that con- 
quered in battle was in the hearts of the soldiers, and from 
on high. Patriotic spirit with resolute courage in officers and 
men is a military combination that never failed. 

"We may well rejoice at the recent victories ; for they teach 
us that battles are to be won now and by us in the same and 
only manner that they were ever won by any people or in any 
age since the days of Joshua, — by boldly pursuing and strik- 
ing the foe. What, under the blessing of Providence, I con- 
ceive to be the true organization of victory and military com- 
bination to end this war, was declared in a few words by 
General Grant's message to General Buckner: — 'I propose to 
move immediately on your works.' 

"Yours, truly, 

"Edwin M. Stanton." 

It is difficult to believe that this absurd letter, which no 
officer in the army could have read without indignation and 
disgust, could have been written by a Secretary of War. Be- 
sides its bad taste and false rhetoric, it involves a contemptuous 
disparagement of military science, most unbecoming in a man 
who was at the head of the War Department of a great nation 
engaged in a momentous war. And there breathes through it 
a spirit of hostility towards General McClellan, of ominous 
import to the success of our arms. After reading it, the Presi- 
dent of the United States ought at once to have removed 
either that officer or ]Mr. Stanton himself. 



Age 35.] HARPER'S FERRY. 151 

Ohio Eailroad. The whole of General Banks's 
division, and two brigades of General Sedgwick's 
division, were thrown across the river at Harper's 
Ferry on the 26th, superintended by General Mc- 
Clellan in person, who had gone up from Washing- 
ton for that purpose. Materials had been collected 
for making a permanent bridge by means of canal- 
boats; but, on attempting to pass the boats through 
the left lock, it was found, for the first time, that 
the lock was too small to permit their passage. 
This unexpected obstacle deranged the plans; and 
an order which had been given for the movement 
of some forces from "Washington was counter- 
manded. Every exertion was made to establish, 
as promptly as possible, depots of forage and sub- 
sistence on the Yirginia side, to supply the troops. 
On the 28th, Charlestown was occupied by a strong 
Federal force; and on the same day General Mc- 
Clellan returned to Washington. In spite of the 
untoward mischance of the canal-boats, — for which 
the commander-in-chief could not be responsible, — 
the design aimed at had been accomplished, and 
before the 1st of April the railroad was in running 
order. 

With General McClellan's return to Washington 
on the 28th of February, preparations were begun 
for carrying out the wishes of the President and 
Secretary of AVar in regard to destroying the bat- 
teries on the Lower Potomac, — though in giving 
his hand to this movement General McClellan 
yielded his own judgment to theirs. He was con- 
vinced that this operation would require the move- 



152 COUNCIL OF OFFICERS, [1862. 

ment of the entire army, that tlie extremely un- 
favorable condition of the roads was a serious ob- 
stacle to be overcome, and that it was unnecessary, 
because the proposed movement to the Lower Chesa- 
peake would — as it subsequently did — force the 
enemy to abandon all his positions in front of 
Washington. But the preparations for a move- 
ment towards the Occoquan in order to carry the 
batteries were advanced as rapidly as the season 
permitted. 

This brings us down to the 8th of March, 1862, 
— an important day in the history of the war. Gene- 
ral McClellan had invited the commanders of 
divisions to meet at head-quarters on that day, in 
order to give them instructions and receive their 
advice and opinion in regard to their commands; 
but at a very early hour on the morning of that 
day he was sent for by the President, who ex- 
pressed his dissatisfaction with the affair of Har- 
per's Ferry and with the plans for the new move- 
ment down the Chesapeake. Explanations were 
made which, apparently, satisfied the President's 
mind. At a later hour in the day, the meeting of 
general officers which had been called was held at 
head-quarters. The officers present (besides Gene- 
ral McClellan) were Generals McDowell, Sumner, 
Heintzelman, Keyes, Franklin, Fitz-John Porter, 
Andrew Porter, Smith, McCall, Blenker, Negley, 
and Barnard. The President of the United States 
was also there. The plans of General McClellan 
were fully explained to the council, and the general 
question submitted to them was whether the enemy 



Age 36.] PRESIDENT* S ORDERS. 153 

should be attacked in front at Manassas and Cen- 
treville, or whether a movement should be made 
down to the Lower Chesapeake. After a full dis- 
cussion, four of the officers — McDowell, Sumner, 
Heintzelman, and Barnard — approved of the former 
plan, and the remainder of the latter. The details 
were not considered as fixed ; though it Avas gene- 
rally understood that the point of destination and 
landing was Urbana, on the Eappahannock. 

At the close of this council of officers, nothing 
had transpired to lead General McClellan to sup- 
pose that there was any lingering distrust of him in 
the President's mind; and he was therefore much 
and painfully surprised to learn that on that very 
8th day of March the President, without consult- 
ing him, had issued two important military orders. 
The first of these was as follows : — 



("President's General War Order, No. 2.) 

"Executive Mansion, ") 
"Washington, March 8, 1862. j 

" Ordered, 1st. That the major-general commanding the 
Army of the Potomac proceed forthwith to organize that 
part of the said army destined to enter upon active ope- 
rations (including the reserve, but excluding the troops 
to be left in the fortifications about Washington) into 
four army corps, to be commanded, according to seniority 
of rank, as follows : — 

"First Corps to consist of four divisions, and to be com- 
manded by Major-General I. McDowell. Second Corps 
to consist of three divisions, and to be commanded by 
Brigadier-General E. V. Sumner. Third Corps to consist 
of three divisions, and to be commanded by Brigadier- 



154 president's orders. [1862. 

General S. P. Heintzelman. Fourth Corps to consist of 
three divisions, and to be commanded by Brigadier-Gene- 
ral E. D. Keyes. 

''2d. That the divisions now commanded by the officers 
above assigned to the commands of army corps shall be 
embraced in and form part of their respective corps. 

"3d. The forces left for the defence of Washington will 
be placed in command of Brigadier-General James Wads- 
worth, who shall also be Military Governor of the District 
of Columbia. 

"4th. That this order be executed with such prompt- 
ness and despatch as not to delay the commencement 
of the operations already directed to be undertaken by the 
Army of the Potomac. 

"5th. A Fifth Army Corps, to be commanded by 
Major-General N. P. Banks, will be formed from his own 
and General Shields's (late General Lander's) division. 

"Abraham Lincoln." 

This order was probably of no great practical 
importance, as it simply anticipated General Mc- 
Clellan's purpose. He had always been in favor of 
an organization into army corps, but preferred de- 
ferring its practical execution until some little ex- 
perience in the coming campaign and on the field 
of battle should show what general officers were 
most competent to exercise these high commands, 
as an Incompetent commander of an army corp)S 
might cause very serious damage, while an incom- 
petent division commander could do no great harm. 
These views commend themselves to common sense; 
but they failed to convince the President's mind, 
who assumed a responsibility from which General 
McClellan at that time shrank. The latter at once 



Age 35.] PRESIDENT'S ORDERS. 155 

issued the order necessary to carry out the com- 
mand of the President. 

The second of the orders issued by the President 
on the 8th of March was as follows ; — 

("President's General War Order, No. 3.) 

" Executive Mansion, ) 
Washington, March 8, 1862. j 

" Ordered, That no change of the base of operations of 
the Army of the Potomac shall be made without leaving 
in and about "Washington such a force as, in the opinion 
of the general-in-chief and the commanders of army 
corps, shall leave said city entirely secure. 

" That no more than two army corps (about fifty thou- 
Band troops) of said Army of the Potomac shall be moved 
en route for a new base of operations until the navigation 
of the Potomac from Washington to the Chesapeake 
Bay shall be freed from enemy's batteries and other 
obstructions, or until the President shall hereafter give 
express permission. 

"That any movement, as aforesaid, en route for a new 
base of operations which may be ordered by the general- 
in-chief, and which may be intended to move upon the 
Chesapeake Bay, shall begin to move upon the bay aa 
early as the 18th of March instant ; and the general-in-chief 
shall be responsible that it so moves as early as that day. 

" Ordered, That the army and navy co-operate in an im- 
mediate effort to capture the enemy's batteries upon the 
Potomac between Washington and the Chesapeake Bay. 

"Abraham Lincoln. 

"L. Thomas, Adjutant- General." 

Here it will be seen that the President again as- 
sumes to fix a certain day in the future for the 
beginning of an important military movement. 



156 MERRIBIAC AND MONITOR. [1862. 

Whether the army would be prepared to move 
upon the Bay on the 18th of March depended upon 
the state of readiness of the transports, the entire 
control of which had been placed by the Secretary 
of War in the hands of one of the assistant secre- 
taries. Unless his arrangements had been com- 
pleted on or before that day, the army could not 
have moved. 

But the record of the important events of the 8th 
of March is not completed; for on that day the 
Merrimac appeared in Hampton Eoads and de- 
stroyed the Cumberland and Congress, and the 
news, flashed far and wide by the telegraph-wires, 
filled the whole land with consternation and dis- 
may. But our spirits rose the next day at the op- 
portune arrival and gallant and successful achieve- 
ment of the Monitor. It is needless to dwell upon 
the memorable contest between these two vessels, 
so important in its effects upon the whole science 
of naval warfare; but it was an event of no incon- 
siderable moment in the fate and fortunes of the 
Peninsular campaign. The power of the Monitor 
had been so satisfactorily demonstrated, and the 
other naval preparations were so extensive and 
formidable, that the security of Fortress Monroe 
as a base of operations was placed beyond a doubt ; 
but, on the other hand, the presence of the Merri- 
mac in the James Eiver closed that river to us, and 
threw us upon the York Eiver, with its tributaries, 
as our only line of water-communication with the 
fortress. The general plan, therefore, remained un- 



Age 35.] MOVEMENTS OF THE ENEMY. 157 

disturbed, though less promising in its details than 
when James Eiver was in our control. 

On Sunday, the 9th of March, trustworthy in- 
formation came to Washington that the enemy was 
beginning to evacuate his positions at Centreville 
and Manassas, as well as on the Upper and Lower 
Potomac. It is not improbable that, in some mys- 
terious way, they had heard of the council of gene- 
ral officers held on the preceding day, and of the 
conclusions arrived at.* 



* *' We have the right, we think, to say that McClellan never 
intended to advance upon Centreville. His long-determined 
purpose was to make Washington safe by means of a strong 
garrison, and then to use the great navigable waters and im- 
mense naval resources of the North to transport the army 
by sea to a point near Richmond. For weeks — perhaps for 
months — this plan had been secretly maturing. Secrecy as 
well as promptness, it will be understood, was indispensable 
here to success. To keep the secret, it had been necessary to 
confide it to few persons; and hence had arisen one great 
cause for jealousy of the general. 

"Be this as it may, as the day of action drew near, those 
who suspected the general's project and were angry at not 
being informed of it, — those whom his promotion had excited to 
envy, — his political enemies (who is without them in America?) 
— in short, all those beneath or beside him who wished him 
ill, — broke out into a chorus of accusations of slowness, in- 
action, incapacity. McClellan, with a patriotic courage which 
I have always admired, disdained these accusations, and made 
no replj'. He satisfied himself with pursuing his preparations 
in laborious silence. But the moment came in which, notwith- 
standing the loyal support given him by the President, that 
functionary could no longer resist the tempest. A council of 
war. of all the divisional generals was held; a plan of campaign, 

U 



158 MANASSAS. [1862. 

As soon as the news came, General McClellan 
determined to cross the river immediately and as- 
certain by observation whether the intelligence was 
true, and then determine what course to pursue. 
Orders were accordingly issued, during the 9th of 
March, for a general movement of the army the next 
morning towards Centreville and Manassas, send- 
ing in advance two regiments of cavalry as a corps 
of observation. At noon on the 10th of March the 
cavalry advance reached the enemy's lines at Cen- 
treville, finding there still burning heaps of military 

not that of McClellan, was proposed and discussed. McClellan 
was then forced to explain his projects, and the next day 
they were known to the enemy Informed, no doubt, by one 
of those thousand female spies who keep up his communications 
into the domestic circles of the Federal enemy, Johnston 
evacuated Manassas at once This was a skilful manoeuvre. 
Incapable of assuming the offensive, threatened with attack 
either at Centreville, where defence would be useless if suc- 
cessful, or at Richmond, the loss of which would be a grave 
check, and unable to cover both positions at once, Johnston 
threw his whole force before the latter of the two." 

The above is taken from a pamphlet published in New York, 
in 1863, with the following title: — "The Army of the Potomac: 
its Organization, its Commander, and its Campaign. By the 
Prince de Joinville Translated from the French, with Notes, 
by William Henry Hurlbert." The original appeared in the 
number of the "Revue des Deux Mondes" for October 15, 
1862. It is there entitled " Campagne de I'Armee du Potomac, 
Mars-Juillet, 1862," and bears the signature of "A. Trognon." 
The article has been generally ascribed to the Prince de Join- 
ville; and, as the translation bears his name on the title-page 
and has been constantly referred to as his, the future extracts 
from the pamphlet will be cited under his name. 



Age 35.] PRESIDENT'S ORDER. 159 

stores and much valuable property. The mass of 
the army advanced to the vicinity of Fairfax Court- 
House, and General McClellan himself went to Ma- 
nassas. The roads were in so impassable a condi- 
tion that a rapid pursuit of an enemy who burned 
or broke up all the bridges behind him in his re- 
treat was impossible. The main body of the army 
was on the 15th of March moved back to the 
vicinity of Alexandria, to be embarked. It was 
while General McClellan was absent on this brief 
reconnoissance in force that the President saw fit 
to remove him from the position of general-in-chief, 
by the following order, which appeared in the " Na- 
tional Intelligencer" of March 12, and which Gene- 
ral McClellan heard of for the first time at Fairfax 
Court-House. 

("President's War Order, No. 3.) 

"Executive Mansion, ] 
Washington, March 11, 1862. j 

"Major-General McClellan having personally taken the 
field at the head of the Army of the Potomac, until other- 
wise ordered, he is relieved from the command of the other 
military departments, he retaining command of the De- 
partment of the Potomac. 

" Ordered, further, That the departments now under the 
respective commands of Generals Halleck and Hunter, 
together with so much of that under General Buell as 
lies west of a north-and-south line indefinitely drawn 
through Knoxville, Tennessee, be consolidated, and desig- 
nated the Department of the Mississippi ; and that, until 
otherwise ordered, Major-General Halleck have command 
of said department. 

" Ordered, also, That the country west of the Depart- 



160 COUNCIL OF WAR. [1862. 

ment of the Potomac and east of the Department of the 
Mississippi be a military department, to be called the 
Mountain Department, and that the same be commanded 
by Major-General Fremont. 

" That all the commanders of departments, after the 
receipt of this order by them, respectively report severally 
and directly to the Secretary of War, and that prompt, 
full, and frequent reports will be expected of all and each 
of them. 

"Abraham Lincoln." 

Whatever emotions General McClellan may have 
felt on reading this order, his sense of duty as a 
patriotic citizen, and his instincts of obedience as 
a soldier, taught him to suppress all expression of 
them; and, in a note addressed by him to the Presi- 
dent on the 12th of March, the next day, he said, in 
language alike distinguished for good feeling and 
good taste, — 

" I believe I said to you, some weeks since, in connection 
with some Western matters, that no feeling of self-inte- 
rest or ambition should ever prevent me from devoting 
myself to the service. I am glad to have the opportunity 
to prove it ; and you will find that, under present circum- 
stances, I shall work just as cheerfully as before, and that 
no consideration of self will in any manner interfere with 
the discharge of my public duties." 

On the 18th of March a council of war was as- 
sembled at Fairfax Court-House, to discuss the 
military position. The President's order No. 3, of 
March 8, was considered. As future events made 
the action of this council of considerable import- 



Age 35.] COUNCIL OF WAR. IGl 

ance, the memorandum of its proceedings is here 
given in full : — 



Head-Quahters, Army of the Potomac, 



.1 



"A council of the generals commanding army corps, at 
the head-quarters of the Army of the Potomac, were of 
the opinion — 

"I. That the enemy having retreated from Manassas 
to Gordonsville, behind the Rappahannock and Rapidan, 
it is the opinion of generals commanding army corps 
that the operations to be carried on will be best under- 
taken from Old Point Comfort, between the York and 
James Rivers: Provided — 

"1st. That the enemy's vessel, Merrimac, can be neu- 
tralized. 

"2d. That the means of transportation sufficient for 
an immediate transfer of the force to its new base can 
be ready at Washington and Alexandria to move down 
the Potomac; and, 

"3d. That a naval auxiliary force can be had to silence, 
or aid in silencing, the enemy's batteries on the York 
River. 

"4th. That the force to be left to cover Washington 
shall be such as to give an entire feeling of security for 
its safety from menace. (Unanimous.) 

"II. If the foregoing cannot be, the army should then 
be moved against the enemy, behind the Rappahannock, 
at the earliest possible moment, and the means for recon- 
structing bridges, repairing railroads, and stocking them 
with materials sufficient for supplying the army should 
at once be collected for both the Orange & Alexandria 
and Acquia & Richmond Railroads. (Unanimous.) 

"N.B. — That, with the forts on the right bank of the 
Potomac fully garrisoned, and those on the left bank oc- 

14« 



162 ADDRESS TO THE SOLDIERS. [1862. 

cupiecl, a covering force in front of the Virginia line of 
twenty-five thousand men would suffice. (Keyes, Heint- 
zelman, and McDowell.) A total of forty thousand men 
for the defence of the city would suffice. (Sumner.)" 

This was assented to by General McClellan, and 
immediately communicated to the War Depart- 
ment; and on the same day the following reply 
was received : — 

"War Department, March 13, 1862. 

*' The President, having considered the plan of operations 
agreed upon by yourself and the comriianders of army 
corps, makes no objection to the same, but gives the fol- 
lowing directions as to its execution: — 

"1. Leave such force at Manassas Junction as shall 
make it entirely certain that the enemy shall not repossess 
himself of that position and line of communication. 

"2. Leave Washington entirely secure. 

"3. Move the remainder of the force down the Potomac, 
choosing a new base at Fortress Monroe, or anywhere 
between here and there ; or, at all events, move such re- 
mainder of the army at once in pursuit of the enemy by 
some route. 

*' Edwin M. Stantont, 
** Secretary of War, 

" Major-General George B. McClellan." 

On the 14th day of March, General McClellan 
issued the following address to his soldiers : — 

"Head-Quarters, Army of the Potomac, ) 

Fairfax Court-House, Va., March 14, 1862. f 

"Soldiers of the Army of the Potomac: — 

" For a long time I have kept you inactive, but not 
without a purpose. You were to be disciplined, armed, 



Age 35.] ADDRESS TO THE SOLDIERS. 163 

and instructed ; the formidable artillery you now have 
had to be created; other armies were to move and 
accomplish certain results. I have held you back that 
you might give the death-blow to the rebellion that has 
distracted our once happy country. The patience you 
have shown, and your confidence in your general, are 
worth a dozen victories. These preliminary results are 
now accomplished. I feel that the patient labors of many 
months have produced their fruit: the Army of the Po- 
tomac is now a real army, magnificent in material, admi- 
rable in discipline and instruction, excellently equipped 
and armed; your commanders are all that I could wish. 
The moment for action has arrived, and I know that I 
can trust in you to save our country. As I ride through 
your ranks, I see in your faces the sure presage of victory ; 
I feel that you will do whatever I ask of you. The period 
of inaction has passed. I will bring you now face to fiice 
with the rebels, and only pray that God may defend the 
right. In whatever direction you may move, however 
strange my actions may appear to you, ever bear in mind 
that my fate is linked with yours, and that all I do is to 
bring you, where I know you wish to be, on the decisive 
battle-field. It is my business to place you there. I am 
to watch over you as a parent over his children ; and you 
know that your general loves you from the depths of his 
heart. It shall be my care, as it has ever been, to gain 
success with the least possible loss ; but I know that, if it is 
necessary, you will willingly follow me to our graves for 
our righteous cause. God smiles upon us, victory attends 
us. Yet I would not have you think that our aim is to be 
attained without a manly struggle. I will not disguise it 
from you : you have brave foes to encounter, foemen well 
worthy of the steel that you will use so well. I shall de- 
mand of you great, heroic exertions, rapid and long 
marches, desperate combats, privations perhaps. We 
will share all these together; and, when this sad war is 



164 NOTE TO THE "WAR DEPARTMENT. [18C2. 

over, we will return to our homes and feel that we can 
ask no higher honor than the proud consciousness that 
we belonged to the Army of the Potomac. 

"Geo. B. McClellan, 

^^Major-General commanding J' 

Preparations were immediately begun, in com- 
pliance with the directions contained in the letter 
from the Secretary of War of March 13, above 
given. On the 16th of March, General McClellan 
addressed a letter of instructions to General Banks 
to post his command in the vicinity of Manassas 
and intrench himself strongly there, for the gene- 
ral object of covering the line of the Potomac and 
"Washington; and on the same day a similar letter 
of instructions was addressed by liim to General 
WadsAvorth, who was in command at Washington, 
giving him minute and detailed directions as to the 
military precautions to be taken to keep the capital 
secure. 

The Secretary of War having expressed a desire 
that General McClellan should communicate to the 
Departments, in an official form, his designs Avith 
regard to the employment of the Army of the Po- 
tomac, the latter addressed to the Department a 
note under date of March 19, in which he unfolds 
briefly his plan, sets forth its advantages, and 
states what will be requisite to insure its success- 
ful accomplishment. He especially urges the abso- 
lute necessity of a full co-operation of the navy in 
a combined naval and land attack upon Yorktown, 
as a part of his programme. He enforces this view 



Age 35.] INTERVIEW WITH THE PRES ID E N T. 1G5 

by many considerations, and thus concludes his 
communication : — 

"It may be summed up in a few words, that for the 
prompt success of this campaign it is absolutely necessary 
that the navy should at once throw its whole available 
force, its most powerful vessels, against Yorktown. There 
is the most important point, — there the knot to be cut. 
An immediate decision upon the subject-matter of this 
communication is highly desirable, and seems called for 
by the exigencies of the occasion/' 

In the mean time, the troops destined to form the 
active army were collected in camps convenient to 
the points of embarkation, and every preparation 
was made to despatch them as rapidly as possible 
when the transports should be ready. While the 
army was still encamped at Alexandria, a few 
days before sailing for Fortress Monroe, General 
McClellan met the President, by appointment, on 
board a steamer, and was told by the President 
that he had been strongly pressed to take General 
Blenker's division from his (General McClellan's) 
command and give it to General Fremont; but he, 
however, suggested many considerations in op- 
position to this step, and frankly and voluntarily 
avowed his purpose of allowing the division to re- 
main with the Army of the Potomac. The astonish- 
ment, therefore, of General McClellan may well be 
imagined when by the receipt of the following note 
be learned that the President had changed his mind, 
and determined upon a measure the inexpediency 
of which was so obvious to him but a few days 
before : — 



1G6 BLENKER's division withdrawn. [1862. 

"Executive Mansion, "I 
Washington, March 31, 1862. j 

"My dear Sir: — This morning I felt constrained to 
order Blenker's division to Fremont; and I write this to 
assure you that I did so with great pain, understanding 
that you would wish it otherwise. If you could know the 
full pressure of the case, I am confident that you would 
justify it, even beyond a mere acknowledgment that the 
commander-in-chief may order what he pleases. 

"Yours, very truly, 

"A. Lincoln. 

"Major-General McClellan.'' 

The weak and deprecatory tone of this note dis- 
arms, or at least alloys with contempt, the indigna- 
tion justly awakened by the deliberate breach of 
faith which it confesses ; but it is a melancholy fact 
that at so critical a period the reins of executive 
power were in hands that held them with so slack a 
grasp, and that the President, by yielding to un- 
known and irresponsible advisers in the conduct 
of a campaign, seemingly acted as if he thought 
that many bad generals were better than one good 
one. 

General McClellan could only acquiesce in the 
latest decision of the President, not suppressing 
some natural expressions of surprise; but he was 
relieved by the President's positive and emphatic 
assurance that he might be confident that in no 
event should any more troops be detached from his 
command. General Blenker's division consisted of 
about ten thousand men. 

On the 1st of April, General McCleUan addressed 



Age 35.] DEFENCES OF WASHINGTON. 167 

another letter of instruction to General Banks, 
founded upon the retreat of General Jackson up the 
Yalley of the Shenandoah, and the change for the 
better in the military position of the Federal cause 
in that region. 

In view of events which subsequently occurred, 
and of questions which were subsequently raised, it 
becomes of importance here that the reader should 
understand how far the defence of Washington 
was provided for before the Army of the Potomac 
was withdrawn. 

In the first place, the city itself was defended by 
a strong system of fortifications, built under the 
directions of General Barnard, and sweeping round 
a line of thirty-three miles in extent. The troops 
w^hich were assigned to garrison these fortifications 
were eighteen thousand in number, w^ith thirty -two 
field-guns. At Manassas there were ten thousand 
men; on the Lower Potomac, thirteen hundred; in 
the Yalley of the Shenandoah, thirty-five thousand. 
Thus, without including General Blenker's division, 
which was at Warrenton, there were about sixty- 
three thousand men disposed at various points for 
the protection of "Washington, together with eighty- 
five pieces of light artillery, including the thirty- 
two above mentioned. There was also a body of 
troops in ISTew York, over four thousand in number, 
which General McClellan recommended to have sent 
to Washington to reinforce the garrison there. 

These forces w^ere deemed by him amply ade- 
quate to insure the safety of Washington and to 
give everybody there an entire sense of security, — 



168 DEFENCES OF WASHINGTON. [1862. 

a conclusion not to be doubted, as the following 
facts show. 

There was no reason to apprehend an attack by 
way of Manassas and Centreville; for the enemy 
in their retreat across the Rappahannock had de- 
stroyed all the railroad-bridges behind them. Had 
they attempted such a movement, their progress 
must have been very slow; for they must have re- 
built their bridges, and this would have announced 
their purpose beforehand and afforded ample time 
to concentrate a large body of forces at Washing- 
ton. 

]S'or was there any real ground of apprehension 
from the Yalley of the Shenandoah; because the 
movement of the army on Eichmond would make 
it impossible for the enemy to leave in that region 
men enough to overpower the large body of troops 
we had there. But, in General McClellan's opinion, 
the wa}^ to defend Washington was to attack Eich- 
mond; and the greater the force thrown against 
the rebel capital, the greater the security of our 
own. Strongly fortified as Washington was, capa- 
ble of being readily reinforced from the I^orth, it 
was manifest that the enemy could not afford to 
detach from his main army a force sufiicient to 
capture it. 

Here were solid grounds enough, it would appear, 
for General McClellan's conclusion that he had left 
Washington perfectly safe; but, unhappily, fears, 
panics, and apprehensions take their rise in that 
part of the mind which is not reached by the voice 
of reason. Whether Washington were safe or not 



Age 35.] EMBARKATION BEGUN. 169 

was a matter of sound military judgment; but as 
a matter of fact it is certain that from the mo- 
ment the Army of the Potomac landed upon the 
Peninsula an uneasy sense of insecurity took pos- 
session of the minds of the President, the Cabinet, 
and the members of Congress. The public in gene- 
ral shared this feeling; and the Northern press 
encouraged and increased it. All over the loyal 
States the question of the safety of Washington 
was discussed, with abundant zeal and very little 
knowledge. Some of this alarm may have been 
counterfeited for political effect; but without doubt 
much of it was real; and this should be borne 
in mind, when discussing measures subsequently 
adopted, disastrous in their consequences, but, un- 
questionably, inspired by an honest but miserable 
fright. It was destined, in the providence of God, 
that our cause should suffer alike from unreason- 
able hopes and extravagant fears. 



CHAPTEE YII. 



Alexandria was selected as the point of depart- 
ure, and the embarkation began on the 17th of 
March. The removal of a large body of troops, 
including cavalry and artillery, with armaments 
and supplies, was of necessity a slow work; and 
more than a fortnight elapsed before the whole 
force was transported. General McClellan reached 
Fortress Monroe on the 2d of April. He had in 

15 



170 FORTRESS MONROE. 



[18G1 



all between fifty and sixty thousand men with him; 
and others were to follow as fast as means of trans- 
portation could be supplied. 

It should here be borne in mind, as a matter of 
mere justice to General McClellan, that for the suc- 
cessful execution of his projected expedition he had 
required that the whole of the four corps under his 
command should be employed, with the addition 
of ten thousand men drawn from the forces in the 
vicinity of Fortress Monroe, — that position and its 
dependencies being regarded as amply protected 
by the naval force in its neighborhood. Before he 
left Washington, an order had been issued by the 
War Department, placing Fortress Monroe and its 
dependencies under his control, and authorizing 
him to draw from the troops under General Wool 
a division of about ten thousand men. And, in ad- 
dition to the land-forces, the co-operation of the 
navy was deemed essential in order to reduce or 
silence the strong batteries which the Confederates 
had erected at Yorktown and Gloucester. 

But he had hardly landed upon the Peninsula 
when he w^as doomed to taste the bitterness of dis- 
appointed hope, and by another experience to have 
the conviction forced upon him that the Administra- 
tion was unfaithful to him. During the night of 
the 3d of April, he received a telegram from the 
Adjutant-General of the army, stating that, by the 
President's order, he was deprived of all control 
over General Wool and the troops under his com- 
mand, and forbidden, without that officer's sanc- 
tion, to detach any portion of his force. No causes 



Age 35.] 



MERRIMAC. 171 



were assigned, or have ever been assigned, for this 
order, which was in violation of a deliberate and 
official engagement, and left the general in com- 
mand of a most important military movement with- 
out any base of operations under his own control, 
— a situation without parallel, it is believed, in 
military history. 

JS'or was this all. The terrible Merrimac lay, 
''hushed in grim repose," in the James Eiver; and 
no one knew when she might reappear or in how 
formidable a guise. Admiral Goldsborough, then in 
command of the United States squadron in Hampton 
Roads, felt, and with justice, that it was his para- 
mount duty to watch the Merrimac; and he, con- 
sequently, did not venture to detach for the assist- 
ance of the army a suitable force to attack the 
water-batteries at Yorktown and Gloucester. This 
was contrary to what General McClellan had been 
led to expect, and a serious derangement of his 
plans. 

In fact, it should be remembered that during the 
operations against Yorktown the navy was not able 
to lend the army any material assistance till after 
the siege-guns had partially silenced the enemy's 
water-batteries. 

But the heaviest blow was yet to come. On the 
4th of April the following telegram was received : — 

"Adjutant-General's Office, April 4, 1862.; 
"By direction of the President, General McDowell's 
army corps has been detached from the force under your 



172 Mcdowell's corps. [1862. 

immediate command, and the general is ordered to re- 
port to the Secretary of War. Letter by mail. 

"L. Thomas, 

" Adjutant-General. 
"General McClellan." 

This fell with crushiDg weight upon General Mc- 
Clellan's hopes. Its effect upon him cannot be 
better described than in his own simple language, — 
the force of which could not be increased by any 
attempt at rhetorical embellishment: — 

"The President having promised, in our interview fol- 
lowing his order of March 31, withdrawing Blenker's divi- 
sion of ten thousand men from my command, that 
nothing of tlie sort should be repeated, — that I might 
rest assured that the campaign should proceed, with no 
further deductions from the force upon which its opera- 
tions had been planned, — I may confess to having been 
shocked at this order, which, with that of the 31st ultimo 
and that of the 3d, removed nearly sixty thousand men 
from my command, and reduced my force by more than 
one-third, after its task had been assigned, its operations 
planned, its fighting begun. To me the blow was most 
discouraging. It frustrated all my plans for impending 
operations. It fell when I was too deeply committed to 
withdraw. It left me incapable of continuing operations 
which had been begun. It compelled the adoption of 
another, a different and a less effective, plan of campaign. 
It made rapid and brilliant operations impossible. It was 
a fatal error." 

General McClellan's plan had been, if the works at 
Yorktown and Williamsburg offered a serious resist- 
ance, that General McDowell's corps should land 



Age 35.] NATURE OP THE COUNTRY. 173 

on the left bank of the York, or on the Severn, so as 
to move upon Gloucester and "West Point, in order 
to take in reverse whatever force the enemy might 
have on the Peninsula and compel him to abandon 
his positions. But, since McDowell's corps was 
withheld, this plan, of course, became impossible, 
and there was no choice left but to attack the 
enemy's positions directly in front. And a grave 
question now rose, — whether these positions should 
be assaulted or invested. The problem presented 
was not easy of solution. 

From the moment of landing upon the Peninsula, 
it became obvious that the difficulties in the ad- 
vance to Eichmond were sufficient to task all the 
resources of the general in command, even if he 
had been furnished with the entire force promised 
him, — which he had not been. The nature of the 
country is very unfavorable to an invading army, 
and to the same extent favorable to a force which 
stands upon the defensive. It is a low, flat region, 
little elevated above the level of the sea, thinly in- 
habited, and scourged with malaria for many weeks 
of the 3^ear. It is covered with marshy forests; 
and the roads which traverse it hardly deserve the 
name. It is everywhere veined with streams and 
water-courses, which flow lazily along their level 
beds, and, by the copious rains which fall there, 
are easily swollen into broad and shallow lakes. 
The earth was constantly saturated with moisture, 
and the mud was deep, pitiless, and universal. 
After a rain, the so-called roads became utterly im- 
practicable for any kind of wheeled vehicle. The 

15* 



174 CONFEDERATE DEFENCES. [1862. 

wagons stuck hopelessly fast in the tenacious mire; 
and to transport them it became necessary to con- 
struct corduroy roads, — a slow and toilsome process. 

And, strange to say, though this was the earliest- 
settled portion of the whole country and full of 
historical interest, serious difficulties were encoun- 
tered from the want of accurate topographical know- 
ledge of the region before them. The common 
maps were found to be so incorrect as to be of little 
or no value. Eeconnoissances, frequently made at 
great risk, proved the only trustworthy sources of 
information. 

The progress of our army would have been slow 
had natural difficulties alone been in their path; but 
they found themselves met by a foe whose courage 
and energy they were too brave themselves not to 
respect. Among the Confederates there were unity 
of purpose and concerted action towards a common 
end. They knew that time was on their side, and 
their great object was to gain time and delay our 
progress as much as possible. Since leaving Ma- 
nassas, they had been diligently at work, without 
the loss of an hour, in strengthening all available 
points by skilfully constructed works. It was 
found that Warwick Eiver was controlled by the 
Confederate gunboats for some distance from its 
mouth, — that the fords had been destroyed by dams, 
the approaches to which were generally through 
dense forests and deep swamps and defended by 
extensive and formidable works, — and that York- 
town was strongly fortified, armed and garrisoned, 
and connected with the defences of the "Warwick 



Age 35.] YORKTOWN INVESTED. 175 

by forts and intrenchments, the ground in front of 
which was swept by the guns of Yorktown. 

After close personal reconnoissance, and after 
careful reflection and consultation, General Mc- 
Clellan determined not to attempt to carry the 
lines of Yorktown by immediate assault, but to 
assail it by the regular oj)erations of a siege. As 
this decision has been severely criticized by writers 
who conduct campaigns in their studies and judge 
of military movements and military men by the 
light of subsequent events, it may be well to pause 
for a moment and consider briefly the grounds of 
his determination. 

He had with him at that time — General Frank- 
lin's division not having then arrived — but a little 
over fifty thousand men. The number of the Con- 
federate forces was not known; but General John- 
ston had reached Yorktown on the 6th of April 
with heavy reinforcements, and it was believed 
that the whole force of the enemy was, or soon 
would be, not less than a hundred thousand men. 
Our troops were admirable troops, as their subse- 
quent conduct abundantly showed; but they were 
comparatively new; and nothing tries the temper 
and nerve of the soldier so much as the assault of 
a strongly-defended place. 

General Barnard, Chief Engineer of the army, 
whose position entitled his opinion to the highest 
consideration, expressed his judgment that the 
works could not with any reasonable degree of 
certainty be carried by assault. There are co- 
pious extracts from his Eeport embodied in that of 



176 GENERAL BARNARD. [1862. 

General McClellan. The details are too technical 
to be fully understood by the general reader; but a 
single sentence will serve to show what our assault- 
ing force must have been prepared to meet : — 

"It will be seen, therefore, that our approaches were 
swept by the fire of at least forty-nine guns, nearly all of 
which were heavy, and many of them the most formida- 
ble guns known. Besides that, two- thirds of the guns of 
the water-batteries, and all the guns of Gloucester, bore on 
our right batteries, though under disadvantageous cir- 
cumstances." 

It is true that General Barnard has since changed 
his mind, and given it as his opinion that the lines 
of Yorktown should have been assaulted; but it is 
clear that General McClellan had an opposite judg- 
ment given at the time and on the spot and under 
the gravest official responsibility.* 



■5^ This second, or retrospective, Report of General Barnard 
was made in January, ]863, at a time when General McClellan 
was living in retirement and out of favor with the Administra- 
tion. The Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the 
War copy several of its paragraphs into their Report on the 
Army of the Potomac; and the whole of it may be found at 
page 394 of their Proceedings, Part First, appended to Gene- 
ral Barnard's testimony. The Report of the Committee has 
been translated into French, and published, with notes, by 
Colonel Lecomte, an accomplished Swiss officer who served 
on General McClellan's staff during the Peninsular campaign. 
One of General Barnard's paragraphs which the Committee 
copy is as follows: — "However I may be committed to any ex- 
pression of professional opinion to the contrary (I certainly 
did suggest it), my opinion now is that the lines of Yorktown 



Age 35.] GENERAL BARNARD. 177^ 

General McClellan, on tlie 7th of April, sent a 
long telegram to the Secretary of War, in which 
he explained the reasons why an instant assault was 

ehould have been assaulted. There is reason to believe that 
they were not held in strong force when our army appeared 
before them ; and we know that they were far from complete. 
The prestige of power, the morale, were on our side. It was 
due to ourselves to confirm and sustain it. We should proba- 
bly have succeeded. But, if we had failed, it may be well 
doubted whether the shock of an unsuccessful assault would 
be more demoralizing than the labors of a siege." 

Upon the above, Colonel Lecomte remarks, "We are the 
more astonished at this retrospective confidence of General 
Barnard, because, on the spot, the engineer officers who were 
associated with him, and he himself, we believe, repeatedly 
expressed very different opinions." 

General Barnard further says, "The siege having been de- 
termined upon, we should have opened our batteries upon the 
place as fast as they were completed. The effect on our troops 
would have been inspiring. It would have lightened the siege 
and shortened our labors ; and, besides, we should have had 
the credit of driving the enemy from Yorktown by force of 
arms, — whereas, as it was, we only induced him to evacuate 
for prudential reasons." 

Upon which Colonel Lecomte remarks, "This is not certain. 
On the contrary, nothing discourages an army and inspirits the 
enemy more than a fire of artillery that begins feebly, without 
taking into account that in this way the calibre of the pieces 
is revealed. And as to the 'credit' of taking Yorktown by 
force of arms, this slight advantage might also have been 
doubtful; because, unless we had inflicted heavy loss upon 
the enemy and taken many prisoners at the very moment of 
evacuation (which was hardly to be expected), they might 
have pretended that they repulsed us, and only evacuated the 
place, later, for prudential reasons." 



178 PRESIDENT Lincoln's letter. [18C2. 

not to be made, prominent among whicli was the 
limited amount of force as yet under his control. 
This was replied to by the President, in a letter 
dated April 9, in which he restates the grounds 
on which Blenker's division had been kept back, 
and shows that his mind was still not free from ap- 
prehensions as to the safety of Washington ! The 
concluding paragraphs are as follow : — 

"I suppose the whole force which has gone forward for 
you is with you by this time. And, if so, I think it is 
the precise time for you to strike a blow. By delay the 
enemy will relatively gain upon you ; that is, he will gain 
faster by fortifications and reinforcements than you can 
by reinforcements alone. And once more let me tell you, 
it is indispensable to you that you strike a blow. I am 
powerless to help this. You will do me the justice to 
remember I always insisted that going down the bay in 
search of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, 
was only shifting, and not surmounting, a difficulty, — 
that we would find the same enemy and the same or 
equal intrenchments at either place. The country will 
not fail to note — is now noting— that the present hesi- 
tation to move upon an intrenched enemy is but the 
story of Manassas repeated. 

"I beg to assure you that I have never written you or 
spoken to you in greater kindness of feeling than now, 
nor with a fuller pu,i*pose to sustain you, so far as, in 
my most anxious judgment, I consistently can. But you 
must act. 

"Yours, very truly, 

*'A. Lincoln. 

"Major-General McClellan." 

To these considerations General McClellau re- 



Age 35.] INVESTMENT OF YORKTOWN, 179 

plies, in his Keport, in a few words, which are here 
quoted, as they can hardly be improved : — 

"His Excellency could not judge of the formidable 
character of the works before us as well as if he had been 
on the ground ; and, whatever might have been his desire 
for prompt action (certainly no greater than mine), I feel 
confident, if he could have made a personal inspection of 
the enemy's defences, he would have forbidden me risk- 
ing the safety of the army and the possible successes of 
the campaign on a sanguinary assault of an advantageous 
and formidable position, which, even if successful, could 
not have been followed up to any other or better result 
than would have been reached by the regular operations 
of a siege. Still less could I forego the conclusions of my 
most instructed judgment for the mere sake of avoiding 
the personal consequences intimated in the President's 
despatch.'' 

The investment of Yorktown, as it proved, cost 
a month of valuable time, — which certainly was no 
inconsiderable gain to the enemy ; but, on the other 
hand, it cost us no loss of life. "VVe got it at last 
without bloodshed. But suppose General McClellan 
had assaulted it early in April, as now he is blamed 
by man}' for not having done, and, after the fright- 
ful carnage which must have been the result of 
such an attempt, — after thousands of the flower of 
our population had been mowed down by a tempest 
of iron hail, as grass falls before the mower's scythe, 
— the attack had been at last unsuccessful, as was 
the Duke of Wellington's upon Burgos : what would 
have been the public feeling, — bearing in mind al- 
ways that the judgment of the Chief Engineer, 



180 EVACUATION OF YORKTOWN. 



[1862. 



General Barnard, was against an assault? "Would- 
not such a storm of indignation have been raised 
against General McClellan as would have com- 
pelled his sacrifice at the hands of an Administra- 
tion not inclined — perhaps not able — to resist that 
sweeping power of public opinion which moves and 
rages with more than " the force of winds and waters 
pent" ?* 

On the 22d of April, while the siege of York- 
town was going on. General Franklin^s division, 
forming part of General McDowell's corps, arrived, 
and reported to General McClellan. These troops 
were kept on board the transports, and not em- 
ployed for some days. It was General McClellan's 
purpose to act on Gloucester by disembarking this 
division on the north bank of the York Eiver, 
under the protection of the gunboats, but subse- 
quent events rendered the movement unnecessary. 

Our batteries would have been ready to open 
upon Yorktown on the morning of the 6th of May 
at latest ; but in the nights of the 3d and 4th of 
May, that position and the Confederate lines of the 

* "Many of Lord Wellington's proceedings might be called 
rash, and others timid and slow, if taken separately : yet, when 
viewed as parts of a great plan for delivering the whole Penin- 
sula, they will be found discreet or dainng, as the circumstances 
warranted. Nor is there any portion of his campaigns that 
requires this wide-based consideration more than his early 
sieges, which, being instituted contrary to the rules of art, 
and unsuccessful, — or, when successful, attended with a mourn- 
ful slaughter, — have given occasion for questioning his great 
military qualities, which were, however, then most signally 
displayed." — Napiee. 



Age 35.] BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG. 181 

Warwick Eiver were evacuated. This work was 
doubtless commenced some days before, and was 
conducted with skill and energy. On the 3d, 
with a view of masking their retreat, the fire of 
their batteries was unusually severe. 

The Confederates left behind them all their heavy 
guns, eighty in number, each piece supplied with 
seventy-six rounds of ammunition. A large amount 
of warlike stores of every description was also 
abandoned or destroyed. The evacuation is said 
to have been the result of a council of war at 
which President Davis and Generals Lee and 
Johnston were present, and to have been very dis- 
tasteful to Greneral Magruder, the officer in com- 
mand, who did not like to retire from his works 
without a fight. 

THE BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG. 

After the evacuation of Yorktown, the next im- 
portant point before the Federal army was the city 
of Williamsburg, the Colonial capital of Yirginia. 
It is about ten miles from Yorktown, and is on the 
narrowest part of the peninsula between the James 
and York Elvers, being about three miles from the 
former, and five and a quarter from the latter. 

On the 4th of May, immediately after the evacua- 
tion of Yorktown, a portion of the army was put 
in motion to pursue the flying foe, and General 
Franklin's division was ordered to move by water 
to the vicinit}^ of West Point, to cut off the enemy's 
retreat in that direction. General Stoneman led 

16 



182 BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG. [1862. 

the advance upon Williamsburg with the entire 
cavalry force and four batteries of horse-artillery, 
as fast as the muddy condition of the roads would 
permit, and, on reaching a space where the roads 
from Yorktown and Warwick Court-House debouch 
upon the isthmus, he found a large Confederate 
force in a strongly-defended position. After sus- 
taining and repelling a cavalry charge of the 
enemy, and gallantly returning with his batteries 
the fire of their artillery, as he had no infantry to 
carry the works, he withdrew his command and fell 
back to a clearing about half a mile distant. 

By this time night was falling. The Federal in- 
fantry had come up slowly, retarded by the bad 
state of the roads, and it was completely dark be- 
fore they arrived in full force; and, though General 
Sumner, who had come up and assumed the com- 
mand, desired to make an attempt to carry the 
works that night, it was impossible to do so, owing 
to the late hour and the darkness. The troops 
bivouacked in the woods, and, unfortunately, a heavy 
rain set in, and continued for thirty hours, convert- 
ing the country into a vast lake and the roads into 
channels of liquid mud. The battle of the next 
day cannot be better described than in the clear 
and graphic language of the Prince de Joinville, 
besides which his account contains the criticism of 
a candid and intelligent observer upon a defect in 
the organization of our armies, which is the more 
worthy of our consideration because offered in so 
kindly a spirit. 



Age 35.] BATTLE OF WI LLI A MSBURa. 183 

"Next day the battle began again, but, of course, in cir- 
cumstances unfavorable to the Federals. The two roads 
leading to Williamsburg were crowded with troops. Upon 
that to the left from Lee's Mill were the divisions of 
Hooker and Kearney, belonging to Heintzelman's corps; 
but they were separated from each other by an enormous 
multitude of wagons loaded down with baggage and for 
the most part fast in the mud. Upon that to the right, 
two other divisions were moving forward with still greater 
difficulty. Such was the condition of the ground that 
the cannon sank over the axle into the muc^. This 
medley of men and baggage thrown pellmell into narrow 
and flooded roads had fallen into considerable disorder. 
In the United States there is no such thing as a corps of 
the general staff. The American system of 'every man 
for himself,' individually applied by the officers and 
soldiers of each corps to one another, is also ajoplied by 
the corps themselves to their reciprocal relations. There 
is no sp^ial branch of the service whose duty it is to regu- 
late, centralize, and direct the movements of the army. In 
such a case as this of which we are speaking, we should 
have seen the general staff officers of a French army 
taking care that nothing should impede the advance of 
the troops, stopping a file of wagons here and ordering it 
out of the road to clear the way, sending on a detail of 
men there to repair the roadway or to draw a cannon out 
of the mire, in order to communicate to every corps-com- 
mander the orders of the general-in-chief. 

"Here, nothing of the sort is done. The functions of 
the adjutant-general are limited to the transmission of 
the orders of the general. He has nothing to do with 
seeing that they are executed. The general has no one 
to bear his orders but aides-de-camp, who have the best 
intentions in the world, and are excellent at repeating 
mechanically a verbal order, but to whom nobody pays 
much attention if they undertake to exercise any initia- 



184 BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG. [1802. 

live whatever. Down to the present moment, although 
this want of a general staff had been often felt, its con- 
sequences had not been serious. We had the telegraph, 
which followed the army everywhere and kept up com- 
munications between the different corps: the generals 
could converse together and inform each other of any 
thing that it was important to know. But, once on the 
march, this resource was lost to us, and so farewell to our 
communications ! 

"The want of a general staff was not less severely felt 
in obtaining and transmitting the information necessary 
at the moment of an impending action. No one knew 
the country ; the maps were so defective that they were 
useless. Little was known about the fortified battle-field 
on which the army was about to be engaged. Yet this 
battle-field had been seen and reconnoitred the day before 
by the troops which had taken part in Stoneman's 
skirmish. Enough was surely known of it for us to com- 
bine a plan of attack and assign to every commander his 
own part in the work. No ! this was not so. Every one 
kept his observations to himself, — not from ill will, but 
because it was nobody's special duty to do this general 
work. It was a defect in the organization ; and, with the 
best elements in the world, an army which is not organized 
cannot expect great success. It is fortunate if it escape 
great disaster. 

"Thanks to this constitutional defect of the Federal 
armies. Hooker's division, which led the column on the 
left-hand road, and had received, the day before, a gene- 
ral order to march upon Williamsburg, came out on the 
morning of the 5th upon the scene of Stoneman's cavalry- 
fight, without the least knowledge of what it was to meet 
there. Keceived, as soon as it appeared, with a steady fire 
from the hostile works, it deployed resolutely in the 
abatis and went into action. But it came up little by 
little and alone, — whilst the defence was carried on by 



Agk 35.] BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG. 185 

from fifteen to twenty thousand men strongly intrenched. 
The odds were too great. 

"Hoolver, who is an admirable soldier, held his own 
for some time; but he had to give way and fall back, 
leaving in the woods and in these terrible abatis some 
two thousand of his men killed and wounded, with 
several of his guns which he could not bring off. The 
enemy followed him as he fell back. The division of 
General Kearney, having passed the crowded road, and 
marching upon the guns at the pas de course, re-established 
the battle. The fight had now rolled from the edges of 
the plain into the forest; and it was sharp, for the enemy 
was strongly reinforced. The Federals fought not less 
firmly, encouraged by their chiefs. Hooker, Heintzelman, 
and Kearney. Kearney in especial, who lost an arm in 
Mexico, and fought with the French at the Muzaia and 
at Solferino, had displayed the finest courage.* All his 

* ' ' The general acceded to his urgent request, and immediately 
ordered up Kearney's division to his aid. He could not have 
sent a better man. Kearney was of that chivalrous character 
so often to be met with in the French army. He had lost an 
arm in the Mexican War, and he afterwards joined the French 
army as a volunteer aide-de-camp in the Italian campaign, 
greatly distinguishing himself at both Solferino and Magenta. 
Kearney brought up his men at the double quick to support 
Hooker, although the execrable state of the roads somewhat 
retarded him; but he eventually reached the hard-pressed divi- 
sion. It was a fine sight to see Kearney lead on his men, eager 
for the fight as they were. He seemed to be ubiquitous, — now 
leading on his centre, now ordering up a battery, in another 
moment charging at the head of his troops. His striking, manly 
form was prominent wherever the fight was thickest, setting a 
noble example to his soldiers. The opposing troops were soon 
intermingled in a regular melee, and both sides fought despe- 
rately. Owing to the state of the ground, our cavalry was not ser- 
viceable, much to the regret of its officers : it was also very diffi- 
16* 



186 BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG. [1862. 

aides had fallen around him, and, left alone, he had electri- 
fied his men by his intrepidity. During all this time the 
part of the army massed on the road to the right re- 
mained passive. A single division only had come up, 
and the generals in command could not resolve to throw 
it into the engagement without seeing its supports. These 
supports were delayed by the swollen streams, the encum- 
bered roads, the shattered wagons sticking in the mud. 

"But all the while the sound of Hooker's musketry 
was in our ears. His division was cut up and falling back. 
His guns had been heard at first in front, then on one 
side, and they were receding still. The balls and the 
shells began to whistle and shatter the trees over the fresh 
division, as it stood immovable and expectant. 

"It was now three o'clock, and the generals resolved to 
act. One division passed through the woods to flank the 
regiments which were driving Hooker, while to the ex- 
treme right a brigade passed the creek on an old mill- 
bridge, which the enemy had failed to secure, and de- 
bouched upon the flank of the Williamsburg works. 
The Confederates did not expect this attack, which, if 
successful, must sweep every thing before it. They de- 
spatched two brigades, which advanced resolutely through 
the corn-fields to drive back the Federals. The latter 
coolly allowed their foes to come up, and received them 
with a tremendous fire of artillery. The Confederates, 

cult for the artillery to manoeuvre. The struggle, which had 
commenced at the verge of a wood, was gradually drawn into 
the forest itself, and here, under the cracking branches of 
venerable trees, amidst the roar of the artillery, many des- 
perate hand-to-hand encounters took place, such as have seldom 
been witnessed in other wars," — Estvari's War-Pictures from the 
South, p. 277. 

The author of the above work was a Prussian officer, serving 
in the Confederate army. 



Age 35.] BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG. 187 

unshaken, pushed on within thirty yards of the cannon's 
mouth, shouting, ' Bull Kun ! Bull Kun !' as the Swiss 
used to shout, 'Granson! Granson!' There, however, 
they wavered, and the Federal General 'Hancock, seizing 
the moment, cried to his soldiers, as he waved his cap, 
'Now, gentlemen! the bayonet!^ and charged with his 
brigade. The enemy could not withstand the shock, 
broke and fled, strewing the field with his dead. At this 
very moment General McClellan, who had been detained 
at Yorktown, appeared on the field. It was dusk: the 
night was coming on, the rain still falling in torrents. 
On three sides of the plateau on which the general was, 
the cannon and the musketry were rattling uninterrupt- 
edly. The success of Hancock had been decisive, and 
the reserves brought up by the general-in-chief, charg- 
ing upon the field, settled the affair. Then it was that 
I saw General McClellan, passing in front of the Sixth 
Cavalry, give his hand to Major Williams, with a few 
words on his brilliant charge of the day before. The 
regiment did not hear what he said ; but it knew what he 
meant, and from every heart went up one of those mas- 
culine, terrible shouts which are only to be heard on the 
field of battle.* These shouts, taken up along the whole 



■^ "Suddenly a shout of a thousand voices broke upon the air, 
like the rushing of a mighty wind froni the wood. What did 
this portend? There was little time left for us to speculate. 
Charge after charge was made upon our men, and the news 
then spread that General McClellan, with the main body of 
his army, had arrived on the field of battle. This explained 
the loud cheers from the wood. Our men could no longer 
stand their ground. McClellan, in person, led on his troops 
into the midst of the fire. Magruder now, finding that the 
battle was lost, ordered a retreat to be sounded, and directed 
Hill's division, which had just come up, to cover the movement. 
All the wounded anc^ a great pqrtion of the baggage were 



188 BATTLE OF WILLIAMSBURG. [18G2. 

line, struck terror to the enemy. We saw them come 
upon the parapets and look out in silence and motionless 
upon the scene. Then the firing died away, and night 
fell on the combat which in America is called * the battle 
of Williamsburg.'" 

Our loss in the battle of Williamsburg — the greater 
part of which was sustained by General Hooker's 
division — was as follows: Killed, four hundred 
and fifty-six; wounded, fourteen hundred; missing, 
three hundred and seventy -two: total, two thou- 
sand two hundred and twenty-eight. The engage- 
ment had been fought under the disadvantage on 
our part of not knowing the numbers of the enemy 
or the strength of his positions; and we became 
involved in a serious battle, with a large fi3rce 
powerfully intrenched, when we had expected to 
do no more than attack the rear-guard of a retreat- 
ing arm^^ This explains the want of concert among 
the officers on the field, and the failure to send 
support, in all cases, to the place and at the time 
when most needed. General McClellan, during the 
forenoon of the day, w^as at Yorktown, engaged in 
making arrangements for the forwarding of Gene- 
ral Franklin's division to West Point, and in con- 
sultation with the naval commanders, as well as 
with the other duties incident to his position. It 

left in the enemy's hands. The shades of night put an end 
to the fight ; a heavy rain, too, began to fall ; and these circum- 
stances, fortunately, prevented the enemy from completely over- 
whelming us. Tired and worn out, our troops returned to 
Williamsburg, where the excitement had become intense." — 
Estvan's War-Pictures from the South, p. 279. ■ 



Age 35.] TESTI jVIONY OP GENERAL KEYES. 189 

was not until about one o'clock that he heard from 
his aides that every thing was not going on favor- 
ably in front, — upon which he hurried up as rapidly 
as possible, arriving there between four and five in 
the afternoon. 

General Keyes, in his examination before the 
Cono-ressional Committee on the Conduct of the 

o 

War, says, " The battle of Williamsburg was gained 
by our side, but at a very great loss in Hooker's 
division and considerable loss in Hancock's and 
Peck's brigades. The victory, for the reasons I 
have stated, was nothing like as decisive as it 
should have been, nor gained so early in the day. 
In fact, the victory was not what, in military lan- 
guage, is generally called a perfect victory, because 
we were not able to sleep in the enemy's camp ex- 
cept in part."* 

* Upon the battle of Williamsburg, General Barnard says, 
*'We fought, we lost several thousand men, and we gained 
nothing. If we had not fought, the next day a battle would, 
in all probability, have been unnecessary. But, if it had been 
necessary, we should have had time to have brought up our 
resources, reconnoitred the position, and delivered our attack 
in such a way that some result would have flowed from it," 

Upon this Colonel Lecomte remarks, "We gained there at 
least the credit of having carried a position by force of 
arms, which General Barnard regrets so much we did not do at 
Yorktown. But this is not the only contradiction into which 
the honorable general falls. He would not have feared, for in- 
stance, assaults, however fruitless, upon the strongly-fortified 
line of Yorktown and Warwick, and he is inconsolable at the 
losses caused by success." 



190 WILLIAMSBURG OCCUPIED. [1862. 

However imperfect the victory may have been, 
the battle had been entirely satisfactory so far as 
the courage and conduct of the men were concerned. 
They had behaved admirably, regulars and volun- 
teers alike, and given to their commanding officer 
abundant proof that he might depend alike upon 
their bravery and their steadiness, — their power to 
attack and their powder to resist attack. That the 
operations of the army and the course of its com- 
mander had thus far been approved by the public 
sentiment of the country may be inferred from the 
following resolutions, offered by Mr. Lovejoy, and 
unanimously adopted by the House of Eepresenta- 
tives, on the 5th of May: — 

^^ Besolved, That it is with feelings of profound grati- 
tude to Almighty God that the House of RejDresentatives, 
from time to time, hear of the triumphs of the Union 
armies in the great struggle for the supremacy of the 
Constitution and the integrity of the Union. 

''Resolvedy That we receive with profound satisfaction 
intelligence of the recent victories achieved by the 
armies of the Potomac, associated from their localities 
with those of the Revolution, and that the sincere thanks 
of the House are hereby tendered to Major-General 
George B. McClellan for the display of those high mili- 
tary qualities which secure important results with but 
little sacrifice to human life.^' 

On the morning after the battle, finding the 
enemy's position abandoned, we occupied Fort 
Magruder and the town of "Williamsburg, which 
w^as filled with the enemy's wounded, to whose 



Age 35.] WHITE HOUSE. 191 

assistance eighteen of their surgeons were sent 
by General Johnston. Our troops were greatly ex- 
hausted by their toilsome march through the mud 
from their positions in front of Yorktown, and by 
the protracted battle they had fought; and the roads 
were in such a state, after thirty-six hours of con- 
tinuous rain, that it was almost impossible to pass 
even empty wagons over them. Under these cir- 
cumstances, an immediate pursuit of the enemy 
was out of the question. 

The divisions of Franklin, Sedgwick, Porter, and 
Eichardson were sent from Yorktown, by water, 
to the right bank of the Pamunkey, in the vicinity 
of West Point. Early on the morning of May 7, 
General Franklin had completed the disembark- 
ation of his division. Between ten and eleven 
o'clock he was assailed by a large force of the 
enemy, but, after a spirited engagement of three 
or four hours, the Confederates retired, all their 
attacks having been repulsed. The gunboats were 
very eflS.cient, and contributed materially to the 
success of the day. 

As soon as supplies had heen received, and the 
condition of the roads had somewhat improved, the 
army turned its face towards Eichmond, moving 
slowly along the left bank of the Pamunkey, one 
of the two affluents forming the York Eiver, and 
navigable from its junction with the latter river as 
far as White House. The head-quarters of the 
army reached tl^is place on the 16th of May. So 
bad were the roads that the train of one division 



192 MARCH DESCRIBED. [1862. 

took thirty-six hours to get to White House from 
Cumberland, a distance of only five miles.* 

* "Nothing could be more picturesque than this military 
march along the banks of a fine stream through a magnificent 
country arrayed in all the wealth of spring vegetation. The 
winding course of the Pamunkey, through a valley in which 
meadows of the brightest green alternated with wooded hills, 
offered a perpetual scene of enchantment to our eyes. Flowers 
bloomed everywhere, especially on the river-banks, which 
abounded in magnolias, Virginia jessamines, azaleas, and blue 
lupines. Humming-birds, snakes, and strange birds of every 
hue sported in the branches and about the trunks of the trees. 
Occasionally we passed a stately habitation which recalled the 
old mansions of rural France, with its large windows in the 
roof, — around it a handsome garden, and behind it the slave- 
cabins. 

**As the army was descried in the distance, the inhabitants 
would hang out a white flag. One of the provost-marshal's 
horsemen would dismount at the door, and, reassured by his 
presence, the ladies, in their long muslin dresses, surrounded 
by a troop of little negresses with frizzled hair and bare legs, 
would come out upon the veranda and watch the passage of the 
troops. They were often accompanied by old men with strongly- 
marked faces, long white locks, and broad-brimmed hats, — 
never by young men. All the men capable of bearing arms 
had been carried off, willy-nilly, by the Government, to join in 
the general defence. 

*'So from point to point we moved along the river. The 
gunboats went first and explored the country before us ; then 
came the topographical officers, moving through the woods with 
an escort of cavalry, reconnoitring the country, and sketching 
by the eye and the compass provisional maps, which were 
photographed at head-quarters for the use of the generals. 
The next day, with the help of these maps, the army would 
get into motion, mingled in masses with its immense team of 
wagons. About one-fourth of each regiment was occupied in 



AaE 35.] RESPECT FOR PRIVATE PROPERTY. 193 

At White House the Pamnnkey ceases to be 
navigable. The York Eiver Kailroad, which runs 
from Eichmond to West Point, crosses the river 
here by a bridge which the enemy had destroyed. 
Some of the rails also had been removed from the 
track, and the rolling stock had been carried off; but 
the rails were soon relaid, and new cars and locomo- 
tives took the place of those that had been taken 
away. A great depot was established at White 
House, under the protection of the gunboats. The 
army began its march to Eichmond, following the 

escorting the materiel of the corps, piled up — provisions, am- 
munition, tents, and furniture — on wagons, at the rate of ten 
to a battalion. But for the absence of women, we might have 
been taken for an armed emigration rather than for soldiers 
on the march. 

*' On May IG, we reached V/hite House, a fine building, once 
the property of Washington, and now of his descendants, the 
Lee family. The head of this family. General Lee, was one of 
the chief officers of the Confederate Army; one of his nephews 
was in the Federal ranks. General McClellan, always careful 
to insist upon respect for private property, stationed sentinels 
around the residence of the hostile general, forbade any one to 
enter it, and would not enter it himself. He planted his tent 
in a neighboring meadow. This respect for Southern property 
has been made a reproach to the general in Congress: the 
opinion of the army did not take this direction; it endorsed 
the delicate feeling of its leader. This feeling was pushed so 
far that when a general's servants found one day, in an aban- 
doned house, a basket of champagne, the general sent it back 
again conspicuously the next by an aide-de-camp. We m.ay 
smile at this puritanical austerity, to which we are not accus- 
tomed in Europe. For my own part, I admit that I always ad- 
mired it." — Prince de Joinville." 

n 



194 MERRIMAC DESTROYED. [1862. 

line of the railroad, upon which it was dependent 
for its daily supplies. On the 20th of May, our 
advanced light troops reached the banks of Chick- 
ahominy Eiver, about eight miles from Eichmond. 

Meanwhile, important events had been going on 
in the Southern Confederacy. The abandonment 
of Yorktown without waiting for an assault Avas 
the result of a determination on the part of the 
Southern leaders to transfer the scene of struggle 
and resistance from the Peninsula to the neighbor- 
hood of Eichmond. The same policy which coun- 
selled a withdrawal from Yorktown required the 
giving up of Xorfolk; for General Huger and his 
garrison of eighteen thousand men were wanted 
elsewhere. Orders were, accordingly, given him 
to evacuate the place, which he did early in May, 
after destroying a large amount of public property; 
and on the 10th of May Norfolk was taken pos- 
session of by our troops under General Wool. 

But a more painful sacrifice yet was exacted at 
the hands of the Confederates, — the sacrifice of the 
Merrimac, which had done them such substantial 
service, and of whose achievements they were so 
justly proud. About four o'clock on the morning 
of the 11th of May, a brilliant light was seen from 
Fortress Monroe, in the direction of Craney Island; 
and at half-past four an explosion was heard which 
shook the earth far and wide. This was caused by 
the blowing up of the Merrimac, which had been 
abandoned by her ofiicers and crew and set on fire. 
The reasons for destroying her were simply these: 
she was wholly unfitted for ocean navigation, an(3 



Age 35.] CO N FED ER ATE FOLIC Y. 195 

must have gone down in the first storm she met; 
and her draught of water was such that she could 
not get far enough up the James Eiver to be out 
of the reach of the Federal navy, to which the 
river was now opened, and which at any cost would 
have avenged upon the Merrimac the loss of the 
Cumberland and Congress. She must either be 
destroyed or fall into our hands. This now seems 
obvious enough; but the sacrifice of the Merrimac — 
the Virginia, as they called her — was a bitter 
draught for the Southern people to swallow. It 
wounded them in their sectional pride, w^here the 
Southern mind has always been so sensitive. The 
newspapers were loud and general in lamenting and 
denouncing it; and even the court of inquiry which 
was summoned to investigate the subject reported 
that her destruction was unnecessary at the time 
and place at which it was effected. But, for all 
this, the sacrifice of the Merrimac was a necessary 
result of the policy of defence w^hich, after great 
deliberation, was adopted; and that the policy was 
sound, subsequent events have proved beyond a 
doubt. It may be not without profit to pause here 
a moment, and consider in what spirit and with 
what measures the Confederate States prepared 
themselves for the conflict before them. 

The whole military resources of the Confederates 
at that time were under the control of three men, 
President Davis, General Eobert E. Lee, and Gene- 
ral Joseph E. Johnston, — all of them trained soldiers, 
and one of them also a trained statesman. There 
was entire confidence and perfect harmony of ac- 



196 SOUTHERN INSTITUTIONS. 



[1862. 



tion between them. That fatal apple of discord, 
the Presidency, never made any one of them the 
rival of any other. They acted together for one 
object; and that was success in the military con- 
test. They resolved to transfer the scene of deci- 
sive conflict from the Peninsula to the neighbor- 
hood of Eichmond; and that this was a wise deter- 
mination is shown by a glance at the map. The 
Peninsula has York Eiver on one side and James 
Kiver on the other; these rivers must sooner or later 
have been commanded by our gunboats, and then 
their forces would have been turned and defeated. 
The surrender of Norfolk was a source of mortifi- 
cation; but it was a judicious step. The garrison 
was wanted at Eichmond much more than at 
Norfolk; and as the Confederates had no navy, and 
their entire coast was or soon would be blockaded, 
the possession of Norfolk, though it gratified their 
pride, was of no substantial advantage to them. 

The loss of the Merrimac was a more painful 
sacrifice still: it was indeed a blow upon the naked 
heart; but it was a judicious, nay, an inevitable, 
step, and, as such, it was at last acquiesced in. 

In the j)olitical contests which have ended in the 
present civil war, it was often said by Northern 
Avriters and speakers that the South was an olig- 
archy, and that though their political forms were 
democratic their institutions were aristocratic. The 
remark is, to some extent, true. In the Southern 
States the mass of the people have always been con- 
tent to follow the lead of a comparatively few per- 
sons who have practised politics as a profession. 



Age 35.] FORT DARLING. 197 

This relation between the many and the few, what- 
ever objections may be urged to it in time of peace 
is no disadvantange in the conduct of a war. 

The Confederate Congress had passed in April a 
very strong and sweeping conscription-law, which 
included every able-bodied man between eighteen 
and thirty-five, and it was everywhere enforced 
by a powerful public sentiment : so that early in 
June their army began to be steadily recruited from 
this source. The work upon the defences around 
Eichmond, which had been planned some time be- 
fore, was prosecuted as rapidly as possible. 

The destruction of the Merrimac opened the 
James Eiver to our gunboats, but not until the 
Confederates had had time to protect Eichmond 
against a naval attack. On the 15th of May, a 
fleet of five of our gunboats, under Captain John 
Eodgers, steamed up the James, running aground 
several times, but meeting no artificial impediments 
till they came to Ward's Bluff, about eight miles 
from Eichmond, where they encountered a heavy 
battery, called Fort Darling, and two separate bar- 
riers, formed of piles, steamers, and sail-vessels. 
The stream was here very narrow, being only twice 
as wide as the Galena, the leading gunboat, was 
long. The banks of the river were lined with 
rifle-pits, from which sharpshooters annoyed the 
men at the guns and rendered a removal of the 
obstructions impossible. The battery was on a 
blufl' one hundred and fifty feet high, bristling with 
guns of long range and heavy calibre, the shot 
from which fell with crushing weight upon our 
17- 



198 THE MERRIMAC. [1862. 

gallant little fleet. A rifled hundred-pound Parrott 
gun on board one of the gunboats, the Naugatuck, 
burst during the fight, and disabled the vessel. 
The great height of the bluff put it out of the 
range of many of our guns; and after a fight of 
between three and four hours, in which oflicers and 
men fully sustained the high character of the Ame- 
rican navy, Commodore Eodgers gave the signal 
to discontinue the action. 

One word more, in conclusion, upon the Merri- 
mac, or Yirginia, and the lessons her career teaches. 
Her first appearance upon the stage of the world 
was on the 8th day of March, and the drama 
closed with the flames of her funeral pyre on the 
morning of the 11th of May; and certainly never 
was there any mortal craft that within the short 
space of two months played a more important part 
or led a more eventful life. She was originally 
a United States steam screw frigate of fifty guns, 
and, being at Gosport when the rebellion broke out, 
was, like many of her consorts, partly burned and 
sunk when it became certain that Norfolk must fall 
into the hands of the seceding State of Yirginia. 
After a while the Confederates fished her up, and 
it was found that the bottom of the hull, the boilers, 
and the essential parts of the engine were little 
injured. It was proposed to make this wreck the 
nucleus of a casemated vessel with inclined iron- 
plated sides and submerged ends. This ingenious 
suggestion was carried out with skill and energy. 
The peculiar feature of the Merrimac was that her 
ends and the eaves of her casemate were sub- 



Age 35.] THE MERRIMAC. 199 

merged. The inclined roof, covered with railroad- 
iron, was pierced with port-holes for ten guns of 
very heavy calibre. The inclination of her plates, 
and their thickness and form, were determined by 
actual experiment. Her bow was armed with a 
strong projecting prow or beak of steel. When 
completed, she looked something like the roof of 
a house floating upon the water. 

On the morning of the 8th of March, this strange, 
uncouth fabric is seen paddling along the calm 
waters of HamjDton Eoads, like some huge animal 
of the turtle-kind-, making not more than five knots 
an hour. There the Cumberland and the Congress, 
two old-fashioned wooden frigates, were lying at 
anchor; and not far from them were the Minne- 
sota and Eoanoke, screw frigates, and the St. Law- 
rence, an old sailing-frigate. The Merrimac crawls 
by the Congress, delivering a broadside as she 
passes, and makes straight for the Cumberland. 
The sailors on board the latter vessel greet her 
with jokes and laughter; but the officers note with 
surprise and uneasiness that the shotof their heaviest 
broadsides rattle off the roof of the ominous craft 
like so many India-rubber balls, without making 
the slightest impression upon her iron ribs. In a 
few moments she crashes into the Cumberland, 
head on, drives her projecting prow into the star- 
board bow below the water-line, and knocks a 
hole in her side as big as a hogshead. The gallant 
frigate reels- and shivers in every limb under the 
death-stroke, settles by the head, and begins at 
once to sink, carrying with her two hundred of her 



200 THE M ERR I MAC. [1S02. 

dauntless crew, before they had fairly recovered 
from the surprise of the portentous shock. 

The Merrimac next approaches the Congress; 
but she has probably broken or displaced her prow 
m running into the Cumberland, and she attacks the 
Congress, tliorefore, by shot and shells. But before 
her tremendous armament the Congress proves as 
powerless as was the Cumberland before her beak. 
Her colors are hauled down; she is run ashore, and 
set on fire by the Merrimac' s battery. 

Of the other three vessels which have been men- 
tioned, the Minnesota was the only one which 
could have been of any service; and she, unfortu- 
nately, ran aground. The Merrimac, after firing 
a few shots at her, deeming her a sure prey for the 
next day, turns aside to shell the camp and batte- 
ries at Newport News, — but with very little effect. 
In the night the gallant little Monitor arrives, — as 
opportunely as one of Homer's gods coming down 
from Olympus to share in a mortal fray, — attacks 
the Merrimac the next morning, and, after a con- 
test resembling a fight between a swordfish and 
a whale, drives away her gigantic adversary, baffled 
and disabled, thus rendering us a service cheaply 
estimated at her weight in gold. 

On the 11th of April, the Merrimac again appears 
in Hampton Eoads, attended by five small vessels. 
As soon as she is discerned, a large fleet of trans- 
ports and sailing-vessels in the upper roads scuds 
away to a place of safety, like a flock of "tame 
villatic foAvl" that seeks a sheltering covert when 
the hawk is seen in the air. Aided by her at- 



Age 35.] THE MERRIMAC. 201 

tendant spirits, she captures three sailing-vessels 
under the eye of our own fleet, among which was 
the Monitor herself. After this, the Merrimac 
slowly moves to and fro across the mouth of 
Elizabeth Eiver, seemingly inviting a champion to 
come out and try conclusions with her 3 but her 
defiance is not accepted, and she retires with her 
prizes, unmolested. To make the sting of our mor- 
tification a little sharper, all this was done under 
the bows of two foreign frigates, — one French and 
one English, 

Thus, the destruction of two frigates and the cap- 
ture of three small vessels make up the list of the 
]VIerrimac's material triumphs and trophies; but 
these were by no means all the services she ren- 
dered the Confederates, nor all the harm she did to 
us. In the first place, she controlled the James 
Eiver so long as she lived. This rendered it im- 
possible for us to make use of that river as the base 
of our operations; and this was the best base for a 
movement uj)on Eichmond, and that one which, un- 
questionably, we should have adopted but for her 
presence. And, in the second place, the necessity 
of watching the Merrimac rendered it impossible to 
detach from the squadron at Hampton Eoads a suit- 
able force to attack the enemy's water-batteries at 
Yorktown and Gloucester; and this delayed the 
army before the lines of YorktovN^n, and gave the 
Confederates — what they so much w^anted — time. 
Thus the whole current of the Peninsular campaign 
was turned aside, and the course of the war itself 
materially influenced, by this single vessel. Never 



202 THE MERRIMAC. [1862. 

was there a greater apparent disjoroportion between 
cause and effect. 

And the lesson which the Merrimac teaches is, 
that in war no chance should be thrown away, no 
advantage should be foregone; that counsel never 
should be taken of distrust and despondency; that 
the game of war is never wholly lost and never 
wholly won, and that in desperate straits there is 
nothing that ingenuity can suggest which is not 
worth trying. A sudden and unexpected charge 
by Kellermann, at the head of eight hundred cav- 
alry, turned the adverse tide of battle at Marengo 
into a victory. The little fort of Bard, in the 
valley of Aosta, a few weeks earlier, checked, 
and, had not the garrison been over-confident and 
under-vigilant, would have turned back, the whole 
French army.* And the Merrimac may have 
saved the city of Eichmond from capture. 

It is curious to reflect, after all the inventions by 
which the force and destructiveness of projectiles 
have been increased, that in the Merrimac we came 
back to the point from which naval architecture, 
as applied to war, started. The Merrimac's beak 
was nothing more nor less than the rostrum of a 
Roman galley, enlarged and strengthened. 

During the march from Yorktown to the banks 
of the Chickahominy, besides the weighty cares and 
heavy responsibilities of a commanding general at 
the head of a great exjoedition, the mind of General 

* See the account in Alison's "History of the French Revo- 
lution," chap. XXX. 



Age 35.] MORE MEN NEEDED. 203 

McClellan was constantly burdened with a convic- 
tion that his troops were not numerous enough for 
the work in hand, and that reinforcements w^ere 
essential to success. He had carried with him to 
the Peninsula about eighty-five thousri-d men, and 
Franklin's division, which had subsequently joined 
him, amounted to ten thousand more; but some of 
his troops had been killed or disabled in battle, 
some had died from disease, and garrisons had been 
left at Yorktown, Williamsburg, and Gloucester, so 
that now he could not confidently rely upon more 
than eighty thousand men. But time, which was 
thinning his ranks, was swelling those of the enemy; 
and the task before him was that of taking a city 
strongly defended, before which was an army larger 
than his own. On the 10th of May, from a camp 
three miles from Williamsburg, he sent a brief tele- 
gram to the Secretary of War, setting forth his 
position, and urging the necessity of reinforcing 
him without delay w^ith all the disposable troops in 
Eastern Yirginia. He assures the Secretary that 
the rebels will not abandon Eichmond without a 
struggle, and adds that unless he is reinforced it is 
probable he shall be obliged to fight nearly double 
his numbers, strongly intrenched. 

On the 14th of May, he sent a telegram to the 
President in the same strain, stating that the time 
had come for striking a fatal blow at the enemies 
of the Constitution, and entreating him that he 
would cause the Army of the Peninsula to be rein- 
forced without delay by all the disposable troops of 
the Government. To this, on the 18th, an answer 



204 LETTER FROM THE SECRETARY OP WAR. [1862. 

was received from the Secretary of War, the mate- 
rial portions of which are as follows : — 

"The President is not willing to uncover the capital 
entirely ; and it is believed that, even if this were prudent, 
it would require more time to effect a junction between 
your army and that of the Kappahannock, by the way of 
the Potomac and York Rivers, than by a land march. In 
order, therefore, to increase the strength of tlie attack 
upon Richmond at the earliest moment. General McDowell 
has been ordered to march upon that city by the shortest 
route. He is ordered, keeping himself always in position 
to save the capital from all possible attack, so to operate 
as to put his left wing in communication with your right 
wing ; and you are instructed to co-operate so as to esta- 
blish this communication as soon as possible, by extending 
your right wing to the north of Richmond. 

***** 

" When General McDowell is in position on your right, 
his supplies must be drawn from West Point ; and you 
will instruct your staff officers to be prepared to supply 
him by that route. 

"The President desires that General McDowell retain 
the command of the Department of the Rappahannock, 
and of the forces with which he moves forward.'^ 

It will be borne in mind that General McClellan 
wished and had advised that reinforcements should 
be sent to him by w^ater, as their arrival would have 
been more certain. Now that the James Eiver was 
open, they might have been sent by that route, in 
which event our left flank would have rested upon 
that river and been protected by it. Eichmond 
could have been approached by the James, and wo 
should have escaped the losses and delays incurred 



Age 35.] INSTRUCTIONS TO GENERAL MCDOWELL. 205 

by bridging the Chickahominy, and should have 
had the army massed in one body instead of being 
necessarily divided by that stream. This judicious 
mihtary plan, Avhich in all probability would have 
resulted in the capture of Eichmond, could not be 
carried out, because to the President's distempered 
fancy Washington was not safe unless it was 
covered by McDowell's division in a direct lino 
between that city and Richmond. Under the cir- 
cumstances of the case, an attack upon Washington 
by a Confederate force strong enough to carry its 
defences was about as probable an event as an inun- 
dation of the city by an overflow of the Potomac. 

By these orders it will be also noticed that General 
McClellan was commanded to extend his right wing- 
to the north of Eichmond, in order to establish 
the communication between himself and General 
McDowell. This was running a great risk in case 
General McDowell should not come, because it ex- 
posed our right in a way that no prudent officer 
would have done; and, as General McDowell did 
not come, the enemy did not fail to take advantage 
of the opportunity thus afforded them. 

The Secretary's communication of the 18th was 
accompanied by a copy of the instructions which 
had been sent to General McDowell on the previous 
day, of which the following is the substance ; — 



"War Department, 
Washington, May 17, 1862. 



} 



"General: — Upon being joined by General Shields's 
division, you will move upon Richmond by the general 
route of the Richmond & Fredericksburg Railroad, co-ope- 

18 



206 INSTRUCTIONS TO GENERAL MCDOWELL. [1862. 

rating with the forces under General McClellan, now 
threatening Eichmond from the line of the Pamunkey 
and York Kivers. 

"While seeking to establish as soon as possible a com- 
munication between your left wing and the right wing of 
General McClellan, you will hold yourself always in such 
i:)osition as to cover the capital of the nation against a 
sudden dash of any large body of the rebel forces." 

General McDowell had with him forty thousand 
men and ninety pieces of artillery. 

On the 21st of May, General McClellan sent 
another despatch, of some length, to the President. 
He explains to him the position of the army, and 
earnestly and respectfully expresses his regret at 
the delay of McDowell's advance. He tells the 
President frankly that the march of McDowell's 
column upon Eichmond by the shortest land route 
will uncover Washington as completely as its move- 
ment by water; that the enemy cannot advance by 
Fredericksburg, and that if they attempt a move- 
ment, which to him seems utterly improbable, their 
route would be by Gordonsville and Manassas. In 
conclusion, he desires that the extent of his author- 
ity over General McDowell may be clearly defined, 
and suggests that the dangers of a divided command 
can only be surely guarded against by explicitly 
placing General McDowell under his orders in the 
usual way. 

On the 24th he received from the President a 
reply to the above, in which he suggests a plan of 
military movement against General Anderson in 
concert with General McDowell, assures him that 



Age 35.] GENERAL MCDOAYELL WITHDRAWN. 207 

McDowell's division, strengthened by Shields's com- 
mand, would begin to move on Monday, the 26th, 
and tells him that McDowell, after joining him, 
would be under his command. 

This, of course, was highly satisfactory, as it gave 
General McClellan assurance that he would soon be 
reinforced by at least fifty thousand men, and thus 
be made sufiiciently strong to overpower the large 
army confronting him. But his astonishment, his 
agony of disappointment, may well be imagined 
when all these confident expectations were broken 
to pieces by the crushing despatch received at a 
later hour of the same day, which ran thus : — 



"May 24, 1862, 
From Washington 



62, I 
, 4 P.M. / 



"In consequence of General Banks's critical position, I 
have been compelled to suspend General McDowell's 
movements to join you. The enemy are making a des- 
perate push upon Harper's Ferry ; and we are trying to 
throw General Fremont's force, and part of General 
McDowell's, in their rear. 

"A. Lincoln, President 

* 'Major-General Geo. B. McClellan." 

It is necessary to go back a little and state the 
events which occasioned this last despatch. 

It will be remembered that the State of Yirginia, 
contrary to sound military maxims, and certainly 
for reasons other than military, had been parcelled 
out into five separate commands. General Fremont 
was west of the mountains, General Banks was in 
the Valley of the Shenandoah, General McDowell 



208 JACKSON'S MOVEMENTS. [18C2. 

was on the Eappahannock, and General "Wool was 
at Fortress Monroe. During the preceding autumn 
and winter the Confederate General Jackson had 
been at or near Winchester with a body of raw 
troops, which he had been engaged in drilling and 
discijolining. The campaign opened in the valley 
early in March. On the 23d of that month a battle 
was fought near Winchester between General Shields 
and General Jackson, in which the latter was de- 
feated. This battle, by revealing the presence of a 
considerable force of the enemy in that region, was 
probably the reason why McDowell's corps was not 
sent to the Peninsula with McClellan. After the 
battle of Winchester, Jackson had retreated up the 
valley to Harrisonburg, and then struck off to the 
west. On the 8th of May, he fought a battle of not 
very decisive results with the Federal forces under 
Milroy and Schenck, at a place called McDowell, 
near Bull Pasture Mountain. From this point he 
marched to Harrisonburg, thence to New Market, 
where a junction was effected with Ewell's division, 
which had come from Elk Eun Yalley. Their 
united forces amounted to at least fifteen thousand 
men. 

About the middle of May, an order was issued 
from the War Department at Washington for 
General Shields to move with his command from 
the Yalley of the Shenandoah and join General 
McDowell at Fredericksburg. This left General 
Banks with only five or six thousand men at Stras- 
burg. The Government was warned of the danger 
of leaving him with so small a force when so active 



Age 35.] GENERAL BANKS. 209 

and vigilant an officer as Jackson was in tlie valley; 
but it was all to no purpose. It is a mistake to sup- 
pose that General Jackson had been planning and 
executing movements of his own, and upon his own 
responsibility, all this time: he had been under the 
control of the commander-in-chief at Eichmond, 
and all his marches and battles had reference to 
one sole object, — the defence of that city. The Con- 
federate authorities knew how important it was for 
General McClellan that he should be reinforced by 
General McDowell, and they also knew that it was 
an apprehension for the safety of Washington that 
had thus far prevented the junction; and they, of 
course, reasoned that by keeping tip and increasing 
this alarm they might postpone indefinitely a com- 
bination of forces which would be fatal to them. 
The time had come, now that General Banks was 
left so exposed, when a decisive blow might be struck 
towards the end; and the opportunity was not 
neglected. 

After the battle at McDowell, General Jackson 
had contrived to conceal his movements from the 
observation of our forces. General Banks, as has 
been said, was at Strasburg. At Front Eoyal, 
twelve miles in advance. Colonel Kenley was sta- 
tioned, with a Maryland regiment and a few com- 
panies,— about twelve hundred in all, rank and file. 
On Friday, the 23d, at noon, this little handful of 
men was suddenly and unexpectedly assailed by 
General Jackson at the head of a force at least 
ten times as large as its own. Though taken by 
surprise, and with such immense odds against him, 



210 RETREAT OF GENERAL BANKS. [1862. 

Colonel Kenley and his men fought gallantly and 
obstinately for three or four hours, and thus re- 
tarded the Confederate advance j but they were at 
last overpowered by superior numbers, and nearly 
all cut to pieces or taken prisoners. 

The startling news reached General Banks at 
nightfall, and, after a little reflection, he determined 
to move upon Winchester as rapidly as possible. 
Accordingly, at a very early hour the next morning 
he be^an his march. His column was attacked in 
flank while on the way, and a portion of the rear- 
guard turned back to Strasburg. At four o'clock 
in the afternoon the advance-guard arrived at "Win- 
chester. The whole force General Banks had with 
him was less than five thousand men, while that 
of the enemy was fifteen thousand at least. At 
Winchester General Banks determined to try the 
strength of the Confederates by actual collision; 
and preparations were made accordingly during 
the night. The engagement began early the next 
morning, and held the enemy in check for five 
hours. Our soldiers fought well, and were well 
handled; but it was in vain to contend against such 
odds, and orders were given to withdraw. The 
pursuit by the enemy was prompt and vigorous, 
and the retreat rapid and without serious loss. A 
halt of two hours and a half was made at Martins- 
burg; and the rear-guard finally reached the Po- 
tomac at sunset on the 25th. This was forty-eight 
hours after the first news of the attack on Front 
Eoyal. It was a march of fifty-three miles, thirty- 
five of which were performed in one day. The 



Age 35.] RETREAT OF GENERAL BANKS. 211 

river was crossed the next day; "and/' says Gene- 
ral Banks, in his official report, "there never were 
more grateful hearts in the same number of men 
than when, at mid-day on the 26th, we stood on 
the opposite shore." 

General Banks throughout these two disastrous 
days behaved with energy and self-possession ; and 
there is nothing disparaging to his military repu- 
tation in the fact that he retreated, because he 
did it in good order against a force three or four 
times as great as his own, saving all his guns, 
and losing only fifty-five w^agons out of five hun- 
dred. 

On the part of the enemy it must be admitted 
that this expedition, as a move upon the great 
chess-board of war, demands the highest praise. 
It was admirably planned and skilfully and suc- 
cessfully executed. The loss of men on our side 
was not great; that of army and medical stores 
was more considerable; but the indirect, the moral, 
advantages it secured to the enemy were of infi- 
nitely greater moment. To drive General Banks 
from Strasburg across the Potomac was in itself a 
play not worth the candle; but the real object of 
the expedition was to prevent General McDowell's 
division from being sent to reinforce General Mc- 
Clellan; and it unfortunately succeeded. 

"When news of the attack on Colonel Kenley^s 
command at Front Eoyal, on the 23d, reached 
General Geary, who w^as at Eectortown with a 
force charged with the protection of the Manassas 
Gap Railroad, he immediately began to move to 



112 ALARM AT WASHINGTON. 



[1862. 



Manassas Junction. His troops, alarmed by exag- 
gerated reports of the fate of the regiment at 
Pront Eoyal, burnt their tents and destroyed a 
quantity of arms. The contagion of panic spread 
to Catlett's Station, where was General Duryea 
with four regiments. He hastened to Centreville, 
and telegraphed to Washington for helj). The 
rumors were swelled and magnified on their way 
to the capital: the authorities there were thrown 
into a most unnecessary fright, and telegraphic de- 
spatches, pale with the hue of fear, were sent on 
the wings of lightning all over the land. Of these 
the following is a specimen : — 

"Washington, May 25, 1862. 
i' To the Governor of Massachusetts. 
" Intelligence from various quarters leaves no doubt that 
the enemy, in great force, are marching on Washington. 
You will please organize and forward immediately all the 
militia and volunteer force in your State. 

" Edwin M. Stanton, 
^'■Secretary of War J* 

It was under the influence of the apprehensions 
occasioned by the report of General Jackson's 
movements that the President had telegraphed to 
General McClellan, on the 24th of May, as we have 
before stated, that General McDowell's division 
would not join him. On the same day, an order 
was sent by the President to General McDowell, 
directing him to lay aside at present the move- 
ment on Eichmond, and put twenty thousand men 
in motion at once for the Shenandoah, in order to 



Age 35.] GENERAL MCDOWELL. 213 

capture the force of Jackson and Ewell, either 
in co-operation with General Fremont, or alone. 
General McDowell's clear military judgment saw 
at once the injudiciousoess of this order, which 
turned him from a point where he was greatly 
needed to a quarter where he could be of no use; 
and he instantly telegraphed back to the Presi- 
dent's order the following reply, addressed to the 
Secretary of War : — 

"The President's order has been received, and is in 
process of execution. This is a crushing blow to us." 

To this the President responded as follows, still 
on the same 24th of May : — 

" I am highly gratified by your alacrity in obeying my 
orders. The change was as painful to me as it can pos- 
sibly be to you or to any one. Every thing now depends 
upon the celerity and vigor of your movements." 

To this General McDowell made a rej^ly in writ- 
ing, of which the principal and material j)ortion is 
as follows : — 

"Head-Quarters, Department op the Rappahannock, ") 
" Opposite Fredericksburg, May 24, 1862. J 

" His Excellency the President : — 

" I obeyed your order immediately, for it was positive 
and urgent ; and perhaps, as a subordinate, there I ought 
to stop ; but I trust I may be allowed to say something in 
relation to the subject, especially in view of your remark 
that every thing depends upon the celerity and vigor of 
my movements. I beg to say that co-operation between 
General Fremont and myself, to cut off Jackson and 
Ewell, is not to be counted upon, even if it is not a prac- 



214 GENERAL M^^DOWELL. [18G2. 

tical impossibility ; next, that I am entirely beyond 
helping-distance of General Banks, and no celerity or 
vigor will be available as far as he is concerned ; next, 
that by a glance at the map it will be seen that the line 
of retreat of the enemy's forces up the valley is shorter 
than mine to go against him. It will take a week or ten 
days for the force to get to the valley by the route which 
will give it food and forage, and by that time the enemy 
will have retreated. I shall gain nothing for you there, 
and lose much for you here. It is, therefore, not only 
on personal grounds that I have a heavy heart in the 
matter, but I feel that it throws us all back, and from 
Kichmond north we shall have all our large mass para- 
lyzed, and shall have to repeat what we have just accom- 
plished." 

It will be observed that on the 24th of May the 
President directed General McDowell to march to 
the Shenandoah, to cut off the retreating division 
of Jackson, and that on the next day the Secre- 
tary of War telegraphed the Governor of Massa- 
chusetts that the " enemy, in great force," meaning 
of course Jackson's command, were marching on 
Washington. This difference of opinion between 
two high functionaries as to an enemy's move- 
ments is rather a curious fact, and only to be ex- 
plained on the ground that they were acting inde- 
pendently and without consultation or conference. 

What generous mind will refuse to sympathize 
with General McDowell's suffering and sadness 
of spirit in obeying an order which he perceives 
to be most unwise at the very moment he prepares 
to execute it ! 

The silent and incommunicative Jackson — a man 



Age 35.] JACKSON's MOVEMENTS. 215 

who never let his left hand know what his right 
hand was doing, who rarely spoke and rarely 
smiled — would have been amused if he had known 
into what a fright he had thrown the authorities at 
Washington and no small portion of the Northern 
people. He had no more idea of going to Wash- 
ington than of going to Boston : such a diversion 
of his force would have been an act of madness. 
Having done all that he desired and proposed to 
do, his next thought was to get back again ; and ho 
accordingly began his retreat up the Valley of the 
Shenandoah, which he conducted bravely and skil- 
fully. • He had a great advantage in his perfect 
knowledge of the country he was traversing. He 
contrived to slip through the Federal forces which 
were pressing upon him from the west and the 
east. On the 8th of June, he fought a battle with 
General Fremont, at Cross Keys, on the left bank 
of the Shenandoah, by which he secured the pass- 
age of his army over the bridge at Port Eepublic, 
a few miles distant, and the next day engaged a 
portion of General Shields's command near the 
latter place. After a hard fight, our forces fell 
back, and General Jackson continued his retreat, 
to secure which had been his object in both en- 
gagements. 

Thus ended General Jackson's memorable cam- 
paign in the Yalley of the Shenandoah, which had 
begun on the 11th of March, in which that officer 
gave evidence of the highest military qualities — 
vigor, celerity, skill in masking his designs from 
the enemy, and ability in handling his men — and 



216 GENERAL MCCLELLAN AT RICHMOND. [1862. 

fully vindicated his title to the enthusiastic admi- 
ration with which he was regarded by his people 
during the remainder of his brief career. 

It may be added that, had all the military threads 
that united at Eichmond been held in the hand of 
General McClellan, as they should have been, ho 
would never have left General Banks exposed with 
so small a command at an indefensible point. That 
this statement is not matter of opinion merely may 
be seen by a careful reading of General McClellan's 
instructions to General Banks of March 16, to Gene- 
ral Wadsworth of the same date, and his letter of 
April 1 to the Adjutant-General, — all which appear 
in full in his Eeport. 

We now return to Eichmond, where we left Gene- 
ral McClellan with the President's second despatch 
fallen like a stone upon his heart. It was already 
certain that General McDowell's movements to join 
him were suspended, and for an indefinite period; 
and there was nothing for him to do but to address 
himself to the work before him with such means as 
he could command, and doubtless with a sadness 
of spirit like that of the Eoman gladiators when 
they saluted the emperor, ^^Morituri te salutamus.'^ 

The disposition of our forces around Eichmond 
was controlled by two elements, one artificial and 
one natural, — the former being the Eichmond & 
York Eiver Eailroad, and the latter the Chickaho- 
miny Eiver. The railroad ran in a direction nearly 
easterly from Eichmond to White House, at which 
latter place was our depot of supplies. It is diffi- 
cult for a civilian to form an adequate notion of 



Age 35.] CHICKAHOMINY RIVER. 217 

the immense amount of these supplies which must 
be furnished every day for the supj^ort of an army 
of seventy thousand men, including forage for 
horses, cavalry and artillery. The communication 
between such an army and its base of supplies cannot 
be for a moment interrupted or even endangered. 
It was therefore a point of paramount importance 
to guard this railroad from flank movements on 
both sides. The Chickahominy River flows in a 
southeasterly direction, and is crossed both by the 
Richmond & York River Railroad and the Vir- 
ginia Central Railroad, which runs northerly, — the 
river and the portions of the two railroads south 
of it forming an isosceles triangle, with the apex 
towards the east. Place the right hand on a table 
with the palm down, the fingers close together, 
and the thumb stretched back as far as possible ; 
let the thumb represent the course of the "Virginia 
Central Road, and the forefinger that of the Rich- 
mond & York. Richmond will then be in the hollow 
at the bottom of the thumb, and a line drawn from 
the ball of the thumb to the first joint of the fore- 
finger will indicate the course of the Chickahominy 
In order to keep the railroad entirely secure, 
the course of the river made it necessary to divide 
our forces and place part of them on one side of 
the stream and part on the other. This is not 
usually deemed a prudent disposition of an army; 
but there was an imperative necessity for it in 
this case. Besides, General McClellan had been 
directed to extend his right wing so as to form a 
junction with General McDowell; and the order for 

19 



218 DESPATCHES FROM THE PRESIDENT. [1862. 

his co-operation being simply suspended, not re- 
voked, General McClellan was not at liberty to 
abandon the northern approach. 

On the 25th of. May he received a telegraphic de- 
spatch from the President, at considerable length, 
detailing the enemy's movements as far as they were 
known up to its date, stating that twenty thousand 
of McDowell's forces were moving back to Front 
Eoyal, that one more of his brigades was ordered 
to Harper's Ferry through Washington, and that 
the rest of his forces were to remain for the pre- 
sent at Fredericksburg, adding that if McDowell's 
force was beyond their reach they (in Washington) 
should be entirely helpless. At a later hour on the 
same day, the President sent him another despatch, 
indicating apprehensions for the safety of Washing- 
ton, saying, "I think the time is near when you 
must either attack Eichmond or give up the job 
and come to the defence of Washington.''* 

* Upon the President's first despatch of May 25, in vrhich 
he says that apprehensions for the safety of Washington, and 
nothing else, prevented McDowell's being sent to the Penin- 
sula, Colonel Lecomte remarks, "We have full faith in the 
sincerity of the frank and honest language of the President; 
but the Report" (that of the Congressional Committee, which 
quotes a part of the President's despatch) "perverts entirely 
the facts relative to Jackson's campaign, and the insane terror 
it inspired in Washington, which was the true cause of the 
failure on the Peninsula. On quitting Washington, before 
having been deprived of a part of his command, General Mc- 
Clellan had given the most exact and judicious instructions for 
the defence of the capital. He had pointed out Manassas and 
Front Royal as points forming a good advanced line, and had 



Age :36.] MOVEMENTS NEAR RICHMOND. 219 

On the 26th of May, news came that a consider- 
able force of the enemy was in the neighborhood 



ordered Banks to intrench himself there. He had distinctly 
forbidden him to advance farther into Virginia. But as soon 
as General McClellan's back was turned, they wished to make 
Banks a rival of him, and, supposing that the Army of the 
Potomac would attract all the force of the enemy, it was 
thought that Banks might gather some cheap laurels if he 
were sent into the upper Valley of the Shenandoah. The Aulic 
Council at Washington thought they might in this way strike a 
master-stroke, and cause Richmond to fall before McClellan 
had time to appear before it. If the Confederates had not been 
in so much hurry, if they had let Banks advance farther, 
this brave general would have run great risk of being captured 
with all his force. Banks having miraculously escaped, it was 
enough to hold Harper's Ferry strongly on one side, and Centre- 
ville on the other, to cover Washington. Jackson might have 
moved between Warrenton Junction and Winchester; he might 
have pushed cavalry detachments into Western Maryland ; but 
he could have a.ttempted no serious enterprise. 

"Instead of this, it was thought that a good trick might be 
played upon Jackson, and that he might be 'bagged,' to use 
an American expression. To form a notion of this plan of 
the campaign, manufactured at Washington, and the confu- 
sion which attended its execution, one should read the series of 
telegrams by which the President informs General McClellan of 
the progress of this wise manoeuvre. Generals McDowell, Banks, 
Sigel, and Fremont, each coming from his own position, and 
all preserving their independent commands, arrived one after 
another, to be beaten in detail, or to let Jackson escape before 
their eyes without a fight. But the most unfortunate result 
was that the corps of McDowell, divided, weakened by forced 
marches, and transported to another theatre of war, could not 
take the part which had been assigned to it. For the second 
time, and definitively, it was detained far from the army of 



220 HANOVER COURT-HOUSE. [1862. 

of Hanover Coiirt-House, to the right and rear of 
our army, and thus threatening our communica- 
tions; and General Fitz-John Porter's division was 
ordered to march the next morning at daybreak 
to dislodge them. They set off in a heavy storm, 
came up with the enemy in the course of the day, 
attacked and defeated him, and took and destroyed 
his camp at Hanover Court-House. The bridges 
of the Yirginia Central Eailroad and the Frede- 

General McClellan, to wliicli for the second time it thus caused 
great mischief, as a few brief explanations will show. 

*' After the destruction of the Merrimac, and the taking of 
Norfolk by the Federals, which opened the James River, Com- 
modore Goldsborough had proposed to General McClellan to take 
the James River as a base of operations and have it flank his left 
wing. This change of base, had it then been carried out, would 
have made the attack upon Richmond easier, through the aid of 
the gunboats. General McClellan abandoned this obvious ad- 
vantage, because he had been ordered to extend his right wing 
towards McDowell, who was coming from Fredericksburg to 
reinforce the army of the Peninsula as soon as it had reached 
Richmond. General McClellan expected General McDowell 
by the railroad from Fredericksburg to Richmond, and had 
already sent troops in that direction to eflfect a junction, — 
when, instead of this reinforcement, he received a telegraphic 
order to burn the railroad-bridges over the branches of the 
Pamunkey, and thus to render all communication with Mc- 
Dowell impossible, the latter's outposts having been at that 
time but twenty-one miles distant from those of McClellan. 
But this was the period of Banks's defeat ; and such was the 
terror at Washington that they thought the whole Confederate 
army was marching to the North and that the capital was to 
be saved by destroying the bridges. The alarm was so great 
that it was even proposed to General McClellan to re-embark 
his army and bring it within the lines of Alexandria." 



Age 35.] GENERAL F. PORTER's MOVEMENT. 221 

ricksburg & Eichmond Eailroad, both over the 
South Ann, were destroyed, as well as a consider- 
able amount of Confederate proj)ertj at Hanover 
Court-House and Ashland. General McClellan was 
much gratified at the way in which this brilliant 
movement was executed by General Porter, and he 
deemed its results valuable, because it was thus ren- 
dered impossible for the enemy to communicate by 
rail with Fredericksburg, or with Jackson except by 
the very circuitous route of Lynchburg. More im- 
portant still, by the clearing of our right flank and 
rear, the road was left entirely open for the advance 
of McDowell, had he been permitted to join the 
Army of the Potomac. His advanced guard was 
at this time at Bowling Green, only about fifteen or 
twenty miles distant from that of Porter : so near 
did Ave come to seizing the golden opportunity 
which Fortune never offers a second time ! Mc- 
Dowell's withdrawal towards Front Eoyal was, as 
General McClellan observes in his Eeport, "a se- 
rious and fatal error." He was sent to a point 
where he could do no good, and diverted from a 
point where his presence was greatly needed and 
could not have failed to secure important results. 

As our arm}^ was massed on both sides of the 
Chickahominy, it was necessary to maintain easy 
communication between them; and this compelled 
the building of several bridges, some of which 
were new, and others were reconstructions of those 
which the enemy had destroyed. Our troops were 
very efificient in work of this kind, but they had 
great difficulties to struggle against. The Chicka- 

19* 



222 RAINY WEATHER. [18G2. 

hominy in this region is a narrow and shallow 
stream, fringed with a dense growth of heavy 
forest-trees, and bordered by low marshy bottom- 
lands, varying from half a mile to a mile in width. 
A heavy rain would swell the narrow rivulet into 
a broad and shallow flood, and the w^ork of days 
would be swept away in a single night. When 
the waters were low, a child might ford it; when 
they were high, a horse and his rider might be 
drowned in it. The labors of our engineers were 

<'Quencli'd in a boggy syrtis, neither sea 
Nor good dry laud." 

The elements, too, seemed to have conspired 
against us. So rainy a season had never been 
known within the memory of man; the pitiless 
floods fell upon us without intermission. The petu- 
lant and rebel stream seemed to take a j^erverse 
pleasure in breaking the fetters with which patriot 
hands essayed to bind it. And then these rains 
turned the wretched narrow roads of the Peninsula 
into tracks of impassable and heart-breaking mire, 
in which horses sank to their knees and wagons 
stuck hopelessly fast.* 

* "Unfortunately, every thing dragged with us. The roads 
were long in drying, the bridges were long in building. 'Never 
have we seen so rainy a season,' said the oldest inhabitant. 
'Never did we see bridges so difficult to build,' said the en- 
gineers. The abominable river laughed at all their efforts. 
Too narrow for a bridge of boats, too deep and too muddy for 
piers, here a simple brook some ten yards wide, flowing be- 
tween two plains of quicksand, in which the horses sank up to 
the girths, and which offered no bearings, — there divided into a 



Age 35.] BATTLE OF FAIR OAKS. 223 

During all this time our troops were busily em- 
ployed, besides building bridges, in intrenching 
themselves, throwing up redoubts, digging rifle- 
pits, and felling timber in the line of the batteries. 



THE BATTLE OF FAIR OAKS. 

On the 30th of May, two corps were on the south 
side of the Chickahominy, — that of Keyes, com- 
prising the divisions of Couch and Casey, and Ileint- 
zelman's, comprising those of Hooker and Kearney. 
Casey's division, numbering about five thousand, 
was at Fair Oaks, a station on the York Eiver 
Railroad. A redoubt and rifle-pit had been con- 
structed, and there was also an abatis in front 
of them. Couch's division, about eight thousand 
strong, was at Seven Pines, three-quarters of a 
mile in the rear; while the two divisions of Heint- 
zelman's corps, in all about sixteen thousand, were 
still farther back. The right flank of Kearney was 
on the railroad, and the left of Hooker on White 
Oak Swamp. 

During the day and night of May 30, there had 
been a violent storm, with heavy torrents of rain. 

thousand tiny rivulets spread over a surface of three hundred 
yards, and traversing one of those "wooded morasses which are 
peculiar to tropical countries, — changing its level and its bed 
from day to day, the river, in its capricious and uncertain 
Bway, annulled and undid to-day the labors of yesterday, 
carried on under a burning sun and often under the fire of the 
enemy. And so "went by days upon days, — precious, irrecover- 
able days." — PRINCT5 DB JOINVILLE. 



224 BATTLE OP FAIR OAKS. [1862. 

The Confederates, presuming that a rapid rise in 
the river would follow, resolved to seize the oppor- 
tunity, throw their whole force upon our left wing, 
south of the Chickahominy, and cut it to pieces 
before aid could come from the other side. They 
supposed that they should have to deal with no other 
troops than those of Keyes, not being aware of the 
presence of Heintzelman's corps. Their disposi- 
tions were skilfully made. Longstreet and Hill, 
with thirty-two thousand men, were to advance 
along the Williamsburg road 3 Huger, with sixteen 
thousand, was to move down the Charles City road, 
which runs southeast from Richmond, to attack 
our left flank; and Smith, with the same number, 
was to march north, along the l^ine-Mile road, so 
as to turn our right flank and cover the Confede- 
rate left. Had these plans all been successfully 
executed, we could hardly have escaped an over- 
whelming defeat. 

The columns started at daybreak on the 31st, 
and Hill, Longstreet, and Smith were in position to 
begin the attack at eight o'clock; but Huger did 
not appear at the appointed time and place. Hour 
after hour rolled away, and brought no tidings of 
him; his artillery had been immovably fixed in the 
mud, and the passage of his troops arrested. At 
noon. Hill and Longstreet resolved to make the 
attack without waiting for him. Accordingly, at 
about one o'clock they fell in overwhelming mass 
tipon Casey's division. Some of his troops, thus sud- 
denly assailed by greatly superior numbers, broke 
and fled in disorder; but the larger part stood their 



Age 35.] BATTLE OF FAIR OAKS. 225 

ground manfully, and were nobly sustained by their 
officers. But it was impossible to resist the force 
that Avas hurled against them. Slowly, inch by 
inch, they gave way; and it was not until after 
three o'clock that they fell back through Couch's 
line of battle to the rear, too much exhausted, and 
their ranks too much thinned, to take further part 
in the contest as a body. 

At four o'clock we had lost nearly a mile of 
ground, fifteen of our guns had been captured, and 
the enemy were in possession of Casey's camp. 
Couch's division was now assailed. His troo233 
stood firm, and the repeated assaults of the enemy 
were steadily met, — our left being protected by the 
impenetrable morasses of the White Oak Swamp. 
Two of Heintzelman's brigades appeared on the field, 
with the gallant Kearney at their head. The move- 
ments of the troops were now directed b}^ General 
McClellan in person. But a new element of danger 
intervened. General Couch discovered large masses 
of the enemy pushing towards our right and cross- 
ing the railroad, as well as a heavy column which 
had been held in i-eserve and was now making its 
way towards Fair Oaks Station. This was part of 
Smith's division, which had come by the Nine-Mile 
road to attack our right flank. General Couch at 
once engaged this column with four regiments; but 
he was overpovv^ered. and the enemy pushed be- 
tween him and the main body of his division. Our 
position was now critical; for, if the enemy had 
succeeded in getting in our rear, w^e must have been 



226 BATTLE OF FAIR OAKl 



[1862. 



defeated with great loss. "But," says the Prince 
de Joinville, — 

"But exactly at this moment (six o'clock p.m.), new 
actors come upon the stage. Sumner, who has at last 
passed the river with Sedgwick's division on the bridge 
built by his troops, and who, with a soldier's instinct, has 
marched straight to the cannon through the woods, sud- 
denly appears upon the flank of the hostile column 
which is trying to cut off Heintzelman and Keyes. He 
plants in a clearing a battery which he has succeeded in 
bringing up. His guns are not rifled guns, the rage of 
the hour, and fit only to be fired in cool blood, and at 
long range in an open country : they are real fighting 
guns, old twelve-pound howitzers carrying either a round 
projectile, which ricochets and rolls, or a good dose of 
grape. The simple and rapid fire of these pieces makes 
terrible havoc in the hostile ranks. In vain Johnston 
sends up his best troops against this battery, the flower 
of South Carolina, including the Hampton Legion ; in 
vain does he come upon the field in person: nothing 
can shake the Federal ranks. When night falls, it was 
the Federals who, bayonet in hand, and gallantly led by 
Sumner himself, charged furiously upon the foe, and 
drove him before them, with fearful slaughter, as far as 
Fair Oaks Station.'' 

Orders had been sent from head-qnarters to Gene- 
ral Sumner, at two o'clock, to move his division 
across the river. Two bridges had been built by 
his men, one opposite General Sedgwick's division, 
and one opposite General Richardson's, — both cor- 
duroy bridges. But the latter was already destroyed 
by the flood, and the former much injured. The 
roads, too, were deep and muddy; and it was not 



Age 35.] BATTLE OF FAIR OAKS. 227 

until six o'clock, and after groat exertions, that 
General Sedgwick's division, with a single battery 
(Kirby's), was able to reach the field and exert a 
favorable influence upon the fortunes of the day. 

The opportune arrival of General Sumner was 
not our only piece of good fortune; for about sun- 
set the Confederate commander-in-chief, General J. 
E. Johnston, who had accompanied Smith's corps 
and directed the enemy's movements since four or 
five o'clock, was struck from his horse, severely 
wounded, by the fragment of a shell. In conse- 
quence of this, litter confusion prevailed for a time 
upon the Confederate left. 

The next morning, at an early hour, the battle 
was renewed, the enemy making an attack upon 
General Eichardson's division, which had not taken 
part in the engagement of the previous day, and 
which was now posted in front. They met it firmly, 
and returned with effect the enemy's fire, until 
General Howard's brigade was ordered to the front, 
when the enemy's line fell back. Other attacks, in 
other parts of the field, "were repulsed; and finally 
our line advanced with the bayonet, and the enemy 
retreated, having gained about half a mile of 
ground in two days' fighting. 

In these severely contested battles our loss was 
five thousand seven hundred and thirty-seven, and 
that of the enemy six thousand seven hundred and 
eighty-three : we also lost ten pieces of artillery.* 

* At the time the battle of Fair Oaks began, General Mc- 
Clellan was confined to his bed by illness. This fact does not 



228 BATTLE OF FAIR OAKS. [1862. 

The battle of Fair Oaks, or Seven Pines, as the 
Confederates call it, has some points of resemblance 
to that of Waterloo, and, like that, shows how much 
military movements are controlled by fortune or 
accident. At Waterloo, Bonaparte's attack upon 
the British lines was delayed some hours by the 
rain, and consequent state of the roads. At Fair 
Oaks, the muddy roads held fast Iluger's division, 
and caused the assault to be postponed four or five 

appear in his Report, but is stated by liim in his evidence be- 
fore the Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War. 
But that committee say in their Report (p. 22), speaking of the 
second day's fight, ''General McClellan was with the main 
part of the army on the left bank of the Chickahominy. After 
the fighting was over, he came across to the right bank of the 
river." This statement is as untrue as it is unjust. General 
McClellan, enfeebled as he was by illness, immediately got on 
horseback when he heard the cannon which opened the battle 
of the 31st, was employed during the remainder of the day in 
receiving reports and giving orders, spent a portion of the 
night in conferring with his officers, and early the next morning 
went over to the right bank of the river, while the fight of June 
1st was raging. Colonel Lecomte remarks upon the statement 
of the committee, that it is " contradicted by many ocular wit- 
nesses, and, among others, by one of his aides who was with 
him the whole day. General McClellan, says this officer, 
though severely ill with dysentery, had passed the greater 
part of the night in seeking his generals and conferring with 
them. About half-past seven in the morning he left the head- 
quarters of General Sumner, and between eight and nine ar- 
rived at the place where the latter was engaged. The fight 
was then at its height: we were in a clearing, and were 
fighting along the edge of a wood, two hundred metres" (about 
six hundred and fifty feet) "from the spot where the general 
himself (Sumner) was directing the battle.". 



Age 35.] BATTLE OF FAIR OAKS. 229 

hours. Huger took no part in the battle, contrary 
to the plans which had been agreed upon : Grouchy 
did not appear at Waterloo, as was expected. Sum- 
ner's arrival upon the field at six is paralleled by 
that of Blucher at Waterloo at about the same hour. 
So much for the points of resemblance between 
the two battles; but in other respects that of Fair 
Oaks illustrates the power of fortune over war. 
Had Huger's corps attacked us on the left flank at 
the same time that Hill and Longstreet did in front, 
we could hardly have escaped destruction. Thus 
the rain which swelled the stream and occasioned 
the attack also prevented it from being successful, 
by making impassable the road over which Huger 
was directed to move. We had also another piece 
of good fortune. Smith's corps, it will be remem- 
bered, was moved along the Xine-Mile road, to bo 
ready to be employed against our right flank. Gene- 
ral Johnston, the commander-in-chief, was Avith this 
corps, and, of course, directed its movements. He 
says in his oflicial report that he accompanied this 
corps, so that he might be on a part of the field where 
he could observe and be ready to meet any counter- 
movement which might be made against his centre 
or left, and then adds, '-Owing to some peculiar 
condition of the atmosphere, the sound of the mus- 
ketry did not reach us. I consequently deferred 
giving the signal for General Smith's advance till 
four o'clock.^' Thus the advance of Smith's corps 
was delayed two hours; and precious hours they 
were to us, because they enabled Sumner to get to 
the field and save us from being cut to pieces. 

20 



130 BATTLE OF FAIR OAKS. 



[1SG3. 



General Sumner had crossed the river by the 
upper of the two bridges which he had built, called 
the Grape-vine bridge; the lower, called the Sun- 
derland bridge, having been carried away. But 
before the next morning the Grape-vine bridge 
was also carried away by the rising flood. " This 
bridge,^^ says the Prince de Joinville, "saved that 
day the whole Federal army from destruction." 

Such are the momentous consequences in war 
which flow from causes so seemingly trivial as the 
state of the atmosphere, the rising or falling of a 
petty stream, a sudden tempest of rain, or the 
condition of a road over which artillery must be 
moved. These things should teach civilian critics 
a wise self-distrust, and a tenderness of judgment 
towards generals who have had the misfortune not 
to succeed in winning a battle or taking a fortress. 

General McClellan has been blamed for not 
having followed up the enemy after the battle of 
Fair Oaks, and, among others, by General Barnard, 
who says, in his Eeport, "The repulse of the rebels 
at Fair Oaks should have been taken advantage of. 
It was one of those 'occasions' which, if not seized, 
do not repeat themselves. We now kriow the state 
of disorganization and dismay in which the rebel 
army retreated. We now know it could have 
been followed into Eichmond." The italics are 
General Barnard's own. Without repeating the ob- 
vious remark that General McClellan should be 
judged by what was known then, and not by what 
we know now, it may be stated that there is nothing 
to justify the assertion that the rebel army retreated 



AGE 35.] BATTLE OF FAIR OAKS. 231 

in "disorganization" and "dismay," and that when 
General Barnard says, " wc know it could have been 
followed into Eichmond," he claims the authority 
of omniscience. The reasons why the enemy were 
not pursued are amply and satisfactorily stated in 
General McClellan's Eeport. The Grape-vine and 
Sunderland bridges had been carried away. The ap- 
proaches to New and Mechanicsville bridges, higher 
up the stream, were overflowed; and both of them 
were enfiladed by batteries of the enemy. To have 
advanced upon Eichmond, the troops must have been 
marched from various points on the left banks of 
the Chickahominy to Bottom's Bridge, and over 
the Williamsburg road to Fair Oaks, upwards of 
twenty miles, — a march which, as the roads then 
were, could not have been made in less than two 
days. "In short," as General McClellan says, — 

"The idea of uniting the two wings of the army in time 
to make a vigorous pursuit of the enemy, with the pros- 
pect of overtaking him before he reached Eichmond, only 
five miles distant from the field of battle, is simply absurd, 
and was, I presume, never for a moment seriously enter- 
tained by any one connected with the Army of the Po- 
tomac."* 

* General Barnard, in his testimony before the Committee on 
the Conduct of the War, says, "By the rise of the Chicka- 
hominy the two bridges built by General Sumner became im- 
practicable by the night of the 31st. The bridges at Bottom's 
Bridge with difficulty were preserved from destruction; but the 
rising water overflowed the adjacent road, and soon these 
bridges became useless for wagons or horses. Fortunately, the 
railroad bridge had been repaired; and by this alone the left 



232 INTRENCH MENTS THROWN UP. [18G2, 



CHAPTEE YIII. 

For about tliree weeks after the battle of Fair 
Oaks nothing of moment took place. By the 2d 
of June our left was advanced considerably beyond 
the lines it had occupied before the battle. The 
position at Fair Oaks was strengthened by a line 
of intrenchments which protected the troops while 
they were at work upon the bridges, gave security 
to the trains, liberated a large fighting-force, and 
afforded a safer retreat in case of disaster. To form 
these intrenchments w^as hard Avork : redoubts and 
embankments had to be raised, rifle-pits to be dug, 
and trees in great numbers to be cut down; and 
all this under the burning sun of a Virginia June. 
General McClellan was anxious to assume the of- 
fensive ; it was his policy to do so, as the enemy 
were gaining and we were losing by the mere lapse 
of time. But no general battle could be risked 
until the two wings of the army were put in full 

wing of the army was supplied. By means of planks laid 
between the rails, infantry, and, with some risk, horses, could 
pass. This, for several days, was the only communication be- 
tween the two wings of the army." — Report on the Conduct of 
the War, vol. i. p. 401. 

The case in defence of General McClellan can hardly be 
more strongly put than by this statement; but how is it to 
be reconciled with General Barnard's subsequently-expressed 
opinion ? 



Age 35.J HEAVY RAINS. 233 

communication with each other, and that, too, by 
bridges strong enough to stand a flood and long 
enough to stretch across the whole bottom-land of 
the river. These necessary works were delayed, 
and the labors and exposures of the men greatly 
increased, by the incessant rains. General McClel- 
lan's communications to the authorities at Wash- 
ington show how he was tried and baffled by the 
obstinately bad weather. On the 4th of June he 
telegraphs to the President, " Terrible rain-storm 
during the night and morning; not yet cleared off. 
Chickahominy flooded, bridges in bad condition;'' 
and on the next day he says to the Secretary of 
War, "Eained most of the night; has now ceased, 
but it is not clear. The river still very high and 
troublesome. '^ On the 7th he tells the Secretary, — 

" The whole face of the country is a perfect bog, en- 
tirely impassable for artillery, or even cavalry, except 
directly in the narrow roads, which renders any general 
movement, either of this or the rebel army, utterlj'^ out 
of the question until we have more favorable weather.'' 

Three days after, in another despatch to the 
Secretary, he says, — 

" I am completely checked by the weather. The roads 
and fields are literally impassable for artillery, — almost so 
for infantry. The Chickahominy is in a dreadful state : 
we have another rain-storm on our hands. 

" I shall attack as soon as the weather and ground will 
permit ; but there will be a delay, the extent of which 
no one can foresee, for the season is altogether abnormal." 

The heat of the weather, the poisonous miasma 

20* 



234 ACTIVITY OF THE ENEMY. 



[1862. 



which, the sun drew up from the saturated soil, and 
the heavy toils of the men, began to tell sadly upon 
the general health of the army. And the vigilant 
and active enemy allowed us no repose. Little 
skirmishes and affairs of outposts were constantly 
occurring; showers of shells would sometimes sud- 
denly fall upon the tents; and no one could say 
whether these demonstrations were not the preludes 
to serious attacks. Our men were obliged to work 
at the intrenchments and upon the bridges as the 
Jews builded on the walls of Jerusalem : '' They 
which builded on the wall, and they that bare bur- 
dens, with those that laded, every one with one of 
his hands wrought in the work, and with the other 
hand held a weapon. For the builders, every one 
had his sword girded by his side, and so builded."* 
General McClellan saw with nothing less than 
anguish of mind the golden moments of opportu- 
nity slipping away from him unimproved, and his 
noble army slowly wasting by disease and expo- 
sure. From trustworthy sources of information, 
he had good reason to believe that the enemy were 
receiving large accessions to their strength; and 
in the north, like an ominous cloud, loomed up the 
corps of the indefatigable Jackson, about which 
frequent rumors began to fly through the air. 
General McClellan knew his old classmate well 
enough to know that he was not a man to lose any 
time, and that, sooner or later, he would be a for- 
midable element of danger on our right flank. His 

* Nehemiah iv. 17, 18. 



Age 35.] GENERAL MCDOWELL EXPECTED. 235 

communications to the Government at Washington 
are full of earnest, almost passionate, entreaties for 
reinforcements, and in them he restates the reasons 
why he deems it important that his hands should 
be strengthened. He suggests that portions of the 
army of General Halleck, then in the Southwest, 
might be detached for this purpose. The replies 
of the Secretary of War are friendly and encou- 
raorino; in tone. On the 11th of June he tells General 
McClellan that McCall's force, forming part of Mc- 
Dowell's corps, was on its way, and that it was in- 
tended to send the rest of McDowell's corps to him 
as speedily as possible. General McCall's division, 
numbering about eleven thousand men, arrived on 
the 12th and 13th; but these were the only rein- 
forcements that General McClellan received till 
after the retreat to Harrison's Landing. 

General McDowell was at this time on the Eap- 
pahannock, with about forty thousand men, in- 
cluding McCall's division. He expected to join Gene- 
ral McClellan, and was most desirous of doing so; 
for on the 10th of June he wrote to the latter, say- 
ing, " For the third time I am ordered to join you, 
and hope this time to get through. * * h^ * j 
w^ish to say I go with the greatest satisfaction, and 
hope to arrive with my main body in time to be of 
service. McCall goes in advance, by water. I will 
be with you in ten days with the remainder, by 
Fredericksburg." On the 12th he wrote again to 
General McClellan, telling him that he shall not be 
with him on so early a day as he had previously 
announced, but still expecting to join him. It 



286 GENERAL STUART'S EXPEDITION. [1862. 

would have been an easy four days' march for Mc- 
Dowell's corps to have made the desired junction 
with the Army of the Potomac; but the junction 
never was made, and on the 27th of June the corps 
of McDowell, Fremont, and Banks were consoli- 
dated into one body, called the Army of Virginia, and 
put under the command of General Pope ! Whether 
this disj)Osition of McDowell's force was in conse- 
quence of a real and sudden change of opinion in 
the councils of the War Department, or whether 
there was never a settled purpose that he should 
go to Eichmond, and General McClellan was only 
amused with hopes never meant to be realized, is a 
matter on which it is now useless to speculate. 
There would be more of contempt in the one case, 
and more of indignation in the other; but it could 
make little difference practically with General Mc- 
Clellan whether he was the victim of want of de- 
cision or want of frankness. He was entitled to 
fair dealing, and the country was entitled to con- 
sistency and firmness. In the management of great 
interests like these, caprice expands to the dimen- 
sions of crime. 

On the 13th of June the rebel General Stuart, 
with fifteen hundred cavalry and four pieces of ar- 
tillery, made a sudden dash upon a small cavalry 
force we had at Hanover Court-House, and over- 
powered them. They then swept on to Tunstall's 
Station on the York Railroad, made an attack upon 
a railway-train, which contrived to escape in spite 
of obstructions which had been laid upon the track, 
though the engineer and some of the passengers 



Age 35.] GENERAL STUART's EXPEDITION. 237 

were killed. A detachment was sent off to "White 
House to destroy stores, and the main body pushed 
on to New Kent Court-House, where they were 
soon joined by their friends, and remained some 
hours. At night they crossed the Chickahominy 
and made their way into the Confederate lines. 

This must be admitted to have been a dashing 
and brilliant expedition. A continuous sweep was 
made clear round the Federal forces, a few prisoners 
were taken, and a considerable amount of valuable 
stores was destroyed. The material losses were 
not much; but the moral results were of conse- 
quence. It encouraged and exhilarated the enemy; 
and, above all, it was a startling revelation to 
General MeClellan of the weak points in his po- 
sition, and of the danger he was in of having his 
communications cut and his supplies by rail inter- 
rupted. 

On the 18th of June, General MeClellan had made 
arrangements to have transports, with supplies of 
provisions and forage, under a convoy of gunboats, 
sent up James Eiver. They reached Harrison's 
Landing in time to be of use to the army on its 
arrival there. Two considerations had led him to 
adopt this course. First, in case of an advance on 
Richmond, our communications with the depot at 
the White House might be severed; and, second, 
he had already begun to feel that the increasing- 
pressure upon his right might force him to make a 
flank movement and establish a new base of opera- 
tions on the James Eiver. 

On Wednesday, June 25, the Army of the Poto- 



238 ARMY OF THE POTOMAC. [1862. 

mac was thus placed. The several corps of Keyes, 
Heintzelman, Sumner, and Franklin, comprising 
eight divisions, were on the right bank of the 
Chickahominy. They were disposed in a semicir- 
cular line of three miles in length, stretching from 
White Oak Swamp on the left to Golding's house 
and the Chickahominy on the right. The front of 
this line was strengthened by six redoubts, mount- 
ing from five to nine guns each, connected by rifle- 
pits, or barricades, which contained numerous em- 
placements for artillery. Extensive " slashings "* 
were made in front, wherever the woods approached 
too near. Head-quarters were at Dr. Trent's house, 
in rear of the right, and near Sumner's upper 
bridge. 

On the left bank of the river were Porter's corps, 
comprising two divisions, and McCall's Pennsyl- 
vania Eeserves. The troops were disjDOsed along 
a line extending from New Bridge, on the left, to 
Beaver Dam Creek, on the right. We had an ad- 
vanced post, composed of a regiment and a battery, 
on the heights overlooking Mechanicsville ; and a 
line of pickets was stretched along the river be- 
tween the Mechanicsville and Meadow bridges. 
Pour batteries had been constructed on the left 
bank, on the ground occupied by Porter; and these 
batteries mounted six guns each. They were in- 

* A "slashing " is a kind of defence made by cutting down 
trees in front of a position, two or three feet from the ground, 
and allowing them to fall. Their branches thus form a barrier 
against the advances of infantry, and a space is opened for 
the play of artillery. 



Age 35.] BRIDGES OVER THE CHICKAHOMINY. 239 

tended to operate i\Y)on the enemy's positions and 
batteries opposite, or to defend the bridges which 
connected the two wings of the army. 

Some of the bridges built by our troops were of 
no use to us, because the enemy held the debouches, 
or ground that commanded the road, on the right 
bank. We could use, on the 25th of June, the fol- 
lowing : Bottom's bridge, in rear of our left, and 
between five and six miles from its front; the rail- 
road bridge ; Sumner's upper bridge ; Woodbury's, 
Alexander's, and Duane's bridges. These last af- 
forded a very direct communication between the 
two wings of the army. As our operations against 
Richmond were conducted along the roads leading 
to it from the east and northeast. Bottom's bridge 
was of little direct service to us. Most of the sup- 
plies for the troops on the right bank of the river 
were brought up by the railroad and over the rail- 
road bridge. 

As it was now certain that the army was not to 
be strengthened by any reinforcements from Mc- 
Dowell, General McClellan resolved to do the best 
he could with what he had. He had covered the 
front of his position with defensive works, to enable 
him to bring the greatest possible numbers into 
action, and to secure the army against the conse- 
quences of unforeseen disaster. As Jackson had 
kept McDowell from joining him, he hoped that 
Jackson might also be kept from joining Lee. 



240 THE SEVEN DAYS. [1862. 

» THE SEVEN DAYS. 

On the 25th of June, a forward movement of the 
picket-line of the left was ordered, preparatory to 
a general and final advance. The orders were suc- 
cessfully carried out, and about a mile of ground 
was gained, with small loss. The advantage thus 
secured was important, as by it both the corps of 
Heintzelman and vSumner were placed in a better 
position for supporting the main attack, which it 
was intended General Franklin should commence 
the following day. During this day, June 25, in- 
formation came that the enemy had received rein- 
forcements from Beauregard's army, and that Jack- 
son was near Hanover Court-House with a large 
body of troops. 

On the next day, Thursday, the 26th, General 
McClellan had intended to make a final attack; but 
he was anticipated by the enemy, and assailed on 
his right by a strong force which crossed the Chick- 
ahominy at Meadow bridge and near Mechanics- 
ville. It appears that on the 25th a council of the 
Confederate generals was held at Eichmond, and 
it was determined that while Jackson was moving 
upon the right flank of the Federal army a general 
and simultaneous attack should be made upon the 
whole line. When the approach of the enemy was 
discovered on our right, our pickets were called in, 
and the regiment and battery at Mechanicsville 
were withdrawn. A strong position was taken by 
our troops so as to resist the threatened attack. It 
extended along the left bank of Beaver Dam Creek, 



Age 35.J 



THE SEVEN DAYS. 241 



a slender tributary of the Chickahominy, which 
runs nearly north and south. The front line was 
composed of McCall's division : Seymour's brigade 
held the left, and Eeynolds's the right. Meade's 
brigade Avas in reserve. The left of the line was 
covered by the river, the right by two brigades of 
Morell's division, de2:)loyed for the purpose of pro- 
tecting that flank. The position had been carefully 
prepared, and was materially strengthened by 
" slashings" and rifle-pits. The creek in front, 
bordered by beautiful catalpa-trees in flower, was 
crossed by only two roads practicable for artillery. 
It was to force these roads that the enemy made 
especial eflbrts. Their attack began at three p.m. 
along the whole line, and a determined attempt 
was made at the same time to carry the upper 
road. General Eeynolds succeeded in resisting 
this attempt, and the enemy fell back for a while. 
Our troops then had a breathing-space for a couple 
of hours, — though the fire of the artillery and the 
skirmishing did not cease. The passage of the 
lower road was then attempted ; but here also Gene- 
ral Seymour was successful. The action ceased as 
the darkness gathered, and the enemy retired at 
nine o'clock from the front of a position which it 
had assailed in vain and with very heavy loss. 
TVe had been successful at all points; and the trooj^s 
that lay that night in front of Richmond will never 
forget the enthusiasm that ran like wildfire through 
our lines, from the heights of the upper Chicka- 
hominy to the lowlands of White Oak Swamp, 
when the news of the success was brought to them, 

21 



242 THE SEVEN DAYS. [1862. 

and, amid the ringing cheers of men, the bands, 
long silent by command, filled the air with strains 
of triumphant music. 

In the course of the 26th, the rapid movement 
of events, and esj^ecially the cloud of advancing 
forces on our right, every moment growing darker 
and more menacing, determined General McClellan 
to put into immediate execution that plan of trans- 
ferring his base of operations to the James River 
which he had been meditating for some days, and 
in view of which he had already directed large 
supplies of forage and provisions to be forwarded. 
The task was one of no common difficulty. The 
distance between the points of departure and des- 
tination was about seventeen miles. An army of 
ninety thousand men, including cavalry and artil- 
lery, was to be marched this distance; and, what 
was much more difficult, a boundless procession of 
four thousand wagons, carrying supplies, must go 
with it, a large siege-train must be transj^orted, and 
a herd of twenty-five hundred oxen must be driven. 
For the wagons, the train, and the cattle there was 
but one road available : luckily, it was in good con- 
dition. But it ran north and south, and between 
it and Richmond there were several roads going 
east and west, along which attacks might be ex- 
pected from an active and vigilant enemy. Gene- 
ral McClellan, in short, was attempting one of the 
most difficult and dangerous enterprises in war, — 
a flank movement in the face of a superior force. 
But there was no help for it : it must be done. 

Time was now an element of the greatest import- 



. i 



Age 35.] THE SEVEN DAYS. 243 

ance. The design was to be kept concealed from 
the enemy till the latest possible moment, and every 
instant of the precious interval was to be profitably 
employed. Orders were immediately telegraphed 
to Colonel Ingalls, quartermaster at the AVhite 
House, to run the cars till the last moment, filling 
them with provisions and ammunition, to load 
all his wagons with subsistence and send them to 
Savage's Station, to forward as many supplies as 
possible to James Eiver, and to destroy the rest. 
These commands were all obeyed, and so promptly 
and skilfully that nearly every thing was saved, 
and only a comparatively small amount of stores 
destroyed.* 

To begin auspiciously the contemplated move- 
ment, it was necessary to keep the enemy in check 
on the left bank of the river as long as possible, to 
give time for the removal of the siege-guns and 
trains. The night following the 26th of June was 
a busy one on the right of our army, and the work 
of removal went on till after sunrise ; but shortly 
before daylight it was sufficiently advanced to per- 
mit the withdrawal of the troops from Beaver Dam 
Creek. A new position was taken, in an arc of a 
circle, covering the approaches to our bridges of 
communication. The first line was composed of 
the divisions of Morell and Sykes, the former on 

* The Prince de Joinville says that a complete railway train, 
locomotive, tender, and cars, which had been left on the rails, 
was sent headlong over the broken bridge into the river. 
Nothing was left for the enemy but three siege-guns; and 
these were the only siege-guns he captured. 



244 THE SEVEN DAYS. 



[18G2. 



the leftj the latter on the right. The division of 
McCall was posted in reserve, and fifteen companies 
of cavalry under General Cooke were in rear of 
the left. The battle-ground was a rolling country, 
partly wooded and partly open, extending from the 
descent to the Chickahominy on the left, and curv- 
ing around, in rear of Coal Harbor, towards the 
river again. Our artillery was posted on the com- 
manding ground, and in the intervals between the 
divisions and brigades; and the slope towards the 
river, on our left, was also swept by the fire of four 
batteries, one of them of siege-guns, on the right 
bank of the river. General Stoneman's movable 
column, comprising most of our cavalry and some 
picked troo23S of the other arms, which had been cut 
off by the rai)id advance of Jackson, fell back on 
White House, and rendered no assistance during the 
battle. 

Our dispositions were completed about noon of 
Friday, June 27, and shortly after that hour the 
skirmishers of the enemy appeared, advancing 
rapidly, and a general attack was made upon the 
whole position. The engagement soon became ex- 
tremely severe, and General Porter asked for rein- 
forcements. At two P.M., Slocum's division of the 
6th Corps was ordered to cross the river and sup- 
port him. By three p.m. the pressure of the supe- 
rior numbers of the enemy had become so heavy 
that all the reserves had been moved forward, and 
our line, thus strengthened, met and resisted re- 
peated and desperate attacks along the whole front. 
General Slocum's division arrived at half-past three, 



Age 35.] THE SEVEN DAYS. 245 

and was distributed along the weaker portions of 
our line. Our troops, including this division, num- 
bered about thirty-five thousand men; and it is be- 
lieved that they Avere attacked by from sixty to 
seventy thousand of the enemy. Many of our men 
were wearied by the fighting of the day before, 
and most of them by having been under arms for 
more than two days. The pressure of the superior 
numbers of the enemy was very hard to bear; but 
it was borne manfully, and, time after time, on the 
left and on the right, our troops repulsed the deter- 
mined attacks of the swarming Confederates, who 
charged again and again up to their position. 
Every effort of the enemy failed to break our lines 
until about seven o'clock, when our left was forced, 
and the whole position flanked by a furious attack 
of fresh troops. The battle of Gaines's Mill w^as 
lost. Our men fell back to the hill in the rear, over- 
looking the bridge. Two brigades from the 2d 
Corps arrived most opportunely at this moment. 
They checked and drove back the stragglers, and 
advanced boldly to the front. Their cheers were 
heard by the enemy; and the knowledge that fresh 
troops had arrived, the terrible losses they had them- 
selves sustained, and the gathering darkness, pre- 
vented them from following up their advantage. 

The battle was lost, and with it we lost about 
nine thousand men and twenty guns ; but the ob- 
ject for which it was fought had been attained. 
The enemy was checked, and the needed time was 
gained. Our siege-guns and material were saved, 
and the right wing, under cover of the nighty joined 
21^^ 



246 THE SEVEN DAYS. risfi' 

the main body of the army on the right bank of 
the river. The rear-guard crossed at six o'clock 
in the morning, destroying the bridge behind them. 

Saturday, June 28, was for our army a day rather 
of marching and working than of fighting. The 
enemy were exhausted by the desperate fight of 
the previous day : they were also on the left bank 
of the river, or at least the greater part of them were, 
and the bridges were destroyed, so that they must 
either build new bridges in order to cross the river, 
or else fall back to the Mechanicsville bridge. Thus 
a few precious hours were gained. In accordance 
with orders given by General McClellan to his corps 
commanders, assembled by him at his head-quar- 
ters on the evening of the 27th, the execution of 
his plan for a flank movement to the James River 
w^as commenced at once, under his own direction. 

General Keyes, with his 4th Corps and its artil- 
lery and baggage, crossed the White Oak Swamp 
bridge, and seized strong positions on the op2:»osite 
side, to cover the passage of the other troops and 
trains. General Ileintzelman and General Sumner, 
with the 3d and 2d Corps, remained in the works. 
General Franklin, while withdrawing his command 
from their position in the works, was attacked by 
artillery-firing from tliree points, and an attempt 
was made to carry a part of his line. The fighting 
here was sharp for a little while, and extremely 
damaging to the enemy, who speedily retired. 
This Avas the only fighting of the day. Men were 
busy loading the wagons with ammunition, provi- 
sions, and necessary baggage, and destroying all 



Age ;]5.] THE SEVEN DAYS. 247 

that could not bo carried off. General Porter, with 
the 5th Corps, began the passage of the White Oak 
Swamp during the day. 

On Sunday, the 29th, the troops of the 4th Corps 
remained in their position, covering the road 
through the swamp, until relieved, as will be men- 
tioned, by the arrival of General Slocum ; and those 
of the 5th Corps held their ground beyond the 
swamp, covering the roads leading from Eichmond 
towards the line of retreat. McCall's division also 
crossed the swamp, and took a proper position to 
aid in covering the general movement. 

Day broke darkly : clouds and fog hung very 
low, and a thick mist added to the cheerlessness of 
the morning. It was a sorry sight to see the empty 
embrasures, the deserted camps, filled but the night 
before, and for so many previous days, with guns 
and fighting-men. But the darkness of the morn- 
ing was good for troops that desired to steal a 
march on the enemy, and its coolness was good for 
men that were to fight. 

Slocum's division of the 6th Corps marched 
straight back to Savage's Station, where it was to 
be posted as a reserve to the position to be taken 
by the rear-guard ; but, on reaching the Station, it 
received orders to cross the swamp and relieve the 
corps of General Keyes. The rear-guard, composed 
of the 2d and 3d Corps and Smith's division of the 
6th Corj^s, moved from the works at da^^ight, and 
marched about half-way to Savage's Station, halt- 
ing at Allen's farm, where a line was formed on 
both sides of the railroad, towards Richmond. 



248 THE SEVEN DAYS. [1862. 

About nine o'clock the enemy made an attack with 
infantry and artillery, and renewed the attempt 
twice. The firing of both sides was sharp for a 
while, but the assault was repulsed with ease by 
the skirmish-line of Summer's corps, supported by 
artillery, and our loss was very slight. A report 
that the enemy had repaired the bridges, and 
crossed the Chickahominy in the rear of our posi- 
tion at Allen's farm, was brought to General Sumner 
at that place, and he at once fell back to Savage's 
Station and united his command with Smith's divi- 
sion of the 6th Corps, which General Franklin, by 
reason of the same report, had already moved 
thither. The junction took place a little after 
noon, and General Sumner assumed command of 
the forces so united. 

At Savage's Station a large field extended to the 
left from the railroad, and the ground sloped stead- 
ily downwards towards Eichmond. General Sum- 
ner formed his line in this field, at right angles to 
the railroad. The rise in the ground gave our 
troops an excellent view of the whole position, and 
was favorable for the posting of artillery. Some 
regiments were also placed on the right of our posi- 
tion, nearly parallel to the track, so as to watch the 
apprehended approach of the enemy from the left 
bank of the river. General Heintzelman, in seem- 
ing violation of his orders, withdrew from his posi- 
tion on the left before four o'clock, and marched to 
the swamp, which he crossed at Brackett's Ford. 
Thus the rear-guard was weakened by the loss of 
nearly fifteen thousand men, and the situation of 



AgeS5.] the seven DAYS. 249 

General Sumner appeared critical. His position, 
however, was good, and the trooj)S excellent. The 
whole of the 2d Corps, said to be the only corps in 
the army which has never to this day lost a gun 
or a color, was there, with one division of Franklin's 
corps. About four o'clock the enemy commenced 
his attack in large force by the Williamsburg road, 
which here runs nearly parallel to the railroad. 
The enemy's left was supported by their boasted 
iron-clad railroad battery, mounted, according to 
their newspapers, with a rifled thirty-two. The 
attack w^as gallantly met. General Burns, com- 
manding the front line, rendered special service. 
The reserves were successively sent forward, and 
the action continued with great obstinacy till after 
eight in the evening, when the enemy were driven 
from the field and into the woods beyond, where 
our deployed companies, which were sj)eedily 
thrown forward, found the ground thickly strewn 
with the bodies of the sufferers. The position we 
had gained in this brilliant and picturesque engage- 
ment was held till the road in the rear was cleared; 
and during the ensuing hours of darkness, all the 
troops crossed the White Oak Swamp bridge, and 
Sumner's last brigade, commanded by General 
French, destroyed the bridge at six o'clock in the 
morning. 

During the same night, the 4th Corps, followed 
by the 5th, was moving towards the river, and on 
the morning of Monday, June 30, General Keyes 
had arrived there in safety. He took up a position 
below Turkey Creek bridge, with his left_resting 



250 TIIESEVENDAYS. . [1862. 

on the river. General Porter posted the 5th Corps 
so as to prolong Keyes's line to the riglit and 
cover the Charles City road to Eichmond. Gene- 
ral Franklin, with his own corps, Eichardson's 
division of the 2d Corps, and Naglee's brigade, 
held the passage of AVhite Oak Swamp. The posi- 
tion of the remaining troops was changed at times 
during the day ; but it is enough to say that they 
were so disposed as to hold the ground in front of 
the road connecting Franklin's position with Por- 
ter's right, so as to cover the movement of the 
trains in the rear. General McClellan occupied 
himself in examining the whole line, rectifying the 
position of the troops, and expediting the passage 
of the trains. 

The fierce battle fought on Monday, June 30, is 
known by the name of the battle of Glen dale, or 
Nelson's Farm. It is a little difficult to be under- 
stood, for two reasons. In the first place, the troops 
of the 2d and 3d Corps were so divided that the 
army may be said on that day to have been without 
its corps organization, and to have been an army of 
divisions, and those divisions, in several instances, 
were separated from their usual connection. In the 
second place, though the sharpest fighting was in 
or near Glendale, yet there was fighting along a line 
of about five miles, extending from White Oak 
Swamp to Malvern Hill, and lasting from noon till 
after dark. 

The first attack was made on Franklin's posi- 
tion, which was assailed by a concentrated fire of 
artillery. A very fierce and obstinate artillerj^- 



Age 35.] THE SEVEN DAYS. 251 

combat took jilace here, and there was also some 
infantry-fighting. Our men suffered severely; but 
repeated attempts of the enemy to cross the swamp 
were unsuccessful, and General Franklin held the 
position till after dark. 

Some two hours after the attack just mentioned 
was commenced, a strong column moved down the 
Charles City road, near which, on its right. Gene- 
ral Slocum was posted. General Kearney's divi- 
sion of the 3d Corps connected with General Slo- 
cum's left. General McCall, with the Pennsylva- 
nia Eeserves, prolonged our line to the left, cross- 
ing the JNTew Market road, and General Hooker's 
division of the 3d Corps was on the left of McCall. 
General Sumner, w^ith Sedgwick's division in re- 
serve, was in rear of McCall, on the Quaker road. 
The first attempt of the enemy w^as made on Slo- 
cum's left; but it ^vas checked by his artillery, 
and abandoned. Then, passing to their right, the 
enemy made a fierce onslaught on General McCall. 
His division speedily gave way, with loss of gene- 
ral officers and guns, and the enemy pressed on 
so vigorously that their musketry proved fatal on 
the Quaker road. The centre of our army was 
nearly pierced, the main road of communication al- 
most in the enemy's power. At this critical moment 
Sumner hurried to the front some regiments of 
Sedgwick's division, just returned at the double 
quick from AYhite Oak Swamp, to which they had 
been marched in order to support Franklin. A gal- 
lant advance "was made ; Sumner's artillery opened 
sharply. The advance of the enemy was checked, 



252 THE SEVEN DAYS. [1862. 

some ground was regained, and some guns were re- 
taken. Hooker, moving to his right, aided in the 
repulse. The gap caused hy the giving way of Mc- 
Call's command was speedily closed, and our line 
of retreat was once more securely held. Another 
effort was made by the enemy on Kearney's left; 
but this also was repulsed, with heavy loss. The 
enemy's attack thus failed at all points; but our 
success was costly. "We lost heavily in killed and 
wounded, and in guns. All, or nearly all, of Mc- 
Call's guns were left in the hands of the enemy. 

On the same day, at about five p.m., an attack 
was made on General Porter's left flank, near Mal- 
vern Hill. It was met by the concentrated fire of 
about thirty guns on the hill, by the fire from the 
gunboats on the river, and by the infantry-fire of 
Warren's brigade. The enemy was soon forced to 
retreat, with the loss of two guns. Thus, on the 
right, in the centre, and on the left, the fierce and 
persistent efi'orts of the enemy had failed ; but our 
trains were not yet in safety, and our communica- 
tions not yet secure, so that more marching and 
more fighting were still before the brave Army of 
the Potomac. The troops distributed along the 
line between White Oak Swamp and Malvern Hill 
fell back to the latter place during the night, and 
were posted there, as they arrived, by General Bar- 
nard, who received his instructions from the general 
commanding. 

On Tuesday, July 1, the sun rose on a scene such 
as few but soldiers see, and soldiers rarely. The 
whole Army of the Potomac was massed on the 



Age 35.] THE SEVEN DAYS. 253 

elopes of Malvern Hill. It is an open plateau, and 
extends about a mile and a half in width and three- 
quarters of a mile in depth. On the highest ground 
there is an old-fashioned Virginia house, of brick, 
in one story. Trees standing thickly supply it 
with grateful shade. Behind the house, the ground 
falls away as abruptly as at the Highlands of the 
Hudson, and the delighted eye ranges over miles 
and miles of level country, profusely clothed with 
an almost tropical vegetation, and watered by the 
James, the Appomattox, and Turkey Creek. It is 
a scene of rare loveliness and peace; and gunboats, 
seemingly sleeping at their moorings on the gleam- 
ing river, half seen through the screen of foliage, 
added on that day to the air of repose which brooded 
over the whole landscape. But no stronger con- 
trast could be presented than by the scene in front. 
On those broad slopes, in triple concentric lines, 
with the guns in the intervals and on the higher 
ground in the rear, the weary Army of the Poto- 
mac was rapidly ranging itself. The general com- 
manding, and other general officers, were making 
the circuit of the position and superintending the 
movements of the troops, and, as by magic, the 
great army cam^e into the order of battle. Cavalry 
escorts, the lancers with their red pennons flutter- 
ing beneath the glittering points of their weapons, 
gave animation to the scene. 

The line taken up by our army was something 
more than the half of a circle. The left rested on 
the hill near the river, and the line curved round 
the hill and backwards, through a wooded country, 

22 



254 THE SEVEN DAYS. [1862. 

towards a point below Ilaxall's, on the James. 
The flotilla was so moored as to protect our left 
flank and command the approaches from Eich- 
mond. Porter's corps was on the left; next camo 
Couch's division of the 4th Corps, then Heintzel- 
man's corps, then Sumner's, then Franklin's, and, 
on the extreme right, Keyes, with the remainder 
of the 4th Corps. The remains of McCall's division 
were in reserve, and stationed in the rear of Porter 
and Couch. The right, where the troops were less 
compact than elsewhere, was strengthened by 
*' slashings" and barricades. 

The enemy began to feel along our lines early 
in the day, and annoyed our troops by artillery-fire 
from various points. Batteries appeared, and fired, 
and disappeared only to present themselves again at 
a new point, and so keep our wearied troops from 
preparing by rest for the coming struggle. About 
three o'clock the real battle began. A heavy fire 
of artillery opened on Couch's division and the left 
of Kearney's, which was connected with the right of 
Couch's; and a brisk attack of infantry on Couch's 
front speedily followed. The enemy, disregarding 
the fire of our artillery, pressed steadily on till they 
were within short musket-range. Then Couch's 
men, who had been lying down, sprang to their 
feet, and delivered a fire which destroyed the order 
of the enemy and drove them back in confusion. 
Their attack thus failed utterly, and the advantage 
gained was improved by an advance of our men 
for nearly half a mile, which gave them a better 
position. 



Age 35.] THE SEVEN DAYS. 2o5 

About two hours of comparative quiet followed 
this discomfiture of the enemy, during which the 
general surveyed the whole line, and every thing 
was made ready for the coming attack, and kept so. 
It was begun at six o'clock; and Porter and Couch 
received it. The whole artillery of the enemy sud- 
denly opened upon them, and brigade after brigade 
came rushing forw^ard to carry their position, but 
only to meet the crushing fire of a determined in- 
fantry, and the tempest of grape, canister, and 
shell that poured upon them from our massed artil- 
lery, with the enormous projectiles that came howl- 
ing over the pleasant w^oods and fields from the 
great guns on the river. Until dark — and the bat- 
tle was w^hen the days are longest — the enemy per- 
sisted in their desperate efforts, but to no purpose. 
It was a day of useless slaughter for them, but of 
comparatively trifling loss for us. The darkness 
fell like a curtain, to close and conceal the sublime 
spectacle of the battle of Malvern Hill. 

With the last shots fired by the artillery, after 
nine o'clock in the evening of this day, the fight- 
ing of the " Seven Days*^ ended. The troops had 
little rest that night, for a further movement was 
ordered as soon as the enemy were finally repulsed. 
By the morning of the following day the whole 
army w^as marching rapidly towards Harrison's 
Landing, on the James Eiver. As there was but 
one main road, it was necessary to crowd it to its 
utmost capacity with artillery and cavalry, while 
the infantry went on each side. A heavy rain 
soon began to fall, — such a rain as is only felt in the 



256 THE SEVEN DAYS. [1862. 

South : the road first became slippery, then muddy, 
then deep with mud. Through this clinging soil 
the weary horses dragged their loads, while on 
each side the living stream of infantry forced its 
toilsome way through the thick and dripping un- 
derbrush which bordered the road. Fortunately, 
the distance was not great, and the troops poured 
rapidly into the vast plain on the river, and sank 
to rest upon its trampled wheat, their journey 
ended, their great task accomplished. The woods of 
the Peninsula were on one side of them, beautiful 
in their midsummer luxuriance, and perhaps con- 
cealing indefatigable enemies; but on the other 
was the broad river, bearing on its calm waters the 
powerful gunboats which displayed the flag of our 
navy, and, thanks to the provident foresight of the 
general commanding, bearing also countless ves- 
sels filled with the ammunition and equipments, 
the food and the clothing, of which our troops stood 
so much in need. 

Mr. Emil Schalk, — a severe military critic, and 
chary of praise, — speaking of the retreat from the 
Chickahominy to the James Eiver, says, "This 
plan of defence reflects the highest credit and honor 
on the general who conceived and carried it out."* 
Such is the opinion, it is believed, of all competent 
judges, whether soldiers by profession, or civilians 
who have made the art of war a special subject of 
study. It was a military movement of great danger 
and difficulty, extending over several days, marked 



* Campaigns of 1862 and 1803, p, 179. 



Agk r.a.] THE SEVEN DAYS. 257 

throughout b}- admirable combinations and disposi- 
tions, — in which nothing was overlooked, nothing 
was forgotten, and not a single mistake was made. 
The sagacious foresight, the calm self-reliance, the 
thorough professional knowledge, the vigilant eye, 
of the commanding general formed the power by 
which the whole breathing mass of courage and en- 
durance was guided and propelled. And the conduct 
of the army was, to borrow General McClellan's own 
expression, " superb." The whole retreat was one 
unbroken strain upon their phj^sical energies and 
moral force. They had to march all night and 
fight all day. The nervous exhaustion produced 
by toil and want of sleep was aggravated by the 
excessive heat of the weather, by which many a 
manly frame was prostrated. The enemy were 
brave, vigilant, well handled, superior in numbers, 
and confident of success; but only at Gaines's Mill 
was any decisive advantage gained. At every 
point, at every moment, the Confederates had met 
organized courage, disciplined valor, the dauntless 
front of men who trusted in themselves and trusted 
in their commander; and at Malvern Hill the closing 
hours of danger and suffering were illumined by the 
blaze of victory, like the rich red sunset which ends 
a day of storm and cloud. And not only had our men 
fought admirably, but they had toiled patiently and 
intelligently. Guns were to be removed, wagons 
and teams were to be helped along, here a piece of 
road was to be mended, and there trees were to be 
cut down to obstruct the enemy's passage; and for 
all these labors the officers found quick faculty, 



258 THE SEVEN DAYS. [1SG2. 

serviceable hands, and a willing spirit. When it 
is remembered that the carriages and teams belong- 
ing to the army, stretched out in one line, would 
have reached nearly forty miles, we can understand 
that nothing could have insured their safe removal 
in the face of an enemy but that universal training 
of the brain and hand found among a pcoj^le who 
are all taught to handle indifferently the pen, the 
axe, the gun, and the spade. 

The general in command, when the James Eiver 
had been reached, had a right to look around with 
just pride upon the army now sheltered and safe. 
On the 28th, in the bitterness of his soul, he had 
said, in a telegraphic message to the Secretary of 
"War, "If I save this army now, I tell you plainly 
that I owe no thanks to you, or to any other 
persons in Washington. You have done your best 
to sacrifice this army." That army he had saved; 
and the army was conscious of it. But there 
was nothing of triumph in his own mind; for their 
safety had been won at fearful cost. Our killed, 
wounded, and missing from the 26th of June to 
the 1st of July reached the mournful aggregate of 
fifteen thousand. Of the sick and wounded, many 
had of necessity been left behind, but with a proper 
complement of surgeons and attendants and a boun- 
tiful supply of rations and medical stores. 

And there was another consideration which might 
have deepened the sadness of his mind, if he had 
allowed his thoughts to dwell upon it at such a 
moment. He had conducted an important move- 
ment with a skill and success which an intelligent 



Age 35.] THE SEVEN DAYS. 259 

military judgment could understand and appre- 
ciate; but still that movement was a retreat. This 
was the great fact present to the public mind. lie 
had been compelled to abandon his position before 
Richmond , the place was not taken : he was a gene- 
ral in command of a large army, and had failed to 
accomplish the object of his own hopes. The facts 
and events which had rendered a retrograde move- 
ment necessary required some reflection to make 
them understood and some candor to make them felt. 
His knowledge of human nature, and of the bitter- 
ness and unscrupulousness of party, was enough to 
reveal to him the harsh judgments, the misconstruc- 
tions, the injustice, the cruel insinuations, the ca- 
lumnious charges, to which he had exposed him- 
self by the crime of failure, — that crime which 
the public is so slow to forgive. He must have 
foreseen how the pert phrase-makers of the land — 
who conduct campaigns so admirably in their arm- 
chairs, and dispose of brigades and divisions as 
easily as they fold and label their letters — would 
strive to mangle him with their pens, — weapons more 
cruel than the tiger's claw or the serpent's tooth, — 
and point out what he should have done, and should 
not have done, to have escaped the shame and dis- 
grace of retreating before a rebel foe. Sir John 
Moore, dying in the arms of victory at the close 
of a successful retreat, said, " I hope the people of 
England will be satisfied : I hope my country will 
do me justice." His country, in time, did justice 
to that great man. Sooner or later, the world 
comes round to see the truth and do the right; 



260 THE SEVEN DAYS. [1862. 

and for the coming of that time General McClellan 
can afford to wait. 

But the saddest of all experiences for a command- 
ing general is to lose the confidence of his army. 
That cup was never put to General McClellan's lips. 
His soldiers were intelligent enough to understand 
what he had done, and generous enough to be grate- 
ful to him for it. They had witnessed his toils and 
exposures, his calm self-reliance, his resolute front, 
his unaltered brow : they had seen him perplexed 
but not cast doAvn, anxious but not despairing. 
The approach of danger, the burden of responsi- 
bility, had called forth reserved powers and unre- 
vealed energies. Their common perils, their com- 
mon labors, the trying scenes they had passed 
through, the safety they had secu'red, had created 
new ties of sympathy between Ihe commanding 
general and his noble army. No muttered curses 
fell upon his ear, no sullen, averted countenances 
met his eye; but, as he rode along their lines, shouts 
of welcome instead, and faces glowing with honest 
joy, passed a judgment upon his course that en- 
abled him to meet w^ith composure the sneers of 
the scoffer, the malice of partisan falsehood, and 
the rash censures of presumptuous half-knowledge. 



Age 35.] ADDRESS TO THE ARMY. 261 



CHAPTER IX. 

The history of the Army of the Potomac during 
the months of July and August, 1862, may be told 
in a few words. During their retrograde move- 
ment to the banks of the James, they had been 
fearfully weakened by losses in killed, wounded, 
and prisoners ; but they were not in the least de- 
moralized. They had conducted themselves in a 
way to move the admiration and win the gratitude 
of their commander ; and from a full heart, on the 
4th of July, he issued to them the following ad- 
mirable and heartful address : — 

^'Head-Quarteus Army op the Potomac, ) 
Camp near Harrison's Landing, July 4, 1862. J 

" Soldiers of the Army of the Potomac : — Your achieve- 
ments of the last ten days have illustrated the valor and 
endurance of the American soldier. Attacked by supe- 
rior forces, and without hope of reinforcements, you have 
succeeded in changing your base of operations by a flank 
movement, always regarded as the most hazardous of 
military expedients. You have saved all your material, 
all your trains and all your guns, except a few lost in 
battle, taking in return guns and colors from the enemy. 
Upon your march, you have been assailed day after day, 
with desperate fury, by men of the same race and nation, 
skilfully massed and led. Under every disadvantage of 
number, and necessarily of position also, you have in 
every conflict beaten back your foes with enormous slaugh- 
ter. Your conduct ranks you among the celebrated ar- 



202 LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT. [1SG2. 

mies of history. No one will now question that each of 
you may always with pride say, ' I belong to the Army 
of the Potomac.^ You have reached the new base, com- 
plete in organization and unimpaired in spirit. The 
enemy may at any moment attack you. We are prei)ared 
to meet them. I have personally established your lines. 
Let them come, and we will convert their repulse into a 
final defeat. Your Government is strengthening you 
with the resources of a great people. On this, our nation's 
birthday, we declare to our foes, who are rebels against 
the best interests of mankind, that this army shall enter 
the capital of the so-called Confederacy, that our national 
Constitution shall prevail, and that the Union, which can 
alone insure internal peace and external security to each 
State, ' must and shall be preserved,^ cost what it may in 
time, treasure, and blood. 

" George B. McClellan.^' 

The high spirit which breathes through this ad- 
dress, animates also his communications with the 
Government at Washington. He informs the Presi- 
dent, in a despatch of July 7, that his men were in 
splendid spirits and " anxious to try it again;" and 
in this anxiety he himself distinctly shared. 

Having a brief interval of comparative leisure, 
he drew up and addressed to the President a letter, 
under date of July 7, containing certain views re- 
garding the conduct of the war, which, in his judg- 
ment, were essential to its objects and success. 
The letter is as follows : — 

"Head-Quarters Army op the Potomac, ") 
Camp near Harrison's Landing, Va., July 7, 1862. J 
" Mr. President : — You have been fully informed that 
the rebel army is in our front, with the purpose of over- 



Age 35.] LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT. 2G3 

whelming us by attacking our position or reducing us by 
blocking our river-communications. I cannot but regard 
our condition as critical, and I earnestly desire, in view 
of possible contingencies, to lay before your Excellency, 
for your private consideration, my general views concern- 
ing the existing state of the rebellion, although they do 
not strictly relate to the situation of this army or strictly 
come within the scope of my official duties. These views 
amount to convictions, and are deeply impressed upon 
my mind and heart. Our cause must never be abandoned ; 
it is the cause of free institutions and self-government. 
The Constitution and the Union must be preserved, what- 
ever may be the cost in time, treasure, and blood. If se- 
cession is successful, other dissolutions are clearly to be 
seen in the future. Let neither military disaster, political 
faction, nor foreign war shake your settled purpose to 
enforce the equal operation of the laws of the United 
States upon the people of every State. 

" The time has come when the Government must de- 
termine upon a civil and military policy covering the 
whole ground of our national trouble. 

" The responsibility of determining, declaring, and sup- 
porting such civil and military policy, and of directing 
the whole course of national affairs in regard to the re- 
bellion, must now be assumed and exercised by you, or 
our cause will be lost. The Constitution gives you power 
sufficient even for the present terrible exigency. 

"This rebellion has assumed the character of war: 
as such it should be regarded, and it should be conducted 
upon the highest principles known to Christian civiliza- 
tion. It should not be a war looking to the subjugation 
of the people of apy State, in any event. It should not 
be at all a war upon population, but against armed forces 
and political organizations. Neither confiscation of pro- 
perty, political executions of persons, territorial organi- 



264 LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT. [1862. 

zation of States, or forcible abolition of slavery, should 
be contemplated for a moment. 

*' In prosecuting the war, all private property and un- 
armed persons should be strictly protected, subject only 
to the necessity of military operations ; all private pro- 
perty taken for military use should be paid or receipted 
for ; pillage and waste should be treated as high crimes, 
all unnecessary trespass sternly prohibited, and offensive 
demeanor by the military towards citizens promptly re- 
buked. Military arrests should not be tolerated, except 
in places where active hostilities exist ; and oaths, not 
required by enactments constitutionally made, should be 
neither demanded nor received. 

" Military government should be confined to the pre- 
servation of public order and the protection of political 
right. Military power should not be allowed to interfere 
with the relations of servitude, either by sujoporting or 
impairing the authority of the master, except for re- 
pressing disorder, as in other cases. Slaves, contraband 
tinder the act of Congress, seeking military protection, 
should receive it. The right of the Government to ap- 
propriate permanently to its own service claims to slave- 
labor should be asserted, and the right of the owner to 
compensation therefor should be recognized. This prin- 
ciple might be extended, upon grounds of military neces- 
sity and security, to all the slaves within a particular State, 
thus working manumission in such State ; and in Missouri, 
perhaps in Western Virginia also, and possibly even in 
Maryland, the expediency of such a measure is only a ques- 
tion of time. A system of policy thus constitutional and 
conservative, and pervaded by the influences of Christian- 
ity and freedom, would receive the support of almost all 
truly loyal men, would deeply impress the rebel masses and 
all foreign nations, and it might be humbly hoped that it 
would commend itself to the favor of the Almighty. 

"Unless the principles governing the future conduct 



Age 35.] LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT. 265 

of our struggle shall be made known and approved, the 
effort to obtain requisite forces will be almost hopeless. 
A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, 
will rapidly disintegrate our present armies. The policy 
of the Government must be supported by concentrations 
of military power. The national forces should not be 
disjoersed in expeditions, posts of occupation, and nu- 
merous armies, but should be mainly collected into masses 
and brought to bear upon the armies of the Confederate 
States. Those armies thoroughly defeated, the political 
structure which they support would soon cease to exist. 

" In carrying out any system of policy which you may 
form, you will require a commander-in-chief of the army, 
one who possesses your confidence, understands your 
views, and who is competent to execute your orders, by 
directing the military forces of the nation to the accom- 
plishment of the objects by you proposed. I do not ask 
that place for myself. I am willing to serve you in such 
position as you may assign, me, and I will do so as faith- 
fully as ever subordinate served superior. 

"I may be on the brink of eternity; and, as I hope for 
forgiveness from my Maker, I have written this letter with 
sincerity towards you and from love for my country. 

•* Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 
*' George B. McClellan, 

*' Major- General couunanding. 
"His Excellency A. Lincoln, President." 

In regard to this communication, tv?^o questions 
have arisen. First, Was it proper for General Mc- 
Clellan to write such a letter? This would seem to 
be answered by the statement that he had pre- 
viously asked and obtained the President's permis- 
sion to do so. On the 20th of June he had said, in 
a despatch, " I would be glad to have permission 

23 



266 LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT. [18G2. 

to lay before your Excellency, by letter or tele- 
graph, my views as to the present state of military 
affairs throughout the country ;'^ and the next day 
the President replied, in language marked hy that 
personal kindness Avhich generally characterized 
his communications, "If it would not divert too 
much of your time and attention from the army 
under your immediate command, I would be glad 
to have your views as to the present state of mili- 
tary affairs throughout the Avhole country, as you 
say you would be glad to give them." 

Second, Are the views which General McClellan 
sets forth in his communication sound and wise in 
point of fact? Upon this question much has been 
and will be said on both sides; but whatever is said 
on one side will do but little towards convincing 
the other. In short, it raises the issues on which 
the country began to be divided soon after the w^ar 
broke out, and on which it is now rent in twain. 
Every man has made up his fagots on these ques- 
tions and bound them round with the cords of pas- 
sion and prejudice ; and it is useless to attempt to 
disturb them. Time, which determines all things, 
will sooner or later determine whether General 
McClellan was right or wrong. 

As to the Army of the Potomac, it was General 
McClellan's opinion that it ought not to be with- 
drawn, but that it should be promptly reinforced 
and thrown again upon Eichmond. In his judg- 
ment, it was our policy to concentrate here every 
thing we could spare from less important points, 
in order to make a successful demonstration against 



Age 35.] GENERAL HALLECK GENERAL-IN-CHIEF. 267 

the enemy in his most vital and important point. 
The Government was undecided in its plans. On 
the 4th of July the President had informed Gene- 
ral McCiellan that it was impossible to reinforce 
him so as to enable him to resume the offensive 
within a month or six weeks, and that therefore 
for the present a defensive policy was his only care, 
— adding, " Save the army, first, where you are, 
if you can, and, secondly, by removal, if you 
must." 

On the 11th of July, one of the recommendations 
contained in General McClellan's letter of July 7 
to the President was adopted, by the appointment 
of Major-General Halleck to the post of General-in- 
Chief of the entire army of the United States. 
This was the position held by General McClcllan 
before he left Washington to conduct the Peninsular 
campaign. Its duties had subsequently been per- 
formed by the President and Secretary of "War; and 
it was understood that they had a military adviser, 
in the person of Major-General Hitchcock. 

The disposition to be made of the Army of the 
Potomac was one of the first subjects to which the 
attention of the general-in-chief was called on his 
arrival in Washington ; and, in order to observe 
for himself its condition, he made a visit to Har- 
rison's Landing, leaving AYashington on the 24th 
of July and returning on the 27th. The result of 
this visit was that General Halleck, after full con- 
sultation with his ofiicers, came to the conclusion 
that it would not be possible to strengthen the 
Army of the Peninsula with the reinforcements 



268 GENERAL HALLECK's ORDER. 



[1862. 



which General McClellan required, and he there- 
fore determined to withdraw it to some position 
where it could unite with that of General Pope, 
who was now in command of the Army of Vir- 
ginia. But this decision was not immediately 
made known to General McClellan, who on the 
30th of July received a despatch from General 
Halleck saying that, in order to enable him to 
move in any direction, it was necessary to relieve 
him of his sick, and that arrangements had been 
made accordingly, adding, "I hope you will send 
them away as quickly as possible, and advise me 
of their removal.'^ General McClellan began im- 
mediately to execute this order, but pressed the 
general-in-chief to inform him of the views of the 
Government in regard to the future dis2:)Osition of 
the Army of the Potomac, because if a forward 
movement were contemplated many of the sick 
could be of service at the depots, and he could not 
decide what cases to send oif unless he knew what 
was to be done with the army. 

On the 3d of August, Coggin's Point, on the 
south side of the James, was occupied by our troops, 
and Colonel Averill, at the head of three hundred 
cavalry, attacked and dispersed a cavalry force of 
the enemy four hundred and fifty in number, at 
Sycamore Church, on the main road from Peters- 
burg to Suffolk, four miles from Cole's House. On 
the 5th of August, General Hooker attacked a very 
considerable force of infantry and artillery sta- 
tioned at Malvern Hill, carried the position, and 
drove the enemy back to Newmarket, four miles 



Agi: 35.] ARMY WITHDRAWN. 269 

distant; and on the same day Colonel Averill re- 
turned from a reconnoissanee in the direction of. 
Savage's Station towards iiichmond, in the course 
of which he had encountered the 10th Virginia 
Cavalry near White Oak Swamp bridge and driven 
them back some distance towards Eichmond. These 
military demonstrations were made w4th the ex- 
pectation, or at least the hope, that an offensive 
movement upon Eichmond would still be the policy 
of the Government. 

On the 3d of August, the decision of the Govern- 
ment was distinctly communicated to General 
McClellan in a despatch from General Halleck, in 
which he said, " It is determined to withdraw 
your army from the Peninsula to Acquia Creek. 
You will take immediate means to effect this, 
covering the movement the best you can. Its real 
object and withdrawal should be concealed even 
from your own officers." This was a heavy blow 
to General McClellan ; and he earnestly protested 
against it in a long telegraphic despatch, dated 
August 4, to which General Halleck replied in a 
letter dated August 6. 

General McClellan's arguments against the re- 
moval of the army and in favor of an offensive 
movement, as presented in his despatch, are briefly 
as follows. The army was in excellent discipline 
and condition, and in a favorable position, being 
only twenty-five miles from Eichmond, and they 
w^ould not be likely to have a battle till they were 
within ten miles of it. 

At Acquia Crook thej^ w^ould be seventy-five 

2^* 



270 GENERAL MccLELLAN'S DE SP ATC H. [1S62. 

miles from Eichmond, with only land-transporta- 
tion all the way. 

The step would demoralize the army, and have 
a most depressing effect upon the people of the 
!North, and might induce foreign Powers to recog- 
nize our adversaries. 

The communication concludes thus : — 

" It may be said that there are no reinforcements avail- 
able. I point to Burnside's force, — to that of Pope, not 
necessary to maintain a strict defensive in front of Wash- 
ington and Harper's Ferry, — to those portions of the 
Army of the West not required for a strict defensive 
there. Here, directly in front of this army, is the heart 
of the rebellion : it is here that all our resources should 
be collected to strike the blow which will determine the 
fate of the nation. 

"All points of secondary importance elsewhere should 
be abandoned, and every available man brought here. A 
decided victory here, and the military strength of the 
rebellion is crushed. It matters not what partial reverses 
we may meet with elsewhere : here is the true defence 
of Washington ; it is here, on the banks of the James, 
that the fate of the Union should be decided. 

" Clear in my convictions of right, strong in the con- 
sciousness that I have ever been, and still am, actuated 
solely by the love of my country, knowing that no ambi- 
tious or selfish motives have influenced me from the com- 
mencement of this war, I do now what I never did in 
my life before : I entreat that this order may be rescinded. 

" If my counsel does not prevail, I will with a sad heart 
pbey your orders to the utmost of my power, directing 
to the movement, which I clearly foresee will be one of 
the utmost delicacy and difficulty, whatever skill I may 
possess. Whatever the result may be — and may God grant 



Age 35.] GENERAL HALLEOK's REPLY. 271 

that I am mistaken in my forebodings ! — I shall at least 
have the internal satisfaction that I have written and 
spoken frankly, and have sought to do the best in my 
power to avert disaster from my country." 

The considerations urged by General Halleck in 
reply were as follows :— 

The enemy's forces in and around Eichmond were 
estimated at two hundred thousand. General Pope's 
army was only forty thousand; the Army of the Pe- 
ninsula, effective force, about ninety thousand. The 
relative position of the enemy towards them was 
such that his command and that of Pope must be 
united; and they could not be united by land with- 
out exposing both to destruction. It was a military 
impossibility to send Pope's forces by water to the 
Peninsula; and thus the only alternative was to 
send the Army of the Peninsula to Pope. 

A simple change of position to a new and by no 
means distant base would not demoralize an army 
in excellent discipline, unless the officers themselves 
should assist in that demoralization, — which he is 
satisfied they would not. 

The political effect of the withdrawal might at 
first be unfavorable; but the public were beginning 
to understand the necessity of it, and they would 
have more confidence in a united army than in its 
separated fragments. 

It would be impossible to furnish the requisite 
reinforcements under several weeks. 

To keep the army in its present position until it 
could be reinforced would almost destroy it, in the 
sickly region where it then was. In the mean time, 



272 REMOVAL BEGUN. 



[186?. 



General Pope's forces would be exposed to the 
heavy blows of the enemy, without the slightest 
hope of assistance from General McClellan. 

A majority of the highest officers of the Army 
of the Potomac were decidedly in favor of the 
movement. 

All General McClellan's plans required reinforce- 
ments; but reinforcements could not be had. 

There was nothing, of course, for General Mc- 
Clellan to do but to submit, and obey the orders of 
his superior, — which he did with a heavy heart. 

In the mean time, the removal of the sick, in com- 
pliance w^ith the order of July 30, was going on as 
rapidly as possible, though somewhat interrupted 
by another order, of August 6, directing the imme- 
diate shipment of a regiment of cavalry and several 
batteries of artillery to Burnside's command at 
Acquia Creek. The order of August 3d also re- 
quired the transjiortation of a great amount of 
material. All this was obviously a work of time; 
but in spite of this, in spite of General McClellan's 
repeated and emphatic assertions to the contrary. 
General Halleck's mind became possessed with the 
notion that the removal of the sick had not been 
begun when the order was first received, and 
that the whole business of transportation was not 
pushed on so rapidly as it should have been. But 
General McClellan never received from the Ad- 
ministration " that forbearance, patience, and con- 
fidence" for which he had asked, — and which 
every soldier has a right to ask,— but always had 
a countenance of suspicion and distrust turned 



Age 35.] REMOVAL NOT DELAYED. 273 

towards him. He Lad now twelve thousand sick and 
wounded to transport, besides cavalry, artillery, 
wagons, baggage, and supplies. He was working 
day and night to speed their removal; he was 
in a situation that demanded kind consideration, 
for he was the leader of an enterprise which had 
failed, whose hopes had been crossed, whose plans 
for the future had been arrested, who was obeying 
faithfully orders w^hich he deemed unwise; and 
surely he did not need at such a moment the further 
discipline of a despatch like this, under date of 
August 9 : — " Considering the amount of transporta- 
tion at your disposal, your delay is not satisfactory : 
you must move with all possible celerity." 

The ]Dlain statements in General McClellan's Ee- 
port, and the letters of the Quartermaster and As- 
sistant Quartermaster, which are also to be found 
there, are sufficient to vindicate him completely 
from the charge of negligence or delay in trans- 
porting his materials and men. Indeed, in an 
issue like that between him and the commander-in- 
chief the testimony of General McClellan must be 
held to be decisive. Here was a certain work to 
be dorve, the removal of a certain number of per- 
sons, sick and well, and a certain amount of stores, 
supplies, and warlike materials from one point to 
another. The time within which the task could be 
accomplished depended upon several elements which 
were wholly matters of fact, — such as the number 
of vessels, their capacity, their speed, the state of 
the water in the river, and the wharf-accommoda- 
tions at the points of departure and arrival, — upon 



274 REMOVAL NOT DELAYED. 



[1862. 



all which General McClellan had, and General 
Halleck had not, the means of being exactly in- 
formed. Thus, it was General McClellan's know- 
ledge against General Ilalleck's surmise or con- 
jecture. General Halleck, sitting in his office at 
"Washington, might have thought that there was 
unreasonable delay; but General McClellan alone 
could have known w^hat was the proportion between 
the work to be done and the means to do it. 

General McClellan, happily for his peace of mind 
and health of body, is not a man of irritable tem- 
j)erament, and so he could possess his soul in pa- 
tience under the rash expressions of General Hal- 
leck's impatience, which, too, may have had the 
excuse of being prompted by patriotic zeal and 
professional activity; but this excuse cannot be 
offered on behalf of a deliberate wrong. In a letter 
subsequently w^ritten to the Secretary of "War, 
General Halleck says, "The evacuation of Har- 
rison's Landing, however, was not commenced till 
the 14th, eleven days after it was ordered.'^ The 
authority for this statement — which is neither 
more nor less than that General McClellan had re- 
fused or delayed for eleven days to execute a mili- 
tary order — is a despatch from the latter, under 
date of August 14, which says, — 

" Movement has commenced, — by land and water. 
All the sick will be away by to-morrow night.* 
Every thing being done to carry out your orders." 
At the date of this despatch, nearly all the sick, a 

^- This would Lave been absolutely impossible if nearly all 
of them were not already gone. 



Agl 35.] GENERAL HALLECK S CHARGE NOT TRUE, 21 D 

large amount of supplies and materials, a regiment 
of cavalry, and five batteries of artillery had been 
removed, and the phrase " movement has com- 
menced" referred obviously to the movement of 
the main army ; and yet General Halleck sets his 
hand and gives his official sanction to a statement 
which distinctly conveys the impression that none 
of these things had been done at that time ! Com- 
ment is unnecessary, as strong facts do not need 
the aid of strong language.* 

*A passage between General Halleck and General McClel- 
lan is worthy of being preserved in a note, as one of the curi- 
osities of official life. On the 12th of August, General McClel- 
lan's head-quarters were at Berkeley, seventy miles from James- 
town Island, the nearest telegraph-office. Eeing desirous of 
having more speedy and full explanation of the condition of 
affairs in the army than he could get by sending a steamer to 
Jamestown Island and waiting ten hours for a reply, he pro- 
posed to go in person to the office, and so informed General 
Halleck at the close of a despatch of the 12th. He accordingly 
went to Jamestown Island, but on arriving there found there 
was an interruption in the electric current, so that he was 
obliged to continue on to Fortress Monroe and across the Chesa- 
peake Bay to Cherry-Stone Inlet, on the "Eastern Shore." 
He arrived there late in the evening, and immediately sent the 
following dispatch : — 

''Cherry-Stone, August 13, 1862, 11.30p.m. 
" Please come to the office; wish to talk to you. What news 
from Pope ? *' G. B, McClellan, 

Major- General. 
"Major-General H. W. Halleck, 

Washington." 

The next day, at half-past twelve, he sent another despatch, 
as follows: — 



276 TROOPS IN MOTION. [1862. 

On the 16th of August all the troops were in 
motion by land and water, and late in the afternoon 

'• Cherey-Stone Ijjlet, August 14, 1862, 12.30 a.m. 
"Started to Jamestown Island to talk with you ; found cable 
broken, and came here. Please read my long telegram. All 
quiet at camp. Enemy burned wharves at City Point yester- 
day. No rebel pickets within eight (8) miles of Coggin's 
Point yesterday. 

"Richmond prisoners state that large force with guns left 
Richmond northward on Sunday. 

"G. B. McClellan, 
* ' Major- General. 
"Major- General H. W. Halleck, 

Washington.^^ 
To which the following reply was received: — 

"Washington, August 14, 1862, 1.40 a.m. 
"I have read your despatch. There is no change of plans. 
You will send up your troops as rapidly as possible. There is 
no difficulty in landing them. According to your own accounts, 
there is now no difficulty in withdrawing your forces. Do so 
with all possible rapidity. 

" H. W. Halleck, 
" Major -General. 
" Major-General G. B. McClellan." 

Before General McClellan had time to decipher and reply to 
this despatch, the telegraph-operator in Washington informed 
him that General Halleck had taken his hat and walked out 
of the office without another word or message! General 
McClellan then telegraphed thus : — 

"Cherry-Stone Inlet, August 14, 1862, 1.40 a.m. 
"Your orders will be obeyed. I return at once. I had 
hoped to have had a longer and fuller conversation with you, 
after travelling so far for the purpose. 

" G. B. McClellan, 

*■'■ Major-General. 
*' Major-General H. W. Halleck, 

Washington, i?. C." 



Age 35.] REMOVAL COMPLETED. 277 

of that day, when the last man had disappeared 
from the deserted camps, General McClellau fol- 
lowed with his personal staff in the track of the 
grand Army of the Potomac, "bidding farewell," 
as he says in his Eeport, "to the scenes still covered 
with the marks of its presence, and to be ever memo- 
rable in history as the vicinity of its most brilliant 
exploits." On the 20th the army was at Yorktown, 
Fortress Monroe, and Newport News, ready to em- 
bark for whatever might be its destination. 

A brief extract from General McClellan's Eeport 
at this point may be here fittingly introduced : — 

*'■ As the campaign on the Peninsula terminated here, 
I cannot close this part of my report without giving an 
expression of my sincere thanks and gratitude to the 
officers and men whom I had the honor to command. 

** From the commencement to the termination of this 
most arduous campaign, the Army of the Potomac always 
evinced the most perfect subordination, zeal, and alacrity 
in the performance of all the duties required of it. 

" The amount of severe labor accomplished by this army 
in the construction of intrenchments, roads, bridges, &c. 
was enormous ; yet all the work was performed with the 
most gratifying cheerfulness and devotion to the interests 
of the service. 

" During the campaign ten severely contested and san- 
guinary battles had been fought, besides numerous 
small engagements, in which the troops exhibited the 
most determined enthusiasm and bravery. They submit- 
ted to exposure, sickness, and even death, without a mur- 
mur. Indeed, they had become veterans in their coun- 
try's cause, and richly deserved the warm commendation 
of the Government. 

24 



278 DEPARTURE FOR ACQUIA CREEK. [18G2. 

" It was in view of these facts that this seemed to me an 
appropriate occasion for the general-in-chief to give, in 
general orders, some appreciative expression of the ser- 
vices of the army while upon the Peninsula. Accord- 
ingly, on the 18th, I sent him the following despatch : — 

"'Head-Quarters Army of the Potomac, ] 
August 18, 1862, 11 P.M. I 

** * Please say a kind word to my army, that I can repeat 
to them in general orders, in regard to their conduct at 
Yorktown, Williamsburg, West Point, Hanover Court- 
Ilouse, and on the Chickahominy, as well as in regard to 
the (7) seven days, and the recent retreat. 

'* * No one has ever said any thing to cheer them but 
myself. Say nothing about me. Merely give my men 
and officers credit for what they have done. It will do 
you much good, and will strengthen you much with them, 
if you issue a handsome order to them in regard to what 
they have accomplished. They deserve it. 

" ' G. B. McClellan, 

" ' 3Iajor- General. 

" 'Major-General Halleck, 

'''Washington, D. C 

*' As no reply was received to this communication, and 
no order was issued by the general-in-chief, I conclude 
that my suggestion did not meet with his approbation." 

Immediately on reaching Fortress Monroe, Gene- 
ral McClellan gave directions for strengthening the 
defences of Yorktown, so as to resist any attack from 
the direction of Eichmond, and left General Keyes, 
with his corps, to perform the work and tempora- 
rily to garrison the place. On the evening of the 23d 
he sailed with his staff for Acquia Creek, where he 
arrived on the following morning and reported for 



Age 35.] ALEXANDRIA. 279 

orders. On the 26th he was ordered to Alexan- 
dria, and reached there the same day. In the 
mean time the corps of Heintzelman and Porter 
had sailed from Newport News and Yorktown, on 
the 19th, 20th, and 21st, to join General Pope's 
army; and those of Franklin and Sumner followed 
a day or two after. 

General McClellan remained at Alexandria till 
the close of the march. A brisk intercourse by 
telegraph was kept up between him and th© 
commander-in-chief with reference to General 
Pope's movements and the defence of Washington ; 
but no specific duty w^as assigned to him, and his 
brave army was by parcels detached from him, and 
sent to take part in movements in regard to which 
it is easy to see he had the gravest misgivings. Few 
experiences in life are more trying than to see 
things going wrong and have no power to prevent 
it. The following extract from a despatch sent 
from the camp near Alexandria, on the 30th of 
August, while the disastrous second battle of Bull 
Eun was going on, shows how much he felt and 
how much he suppressed : — 

" I cannot express to you the pain and mortification I 
have experienced to-day in listening to the distant sound 
of the firing of my men. As I can be of no further use 
here, I respectfully ask that, if there is a probability of 
the conflict being renewed to-morrow, I may be permit- 
ted to go to the scene of battle with my staff, merely to 
be with my own men, if nothing more : they will fight 
none the worse for my being with them. If it is not 
deemed best to intrust me with the command even of 



280 ORDER FROM THE WAR DEPARTMENT. [18G2. 

my own army, I simply ask to be permitted to share their 
fate on the field of battle." 

On the 30th, the following order was issued from 
the War Department : — 

" War Department, August 30, 1862. 

*' The following are the commanders of the armies ope- 
rating in Virginia : — 

*' General Burnside commands his own corps, except 
those that have been temporarily detached and assigned 
to General Pope. 

" General McClellan commands that portion of the 
Army of the Potomac that has not been sent forward to 
General Pope's command. 

** General Pope commands the Army of Virginia and 
all the forces temporarily attached to it. All the forces 
are under the command of Major-General Halleck, gene- 
ral-in-chief. 

" E. D. TOWNSEND, 

" Assistant Adjutant- General.'' 

The practical eifect of this order w^s that Gene- 
ral McClellan had no control over anybody, except 
his staff, some hundred men in camp near Alexan- 
dria, and a few troops at Fortress Monroe. 



CHAPTEE X. 

The campaign of General Pope in Virginia w^as 
closed with the disastrous battle of August 30, 
1862, fought on the ill-omened field of Bull Eun, 



Age 35.J PRESIDENT LINCOLN. 281 

and with that of Chantilly, two days after, in which 
our success was dearly bought by the loss of two 
of the best officers in the service, General Stevens 
and General Kearney. On the 1st of September 
General McClellan went into Washington, w^here he 
had an interview with General Halleck, who in- 
structed him verbally to take command of the 
defences of the place, with authority expressly lim- 
ited to the works and their garrisons, and not ex- 
tending to the troops in front under General Pope. 
On the same day General McClellan waited upon 
the President of the United States, at the house of 
General Halleck, and in obedience to a message 
from him. He was then and there told by the Presi- 
dent that he had reason to believe that the Army 
of the Potomac was not cheerfully co-operating 
with and supporting General Pope, and was asked 
to use his influence in correcting this state of things. 
General McClellan replied that the information 
could not be true, and that the Army of the Poto- 
mac, whatever might be their estimate of General 
Pope, would obey his orders and do their duty. 
But this did not satisfy the President, who seemed 
much moved during the interview; and, at his ear- 
nest and reiterated request, General McClellan tele- 
graphed to General Porter as follows : — 

"Washingtox, September 1, 1862. 
** I ask of you, for my sake, that of the country, and 
the old Army of the Potomac, that you and all my 
friends will lend the fullest and most cordial co-operation 
to General Pope in all the operations now going on. The 
destinies of our country, the honor of our army, are at 
24* 



282 GENERAL PORTER. [1SG2. 

stake, and all depends now upon the cheerful co-opera- 
tion of all in the field. This week is the crisis of our fate. 
Say the same thing to my friends m the Army of the 
Potomac, and that the last request I have to make of 
them is that, for their country's sake, they will extend 
to General Pope the same support they ever have to me. 

" I am in charge of the defences of Washington, and 
am doing all I can to render your retreat safe, should 
that become necessary. 

''George B. McClellan. 

" Major-General Porter." 

General Porter sent the following reply : — 

"Fairfax Court-House, 10 a.m., September 2, 1862. 
*' You may rest assured that all your friends, as well as 
every lover of his country, will ever give, as they have 
given, to General Pope their cordial co-operation and con- 
stant support in the execution of all orders and plans. 
Our killed, wounded, and enfeebled troops attest our 
devoted duty. 

"F. J. Porter, Major- General. 
"General George B. McClellan, 
*' Washington J* 

It need hardly be said that General McClellan's 
message, unexplained, is open to the obvious infer- 
ence that he had some doubt whether General Por- 
ter and the troops under him would be faithful in 
the discharge of their duty to the nation and its 
cause; but no such impression ever crossed his 
mind, and what he did was done solely at the Pre- 
sident's request. 

On the same day, September 2, the roads leading 



Age 35.] GEN. MCCLELLAN AGAIN IN COMMAND. 283 

into Washington from the west began to be filled 
with the broken fragments of a defeated and de- 
moralized army, like a lee shore strewn with the 
wreck of a noble fleet. Ambulances moved slowly 
along with their mournful freight of wounded men. 
Groups and squads 'of straggling soldiers appeared, 
weary and footsore, some slightly hurt, and all dis- 
pirited, some sadly silent, and some uttering cursea 
and threats. The emergency of the case required 
immediate action; and in view of the attachment of 
the Army of the Potomac to their late commander, 
and of their unabated confidence in him, the Pre- 
sident of the United States did the best and wisest 
thing he could have done under the circumstances : 
he turned to General McClellan for help. In a per- 
sonal interview, he begged of the latter to reassume 
command of the forces, make provisions for the de- 
fence of the capital, and act according to the best 
of his judgment for the common cause. Not readily, 
not without a good deal of anxious misgiving, did 
General McClellan yield; but he did yield at last. 
He accepted the trust, and instantly began the dis- 
charge of its duties with his wonted energy. Aides 
were sent out to the commanders of divisions, with 
instructions to move their commands to designated 
points. On the very day of his reappointment, 
General McClellan was himself in the saddle, sivinor 
personal directions to portions of the advancing 
army; and the next day he was at Alexandria, 
rectifying the j)Ositions of the troops and issuing 
necessary orders. 

The soldiers of the Army of the Potomac, as soon 



284 JOY or THE ARMY. [18G2. 

as they learned that their beloved commander was 
to lead them again, took heart once more. Confi- 
dence returned. "Hope elevated and joy bright- 
ened their crests." Missing men reappeared, the 
broken fragments of divisions and brigades were 
reunited, order reigned anew in the lately disordered 
files, and the shattered and demoralized host began 
instantly to assume the method and proportions of 
an army, with "degree, priority, and place." Be- 
fore the close of that very 2d of September, such 
dispositions were made as insured the successful 
defence of Washington against any attack on the 
south side of the Potomac* 

* <' To-day, by order of the President, General McClellan has 
again assumed the supreme command of the army. Imme- 
diately after accepting the chief command of all the Union 
forces in the neighborhood of Washington, General McClellan 
proceeded to inspect the troops and fortifications on the south 
side of the river. This occupied him until after midnight. 
His reception by the officers and soldiers was marked by the 
most unbounded enthusiasm. In every camp his arrival was 
greeted by hearty and prolonged cheering, and manifestations 
of the wildest delight. Many of the soldiers who fought under 
liim in the hardest battles of the war wept with joy at again 
having for their commander one upon whom they could place 
implicit reliance. Already his hurried visit to our camps has 
wrought a remarkable change in the soldiers. His presence 
seemed to act magically upon them : despondency is replaced 
by confidence, and all are glad that McClellan will hereafter 
direct them." — Ellis'' s Leaves from the Diary of an Army BurgeoHy 
p. 214. 

' ' To-night the Union army will all be concentrated in the works 
around this city, and General McClellan has already assumed 
the position of commander-in-chief of all the forces in the field 



Age 35.] MARCH OF THE ARMY. 285 

But this was not the intention of the enemy; for 
on the 3d he had disappeared from the front of 
Washington, and the information received of his 
movements induced the belief that he intended to 
cross the Upper Potomac into Maryland. This 
made an active campaign necessary in order to 
cover Baltimore, prevent the invasion of Pennsyl- 
vania, and clear Maryland; and measures were im- 
mediately taken accordingly. General Banks was 
left in command of the defences of Washino-ton ; 
and on the 4th of September a forward movement 
of the army was commenced, and General McClel- 
lan himself left the capital and took the field on 
the 7th. At this time it was known that the mass 
of the rebel army had passed up the south side of 
the Potomac, in the direction of Leesburg, and that 
a portion had crossed into Maryland ; but whether 
they intended to send over their whole force with a 
view to turn Washington by a flank movement down 
the north bank of the Potomac, or to move on Bal- 
timore, or to invade Pennsylvania, were matters of 
uncertainty. This constrained General McClellan to 
proceed with great caution for a few days, and so move 
as to keep both Baltimore and Washington covered, 
and at the same time hold the troops in readiness 
to follow the enemy if he went into Pennsylvania. 

The general course of the march was in a north- 
westerly direction, the points of destination being 
the city of Frederick, in Maryland, and its vicinity. 

in this part of the country. The announcement of this latter 
fact has been hailed with acclamations of infinite delight by 
nearly the whole population." — 8ame^ p. 218. 



28G MARCH OF THE ARMY, [1862. 

The army moved in five columns, stretching across 
the region embraced between the Baltimore & 
Ohio Railroad and the Potomac. The left always 
rested on the river, and the extreme right was as 
far out as Cooksville. On the 14th of September, 
Burnside and Sumner, each with two corps, were 
at South Mountain, Franklin's corps and Couch's 
division w^ere at Burkettsville, and Sykes's division 
was at Middletown. 

As soon as General McClellan had left Washing- 
ton, an active intercourse by telegraph-wires began 
to be kept up between him and the authorities there, 
especially the President of the United States and 
the commander-in-chief. The communications sent 
to General McClellan are tinged with a questioning 
and complaining spirit, show^ing that he no more 
enjoyed the confidence of the Administration than 
during the campaign in Virginia, and forcing upon 
him the conviction that his appointment was rather 
extorted from them in deference to the strong senti- 
ment of the army than as a spontaneous movement 
of their own. General Halleck's mind was dark- 
ened with apprehensions for the safety of the capi- 
tal, and he feared that General McClellan's move- 
mients w^ere too precipitate, and that he was ex- 
posing his front and rear. Upon these views of the 
commander-in-chief. General McClellan remarks, in 
his Eeport, — 

" The importance of moving with all due caution, so 
as not to uncover the national capital until the enemy's 
position and plans were developed, was, I believe, fully 
appreciated by me ; and, as my troops extended from the 



Age 35.] GENERAL IIALLECK's TE S T I M O N Y. 287 

Baltimore & Ohio Railroad to the Potomac, with the 
extreme left flank moving along that stream, and with 
strong pickets left in rear to watch and guard all the 
available fords, I did not regard my left or rear as in any 
degree exposed. But it appears from the foregoing tele- 
grams that the general-in-chief was of a different opinion, 
and that my movements were, in his judgment, too pre- 
cipitate not only for the safety of Washington, but also 
for the security of my left and rear. 

*' The precise nature of these daily injunctions against a 
precipitate advance may now be perceived. The general- 
in-chief, in his testimony before the Committee on the 
Conduct of the War, says, ' In respect to General McClel- 
lan's going too fast, or too far from Washington, there can 
be found no such telegram from me to him. He has mis- 
taken the meaning of the telegrams I sent him. I tele- 
graphed him that he was going too far, not from Wash- 
ington, but from the Potomac, leaving General Lee the 
opportunity to come down the Potomac and get between 
him and Washington. I thought General McClellan 
should keep more on the Potomac, and press forward his 
left rather than his right, so as the more readily to relieve 
Harper's Ferry.* 

"As I can find no telegram from the general-in-chief 
recommending me to keep my left flank nearer the Po- 
tomac, I am compelled to believe that when he gave this 
testimony he had forgotten the purport of the telegrams 
above quoted, and had also ceased to remember the fact, 
well known to him at the time, that my left, from the 
time I left Washington, always rested on the Potomac, and 
that my centre was continually in position to reinforce 
the left or right, as occasion might require. Had I ad- 
vanced my left flank along the Potomac more rapidly 
than the other columns marched upon the roads to the 
right, I should have thrown that flank out of supporting 
distance of the other troops, and greatly exposed it. And 



283 MOVEMENTS OF THE C N F E DER AT E S. [1862. 

if I had marched the entire army in one column along the 
banks of the river, instead of upon five different parallel 
roads, the column, with its trains, would have extended 
about fifty miles, and the enemy might have defeated the 
advance before the rear could have reached the scene of 
action. Moreover, such a movement would have unco- 
vered the communications with Baltimore and Wash- 
ington on our right, and exposed our left and rear. I 
presume it will be admitted by every military man that 
it was necessary to move the army in such order that it 
could at any time be concentrated for battle ; and I am 
of opinion that this object could not have been accom- 
plished in any other way than the one employed. Any 
other disposition of our forces would have subjected them 
to defeat in detached fragments.''' 

In the mean time the Confederate army had crossed 
the Potomac at two fords near Point of Eocks, en- 
tered Maryland, and marched as far as Frederick, 
which they reached and occupied on the 6th. The 
main body of the army encamped for some days on 
a line betAveen Frederick and the Potomac Eiver. 
Kecruiting-ofiices were opened in the city, and citi- 
zens invited to enlist ; but very few recruits were 
obtained. An address was issued to the people 
of Maryland by General Lee, but no enthusiastic 
response was made; and the Confederate leaders 
were much disappointed at the coldness and in- 
diiference with which they were received. 

On the 10th, General Lee began to evacuate 
Frederick, and, taking the road to Hagerstown, 
crossed the Catoctin Mountains, passed through the 
valley in which Middletown is situated, and drew 
up his forces along the crest of South Mountain, to 



Age 35.] BATTLE OF SOUTH MOUNTAIN. 289 

await the advance of General McClellan. At the 
same time he detached a portion of his force, 
amounting to twenty-five thousand men, and sent 
them, under command of General Jackson, to Har- 
per's Ferry, by the Williamsport road. On the 13th, 
the rear-guard of the enemy's army was found in 
strong position at Turner's Gap of the South Moun 
tain, over which the main road from Frederick to 
Hagerstown is carried; and preparations were made 
for an attack the next morning. The position of 
the Confederates was very strong on the sides and 
summit of the mountain, both to the right and 
left of the gap. The battle began on the morning 
of the 14th, but was some hours merely an artillery 
duel, with no very decisive results, though, on the 
whole, with gain to our side. At three, our line of 
battle was formed, and orders were given to move 
the whole forward, and take or silence the enemy's 
batteries. They were executed with enthusiasm 
and complete success. Our right, centre, and left 
advanced simultaneously towards the enemy, un- 
broken by a fire from two pieces of cannon which 
played upon our columns for upwards of an hour 
before they were silenced by our batteries. The 
right wing, where General Hooker was in command, 
was first engaged, and the left followed at no long 
interval. The tactics and order of battle were 
simple, and substantially the same all along the 
line. Steadily, without pause or wavering, our 
gallant troops pressed up the slope, and delivered 
heavy volleys of musketry as they came within 
range. It was for some time a hot and steady fight 



290 CRAMPTON'S pass. [1862. 

of man against man, company against company, 
regiment against regiment. The woods, the ledges 
of rock, all the natural lines of attack and defence, 
were for some time blazing with steady sheets of 
dazzling flame and ringing with sharp volleys. 
But our line moved on with the sweeping and irre- 
sistible force of a mighty flood, and the Confede- 
rates soon began to waver and give way. They 
were driven up to the top of the mountain, and 
thence down on the other side. At six o'clock the 
enemy had been beaten from all their positions, 
and we held undisturbed possession of the heights. 

The battle of South Mountain reflected high 
honor upon the ofiicers and men who took part in 
it. The judicious plans of the general commanding 
were admirably and successfully carried out. Our 
numbers were probably somewhat larger than the 
enemy's; but this advantage was more than counter- 
balanced by his superiority in position, on the crest 
and sides of a hill, with woods and rocky ledges for 
shelter and defence, and broken ground everywhere 
to embarrass the movements of our trooj^s. 

Our losses were three hundred and twelve killed, 
twelve hundred and thirty-four wounded, twenty- 
two missing. Among the killed was General Eeno, 
a brave and valuable officer, who was General 
McClellan's classmate at West Point. 

At the same time with the battle of South Moun- 
tain, an engagement took place at Crampton's Pass, 
between a division under General Franklin and a 
portion of the Confederate army. The enemy Avere 
found in the rear of Burkettsville, at the base of 



Age 35.] SURRENDER OF HARPER's FERRY. 291 

the mountain, with infantry posted in force on both 
Bides of the road, and artillery in strong positions 
to defend the approaches to the Pass. They were 
forced from their positions by a steady charge of 
our line, and driven up the slope, and at the end of 
three hours' fighting the crest was carried, and the 
enemy fled down the mountain on the other side. 

On the 12th of September, the Confederate force 
under General Jackson, which had been detached 
for the purpose, appeared before Harper's Ferry, 
and on the 15th the unfortunate and humiliatine: 
surrender of that position took place, — the Union 
cavalry having, on the night of the 14th, cut their 
way through the enemy's line and reached Green- 
castle, Pa., in safety the next morning. The un- 
toward surrender of this post awakened a very 
strong feeling throughout the country, and a court 
of inquiry was immediately summoned to investi- 
gate the circumstances. The court met in "VYash- 
. ington on the 25th of September, and their report 
was published early in November. It gives a de- 
tailed narrative of the surrender, and states the 
conclusion that " the incapacity" of Colonel Miles, 
the commanding officer (who, haj)pily for him, was 
killed during the assault), " amounting almost to 
imbecility, led to the shameful surrender of this 
important post." The report also strongly reflects 
upon " the military incapacity" of Colonel Ford, the 
officer second in command, in consequence of which 
he was dismissed from the service of the United 
States. 

But the military commission diverges a little 



292 SURRENDER OF HARPER'S FERRY. [18G2. 

from its legitimate path of inquiry, and lends itself 
to the persistent hostility with which G-eneral Mc- 
Clellan was pursued by the general-in-chief, in the 
paragraphs following : — 

" The commission has remarked freely on Colonel Miles, 
an old officer, who has been killed in the service of his 
country ; and it cannot, from any motives of delicacy, re- 
frain from censuring those in high command when it 
thinks 6uch censure deserved. 

" The general-in-chief has testified that General McClel- 
lan, after having received orders to repel the enemy in- 
vading the State of Maryland, marched only six miles per 
day, on an average, when pursuing this invading enemy. 

" The general-in-chief also testifies that, in his opinion, 
he could and should have relieved and protected Har- 
per's Ferry; and in this opinion the commission fully 
concur." 

Upon these charges General McClellan quietly 
and pertinently remarks in his Eeport, — 

" I have been greatly surprised that this commission, in 
its investigations never called upon me, nor upon any 
officer of my staff, nor, so far as I know, upon any officer 
of the Army of the Potomac able to give an intelligent 
statement of the movements of that army. But another 
paragraph in the same report makes testimony from such 
sources quite superfluous. It is as follows : — 

'"By a reference to the evidence it will be seen that, at 
the very moment Colonel Ford abandoned Maryland 
Heights, his little army was in reality relieved by Gene- 
rals Franklin's and Sumner's corps at Crampton's Gap, 
within seven miles of his position.' 

" The corps of Generals Franklin and Sumner were a 
part of the army which I at that time had the honor to 



Age 35.] SURRENDER OF HARPER'S FERRY. 293 

command, and they were acting under my orders at 
Crampton's Gap and elsewhere ; and if, as the commis- 
sion states, Colonel Ford's 'little army was in reality 
relieved' by those officers, it was relieved by me." 

It will be observed that the general-in-chief tes- 
tifies and the commission reports on an issue not 
then legitimately on trial ; and that is, the rate at 
which the army of General McClellan marched 
during the Maryland campaign. Good haters 
should have good memories; and the general-in- 
chief had apparently forgotten, when he was cen- 
suring General McClellan before the commission 
for moving only six miles a day, that only a short 
time before he had been apprehensive that the 
army was going too fast, and was thus uncovering 
Washington as well as exposing its own front and 
rear. 

Why, in point of fact, the army moved no more 
than six miles a day may be easily explained. 

In the first place, it was not distinctly known 
where the rebel army was going, and it was neces- 
sary to proceed cautiously, so as to keep watch 
upon it and be ready to anticipate and foil any 
sudden movement. In the second place, the in- 
vading army was well organized, well disciplined, 
led by a skilful commander, and flushed with vic- 
tory, whereas our own was demoralized by a re- 
cent defeat and by a sudden change in command ; 
and these slow marches were necessary for organ- 
ization and consolidation, and to establish true re- 
lations between the soldiers and their new leader. 

But to return to the surrender of Harper's 



294 SURRENDER OF HARPER'S FERRY. [1S62. 

Feriy. Before General McClellan left Washington, 
he recommended to the proper authorities that the 
garrison at Harper's Ferry should be withdrawn 
by way of Hagerstown to aid in covering the Cum- 
berland Yalley, or that, taking up the pontoon 
bridge and obstructing the railroad bridge, it should 
fall back to the Maryland Heights and there hold 
out to the last. This was unquestionably judicious 
advice; but it was not deemed proper to adopt 
either of the plans suggested. The garrison was 
not withdrawn, — as would have been the wiser 
course, for the position was of no value as a 
strategic point, as the enemy's troops then stood, 
— nor were measures taken to protect them from 
capture. 

It was not until the 12th that General McClellan 
was directed to assume command of the garrison at 
Harper's Ferry, as soon as he should open commu- 
nication with that place ; but when this order was re- 
ceived, all communication from the direction he was 
approaching was cut off. Nothing, therefore, was left 
to be done but to endeavor to relieve the garrison. 
Artillery was ordered to be fired by our advance, 
at frequent intervals, as a signal that relief was 
at hand ; and these reports, as was afterwards 
ascertained, were distinctly heard at Harper's 
Ferry. It was confidently expected that Colonel 
Miles would hold out till our forces had carried the 
mountain-passes and were in a condition to send a 
detachment to his relief; and this he assuredly 
might have done, had he been competent to the 
important command intrusted to him. And it was 



Age 35.] SURRENDER OF IIARPER's FERRY. 295 

with a view of relieving the garrison at Harper's 
Ferry that Franklin's column was ordered to move 
through Crampton's Pass, in front of Burketts- 
ville, while the centre and right marched upon 
Turner's Pass in front of Middletown. 

On the 14th a verbal message from Colonel Miles 
reached General McClellan, which was the first 
authentic intelligence the latter had received as to 
the condition of things at Harper's Ferry. The 
messenger reported as to the position of our force 
there, and stated that Colonel Miles instructed him 
to say that he could hold out with certainty two 
days longer. General McClellan directed him to 
make his way back, if possible, with the informa- 
tion that he was rapidly approaching and felt con- 
fident that he could relieve the place. It does not 
appear that this message ever reached Colonel 
Miles. 

On the afternoon of the 14th, General McClellan 
addressed a letter to Colonel Miles, giving him in- 
structions and information, assuring him that the 
centre was making every effort to relieve him, and 
entreating him to hold out to the last extremity. 
Three copies of this letter were sent by three dif- 
ferent couriers on three different routes, but none 
of them succeeded in reaching Harper's Ferry. 

On the previous day, September 13, General 
McClellan had sent to General Franklin a letter 
of detailed instructions as to his movements, and 
further orders were despatched on the following 
day. 

The results of the battle of South Mountain — 



296 BATTLE OF ANTIETAM. [18G2. 

considering Franklin's attack on Crampton's Pass 
as a part of one general and concerted plan — re- 
sponded exactly to General McClellan's hopes and 
wishes ; and the close of the action, on the evening 
of the 14th, found General Franklin's advance 
■vvithin six miles of Harper's Ferry. A despatch 
was sent to him from head-quarters during the 
night of the 14th, containing instructions as to his 
movements in case he should succeed in opening 
communication with Colonel Miles; and this would 
have been done had the place held out for twenty- 
four hours longer. But the surrender was made 
at eight a.m. on the 15th. 

Uj^on a fair examination of the case, it cannot 
be maintained that General McClellan is guilty 
of the charge made by the general-in-chief, and 
sanctioned by the Committee of Inquiry, that he 
failed to relieve and protect Harper's Ferry, having 
the power to do so. 

THE BATTLE OE ANTIETAM. 

The pursuit of the enemy followed immediately 
after the battle of South Mountain, and on the 15th 
they were found strongly posted behind Antietam 
Creek, near Sharpsburg. Our troops were not up 
in sufficient force to begin the attack on that day. 
The ground occupied by the Confederates was a 
rugged and wooded plateau, descending to the 
banks of the Antietam, which is here a deep 
stream, with few fords, and crossed by three stone 
bridges. On all flivorable points the enemy's ar- 



Age 35.] BATTLE OF ANTIETAM. 297 

tilleiy was posted; and their reserves, hidden from, 
view by the hills on which their line of battle was 
formed, could manoeuvre without being seen by 
our army, and, from the shortness of their line, 
could easily reinforce any point which needed 
strengthening. Their j^osition, stretching across 
the space included between the Potomac and the 
Antietam, their flanks and rear protected by these 
streams, was very strong, and it had the further 
advantage of masking their numbers from our ob- 
servation. 

On the morning of the 16th it was discovered 
that the enemy had changed the position of his 
batteries; and the whole forenoon was spent in 
reconnoitring, in examining the ground, finding 
fords, clearing the aj^proaches, and hurrying up 
the ammunition and suj^ply trains, which had been 
delayed by the rapid march of the troops. About 
daylight the enemy opened a heavy fire of artillery 
on our guns in position, which was promptly re- 
turned. Their fire was silenced for the time, but it 
was frequently renewed during the day. 

General McClellan's plan was to attack the 
enemy's left with the corps of Hooker and Mans- 
field, supported by Sumner's, and, if necessary, by 
Franklin's; and, in case of success at this point, to 
move Burnside's corps against the enemy's ex- 
treme right, and, having carried their position, to 
press along the crest towards our right, and, when- 
ever either of these flank movements should be 
successful, to advance our centre with all the forces 
then disposable. The general in command himself 



298 BATTLE OF ANTIETAM. [1862. 

occupied a ridge on the centre, where Porter's 
corps, including Sykes's division, was stationed as 
a reserve. 

About three o'clock. General Hooker crossed the 
Antietam by the bridge on the Hagerstown road 
and an adjacent ford, and soon gained the crest of 
the hill on the right bank of the stream. He then 
turned to the left, and followed down the ridge, 
under a sharp fire of musketry, which lasted till 
dark. 

During the night, General Mansfield's corps 
crossed the Antietam by the same bridge and ford 
used by Hooker's. 

At daylight on the 17th, General Hooker at- 
tacked the enemy's forces before him, and drove 
them from the open field in front of the first line 
of woods into a second line of woods beyond. But 
out of this second line a very destructive fire was 
poured from a body of fresh troops, before which 
our own forces recoiled. General Mansfield's corps 
was now ordered up, and came promptly into ac- 
tion; and for about two hours the tide of battle 
swayed to and fro with varying fortunes. The 
scene of the heaviest fighting was a piece of 
ploughed land, nearly enclosed by woods, and 
entered by a corn-field in the rear, on the crest of 
the hill. Three or four times this position was 
taken and lost, and the ground was thickly strewn 
with the bodies of the dead. Early in the fight, 
the gallant veteran General Mansfield was mor- 
tally wounded. General Hartsuff, of Hooker's 
corps, and General Crawford, of Mansfield's corps, 



Age 35.] BATTLE OF ANTIETAM. 299 

were both wounded, the former severely. Between 
nine and ten, General Hooker, who had shown ex- 
cellent conduct and the most brilliant courage, was 
shot through the foot, and, after having fainted 
with pain, was obliged to leave the field. 

At this time General Sumner's corps reached 
this portion of the field, and became hotly engaged ; 
but it suffered severely from a heavy fire of mus- 
ketry and shell from the enemy's breast-works and 
batteries, and portions of the line were com2:)elled 
to withdraw. General Sedgwick and General Dana 
were seriously w^ounded, and taken from the field. 
On the left, General Eichardson was mortally 
w^ounded, and General Meagher disabled by the 
fall of his horsCj shot under him. 

At one o'clock the aspect of aftairs on our right 
flank was not promising. Our troops had sufi'ered 
severely, and our loss in oflScers had been frightful. 
Portions of our force were scattered and demoral- 
ized, and the corn-field before mentioned was in 
the enemy's possession. We Avere in no condition 
to assume the offensive, and hardly able to hold 
the positions we had gained. At this time General 
Franklin arrived upon the field with fresh troops; 
and while one of his divisions, under Slocum, was 
sent forward on the left to the support of French 
and Eichardson, another, under Smith, was ordered 
to retake the woods and corn-fields which had been 
so hotly contested during the day. This order was 
executed in the most gallant style, and in ten 
minutes the enemy w^ere driven out and our troops 
were in undisturbed possession of the whole field. 



300 BATTLE OF ANTIETAM. [1862. 

This was substantially the close of the battle on our 
right, though the artillery on both sides maintained 
a fire for some time longer. It was not deemed 
safe for Franklin's corps to push on any farther, 
because the rest of our troops had suffered too se- 
verely to be relied upon as an efficient reserve. The 
battle had been fought with desperate courage on 
both sides, but the advantage, on the whole, was 
with us. But we had lost too many men, and were 
too much exhausted, to make any ncAv attack, and 
the enemy were not able to assume the offensive. 

Meanwhile, Eurnside had been engaged on the 
extreme left of the Federal position in attempting to 
cross the lower stone bridge, — a structure strongly 
defended by infantry and artillery. After two un- 
successful attacks, it was finally carried by assault, 
and the Confederates driven to a range of hills in 
the rear, where their batteries played upon our 
troops with damaging effect. A halt was then 
made until three o'clock, when urgent orders were 
sent from head-quarters to General Eurnside to 
push forward his force and carry these heights at 
any cost. The advance was then gallantly resumed, 
the enemy driven from, his guns, and the heights car- 
ried. Ey this time it was nearly dark, and strong 
reinforcements having just then reached the enemy 
from Harper's Ferry, attacked Eurnside's troops on 
the left flank, and forced them to retire to a lower 
line of hills nearer the bridge. During this move- 
ment General Eodman was mortally wounded. 

All day long General Porter's reserve corps filled 
the interval between the right wing and General 



Age 35.] BATTLE OF ANTIETAM. 301 

Burnsidc's command, guarding the main approach 
from the enemy's position to our trains of supply. 
It had been necessary to maintain this part of our 
line in strong force, lest the enemy, taking ad- 
vantage of an exhibition of weakness there, should 
pierce our centre, gain our rear, and capture or 
destroy our supply-trains. General Burnsidc, at 
the close of the day, hotly pressed by the enemy, 
had sent an urgent request for reinforcements ; but 
they could not be had, and he was ordered to hold 
his ground, or at least the bridge, till dark. At 
one moment, about the middle of the afternoon, 
the position on our right was so critical that two 
brigades from Porter's corps were ordered to re- 
inforce our troops on that wing ; but, after confer- 
ence with General Sumner, the order was counter- 
manded while in the course of execution. 

Our entire force engac-ed at Antietam was about 
eighty-seven thousand men. That of the Confede- 
rates was less at the beginning, but they were re- 
inforced during the day by Jackson's command 
from Harper's Ferry; and during the afternoon the 
numbers were probably about equal. Our loss in 
killed, wounded, and missing was twelve thousand 
four hundred and nine ; that of the Confederates 
was at least as great. 

Thirteen guns, thirty-nine colors, upwards of 
fifteen thousand stand of small arms, and more 
than six thousand prisoners were our trophies of 
success in the battles of South Mountain and An- 
tietam. Not a gun or a color was lost by our 
army. 

26 



502 BATTLE OF ANTIETAM. 



[1SG2. 



Early on the 18tli the Confederates sent in a flag 
of truce, asking permission to bury their dead who 
had fallen between the lines of the two armies. 
The request was granted. General McClellan says, 
in his Eeport, after a detailed account of the battle, — 

"Night closed the long and desperately-contested 
battle of the 17th. Nearly two hundred thousand men 
and five hundred pieces of artillery were for fourteen 
hours engaged in this memorable battle. We had at- 
tacked the enemy in a position selected by the experi- 
enced engineer then in person directing their operations. 
"We had driven them from their line on one flank, and 
secured a footing within it on the other. The Army of 
the Potomac, notwithstanding the moral effect incident 
to previous reverses, had achieved a victory over an ad- 
versary invested with the prestige of recent success. Our 
soldiers slept that night conquerors on a field won by 
their valor and covered with the dead and wounded of 
the enemy. 

"The night, however, brought with it grave responsi- 
bilities. Whether to renew the attack on the 18th or to 
defer it, even with the risk of the enemy's retirement, 
was the question before me. 

"After a night of anxious deliberation, and a full and 
careful survey of the situation and condition of our army, 
and the strength and position of the enemy, I concluded 
that the success of an attack on the 18th was not certain. I 
am aware of the fact that, under ordinary circumstances, 
a general is expected to risk a battle if he has a reason- 
able prospect of success ; but at this critical juncture I 
should have had a narrow view of the condition of the 
country had I been willing to hazard another battle with 
less than an absolute assurance of success. At that mo- 
ment — Virginia lost, Washington menaced, Maryland in- 



Age 35.] BATTLE OF ANTIETAM. 303 

vaded — the national cause could afford no risks of defeat. 
One battle lost, and almost all would have been lost. 
Lee's army might then have marched as it pleased on 
Washington, Baltimore, Philadelj^hia, or New York. It 
could have levied its sujoplies from a fertile and undevas- 
tated country, extorted tribute from wealthy and popu- 
lous cities, and nowhere east of the Alleghanies was 
there another organized force able to arrest its march.'* 

He then proceeds to set forth some of the con- 
siderations which led him to doubt the certainty of 
success in attacking before the 19th. 

The troops were greatly overcome by the ex- 
haustion of the recent battles, and the long day and 
night marches of the previous three days. 

The supply -trains were in the rear, and many of 
the troops had suifered from hunger. They required 
rest and refreshment. 

One division of Sumner's and all of Hooker's 
corps, on the right, after fighting valiantly for 
many hours, had been driven back in disorder, and 
were somewhat demoralized. 

Our losses had been very heavy. 

Many of our heaviest batteries had consumed all 
their ammunition, and they could not be supplied 
till late on the 18th. 

Large reinforcements which were immediately 
expected had not arrived. 

Supplies of forage had to be brought up and 
issued, and infantry-ammunition distributed. 

The 18th Avas, therefore, spent in collecting the 
dispersed, giving rest to the fatigued, burying the 
dead, and the necessary preparations for a renewal 



304 MESSAGE FROM GENERAL HALLECK, [1862. 

of the battle. Orders were given for an attack at 
daylight on the 19th. But during the night of the 
18th the enemy abandoned their position, and 
crossed the Potomac into Yirginia, just two weeks 
from the day they had entered Maryland. As their 
line was near the river, the evacuation presented 
little difficulty, and was effected before daylight. 

On the 19th, General McClellan sent to the com- 
mander-in-chief a telegraphic report as follows : — 

" I have the honor to report that Maryland is entirely 
freed from the presence of the enemy, who has been 
driven across the Potomac. No fears need now be enter- 
tained for the safety of Pennsylvania. I shall at once 
occupy Harper's Ferry.'' 

On the following day this despatch was re- 
ceived : — 

" Washington, September 20, 1862, 2 p.m. 
" We are still left entirely in the dark in regard to your 
own movements and those of the enemy. This should 
not be so. You should keep me advised of both, so far 
as you know them. 

" H. W. Halleck, 
** General-in-Chief. 
"Major-General G. B. McClellan.^' 

In reply to this curt and ungracious message, 
General McClellan, after giving the information 
sought, as far as it was in his power to do, said, — 

" I regret that you find it necessary to couch every de- 
spatch I have the honor to receive from you in the spirit 
of fault-finding, and that you have not yet found leisure 



Age 35.] GENERAL HOOKER PRAISED. 305 

to say one word in commendation of the recent achieve- 
ments of this army, or even to allude to them." 

On the same 19th of September, in the midst of 
his onerous cares and labors, General McClellan 
found time to send another desj)ateh to the com- 
mander-in-chief, as an act of prompt justice to a 
brave officer. It was as follows : — 

"Head-Quarters Army op the Potomac, September 19. 
"As an act of justice to the merits of that most excellent 
officer, Major-General Joseph Hooker, who was eminently 
conspicuous for his gallantry and ability as a leader in 
several hard-fought battles in Virginia, and who in the 
battle of Antietam Creek, on the 17th inst., was wounded 
at the head of his corps while leading it forward in ac- 
tion, I most urgently recommend him for the appoint- 
ment of brigadier-general in the United States Army, to 
fill the vacancy created by the death of the late Brigadier- 
General Mansfield. This would be but a fit reward for 
the service General Hooker rendered his country. I feel 
sure his appointment would gratify the whole army. 

"George B. McClellan, 

" Major-General, 
"Major-General H. W. Halleck, 
" General-in-Chief:' 

This suggestion was adopted, and General Hooker 
was made a brigadier-general in the regular army 
of the United States, his commission bearing date 
September 2, 1862. 

The result of the victories at South Mountain 
and Antietam was to drive the enemy from Mary- 
land, to secure Pennsylvania from invasion, and to 
put Harper's Ferry once more into our possession. 

26* 



306 GOVERNOR BRADFORD'S ORDER. [1862. 

This was much to have been done in a fortnight's 
time by an army in the shattered and demoralized 
condition that General McClellan's was in when he 
took it in hand on the second day of September. 
How strong a sense of the value of these services 
was felt by those Avho were most nearly interested 
may be learned by an executive order of the Gover- 
nor of Maryland, as follows : — 

" State op Maryland, Executive Department, 1 
Annapolis, September 29, 1862. j 

"The expulsion of the rebel army from the soil of 
Maryland should not be suffered to pass without a proper 
acknowledgment, and the cordial thanks of her authori- 
ties to those who were chiefly instrumental in compelling 
that evacuation. 

"I would tender, therefore, on behalf of the State of 
Maryland, to Major-General McClellan, and the gallant 
officers and men under his command, my earnest and 
hearty thanks for the distinguished courage, skill, and 
gallantry with which the achievement was accomplished. 
It reflects a lustre upon the ability of the commander-in- 
chief, and the heroism and endurance of his followers, 
that the country everywhere recognizes, and that even 
our enemies are constrained to acknowledge. 

** A. W. Bradford. 

" By the Governor: 

"Wm. B.Hill, 

" Secretary of State'* 



Age 35.] A GRAVE QUESTION. 307 



CHAPTEE XI. 

It now became a grave question with General 
McClellan whether or not he should pursue the re- 
treating enemy into Yirginia. Our losses had been 
heavy ; the army was greatly exhausted by hard 
Avork, fatiguing marches, hunger, and want of sleep. 
Many of the troops were new levies; and, though 
they had fought well, they had not the steadiness 
and discipline that Avere needed for an expedition so 
formidable. The means of transportation at our dis- 
posal, on the 19th of September, were not enough to 
furnish a single day's subsistence in advance. Un- 
der these circumstances, General McClellan did not 
deem it wise to cross the river with his army, over 
a deep and difficult ford, in pursuit of a retreating 
enemy, and thus place between himself and his base 
of supplies a stream liable at any time to rise above 
a fording stage. 

This decision was made known to the authorities 
at "Washington, and they were duly informed of the 
movements of our own troops, and of those of the 
enemy, as far as the latter could be ascertained. The 
commander-in-chief, to whom, in general, the com- 
munications were addressed, was urged to push for- 
ward all the old troops that could be dispensed with 
around Washington and other places, so that the 
old skeleton regiments might be filled up at once, 
and officers appointed to supply the numerous exist- 



308 PRESIDENT Lincoln's visit. [1862. 

ing vacancies. The work of reorganizing, drilling, 
and supplying the army was begun at the earliest 
moment. The different corps were stationed along 
the river in the best position to cover and guard 
the fords. Eeconnoissances upon the Virginia side 
of the Potomac, for the purpose of learning the 
enemy's positions and movements, were frequently 
made. This was a trying and exhausting service 
for our cavalry, with which the army was inade- 
quately supplied. 

On the first day of October the President of the 
United States paid a visit to the Army of the Poto- 
mac, and remained several days, during which time 
he passed through the different encampments, re- 
viewed the troops, and went over the battle-fields 
of South Mountain and Antietam. During this 
visit. General McClellan explained to him fully, in 
conversation, the movements of the army since it 
had left Washington, and gave the reasons why the 
enemy was not pursued after he had crossed the 
Potomac. 

The twenty-second day of September, 1862, was a 
memorable day in the history of the war and the 
history of the country ; for on that day the Presi- 
dent issued his proclamation in which he an- 
nounced that on the first day of January, 1863, 
all persons held as slaves within any State, or any 
designated part of a State, the people w^hereof 
should then be in rebellion against the "United 
States, should be thenceforth and forever free. 
All discussion of the expediency of this proclama- 
tion, or of its legal effect, would be inopportune; but 



Age 36.] president's PROCLAMATION. 309 

it will be admitted, alike by those who approve and 
those who disapprove it, that it gave a new charac- 
ter to the w^ar and changed its objects. It is hardly 
necessary to add that this proclamation became 
at once, throughout the country, a subject of ear- 
nest debate and vehement controversy, which have, 
indeed, continued to the present time. From the 
character of the men composing the Army of the 
Potomac, who were voters and citizens as well as 
soldiers, accustomed to read the newspapers and 
talk politics, it was obvious that the same division 
of opinion upon the President's proclamation would 
be found among them as was found in the public 
at large ; and there was danger that this conflict 
of views might impair that unity of action and 
patriotic zeal which are so essential to the success 
of all military movements. General McClellan felt 
himself called upon to remind the officers and sol- 
diers under his command of the relations between 
the civil authorities and the military forces of the 
country, and of the duties of the latter in regard 
to the political questions of the day and the path 
of civil policy marked out by the Government; 
and he may have done this with the more prompt- 
ness and emphasis from the fact that he was known 
not to belong to that party by whose influence the 
proclamation had been extorted from a too-yielding 
President. With these views, the following gene- 
ral order was issued, which may unhesitatingly be 
pronounced admirable alike in substance and in 
form, animated by a high-toned patriotism, defining 
with precision the line where the duty of the citi- 



} 



310 GENERAL MCCLELLAN'S ORDER. [1862. 

zen ends and the duty of the soldier begins, and 
giving to every candid mind an assurance that 
General McClellan himself would serve his coun- 
try as faithfully and zealously in the future as he 
had done in the past : — 

" Head-Quarters Army of the Potomac, 
Camp near Sharpsburg, Maryland, October 7, 1862. 

General Order No. 163. 

*• The attention of the officers and soldiers of the Army 
of the Potomac is called to General Order No. 139, War 
Department, publishing to the army the President's pro- 
clamation of September 22. 

*' A proclamation of such grave moment to the nation, 
officially communicated to the army, affords to the gene- 
ral commanding an opportunity of defining specifically to 
the officers and soldiers under his command, the relation 
borne by all persons in the military service of the United 
States towards the civil authorities of the Government. 

"The Constitution confides to the civil authorities, 
legislative, judicial, and executive, the power and duty 
of making, expounding, and executing the federal laws. 
Armed forces are raised and supported simply to sustain 
the civil authorities, and are to be held in strict subordi- 
nation thereto in all respects. 

" This fundamental rule of our political system is essen- 
tial to the security of our republican institutions, and 
should be thoroughly understood and observed by every 
soldier. The principle upon which, and the object for 
which, armies shall be employed in suppressing rebellion, 
must be determined and declared by the civil authori- 
ties ; and the chief executive, who is charged with the 
administration of the national affiiirs, is the proper and 
only source through which the needs and orders of the 
Government can be made known to the armies of the 
nation. 



Age 35.] GENERAL M^CLELLAN'S ORDER. 311 

" Discussions by officers and soldiers concerning public 
measures determined upon and declared by the Govern- 
ment, when carried once beyond temperate and respect- 
ful expressions of opinion, tend greatly to impair and 
destroy the discipline and efficiency of troops, by substi- 
tuting the spirit of political faction for that firm, steady, 
and earnest support of the authority of the Government, 
which is the highest duty of the American soldier. The 
remedy for political errors, if any are committed, is to bo 
found only in the action of the people at the polls. 

'* In thus calling the attention of this army to the true 
relation between the soldier and the Government, the 
general commanding merely adverts to an evil against 
which it has been thought advisable, during our whole 
history, to guard the armies of the republic, and in so 
doing he will not be considered by any right-minded per- 
son as casting any reflection upon that loyalty and good 
conduct which has been so fully illustrated upon so many 
battle-fields. 

" In carrying out all measures of public policy, this 
army will, of course, be guided by the same rules of 
mercy and Christianity that have ever controlled their 
conduct towards the defenceless. 

"By order of Major-General McClellan. 
James A. Hardee, 
" Lieut- Col., Aide-de- Camp, Acting Assistant Adjutant-General. 
" George B. McClellan, 

^^ Major-General commanding." 

The seeming inactivity of the Army of the Poto- 
mac after the battle of Antietam was a disappoint- 
ment to the public, and an annoyance to the Ad- 
ministration. It was expected that Lee's retreat- 
ing forces would be instantly and vigorously pur- 
sued, and a new path to Eichmond opened through 
his broken columns. 



812 ADVANCE ORDERED BY THE PRESIDENT. [1862. 

The earnest desire of the Administration for a 
forward movement at length took the form of a 
positive and peremptory order, which was received 
on the 7th of October, and is as follows : — 

"Washington, D. C, October 6, 1862. 

"I am instructed to telegraph you as follows. The 
President directs that you cross the Potomac and give 
battle to the enemy, or drive him south. Your army 
must move now, while the roads are good. If you cross 
the river between the enemy and Washington, and cover 
the latter by your operations, you can be reinforced with 
thirty thousand men. If you move up the valley of the 
Shenandoah, not more than twelve thousand or fifteen 
thousand can be sent to you. The President advises the 
interior line between Washington and the enemy, but 
does not order it. He is very desirous that your army 
move as soon as possible. You will immediately report 
what line you adopt, and when you intend to cross the 
river; also to what point the reinforcements are to be 
sent. It is necessary that the plan of your operations be 
positively determined on, before orders are given for 
building bridges and repairing railroads. I am directed 
to add that the Secretary of War and the General-in- 
Chief fully concur with the President in these instructions. 

*'H. W. Halleck, 
'* General-in-Chief. 

" Major-General McClellan." 

This order was not immediately carried out, for 
a forward movement at that moment was an im- 
possibility, and, had it been insisted upon. General 
McClellan must at once have resigned his com- 
mand; but, on the other hand, it cannot be said 
that it was disobeyed, for every possible effort was 



Age 35.] THE ARMY IN NEED OF REST. 813 

made to comply with its directions, and tlie genc- 
ral-in-chief was day by day informed of the progress 
that was making, and of the reasons why the de- 
sired advance was delayed. 

These reasons are set forth in full in General 
McClellan's Eeport, and are substantiated by the 
testimony of the chief quartermaster. Colonel In- 
galls, and of other officers. The army was wholly 
deficient in cavalry, and a large part of our troops 
were in want of shoes, clothing, blankets, knap- 
sacks, and shelter-tents. It should be borne in 
mind that the presence of the Confederates in 
Maryland, and the imperative necessity of driving 
them out, had made excessive demands upon the 
strength and endurance of the Army of the Poto- 
mac. It w^as one of those cases in which nervous 
energy is called upon to do the work of muscular 
strength : for a while the claim is answered, but 
sooner or later the time of reaction must come. 
After the battle of Antietam a natural exhaustion 
followed the unnatural excitement which had been 
kept up for a fortnight previous. Had the army 
been furnished with clothing and supplies, a rest 
of some days would still have been required before 
a forward movement would have been expedient or 
even safe ; but, in consequence of the deficiencies 
above mentioned, a yet further delay was compelled. 

The order to cross the Potomac was dated on 
the 6th of October, as has been seen, but the move- 
ment did not begin till the 26th; and during the 
intermediate period the Administration and Grene- 
ral McClcllan were fairl}^ at issue. The case on 
27 



31-1: DEFICIENCY IN SUPPLIES. 



[1862. 



behalf of the latter may be found stated in his 
Ilei:)ort; that on behalf of the Administration, in the 
report of the Congressional Committee on the Con- 
duct of the War, and in the appendix to the testi- 
mony of General Halleck, and is summed up in a 
letter of his, addressed to the Secretary of War, 
dated October 28, 1862, which was published in 
the newspapers of the day at the same time with 
the order for removing General McClellan. With- 
out going into minute detail, without spreading 
the whole evidence upon the record, the points of 
difference were these : — 

General McClellan says that the army is deficient 
in clothing and supplies of all kinds, and especially 
in horses, that requisitions for the needed articles 
had been duly made upon the War Department at 
Washington, but that in point of fact they had not 
been received, and that until they were received it 
was not possible for the army to advance. 

On the other hand, the Administration, repre- 
sented by the general-in-chief, says that all General 
McClellan's requisitions had been promptly referred 
to the proper functionaries, that all the supplies 
asked for, horses included, had been procured and 
forwarded without delay, and that it was not pos- 
sible that the army could have been in the desti- 
tute condition alleged. A lono; letter from General 
Meigs, the Quartermaster-General, is given in sup- 
port of these positions. 

It is easy to see that the statements of the Ad- 
ministration are not inconsistent with the state- 
ments of General McClellan. The former say, 



Age 35.] GENERAL MEIGS NOT BLAxMED. 315 

substantially, that certain, supplies were put on 
board freight-trains at Washington to be forwarded 
to an army stationed at different points in the 
neighborhood of Harper's Ferry, forty or fifty 
miles off. General McClellan says that these arti- 
cles were not received; and if credible and unim- 
peached witnesses, speaking upon matters within 
their knowledge, are to be believed, he proves it. 
It is obvious that proof that articles have been 
received is not made when it is shown that they 
have been despatched to their point of destination. 
General McClellan, be it remembered, is only de- 
fending or justifying himself for not advancing, 
and is not making any complaint against the Admin- 
istration, or against any officer, civil or military, at 
Washington. This distinctly appears by the fol- 
lowing despatch, which was published in connection 
with General Halleck's letter to the Secretar}- of 
War, before referred to, as a document in justifica- 
tion of General McClellan's removal : — 

''Head-Quarters Army op the Potomac, Oct. 22, 1862. 

"Your despatch of this date is received. I have 
never intended in any letter or despatch to make any 
accusation against yourself or your department for not 
furnishing or forwarding clothing as rapidly as it was 
possible for you to do. I believe that every thing has 
been done that could be done in this respect. The idea 
that I have tried to convey was that certain portions of 
the command were without clothing, and the army could 
not move until it was supplied. ,, ^ ^ McClell^. 

"To Brig.-Gen. Meigs, 

*' Quartermaster- General." 



316 LETTER OF GENERAL MEIGS. [18G2. 

That supplies sent from Washington in season 
were not seasonably received by General McClellan 
is further shown by the letter of General Meigs 
before referred to, which is one of the documents 
in the case on the side of the Administration. 
At the commencement of this letter he says that 
*'all the articles of clothing called for by requisition 
from General McClellan's head-quarters were not 
only ordered, but had been shipped, on the 14th of 
October," — a date, it will be observed, eight days 
later than the day on which the army had been 
ordered to cross the Potomac; but in subsequent 
portions of the letter statements and admissions 
are made which show that further delays may have 
taken place in the transportation, and that indeed 
they did. Some of these are transcribed without 
further comment : — 

"This department cannot control the trains upon rail- 
roads of which the War Department has not taken the 
management into its own hands." 

"The railroad companies complain that cars are not 
unloaded at their destinations, and that their sidings are 
occupied with cars which are needed for forwarding sup- 
plies. I presume that the missing articles are in some of 
these cars, or that> they have been unloaded and have not 
yet reached the particular corps or detachment for which 
they are intended." 

"The fact is that no railroad can provide facilities for 
unloading cars and transacting the business attending 
the supply of an army of the size of General McClellan's 
in a short time or in a contracted space. Sidings, switches, 
depots, and turn-outs do not exist, and cannot be laid down 
at once, for such a traffic." 



Age 35.] GENERAL HAUPT's CIRCULAR. 317 

"The railroads are heavily taxed, and transportation 
has been delayed. A case is reported in which horses 
remained fifty hours on the cars without food or water." 

There is yet another piece of evidence showing 
that there had been delays in the transportation 
of supplies to the army of General McClellan. In 
August, 1862, the superintendence and management 
of all the railways used by the Government for 
military purposes were intrusted to Brigadier-Gene- 
ral Haupt, a competent and energetic officer. On 
the 10th of November, five days after the date of 
the order removing General McClellan, he ad- 
dressed, from Washington, a circular letter to post- 
quartermasters, commissaries, officers and agents 
of military railroads, from which we make a few 
extracts : — 

"Gentlemex: — The exceedingly critical condition of 
aifairs compels me to address to you this circular, and to 
endeavor, with all the earnestness and force of language 
I can command, to explain some of the difficulties con- 
nected with military railroad transportation, and ask 
your co-operation and assistance in forwarding supplies. 

"The army is dependent for its supplies upon a single- 
track railroad, in bad condition, without sidings of suffi- 
cient length, w^ithout wood, with a short supply of water, 
and with insufficient equipments. This road is taxed 
with an amount of business equal to the ordinary freights 
of a large city, — an amount four times as large as it has 
ever before been called on to accommodate, and twice as 
large as I reported to General McClellan its capacity for 
transportation. 

"There cannot be the most distant prospect of keeping 
the firmy supj)lipd without constant., uninterrupted move- 



118 WANT OF HORSES. 



[1862. 



merit of trains day and night. The delicate machinery 
of the road must not be deranged by any detention or 
interference. It must be directed by one mind, and one 
only. 

"Again I say that, if the army is to be supplied, the 
condition which, in its importance, transcends all others, 
is that no delay — not even a minute — should be allowed 
to occur in unloading cars, if it can be avoided. Move- 
ment, unceasing movement, in the trains, is our only 
salvation. Without it, the army must either retreat or 
starve." 

The above extracts alone are enough to make 
out General McClellan's case; for they show that 
the road upon which the army was exclusively de- 
pendent for supplies was taxed beyond its capacity, 
and that there was a w^ant of system in its manage- 
ment by which unnecessary delays were incurred ; 
and this was all General McClellan ever asked the 
Administration to believe. 

In the opinion of General McClellan, the most 
important want in the army was the want of horses, 
— not merely for cavalry and artillery, but for trans- 
portation. From the commencement the army had 
been deficient in cavalry; and after the battle of 
Antietam constant reconnoissances upon the Vir- 
ginia side of the river, to learn the enemy's position 
and movements, had broken down the greater part 
of the cavalry-horses. A violent disease, attacking 
the hoof and tongue, soon after broke out among 
the animals, and at one time put nearly four thou- 
sand of them out of condition for service. To such 



Age35.] number of HORSES REQUIRED. 319 

an extent had the cavalry arm become reduced, that 
when the Confederate general Stuart made his raid 
into Pennsylvania, on the 11th of October, with two 
thousand men, penetrating as far as Chambersburg, 
General McClellan could only mount eight hundred 
men to follow him. Few civilians have any notion 
of the number of horses which are required by an 
army of a hundred thousand men. Indeed, we may 
go further, and say that few civilians have any dis- 
tinct notion of what an army of a hundred thou- 
sand men is. AYe repeat the words mechanically, 
as we repeat the distances of the solar system, 
without any very definite impressions of numbers 
and mass in one case, or of space in the other. The 
following extract from General McClellan's Eeport 
will, we presume, be read with some surprise by 
most of our readers, as well as with interest. 

*'In a letter dated October 14, 1862, the general-in- 
chief says, — 

** 'It is also reported to me that the number of animals 
with your army in the field is about thirty-one thousand. 
It is believed that your present proportion of cavalry and 
of animals is much larger than that of any other of our 
armies.^ 

" What number of animals our other armies had,^^ says 
General McClellan, "I am not prepared to say; but mili- 
tary men in European armies have been of the opinion 
that an army, to be efficient, while carrying on active 
operations in the field, should have a cavalry force equal 
in numbers to from one-sixth to one-fourth of the inr 
fan try force. My cavalry did not amount to one-twentieth 
part of the army, and hence the necessity of giving every 
one of my cavalry-soldiers a serviceable horse. 



320 NUMBER OP HORSES REQUIRED. [18G2. 

"Cavalry may be said to constitute the antennce of an 
army. It scouts all the roads in front, on the flanks, and 
in the rear of the advancing columns, and constantly 
feels the enemy. The amount of labor falling uj^on this 
arm during the Maryland campaign was excessive. 

" To persons not familiar with the movements of troops, 
and the amount of transportation required for a large 
army marching away from water or railroad communica- 
tions, the number of animals mentioned by the general- 
in-chief may have appeared unnecessarily large ; but to 
a military man, who takes the trouble to enter into an 
accurate and detailed computation of the number of 
pounds of subsistence and forage required for such an 
army as that of the Potomac, it will be seen that the 
thirty-one thousand animals were considerably less than 
was absolutely necessary to an advance. 

"As we were required to move through a country which 
could not be depended upon for any of our supplies, it 
became necessary to transport every thing in wagons, and 
to be prepared for all emergencies. I did not consider it 
safe to leave the river without subsistence and forage for 
ten days. 

"The official returns of that date show the aggregate 
strength of the army for duty to have been about one 
hundred and ten thousand men of all arms. This did 
not include teamsters, citizen-employees, officers' servants, 
&c,, amounting to some twelve thousand men, which gives 
a total of one hundred and twenty-two thousand men. 

"The subsistence alone of this army for ten days 
required for its transx-)ortation eighteen hundred and 
thirty wagons, at two thousand pounds to the wagon, 
and ten thousand nine hundred and eighty animals. 

"Our cavalry-horses at that time amounted to five 
thousand and forty-six, and our artillery-horses to six 
thousand eight hundred and thirty-six. 

"To transport full forage for these twenty-two thou- 



Age 35.] WANT OF HORSES. 321 

sand eight hundred and sixty-two animals for ten days 
required seventeen thousand eight hundred and thirty- 
two additional animals ; and this forage would only sup- 
ply the entire number (forty thousand six hundred and 
ninety-four) of animals with a small fraction over half- 
allowance for the time specified. 

"It will be observed that this estimate does not em- 
brace the animals necessary to transport quartermasters' 
supplies, baggage, camp-equipage, ambulances, reserve 
ammunition, forage for officers' horses, &c., which would 
greatly augment the necessary transportation. 

" It may very truly be said that we did make the march 
with the means at our disposal ; but it will be remembered 
that we met with no serious opposition from the enemy, 
neither did we encounter delays from any other cause. 
The roads were in excellent condition, and the troops 
marched with the most commendable order and celerity. 

*' If we had met with a determined resistance from the 
enemy, and our progress had been very much retarded 
thereby, we would have consumed our supplies before 
they could have been renewed. A proper estimate of my 
responsibilities as the commander of that army did not 
justify me in basing my preparations for the expedition 
upon the supposition that I was to have an uninterrupted 
march. On the contrary, it was my duty to be jDrepared 
for all emergencies ; and not the least important of my 
responsibilities was the duty of making ample provision 
for supplying my men and animals with rations and 
forage." 

In regard to the supply of horses, and the con- 
flicting views of General McClellan and the Admin- 
istration thereupon, one or two points are w^orthy 
of notice. General Meigs, in a letter written on 
the 14th of October and addressed to the general- 



322 WANT OF HORSES. [1862. 

in-chief, states, " There have been issued, therefore, 
to the Army of the Potomac, since the battles in 
front of Washington, to replace losses, (9254) nine 
thousand two hundred and fifty-four horses/' 
From this statement a reader would naturally infer 
that this number had been sent to the army under 
General McClellan; but it ajDpears from a report 
of Colonel Myers, the chief quartermaster with 
that army, that only (3813) three thousand eight 
hundred and thirteen came to the forces with which 
General McClellan was ordered to follow and at- 
tack the enemy, and that these w^ere not enough 
to supply the places of the animals disabled by 
sickness and overwork; and General McClellan dis- 
tinctly states that on the 21st of October, after de- 
ducting the force engaged in picketing the river, 
he had but about a thousand serviceable cavalry- 
horses. 

General Halleck, in a letter to General McClellan 
dated October 14, 1862, in reply to a despatch of 
the 12th, says,— 

" In regard to horses, you say that the present rate of 
supply is only one hundred and fifty per week for the 
entire army here and in front of Washington. I find 
from the records that the issues for the last six weeks 
have been eight thousand seven hundred and fifty-four, 
making an average per week of one thousand four hun- 
dred and fifty-nine." 

The same charge is repeated in his letter to the 
Secretary of War of October 28, and is also found 
in General Meigs's letter of October 14. In the 



Age 35.] QUESTION OF FACT. 323 

original despatch to which General Halleck's letter 
is a reply, one thousand and fifty (1050), and not 
one hundred and fifty, is the number stated; and, 
as it was written out in letters in full, it is difiicult 
to see how the telegraphic operator could have 
made a mistake in transmitting the message. The 
gross injustice done to General McClellan in thus 
holding him up to the public as guilty either of de- 
liberate untruth or of enormous carelessness, need 
not be commented upon. 

The question between the authorities at AYash- 
ington and General McClellan was a question of 
fact. Neither the President nor the general-in- 
chief nor the Secretary of War would have insisted 
upon the army's advancing without shoes, clothing, 
and horses ; but it was charged, or at least inti- 
mated, that the army, in point of fact, was sufii- 
ciently supplied with them all, and that the alleged 
want of them was a mere pretext put forward by 
the general in command to excuse his slowness, in- 
dolence, or lack of zeal in the cause. Upon this 
issue we may repeat, what was said before as to the 
charge of needless delay in forwarding the troops 
from Harrison's Bar, that General McClellan stands 
upon the ground of knowledge and the Adminis- 
tration upon the ground of inference. The testi- 
mony of one credible witness swearing affirmatively 
to what he knows outweighs that of twenty who 
can only contradict him by a process of deductive 
reasoning. The case cannot be put more simply 
or more forcibly than has been done by General 
McClellan himself in his Report : — 



324 GENERAL MccLELLAN'S STATEMENT. [1862. 

" The general-in-chief, in a letter to the Secretary of 
War on the 28th of October, says, ' In my opinion, there 
has been no such want of supplies in the army under 
General McClellan as to prevent his compliance with the 
orders to advance against the enemy/ 

*' Notwithstanding this opinion expressed by such high 
authority, I am compelled to say again that the delay in 
the reception of necessary supplies up to that date had 
left the army in a condition totally unfit to advance 
against the enemy ; that an advance under the existing 
circumstances would, in my judgment, have been attended 
with the highest degree of peril, with great suffering and 
sickness among the men, and with imminent danger of 
being cut off from our supplies by the superior cavalry 
force of the enemy, and with no reasonable prospect of 
gaining any advantage over him. 

"I dismiss this subject with the remark that I have 
found it impossible to resist the force of my own convic- 
tions, that the commander of an army, who from the 
time of its organization has for eighteen months been in 
constant communication with its officers and men, the 
greater part of the time engaged in active service in the 
field, and who has exercised this command in many bat- 
tles, must certainly be considered competent to determine 
whether his army is in proper condition to advance on 
the enemy or not; and he must necessarily possess greater 
facilities for forming a correct judgment in regard to the 
wants of his men and the condition of his supplies than 
the general-in-chief in his office at Washington City." 

Injustice to General McClellan, and that it may be 
understood that he was not at all open to the charge 
of disobedience of orders, it should be stated that 
the President's peremptory instructions of October 
6, to cross the Potomac and give battle to the 



Age 35.] NO TIME LOST. 325 

enemy or drive him south, were never distinctly 
repeated. From the moment of receiving them, 
General McClellan set himself diligently at work 
to get his army in condition to obey them; and 
from day to day, almost from hour to hour, he sent 
to Washington reports of his condition and pro- 
gress. His telegraphic despatches between Sep- 
tember 6 and November 7, mostly addressed to 
the general-in-chief, were one hundred and fifty- 
eight in number; and no stronger proof can be ad- 
duced of his attention to his duties, and of his 
earnest desire that the Government should be fully 
informed alike of the state of his own army, and 
of the movements of the enemy as far as he could 
learn them. As the orders to cross the river were 
not renewed, General McClellan had a right to sup- 
pose that the Administration were satisfied that he 
was straining every nerve to get the army in order 
for a forward movement, and on that account for- 
bore to repeat the command. But the evidence on 
this point is not merely negative, but positive, as ap- 
pears from the following extract from his Eeport: — 

" Knowing the solicitude of the President for an early 
movement, and sharing with him fully his anxiety for 
prompt action, on the 21st of October I telegraphed to 
the general-in-chief as follows : — 

"'Head-Quarters Army of the Potomac, ] 
October 21, 1862. ] 

"'Since the receipt of the President's order to move 
•on the enemy, I have been making every exertion to get 
this army supplied with clothing absolutely necessary for 
marching. 



326 NO TIME LOST. 



[1862. 



" 'This, I am happy to say, is now nearly accomplished. 
I have also, during the same time, repeatedly urged upon 
you the importance of supplying cavalry and artillery 
horses to replace those broken down by hard service; and 
steps have been taken to insure a prompt delivery. 

" ' Our cavalry, even when well supplied with horses, is 
much inferior in numbers to that of the enemy, but in 
efficiency has proved itself superior. So forcibly has this 
been impressed upon our old regiments by repeated suc- 
cesses, that the men are fully persuaded that they are 
equal to twice their number of rebel cavalry. 

" 'Exclusive of the cavalry force now engaged in picket- 
ing the river, I have not at present over about one thou- 
sand (1000) horses for service. Officers have been sent in 
various directions to purchase horses, and I expect them 
soon. Without more cavalry-horses, our communications, 
from the moment Ave march, would be at the mercy of 
the large cavalry forces of the enemy, and it would not be 
possible for us to cover our flanks properly, or to obtain 
the necessary information of the position and movements 
of the enemy, in such a way as to insure success. My 
experience has shown the necessity of a large and efficient 
cavalry force. 

" ' Under the foregoing circumstances, I beg leave to ask 
whether the President desires me to march on the enemy 
at once, or to await the reception of the new horses, every 
possible step having been taken to insure their prompt 
arrival. George B, McClellan, 

" ^ Major- General commanding. 

"'Major-General H. W. Halleck, 

^^ ^ General-in-Chief , Washington.' 

"On the same day General Halleck replied as fol- 
lows: — 

"'Washington, October 21, 1862, 3 r. m. 
"'Your telegram of 12 m. has been submitted to the 



Age 35.] MO VEMENT SPEEDED. 327 

President. He directs me to say that he has no change 
to make in his order of the 6th instant. 

" 'If you have not been, and are not now, in condition 
to obey it, you will be able to show such want of ability. 
The President does not expect impossibilities ; but he is 
very anxious that all this good weather should not be 
wasted in inactivity. Telegraph when you will move, 
and on what lines you propose to march. 

"*H. W. Halleck, General-in-Chief. 

" Major-General George B. McClellan.^ " 

General Halleck's reply is ambiguous, wary, cold; 
but General McClellan had a right to draw from it 
the inference which he says he did, as follows : — 

"From the tenor of this despatch. I conceived that it 
was left for my judgment to decide whether or not it was 
possible to move with safety to the army at that time ; 
and this responsibility I exercised with the more confi- 
dence in view of the strong assurances of his trust in me, 
as commander of that army, with which the President 
had seen fit to honor me during his last visit. 

*' The cavalry requirements, without which an advance 
would have been in the highest degree injudicious and 
unsafe, were still wanting. 

" The country before us was an enemy's country, where 
the inhabitants furnished to the enemy every possible 
assistance; providing food for men and forage for ani- 
mals, giving all information concerning our movements, 
and rendering every aid in their power to the enemy's 
cause. 

" It was manifest that we should find it, as we subse- 
quently did, a hostile district, where we could derive no 
aid from the inhabitants that would justify dispensing 
with the active co-operation of an efficient cavalry force. 
Accordingly, I fixed upon the 1st of November as the 



328 MOVEMENT BEGUN. [1862. 

earliest date at which the forward movement could well 
be commenced." 

The above inference is strengthened by a subse- 
quent despatch from General Halleck, dated Octo- 
ber 26, in which he says, — 

*' Since you left Washington, 1 have advised and sug- 
gested in relation to your movements ; but I have given 
you no orders. I do not give you any now. The Govern- 
ment has intrusted you with defeating and driving back 
the rebel army in your front. I shall not attempt to 
control you in the measures you may adopt for that pur- 
pose. You are informed of my views; but the President 
has left you at liberty to adopt them or not, as you may 
deem best." 

On the 26th of October the army began to cross 
the Potomac, and by the 2d of November all the 
corps were on the right bank, marching to the 
South, on a line east of the Blue Eidge, which had 
been selected by General McClellan partly because 
it would secure him the largest accession of force 
and partly because the President had always been 
in favor of it. His purpose was to march his army 
to a point where it could derive its supplies from 
the Manassas Gap Eailway, and where it could be 
held in hand ready for action or movement in any 
direction. 

On the 7th of November the several corps of the 
army were at or near Warrenton, and, as General 
McClellan says, "in admirable condition and spirits. 
I doubt whether during the whole period that I had 
the honor to command the Army of the Potomac, 



Age 35.] GENERAL McCLELLAN REMOVED, 329 

it was in such excellent condition to fight a great 
battle.'^ Of the Confederate army, Longstreet's 
corps was in front at Culpepper, and the remaining 
portion was west of the Blue Eidge, near Chester's 
and Thornton's Gaps. General MeClellan's plan 
was to separate the two wings of the enemy's 
forces, and either beat Longstreet separately, or 
force him to fall back at least upon Gordonsville 
so as to eifect his junction with the rest of the 
army. In the event of a battle he felt confident 
of a brilliant victory. Late on the evening of the 
7th, the following orders were delivered to him 
by General Buckingham : — 

"Head-Quarters of the Army, \ 
Washington, D. C, November 5, 1862. J 
"General: — On the receipt of the order of the Pre- 
sident sent herewith, you will immediately turn over 
your command to Major-General Burnside, and repair to 
Trenton, N. J., reporting on your arrival at that place by 
telegraph for further orders. 

" Very respectfully, your obedient servant, 

"H. W. IIalleck, General-in-Chief. 
" Major-General McClellan." 

"War Department, Adjutant-General's Office,") 
Washington, November 5, 1862. j 

''General Orders No. 182. 
"By direction of the President of the United States, 
it is ordered that Major-General McClellan be relieved 
from the command of the Army of the Potomac, and 
that Major-General Burnside take the command of that 
army. 

"By order of the Secretary of War : 

"E. D. TowNSEND, Adjutant- General.'* 
28* 



GENERAL HALLECKS REPORT. [1862. 



CHAPTEE XII. 

The reasons for this summary and abrupt dis- 
missal of General McClellan, strange to say, have 
never been distinctly and officially given to the 
people of the United States. The President, in his 
annual message to Congress, only twenty-six days 
later than the date of his order of removal, says 
nothing upon the subject. 

The general-in-chief, in his Eeport, addressed to 
the Secretary of War, says, " From the 17th of 
September till the 26th of October, McClellan's 
main army remained on the north bank of the 
Potomac, in the vicinity of Sharpsburg and Har- 
per's Ferry. The long inactivity of so large an 
army in the face of a defeated foe and during the 
most favorable season for rapid movements and a 
vigorous campaign, was a matter of great disap- 
pointment and regret. Your letter of the 27th 
and my reply on the 28th of October, in regard to 
the alleged causes of this unhappy delay, I here- 
with submit, marked Exhibit No. 5. In reply to 
the telegraphic order of the 6th of October, quoted 
in my letter of the 28th, above referred to, Gene- 
ral McClellan disapproved of the plan of crossing 
the Potomac south of the Blue Eidge, and said that 
he would cross at Harper's Ferry and advance upon 
"Winchester. He, however, did not begin to cross 
till the 26th of October, and then at Berlin. 

" The passage occupied several days, and was 



Age 3J.] GENERAL II ALL EC K S REPORT. 331 

completed about the 3d of November. What 
caused him to change his views, or what his plan 
of campaign was, I am ignorant; for about this 
time he ceased to communicate with me in regard 
to his operations, sending his reports directly to 
the President.* On the 5th instant I received 

* This is a curious sentence, and deserves a little examina- 
tion. The date of the document on which it appears is Decem- 
ber 2, 1862, and the general-in-chief says that on that day he 
was ignorant of General McClellan's plans because the latter, 
from a date about a month previous, had ceased to communi- 
cate with him personally and had sent his reports directly to 
the President. Are we to understand that the relations 
between the President and the general-in-chief were such 
during the whole month of November, 1862, that the latter 
never saw, never was informed of, the communications ad- 
dressed to the former by the general commanding the largest 
army in the field? But, if the statement does not mean this, 
it is a mere gratuitous effusion of spite against General Mc- 
Clellan. If it means this, will any body believe it? 

Again, "about this time" General McClellan ceased to com- 
municate with the general-in-chief. About what time? Two 
dates had just before been mentioned, — October 26 and Novem- 
ber 3; and there is nothing to indicate which of the two was 
meant. If it were the latter. General McClellan could not 
have had time to send many communications to anybody aft«r 
that day, as he was deprived of his command on the 7th : if it 
were the former, then the statement is not true; for in the ap- 
pendix to General Halleck's testimony, as published by the 
Congressional Committee on the Conduct of the War, there ap- 
pear no less than six despatches addressed to him by General 
McClellan after October 26. 

General McClellan's communications to the President were 
generally in reply to inquiries or suggestions from the latter, 
whose restless and meddlesome spirit was constantly moving 



332 NO CAUSE ASSIGNED FOR. THE REMOVAL. [18G2. 

the written order of the President relieving Gene- 
ral McClellan and placing General Burnside in com- 
mand of the Army of the Potomac. This order 
was transmitted by a special messenger, who de- 
livered it to General McClellan at Eectortown on 
the 7th/' 

Here it will be seen that no reason is assigned 
for what the general-in-chief chooses to call " re- 
lieving" General McClellan ; but, from the whole 
evidence before him, the reader is left to infer that 
he was removed because he had disobeyed the 
orders of the President without cause or excuse. 
The orders in question, to cross the river and 
attack the enemy, were given on the 6th of Oc- 
tober, the forward movement began on the 26th 
of the same month, and the removal of General 
McClellan was made on the 5th of November, 
when the army were thirty or forty miles on 
their march, in splendid condition and high spirits. 

him to ask questions, obtrude advice, and make comments 
upon military matters, -which were as much out of his sphere 
as they were beyond his comprehension. 

It is true that General McClellan did not communicate his 
plans of the campaign either to the President or the general- 
in-chief; but surely he is to be commended for this. The suc- 
cess of a military movement often depends upon its being kept 
an entire secret from the enemy. General McClellan had 
learned by experience the danger of revealing, even in official 
conversation, his future operations; and it would have been an 
increased risk if he had made the telegraph-wire a confidant. 

The whole passage is characteristic of the inventive in- 
genuity which has been shown, from first to last, in devising 
pretexts to find fault with General McClellan. 



Age 35.] REMOVED FOR POLITICAL REASONS. 333 

In other words, an officer is removed for disobey- 
ing orders not only one month after they were 
given, but eleven days after he had begun to obey 
them! The Administration must have great con- 
fidence in the credulity of the public if they sup- 
pose this will be received as the real cause why 
General McClellan was deprived of his command. 
Had this been done immediately after the 6th of 
October, or at least soon after, the pretext would 
have had some show of seeming. 

The real reasons for which General McClellan 
was removed were political, and not military. They 
are to be found in the wide difference of views 
between his letter of July 7, 1862, written at Har- 
rison's Landing, on the policy and conduct of the 
war, and the President's Proclamation of Septem- 
ber 22. That letter incurred for General McClellan 
the unrelenting hostility of the political party 
which constrained the President to issue the Pro- 
clamation ; and the same influences, or "pressure," 
which procured the document in question, com- 
pelled the removal of General McClellan. And 
that a strong " pressure" was brought to bear upon 
the President is unquestionable; for on the 13th 
of September, in an interview with a deputation 
from Chicago, when urged to issue a proclama- 
tion of emancipation, he distinctly declined it, 
saying, among other things, " What good would 
a proclamation of emancipation from me do, espe- 
cially as we are now situated ? I do not want 
to issue a document that the whole world will see 
must necessarily be inoperative, like the Pope's bul]. 



334 THESE NO JUSTIFICATION. [1862. 

against the comet. Would my word free the slaves, 
when I cannot even enforce the Constitution in the 
rebel States ? Is there a single court or individual 
that would be influenced by it there ? And what 
reason is there to think it would have any greater 
effect upon the slaves than the late law of Con- 
gress which I approved, and which oifers protection 
and freedom to the slaves of rebel masters who 
come within our lines'/ Yet I cannot learn that 
the law has caused a single slave to come over to 
us." It is hardly possible to suppose that in the 
short space of eleven days the mind of the Pre- 
sident had undergone a process of natural conver- 
sion upon a point of such vital moment. 

But General McClellan's political opinions, and 
his manly avowal of them, aiford no justifica- 
tion for his removal from the command of the 
army. He had shown by word and deed that he 
would do his duty as a soldier, Avithin his sphere, 
whatever political policy the Administration might 
adopt or whatever political aspects the war might 
assume. This was all the Administration had a 
right to ask. That he had the confidence and affec- 
tion of his army is beyond question. His removal 
was due to a fact stated affirmatively — though put 
in the form of a question to Ccneral McDowell — 
by a member of the Congressional Committee on 
the Conduct of the War, December 26, 1861, — that 
" there is a political element connected with this 
war which must not be overlooked." There has 
indeed been such an "element" from the beginning 
in the conduct of this war; it never has been 



Age 35.] FAREWELL ADDRESS. 335 

*' overlooked/' but has always been pron-^inent, and 
set in the front of the battle, and has been the 
fruitful source of mistakes and disasters to our 
cause. In the present instance it led to the dan- 
gerous experiment of changing commanders in 
front of an enemy; and the bitter experience of 
Fredericksburg was the direct result. 

The first act of General McClellan on receiving 
the order relieving him of command was to draw 
up a farewell address to the army, as follows, — 
w^hich was read to them at dress-parade on the 
10th :— 

"Head-Quarters Army of the Potomac, ) 
Camp near Rectortown, November 7, 1862. j 

" Officers and Soldiers of the Army of the Potomac : — 

*' An order of the President devolves upon Major-Gene- 
ral Burnside the command of this army. In parting 
from you, I cannot express the love and gratitude I bear 
you. As an army you have grown up under my care. In 
you I have never found doubt or coldness. The battles 
you have fought under my command will proudly live in 
our nation's history. The glory you have achieved, our 
mutual perils and fatigues, the graves of our comrades 
fallen in battle and by disease, the broken forms of those 
whom wounds and sickness have disabled, — the strongest 
associations which can exist among men, — unite us still 
by an indissoluble tie. We shall ever be comrades in 
supporting the Constitution of our country and the nation- 
ality of its people. 

"George B. McClellan, 
''Major-General, U, S. A." 

On Saturday, I^ovember 8, General McClellan 
was busily occupied in making the arrangements 



336 TAKES LEAVE OF THE ARMY. [1862. 

necessary for transferring his command to General 
Burnside. The two generals, between whom the 
personal relations were entirely friendly, were in 
consultation for several hours. 

At nine o'clock on the evening of Sunday, the 
9th, General McClellan took leave of his staff 
officers by appointment. It was a touching and 
impressive scene. A large fire of logs was blazing 
within the enclosure formed by the tents of the 
head-quarters. General McClellan stood just inside 
of his marquee, the curtains of which were parted 
and drawn up. As the officers of his staff ap- 
proached, he grasped each w^armly by the hand, 
and, with a few words of friendly greeting, ushered 
him inside. The tent was soon filled, and many 
were compelled to remain outside. Filling a glass 
of wine. General McClellan raised it, and said, " To 
the Army of the Potomac," to which an officer 
present added, ''and to its old commander." An 
hour or two of social converse passed, and the 
officers took leave of their beloved commander, — 
sadly, sorrowfully. 

Monday, the 10th, was occupied in visiting the 
various camps and bidding farewell to his troops. 
A person present at this scene has thus described 
it : — " As General McClellan, mounted upon a fine 
horse, attended by a retinue of fine-looking military 
men, riding rapidly through the ranks, gracefully 
recognized and bade a farewell to the army, the 
cries and demonstrations of the men were beyond 
bounds, — wild, impassioned, and unrestrained. Pis- 
regarding all military forms, they rushed from their 



Age 35.] LEAVES WAllRENTON. 887 

ranks, and thronged around him with the bitterest 
complaints against those who had removed from 
command their beloved leader." 

As he rode up to the head-quarters of General 
Fitz-John Porter, he was met by a large delega- 
tion of officers in that command, and addressed by 
General Butterfield, who, in a few well-chosen 
words, alluded to the affection existing between 
General McClellan and his officers, and stated that 
those on behalf of w^hom he spoke were there to 
bid him a personal farewell. In reply. General Mc- 
Clellan said, ^' I hardly know what to say to you, 
my friends, officers associated with me so long in 
the Army of the Potomac. I can only bid you 
farewell. History will do justice to the deeds of 
the Army of the Potomac, if the present generation 
does not. I feel as if I had been intimately con- 
nected with each and all of you. Nothing is more 
binding than the friendship of companions in arms. 
May you all in future preserve the high reputation 
of our army, and serve all as well and faithfully as 
you have served me. I will say farewell now, if I 
must say it. Good-bye : God bless you." 

On the 11th, General McClellan left Warrenton. 
On reaching Warrenton Junction, a salute was 
fired. The troops, who had been drawn up in line, 
afterwards broke their ranks; the soldiers crowded 
around him, and many eagerly called for a few 
parting words. He said, in response, while stand- 
ing on the platform of the railroad-station, '' 1 wish 
you to stand by General Burnside as you have stood 
by^ me, and all will be well." 



338 RECEPTION AT TREx\TON. [1862. 

He reached Washington, but, without stopping, 
went to the station of the Philadelphia Kailroad, 
and j)roceeded to the latter city in the train which 
started at five p.m. He arrived at Philadelphia 
about midnight, and was there greeted with music 
and cheers from a crowd assembled to welcome him. 
He appeared upon the platform, and said, — 

" Fellow-citizens of Philadelphia, I thank you for your 
kindness. I have parted with your brothers and sons in 
the Army of the Potomac too recently to make a speech. 
Our parting was sad. I can say nothing more to you ; and 
I do not think you ought to expect a speech from me.'' 

He arrived at Trenton, his point of destination, 
at four o'clock on the morning of the 12th. 

On the evening of the 13th, an address of welcome 
was made to General McClellan, on behalf of the 
citizens of Trenton, by Andrew Dutcher, Esq. A 
large number of interested and sympathizing spec- 
tators were present. In reply, he said, — 

" My friends, — for I feel that you are all my friends, — 
I stand before you not as a maker of speeches, not as a 
politician, but as a soldier. I came among you to seek 
quiet and repose, and from the moment I came among 
you I have received nothing but kindness ; and, although 
1 came among you a stranger, I am well acquainted with 
your history. From the time I took command, your gal- 
lant sons were with me, from the siege of Yorktown 
to the battle of Antietam. I was with them, and wit- 
nessed their bravery, and that of the ever-faithful and 
ever-true Taylor and the intrepid and dashing Kearney. 
One word more. While the army is fighting, you, as citi- 
zens, should see that the war is prosecuted for the preser- 



Age 36.] VISIT TO BOSTON. 339 

vation of the Union and the Constitution, for your nation- 
ality and rights as citizens." 

Since the time of his removal from the command 
of the Army of the Potomac, General McClelian 
has not had any military duties assigned to him, 
but has been living, unemployed, the life of a pri- 
vate citizen. At this moment of writing (July, 1864), 
he resides at Orange, in the State of New Jersey, 
Tvhere his home has been for some months past. 

In the winter of 1863, General McClelian, accom- 
panied by his wife and two or three officers of his 
staff, paid a visit to Boston, arriving there on the 
29th of January and remaining till the 8th of 
February. He came upon the invitation of seve- 
ral gentlemen, not all of one political party, 
but all uniting in their desire to testify to him in 
person their gratitude for his services and the 
esteem in vrhich they held him as an officer and a 
citizen. Though the visit was thus strictly private, 
the general and earnest desire of the people to see 
him gave to it something of the nature of a public 
reception. His movements were followed and his 
steps watched by earnest and interested crowds, 
who greeted him, whenever he was seen, with 
hearty enthusiasm. His time was busily employed 
in visiting the points of attraction in Boston and 
its neighborhood, and in receiving those social at- 
tentions which were tendered to him with a most 
liberal hand. His visit must have been highly grati- 
fying to him; and it is certain that he left a most 
agreeable impression upon all who met him, from 



3-40 VISIT TO BOSTON. [1863. 

his quiet and Bimple manners, and his careful 
abstinence from self-reference and complaints of 
others. It was easy to see that he had qualified 
himself to command others by first learning to 
command himself. 

During his stay in Boston a very handsome 
sword was presented to him; and the value of the 
testimonial was enhanced by the fact that the cost, 
amounting to several hundred dollars, was defrayed 
by a subscription limited to one dollar from each 
person. Among the subscribers — to their honor 
be it said — were not a fcAv members of the Eepubli- 
can party, who, while they supported the Adminis- 
tration, were willing to acknowledge its mistakes. 
The inscription which the sword bore, "Pro rege 
Bsepe, pro patria semper," excited an amount of 
discussion and comment in the newspaper press in 
which future observers will recognize an amusing 
instance of the importance which trifles may assume 
when viewed through a properly magnifying 
medium. 

While in Boston, he was invited to visit Concord, 
New Hampshire, Portland and Augusta, in Maine, 
and other places; but he was not able to accept 
any of these gratifying invitations. 

In October, 1863, the State election in Pennsyl- 
vania took place. Governor Curtin was the Eepub- 
lican candidate for Governor, and Judge Woodward 
the Democratic. The election was contested with 
great ardor, and all over the country much interest 
was felt in the result. It was thought that the vote 
of the soldiers, who were coming into the State 



Age 3G.] LETTER IN FAVOR OF JUDGE WOODWARD. 341 

in great numbers, was of much importance, and 
\vouId, perhaps, decide the contest. They were all 
devoted to General McClellan; but an impression 
was spread among them that he ^vas in favor of 
Governor Curtin. A correspondent of" The Press," 
a leading political journal, had so stated. Under 
these circumstances, it was deemed by the friends 
of Judge AYoodward highly important that this 
erroneous impression should be removed by a dis- 
tinct contradiction under General McClellan's own 
hand. Accordingly, one of Judge "Woodward's 
friends left Philadelphia on Sunday evening, Octo- 
ber 11, — the day of the election being Tuesday, 
October 13, — and went to Orange, New Jersey, 
and laid the whole matter before General McClel- 
lan. The result was the following letter : — 

" Orange, Nsw Jersey, October 12, 1863. 
" Hon. Charles J. Ingersoll, Philadelphia. 

" Dear Sir : — My attention has been called to an article 
in the Philadelphia ' Press,' asserting that I had written 
to the managers of a Democratic meeting at Allentown, 
disapproving the objects of the meeting, and that, if I 
voted or spoke, it would be in favor of Governor Curtin. 
I am informed that similar assertions have been made 
throughout the State. It" has been my earnest endeavor 
heretofore to avoid participating in party politics, and I 
am determined to adhere to this course. 

" But it is obvious that I cannot longer maintain silence 
under such misrepresentations. 

" I therefore request you to deny that I have written 
any such letter or entertained any such views as those 
attributed to me in the Philadelphia 'Press,' and I de- 
sire to state, clearly and distinctly, that, having some few 



o42 LETTER IN FAVOR OF JUDGE WOODWARD. [1863. 

days ago had a full conversation with Judge Woodward, 
I find that our views agree, and I regard his election as 
Governor of Pennsylvania called for by the interests of 
the nation, 

*' I understand Judge Woodward to be in favor of the 
prosecution of the war, with all the means at the con^j- 
mand of the loyal States, until the military power of the 
rebellion is destroyed. I understand him to be of the 
opinion that, while the war is waged with all possible 
decision and energy, the policy directing it should be in 
consonance with the principles of humanity and civiliza- 
tion, working no injury to private rights and property not 
demanded by military law among civilized nations ; and, 
finally, I understand him to agree with me in the opinion 
that the sole great objects of this war are the restoration 
of the unity of the nation, the preservation of the Consti- 
tution, and the supremacy of the laws of the country. 

*' Believing that our opinions entirely agree on these 
points, I would, were it in my power, give to Judge 
Woodward my voice and my vote. 

" I am, very respectfully, yours, 

"George B. McClellan." 

The above letter was immediately telegraphed 
to Philadelphia, but it was not published till late 
in the afternoon of Monday, the 12th, and then it 
was freel}^ denounced as a forgery; and thus it 
failed to exert the influence upon the election which 
it might have done had it appeared earlier. 

General McClellan must have been flattered by 
the amount and character of the discussion which 
this letter called forth, since it proved how much 
weight was attached to his name and opinion. 
There are occasions in the life of every public man 



Age 37.] FIRST NEW YORK CAVALRY. o43 

in which he will be blamed w^hether he docs a cer- 
tain act or declines to do it; and this was one 
of those occasions. Those who w^ere loudest in 
denouncing him for writing and publishing the 
letter w^ould have been entitled to a better hearing 
had they uttered a word of censure upon the shame- 
ful fraud which drew^ it forth from a man always 
disinclined to embrace opportunities for public dis- 
play, and who now' only exercised the undoubted 
right of ever}^ freeman. 

On the 18th of February, 1864, an incident 
occurred in the city of New York, which showed 
how much the soldiers of the Army of the Potomac 
were attached to their old commander. On that 
day, an official reception was given by the munici- 
pal authorities to the veterans of the First New 
York Cavalry, at which General McClellan, under 
whom they had served, was present. When the 
approach of their old commander was announced, 
the soldiers rushed to the door to meet him; and 
as he entered the room they crowded round him 
so that he could hardly walk. After an inter- 
change of greetings between him and the officers. 
Colonel McEeynolds, who commanded the regi- 
ment, spoke as follows : — 

" Soldiers : — But a short time ago the chairman of this 
occasion did us the honor to refer to the fact that the 
First New York Cavalry were the last on the Chicka- 
hominy and the first to reach the James Kiver. It was a 
proud announcement, gentlemen, and it was true. I 
now have the honor, and the great pleasure, to announce 
to you that the noble chieftain who led the Army of the 



344 SPEECH AT NEW YORK. [1864. 

Potomac on that occasion, that matchless chieftain, Gene- 
ral George B. McClellan — [cheers lasting several minutes], 
— I do not blame jou for your enthusiasm, — General 
George B. McClellan, has honored you with his presence. 
If you will keep still for a moment, I have no doubt he 
will speak to you." 

General McClellan replied, as follows : — 

"My Friends and Comrades: — I came here not to make 
a speech to you, but to welcome you home, and express 
to you the pride I have always felt in watching your 
career, not only when you were with me, but since I left 
the Army of the Potomac, while you have been fighting 
battles under others, and your old commander. I can 
tell you now, conscientiously and truly, I am proud of 
you in every respect. There is not one page of your 
record — not a line of it — of which you, your State, and 
your country may not be proud. I congratulate you on 
the patriotism that so many of you have evinced in your 
desire to re-enter the service. I hope, I pray, and I know 
that your future career will be as glorious as your past. 
I have one other hope ; and that is that we may yet serve 
together some day again." 

Loud cheers followed the conclusion of this 
speech, and officers and men cried out, " We'll fol- 
low YOU anywhere, general !" 

After a speech from Major Harkins, General 
McClellan took leave with a few words of farewell, 
the soldiers cheering and crowding round him as 
he went out of the room. 

General McClellan has recently appeared before 
the public, with much honor to himself, in a lite- 
rary capacity. In the autumn of 1863, the officers 



Age 37.] BxVTTLE MONUMENT AT WEST POINT. 345 

of the army stationed at West Point formed an 
association for erecting at that post a monument 
in commemoration of such officers of the regular 
army as shall have fallen in the service during the 
present war. The permission of the Secretary of 
War to erect the proposed monument at West Point 
w^as obtained, and letters were addressed to com- 
manding generals and others, describing the pro- 
ject and soliciting co-operation. Many favorable 
replies were received; and in January, 1864, a 
general circular was sent to the officers of the army, 
setting forth the plan and asking subscriptions. 
The response to this appeal was so universal, 
prompt, and earnest that the committee who had 
the enterprise in charge felt authorized to make 
choice of a site for the proposed monument and 
have it consecrated by appropriate religious cere- 
monies. Trophy Point, on the northern brow of 
the plain on which West Point stands, was accord- 
ingly selected, and the 15th of June, 1864, was 
named as the day for its dedication. General 
McClellan was requested to deliver the oration. 

On the appointed day the site for the proj^osed 
monument was consecrated by appropriate religious 
services. The oration by General ]\IcClellan was 
heard with great interest and deep attention by a 
very large audience, and, after its delivery, was 
immediately published in many of the Democratic 
newspapers of the conntry. It was much com- 
mended by all who had the opportunity to read it 
and were unprejudiced enough to avail themselves 
of such opportunity, for its high-toned patriotism, 



346 SPEECH AT LAKE GEORGE. [1864. 

its judicious choice of topics, its natural eloquence, 
and manly energy of style.* 

In the course of a brief excursion which followed 
the delivery of the address above alluded to, Clene- 
ral McClellan received many gratifying proofs of 
the affectionate attachment felt for him by the peo- 
ple of the country generally, and of the lively inte- 
rest with which they follow his movements. On 
the evening of the 18th of June, at Fort William 
Henry, on the banks of Lake George, he was sere- 
naded; and, at the close of the music, having been 
introduced b}^ Ji\dge Brown to the numerous party 
which had assembled to pay their respects to him, 
he addressed them, as follows: — 

" I thank you, my friends, for this welcome and pleasing 
evidence of your regard. It is a most happy termination 
of the delightful week I have passed in the midst of this 
beautiful region, among such warm and friendly hearts. 
When men come, as you have done, some many miles 
from the mountains and valleys, it means something 
more than empty compliment or idle courtesy. At all 
events, I so regard it, and understand this sudden gather- 
ing of men who are in truth the strength of the nation 
as intended to show your love and gratitude to the gal- 
lant men who have so long fought under my command, 



* On account of the striking merits both of substance and 
form of this discourse, — and it is of no more than moderate 
length, — it is inserted in the Appendix in full, in the belief 
that General McClellan's friends will be glad to possess, in a 
shape less fleeting than that of a newspaper or pamphlet, a 
production so strongly stamped with the characteristics of his 
mind and character. 



Age 37.] SPEECH AT LAKE GEORGE. 347 

and as an evidence to any who maj- dare to doubt, whether 
abroad, at home, or in the rebellious States, that the people 
of this portion of the country intend to support to the 
last the Union of our great nation, the sacredness of its 
Constitution and laws, against whoever may attack them. 
1 do not flatter myself that this kind demonstration is a 
mark of personal regard to me, but that it means far 
more than that. You add to the cogent arguments af- 
forded by the deeds of your sons and brothers in the field 
the sanction and weight of your opinion in favor of the 
justice and vital importance of the real cause for which 
we are fighting, and the cause which should never be 
perverted or lost sight of. 

"It has been my good fortune to have had near me in 
very trying times many of your near relations. In truth, 
there must be among you now men who went with me 
through the memorable seven days of battle that com- 
menced just two years ago to-day. It is only just that I 
should thank you now for the valor and patriotism of 
your sons and brothers who were with me in the Army of 
the Potomac, from Yorktown to Antietam. Yet how 
could they be other than brave and patriotic? for they 
first saw the light amid scenes classical in our earliest 
history, and sprang from ancestors who Avon and held 
their mountains in hundreds of combats against the In- 
dians, the French, and the English. After a gallant de- 
fence of the now ruined ramparts of William Henry, the 
blood of many of your grandsires moistened the very 
ground on which you now stand, in a butchery permitted 
by the cruel apathy of Montcalm, who, two 3'ears after- 
wards, suffered for his crimes in the great battle under the 
walls of Quebec, where others of your ancestors bore a 
most honorable part. Ticonderoga, Crown Point, Sara- 
toga, are all names made sacred to you by the bravery 
of your fathers, who there made illustrious the name of 
American troops. 



848 EXTRACT FROM REPORT. 

"In this latter and more dreadful war you and yours 
have proved worthy of the reputation of your predeces- 
sors. And, whatever sacrifice may yet be necessary, I am 
confident that you will never consent willingly to be 
citizens of a divided and degraded nation, but that you 
will so support the actions of your fellow-countrymen 
in the field that we shall be victorious, and again have 
peace and a reunited country, when the hearts of the 
North and South shall again beat in unison, as they did 
in the good old times of the Eevolution, when our Union 
and Constitution shall be as firm as the mountains which 
encircle this lovely lake, and the future of the Republic 
shall be as serene as the waters of Horicon when no 
breeze ripples its surface." 



CHAPTEE XIII. 



The fiinal chapter of the biography of General 
McClellan can find no more appropriate opening 
than the concluding pages of his Eeport, in which 
he gives a brief abstract of the history and fortunes 
of the Army of the Potomac, comprising v^hat they 
did, what they failed to do, and the reasons for 
both. 

" In this Report I have confined myself to a plain nar- 
rative of such facts as are necessary for the purposes of 
history. 

" Where it was possible, I have preferred to give these 
facts in the language of despatches, written at the time of 
their occurrence, rather than to attempt a new relation. 

"The reports of the subordinate commanders, hereto 



EXTRACT FROM REPORT. 349 

annexed, recite what time and space would fail me to 
mention here, — those individual instances of conspicuous 
bravery and skill by which every battle was marked. To 
them 1 must especially refer; for without them this nar- 
rative would be incomplete, and justice fail to be done. 
But 1 cannot omit to tender to my corps commanders, 
and to the general officers under them, such ample re- 
cognition of their cordial co-operation and their devoted 
services as those reports abundantly avouch. 

"I have not sought to defend the army which I had 
the honor to command, nor myself, against the hostile 
criticisms once so rife. 

"It has seemed to me that nothing more was required 
than such a plain and truthful narrative to enable those 
whose right it is to form a correct judgment on the im- 
portant matters involved. 

"This Report is, in fact, a history of the Army of the 
Potomac. 

"During the jDeriod occupied in the organization of 
that army, it served as a barrier against the advance of a 
lately victorious enemy while the fortification of the 
capital was in progress ; and, under the discipline which 
it then received, it acquired strength, education, and 
some of that experience which is necessary to success in 
active operations, and which enabled it afterwards to sus- 
tain itself under circumstances trying to the most heroic 
men. Frequent skirmishes occurred along the lines, con- 
ducted with great gallantry, which inured our troops to 
the realities of war. 

"The army grew into shape but slowly; and the delays 
which attended on the obtaining of arms, continuing late 
into the winter of 1861-62, were no less trying to the 
soldiers than to the people of the country. Even at the 
time of the organization of the Peninsular campaign, 
some of the finest regiments were without rifles ; nor 
were the utmost exertions on the part of the military 

30 



S50 EXTRACT rilOM REPORT. 

authorities adequate to overcome the obstacles to active 
service. 

"When, at length, the army was in condition to take 
the field, the Peninsular campaign was planned and en- 
tered upon with enthusiasm by officers and men. Had 
this campaign been followed up as it was designed, I 
cannot doubt that it would have resulted m a glorious 
triumph to our arms and the permanent restoration of 
the power of the Government in Virginia and North 
Carolina, if not throughout the revolting States. It was, 
however, otherwise ordered ; and, instead of reporting a 
victorious campaign, it has been my duty to relate the 
heroism of a reduced army, sent upon an expedition 
into an enemy's country, there to abandon one and 
originate another and new plan of campaign, which 
might and would have been successful if supported with 
appreciation of its necessities, but which failed because 
of the repeated failure of promised support at the most 
critical and, as it proved, the most fatal moments. That 
heroism surpasses ordinary description. Its illustration 
must be left for the pen of the historian in times of calm 
reflection, when the nation shall be looking back to the 
past from the midst of peaceful days. 

" For me, now, it is sufficient to say that my comrades 
were victors on every field save one ; and there the 
endurance of a single corps accomplished the object of 
its fighting, and, by securing to the army its transit 
to the James, left to the enemy a ruinous and barren 
victory. 

"The Army of the Potomac was first reduced by the 
withdrawal from my command of the division of General 
Blenker, which was ordered to the Mountain Depart- 
ment, under General Fremont. We had scarcely landed 
on the Peninsula when it was further reduced by a de- 
spatch revoking a previous order giving me command of 
Fortress Monroe, and under which I had expected to 



EXTRACT FROM REPORT. 351 

take ten thousand men from that point to aid in our 
operations. Then, when under fire before the defences 
of Yorktown, we received the news of the withdrawal of 
General McDowell's corps of about thirty-five thousand 
men. This completed the overthrow of the original plan 
of the campaign. 

"About one-third of my entire army (five divisions out 
of fourteen ; one of the nine remaining being but little 
larger than a brigade) was thus taken from me. Instead 
of a rapid advance which I had planned, aided by a flank 
movement up the York River, it was only left to besiege 
Yorktown. That siege was successfully conducted by the 
army ; and when these strong works at length yielded to 
our approaches, the troops rushed forward to the san- 
guinary but successful battle of Williamsburg, and thus 
opened an almost unresisted advance to the banks of the 
Chickahominy. Richmond lay before them, surrounded 
with fortifications, and guarded by an army larger than 
our own ; but the prospect did not shake the courage of 
the brave men who composed my command. Relying 
still on the support which the vastness of our under- 
taking and the grand results depending on our success 
seemed to insure us, we pressed forward. The weather 
was stormy beyond precedent. The deep soil of the 
Peninsula was at times one vast morass. The Chicka- 
hominy rose to a higher stage than had been known for 
years before. Pursuing the advance, the crossings were 
seized, and the right wing extended to effect a junction 
with reinforcements now promised and earnestly desired, 
and upon the arrival of which the complete success of 
the campaign seemed clear. 

"The brilliant battle of Hanover Court-House was 
fought, which opened the way for the First Corps, — with 
the aid of which, had it come, we should then have gone 
into the enemy's capital. It never came. The bravest 
army could not do more, under such overwhelming dis- 



352 EXTRACT FROM REPORT. 

appointment, than the Army of the Potomac then did. 
Fair Oaks attests their courage and endurance when they 
hurled back, again and again, the vastly superior masses 
of the enemy. But mortal men could not accomplish 
the miracles that seemed to have been expected of them. 
But one course was left, — a flank march, in the face of a 
powerful enemy, to another and better base, — one of the 
most hazardous movements in war. The Army of the 
Potomac, holding its own safety, and almost the safety 
of our cause, in its hands, was equal to the occasion. 
The seven days are classical in American history, — those 
days in which the noble soldiers of the Union and Con- 
stitution fought an overwhelming enemy by day, and 
retreated from successive victories by night, through a 
week of battle, closing the terrible scenes of conflicts with 
the ever-memorable victory at Malvern, where they drove 
back, beaten and shattered, the entire Eastern army of 
the Confederacy, and thus secured for themselves a place 
of rest and a point for a new advance upon the capital 
from the banks of the James. Richmond was still within 
our grasp, had the Army of the Potomac been reinforced 
and permitted to advance. But counsels which I cannot 
but think subsequent events proved unwise prevailed in 
Washington, and we were ordered to abandon the cam- 
paign. Never did soldiers better deserve the thanks of a 
nation than the Army of the Potomac for the deeds of the 
Peninsular campaign ; and, although that meed was with- 
held from them by the authorities, I am persuaded they 
have received the applause of the American people. 

"The Army of the Potomac was recalled from within 
sight of Richmond, and incorporated with the Army of 
Virginia. The disappointments of the campaign on the 
Peninsula had not damped their ardor nor diminished 
their patriotism. They fought well, faithfully, gallantly, 
under General Pope, yet were compelled to fall back on 
Washington, defeated and almost demoralized. 



EXTRACT FROM REPORT. 353 

"The enemy, no longer occupied in guarding his own 
capital, poured his troops northward, entered Maryland, 
threatened Pennsylvania, and even Washington itself. 
Elated by his recent victories, and assured that our troops 
were disorganized and dispirited, he was confident that 
the seat of war was now permanently transferred to the 
loyal States, and that his own exhausted soil was to be 
relieved from the burden of supporting two hostile ar- 
mies. But he did not understand the spirit Avhich ani- 
mated the soldiers of the Union. I shall not, nor can I, 
living, forget that, when I was ordered to the command 
of the troops for the defence of the capital, the soldiers 
with whom I had shared so much of the anxiety and 
pain and suffering of the war had not lost their confi- 
dence in me as their commander. They sprang to my 
call with all their ancient vigor, discipline, and courage. 
I led them into Maryland. Fifteen days after they had 
fallen back, defeated, before Washington, they vanquished 
the enemy on the rugged heights of South Mountain, pur- 
sued him to the hard-fought field of Antietam, and drove 
liim, broken and disappointed, across the Potomac into 
Virginia. 

" The army had need of rest. After the terrible expe- 
riences of battles and marches, with scarcely an interval 
of repose, which they had gone through from the time 
of leaving for the Peninsula, the return to Washington, 
the defeat in Virginia, the victory at South Mountain, 
and again at Antietam, it was not surprising that they 
were in a large degree destitute of the absolute necessa- 
ries to effective duty. Shoes were worn out ; blankets 
were lost ; clothing was in rags : in short, the army was 
unfit for active service, and an interval for rest and 
equipment was necessary. When the slowly-forwarded 
supplies came to us, I led the army across the river, 
renovated and refreshed, in good order and discipline, 
and followed the retreating foe to a portion where I was 
;5u* 



354 EXTRACT FROM REPORT. 

confident of decisive victory, — when, in the midst of the 
movement, while my advance-guard was actually in con- 
tact with the enemy, I was removed from the command. 

" I am devoutly grateful to God that my last campaign 
with this brave army was crowned with a victory which 
saved the nation from the greatest peril it had then un- 
dergone. I have not accomplished my purpose if by 
this Report the Army of the Potomac is not placed high 
on the roll of the historic armies of the world. Its deeds 
ennoble the nation to which it belongs. Always ready 
for battle, always firm, steadfast, and trustworthy, I 
never called on it in vain ; nor will the nation ever have 
cause to attribute its want of success under myself, or 
under other commanders, to any failure of patriotism or 
bravery in that noble body of American soldiers. 

"No man can justly charge upon any portion of that 
army, from the commanding general to the private, any 
lack of devotion to the service of the United States 
Government and to the cause of the Constitution and 
the Union. They have proved their fealty in much sor- 
row, suffering, danger, and through the very shadow of 
death. Their comrades, dead on all the fields where we 
fought, have scarcely more claim to the honor of a 
nation's reverence than the survivors to the justice of 
a nation's gratitude," 

To this mournful, eloquent, and modest summing 
up of the case there is not much to be added. 
At the close of the biography of a distinguished 
military commander, the reader naturally looks for 
an analysis and exposition of his military genius, 
and, if not a comparison with the great generals of 
other countries and other times, at least some state- 
ment of his merits, some enumeration of his claims. 
Eut there is an obvious embarrassment in thus deal- 



EFFECT OF CIVIL WAR. 355 

ing with one who is still living, and may chance to 
read the pages in which his military character is 
delineated. What is just praise w^hen spoken of the 
dead may sound like flattery when spoken of the 
living. In the interview between Solon and Croesus, 
so beautifully narrated by Herodotus, the king was 
told by his wise guest that no man could be called 
happy until a fortunate life had been closed by a 
peaceful death ; for that so long as a man was alive 
he was the sport and prey of fortune, and no one 
could tell what the future had in store for him. In 
like manner, no accurate estimate can be made of the 
worth and services of a soldier or statesman until 
the seal of death is set upon his rounded life and 
there is no more for him any earthly future. Far 
distant, we trust, is the day when it will be season- 
able to take the gauge and dimensions of General 
McClellan's powers and accomplishments and assign 
to him his due place on the roll of departed worth. 
And there are other reasons why we must be 
content to wait for a calm and dispassionate esti- 
mate of General McClellan's services and merits. 
A civil war was raging when he was dismissed 
from the command of the Army of the Potomac, 
and it is raging still; and the end seems neither 
near nor certain. A nation engaged in so fierce 
a struggle as ours is in no condition to weigh, 
to examine, to compare, and to decide, — as a lake 
lashed into fury by the tempest can return no true 
image of the sky that bends over it. The passions 
which civil war fosters and creates forbid the exer- 
cise of a judicial understanding. A court of jus- 



356 POLITICAL PREJUDICE. 

tice must needs adjourn if a battle be going on under 
its windows. All our energies, all our faculties, arc 
absorbed in action, and all questions that require 
deliberation must be postponed to a more quiet 
season. We cannot afford to listen. The only 
pause we can brook is such brief interval of repose 
as exhausted nature demands. Before justice can 
be done him. General McClellan must wait for more 
peaceful times and minds less agitated and absorbed. 
To-day we adjourn the hearing, as Neptune, in the 
iEneid, adjourned the punishment of his rebellious 
Avinds, because of the instant need of stilling the 
tempest they had raised : — 

" Quos ego — sed motos praestat componere fluctus." 

Besides, at this moment a considerable portion 
of his countrymen have their minds barred against 
all arguments and considerations in defence of 
General McClellan, by political prejudice. To deny 
him all military capacity is part of the creed of a 
great political party. Most supporters of the pre- 
sent Administration hold it to be a point of duty to 
disparage and decry him. This is no strange phe- 
nomenon. Parallel cases may be found in the his- 
tory of every country in which public opinion is 
allowed free expression. There was a time — and 
the period lasted for years — in which every whig 
statesman in England felt bound to call in question 
the military genius of the Duke of Wellington * 

* Lord Brougham says that some very eminent statesmen 
constantly and greatly misjudged the Duke of Wellington till 



CHARGES AGAINST GENERAL MCCLELLAN. 357 

and just so the Bourbons and their followers con- 
stantly denied the military greatness of Bona- 
parte. 

But General McClellan has been so unjustly 
treated and so unscrupulously slandered that 
something more is required, simply as a matter 
of truth and fair dealing, in vindication and de- 
fence of him. After what has passed, silence 
might seem like acquiescence in charges which are 
as false as they are injurious. It is no fault of 
General McClellan that events have taken such a 
turn that it is impossible to write a life of him 
without taking a somewhat controversial attitude. 
A few remarks are, consequently, submitted, which 
are in the nature of a comment upon some points 
of the evidence presented in the preceding pages. 

First of all : there are some persons who deny 
to General McClellan all merit whatever as a com- 
mander, maintaining that he has neither the ca- 
pacity to plan a campaign nor to fight a battle, and 
that every thing successfully done by him was 
either the work of others or the result of pure acci- 
dent. With such persons it is useless to reason, as 
to do so would be simply a waste of time. No ar- 
guments or considerations Avould have an}^ power 
to shake an impression like this. Men who hold 
this opinion of the conqueror of Malvern Hill and 
Antietam are, in the intellectual line, legitimate 

the publication of his Despatches, when they at once, and in 
the strongest terms, declared how grievously they had erred. 
— Statesmen of the Time of Georye HI., ii. p. 355. 



358 CHARGES AGAINST GENERAL >KCLELLAN. 

descendants of those subjects of George the Third 
who used to maintain that Napoleon Bonaparte was 
deficient in the quality of personal courage. A 
prejudice of this kind is as much proof against 
reason as the diseased fancy of a hypochondriac who 
believes that his legs are made of glass, or that he 
is followed everywhere by a blue dog. "You must 
have observed," said Mr. Grenville, in a letter to 
Mr. Pitt, " that of all impressions the most difficult 
to be removed are those which have no reason to 
support them; because against them no reason can 
be applied." 

But there are other persons, more reasonable, 
more discriminating, who, while they allow General 
McClellan to be an accomplished and meritorious 
officer, capable of doing excellent service in a sub- 
ordinate sphere, hold also the opinion that when at 
the head of an army his good qualities are neu- 
tralized by his slowness, his over-cautiousness, his 
want of dash, his inability to take advantage of the 
sudden opportunities which the fortune of war pre- 
sents. The force of this objection is in some mea- 
sure neutralized by the fact that it is so common 
in military history. The popular mind is always 
eager for results in war, and ignorant of the con- 
ditions essential to success. Without citing any 
further examples, Washington and Wellington,* 

* "This spirit of faction, however, was not confined to one 
side. There was a ministerial person at this time, who, in his 
dread of the opposition, wrote to Lord Wellington complain- 
ing of his inaction, and calling upon him to do something that 
would excite a public sensation ; any thing, provided hlood 



CHARGE OF SLOWNESS. 859 

while their campaigns wore going on, were con- 
stantly censured for their slowness. It is a charge 
easily made, and not easily answered; for the de- 
fence must often rest upon a variety of considera- 
tions which the critic is too impatient to listen to. 
General McClellan is, by nature and temperament, 
wisely cautious, prudent, and deliberate, — the re- 
verse of rash and impulsive; and these traits are, 
of course, shown in his military career. He never 
incurs great risks or plays a desperate game. He 
is, besides, a humane man, very careful of the 
lives of his soldiers, and not needlessly shedding 
human blood. And, lastly, he is a man of moral 
firmness and just self-reliance, who will never be 
induced by popular clamor to take a step which he 
deems unwise, or forego a precaution which he 
deems necessary. A man like this at the head of 
an army will often incur the charge of slowness 
and inertness, and the charge will be made most 
positively by those who are the least qualified to 
form a correct judgment in the premises. Public 
opinion — that is, contemporaneous public opinion — 
is not of any great value on a question like this. 
Ignorance and prejudice are both obstacles in the 
way to a correct understanding of military mea- 
sures and military men. A battle won is a fact 
which all can understand; but comparatively few 
are competent to determine how much merit is due, 

■was spilt. A calm but severe rebuke, and the cessation of all 
friendly intercourse with the writer, discovered the general's 
abhorrence of this detestable policy." — Napier. 



360 INDECISION AND UNREADINESS. 

or rather how little blame should be attached, to the 
general who has had the misfortune to lose a battle. 
Upon a charge of slowness and over-cautiousness 
General McClellan has a right to be tried by his 
peers, — that is, by the officers of the regular army, 
and especially by those who have served under 
him. To their judgment he can confidently ap- 
peal, and by their verdict he is ready to stand or 
fall. 

Indecision and unreadiness are, no doubt, defects 
of mind or infirmities of temperament, arising from 
not having any plans of conduct, or from not carry- 
ing them out with promptness. In either case, 
they are traits which taint the whole being, and 
lay their paralyzing touch upon all the currents of 
life. A sluggish, dawdling, and dilatory man may 
have spasms of activity, but he never acts continu- 
ously and consecutively with energetic quickness. 
When in a commanding general we see a campaign, 
or a military enterprise, marked by rapidity of 
movement, by plans promptly formed and vigor- 
ously executed, and when in the same man we see 
at another time pauses, delays, which bring upon 
him the reproach of slowness, it is fair to infer that 
his conduct in the latter case is the result of a cau- 
tious and far-seeing wisdom, which comprehends all 
the difficulties of the position, and knows that the 
more haste the less speed, so far as the matter in 
hand is concerned. The evidence as to general 
character is important in an issue like this. 

Let us apply these principles to General McClel- 
lan's military career. 



NOT JUSTLY CHARGEABLE WITH SLOWNESS. 361 

In the first place, no one has ever pretended, no 
one can pretend, that he is a military commander 
who acts without previously-formed plans, without 
having determined beforehand what he shall do 
and how he shall do it. On the contrary, he is 
peculiarly and singularly thoughtful of the future, 
carefully meditating every step of his progress, 
and vigilant in providing against all possible con- 
tingencies. Upon this point the evidence is irre- 
sistible and overwhelming. 

But, say General McClellan's assailants and de- 
tractors, though his plans are judicious and care- 
fully formed, he lacks quickness and vigor in carry- 
ing them out; he is slow in the saddle; he does 
not take time by the forelock; he lets opportu- 
nities slip by which never come a second time. 
But -what is the evidence to support these charges ? 
Look at his campaign in Western Virginia in 1861, 
— a part of his military career conveniently ignored 
by his enemies. Here he had a separate command, 
a defined field of action, and was not hampered 
and trammelled by interference from Washington ; 
and do we see any signs of indecision and want of 
promptness here? On the contrary, we observe 
the happiest combination of judgment in design 
and vigor in execution : one skilful and powerful 
blow was instantly followed by another, and the 
result was absolute and permanent military success. 

Then look at the brilliant and crowded period 
between the second and seventeenth days of Sep- 
tember, 1862. On the former of these dates, the 
forces in and around Washington were little better 



362 NOT JUSTLY CHARGEABLE WITH SLOWNESS. 

than a tumultuary and disorganized mob; and 
within forty-eight hours, as if at the touch of a 
magician's wand, they w^ere converted into an 
effective and discij^lined army. Within a fortnight 
from the time of their leaving Washington, they 
had marched fifty miles, fought two battles, gained 
two victories, driven out of Maryland a foe flushed 
wdth recent success, given a sense of security to 
Washington, and raised the spirits of every patriot 
in the land Was there anytime lost here? Is 
there any evidence here of want of decision, w^ant 
of energy, ivant of promptness? Surely not, but 
all the reverse. 

But all this is neutralized and made of no effect 
because, after the battle of Antietam, he did not 
cross the Potomac, pursue Lee's retreating army, 
and utterly destroy it! Nothing but ignorance or 
prejudice, one or both, could make this delay a 
ground for disparaging General McClellan's mili- 
tary reputation. Are w^e to suppose that the man 
who for fifteen days had been acting with the most 
extraordinary energy and vigor was suddenly so 
paralyzed, so smitten with procrastination, that he 
folded up his hands, w^ent to sleep, and from mere in- 
dolence forbore to gather the new laurels which were 
within reach of his hand if he had only stretched 
it out? Such sudden change is inconsistent with 
the laws of human nature. Men are not one week 
brimful of fiery energy and the next eaten up by 
the rust of inaction. The pause made after the 
battle of Antietam must be interpreted by the 
fortnight of crowded and intense action w^hich 



FAILURE TO TAKE RICHMOND. 303 

preceded it; and to an unprejudiced and instructed 
mind it is vindicated by the soundest military rea- 
soning. 

But he failed to take Eichmond, it is said. This 
is true ; but it is equally true that this failure was 
no fault of his. To what causes it was due is set 
forth in the preceding pages, and especially in the 
concluding portion of General McClellan's Eeport, 
copied into this chapter. He never would have 
undertaken to capture Eichmond with a force so 
small as that to which he was finally reduced by 
the interference of the Administration with his 
plans, and their broken faith. It is no disparage- 
ment to a general that, having only ninety thou- 
sand men, he did not succeed in an enterprise which 
he had undertaken upon the assurance that he 
should have a hundred and forty thousand. Be- 
sides, he was forbidden to go on with it, and his 
army sent to General Pope; with what result need 
not be repeated. The Peninsular campaign of 
1862, as planned, was General McClellan's; as exe- 
cuted, it was that of the President and the Secre- 
tary of War: and upon them the responsibility of 
failure must rest. Had they kept their faith, had 
they sent to General McClellan the reinforcements 
which again and again had been promised him, and 
which he again and again demanded, there is very 
little question that Eichmond would have been 
taken. The military chances were greatly in favor 
of such a result. 

Of course, as Eichmond in point of fact w^as not 
captured, the enemies of General McClellan may 



364 GENERAL M^CLELLAN NOT DEFEATED. 

say that it would not have been, even if he had had 
all the forces he asked for or desired. An asser- 
tion like this cannot be denied point-blank. To 
bandy opinions about the past is only one whit less 
unprofitable than to bandy predictions about the 
future. All that can be affirmed is that General 
McClellan's plans were such that, in all human 
probability, success would have followed had he 
been permitted to carry them out. 

So much may be said by way of defence of Gene- 
ral McClellan against the charges most commonly 
brought against him, and in rebuttal of the evi- 
dence put in on the other side; but there are some 
considerations which are in the nature of distinct 
and positive testimony in his behalf, on which it is 
but just to him to say a few words. 

In the first place, with the single exception of 
the battle of Gaines's Mill, in which some thirty- 
five thousand men retired, without disorder or 
demoralization, before twice their number, no army 
led by General McClellan, or that was under his 
control, has ever been defeated. This is a significant 
and important fact, and all the more so from the 
comparisons which are forced upon every unbiassed 
mind by the unjust treatment which General Mc- 
Clellan has received at the hands of the Adminis- 
tration. In August, 1862, the Army of the Poto- 
mac was taken from him and intrusted to General 
Pope; and the consequence was the disaster at 
Eull Eun on the ^Oth of the same month, the 
second misfortune to our arms on that ill-omened 
field. In November of the same year he was 



LOVE OF II IS SOLDIERS. 365 

" relieved" of the command of the same army, 
and General Burnside was put in his place; and 
then came the mournful defeat at Fredericks- 
burg on the 13th of December. Here is Malvern 
Hill against Bull Eun; here are South Mountain 
and Antietam against Fredericksburg. But Gene- 
ral McClellan was practically dismissed from the 
army, with every mark of ignominy and disgrace, 
and General Burnside and General Pope are now, 
and always have been, in honorable and responsi- 
ble military commands. We have nothing to do 
with these two last-named officers, nor do we 
care to discuss the policy of the Administration 
towards them; but it is unjust and unreasonable 
that the tenderness and consideration which have 
been so liberally extended to them should be so 
utterly withheld from General McClellan, and that 
he should be disgraced for his victories while they 
are rewarded, or at least forgiven, for their defeats. 
He asks no favors; but he has a right to demand 
consistency and justice. 

In the next place, General McClellan has always 
had the love and trust of the soldiers he has 
commanded, and, with a few exceptions, has en- 
joyed the respect, confidence, and aifection of 
the officers who have served. under him. At this 
moment his name is a tower of strength with 
the Army of the Potomac. This is an important 
fact, a weighty piece of evidence in his behalf 
Upon the merits of a general in command, the 
opinion of the army which serves under him is of 
far more value than the opinion of the public. The 



366 STRATEGY. 

former cannot be deceived or imposed upon "by a 
reputation made to order by politicians, editors, 
and army-correspondents. The judgment of the 
army is like the judgment of exj^erts in a patent- 
case, or of nautical men in an insurance-case. The 
consequences of incapacity are too serious to per- 
mit any delusion or mystification on the subject. 
And the value of this favorable judgment is en- 
hanced by the high standard of intelligence in our 
army, by the fact that the rank and file, in gene- 
ral, is made up of men who read, write, think, 
and discuss their civil and military leaders. They 
know, by personal experience, his skill, judgment, 
and wisdom. 

It is beyond question that General McClellan is 
an accomplished ofiicer, well read in his profession, 
and master of such knowledge of the art of war 
as can be learned from books. And many of those 
who deny to him the praise of rapid and brilliant 
execution in the field admit his merit in that de- 
partment of the art of war which is called strateg}^, 
as distinguished from tactics. " Strategy," says 
Jomini, "is the art of properly directing masses 
upon the theatre of war, whether for the invasion 
of a country or for the defence of one's own." 
It includes the choice of a fixed base of operations, 
of zones and lines of operations, of strategic lines, 
and of vital geographical points to occupy offen- 
sively or to cover defensively; or, in popular lan- 
guage, it is the planning and laying out beforehand 
of a campaign. It supposes an intimate knowledge 



S T R A T E C. Y. 367 

of the physical features of the country comprised 
within the zone of operations, and a prophetic sa- 
gacity in determining and selecting those decisive 
strategic points the possession of which insures 
the control of a region important to hold. It selects 
the spots where magazines of supplies should be 
formed, as well as Avhere permanent fortifications 
should be constructed. The strategist is to the tac- 
tician Avhat the architect is to the builder. Bliicher 
and Ney, among others, were instances of men of 
the most brilliant conduct on the field of battle who 
had no power of strategy, no capacity of organ- 
izing a campaign or of directing the movements of 
detached bodies of troops so as to bring them to 
bear upon a given point at the same time. On the 
other hand, the Archduke Charles, who as a stra- 
tegist had no rival but Napoleon himself, is thought 
to have sometimes shown a want of quickness and 
decision on the field of battle. That General Mc- 
Clellan is capable of planning and organizing a 
campaign, of designating movements to be executed 
by others, can be doubted by no man of candid 
mind who will read his memorandum on the con- 
duct of the war, addressed to the President, and 
to be found in the fifth chapter of the present work, 
and his letters of instruction to Generals Halleck, 
Buell, Sherman, and Butler, contained in his Eeport. 
Strategy is the most important department of the 
art of war, and strategical skill is the highest and 
rarest function of military genius. To handle troops 
well on the field of battle, to retain self-possession 



368 HIGH PERSONAL CHARACTER. 

amid " all the currents of a heady fight," to take 
advantage of any mistake made by the enemy, to 
repair the mischances and disasters in his own 
ranks, requires a man of no common capacity; but 
yet higher powers are demanded of him who at the 
head of a great army executes a series of move- 
ments, extending over several weeks perhaps, which 
finally compel an adversary to give battle at a point 
and under conditions which insure his defeat. The 
superiority of the Archduke Charles in this the 
most intellectual part of his profession has given 
him the second place on the roll of honor of the 
great generals in the wars of the French Revolu- 
tion. 

But General McClellan has shown great moral 
qualities in his career of public service, which are 
elements of w^hat may be called character, in dis- 
tinction from pure intellectual force. The spotless 
purity of his private life has never been called in 
question. The rancor of partisan or personal ma- 
lignity has never accused him of pecuniary corrup- 
tion, of rapacity, of turning his official opportunities 
to his own gain or the gain of others. No swarm 
of unworthy favorites or needy dependants has ever 
buzzed around him. His record is wdthout a blot; 
his hands are without a stain. His name has never 
been mixed up with disreputable or doubtful trans- 
actions. The charges against him are aimed at 
him solely in his military capacity. And this is 
not merely negative praise. The life of a soldier 
is a life of moral danger and exposures, as w^ell as 
physical; and only the noblest and purest natures 



HIGH PERSONAL QUALITIES. 3G9 

entirely escape reproach.* There are no eyes so 
sharp as the eyes of hatred; and now, for two long 
years, has General McClellan been watched and 
scanned by these, in hope to find some speck or 
flaw in his record; but vain has been the quest, 
fruitless the search. As a shield of steel dazzles 
and blinds the eye, so does the spotless purity 
of his character repel the envious and sinister 
glance. No slanderer, however base, no courtier, 
however fawning, has ever dared to accuse him 
of intemperance, licentiousness, rapacity, or pro- 
fanity : nay, more, he has never been even sus- 
pected of them. 1^0 unscrupulous partisan sheet 
has ever insinuated or hinted at any such charges; 
no reckless platform-orator has ever suggested any 
thing of the kind; it has never been whispered 
round a camp-fire, or a dinner-table, or in a com- 
mittee-room, a base Congressional mess, or a baser 
legislative lobby. The moral instincts of the 
American people are sound and good; and they 
have an instinctive and well-founded perception of 
General McClellan's moral worth which is proof 
against all the insinuations of malice, all the devices 
of calumny. The hold he has upon their hearts is 
due to their strong sense of his integrity, his sin- 
cerity, his disinterestedness, his loyalty to duty, his 
moral purity, his unspotted life ; and it is a hold 
which cannot be lost or shaken. 



I never knew a Warryer yet, but thee. 

From wine, tobacco, debts, dice, oaths, so free." 

Thomas Carlton to Captain John Smith. 



870 SELF-COMMAND. 

But this is not all. The training and education 
of a soldier tend to make a man keenly sensitive 
on the point of honor, and to feel a stain on his 
professional reputation like a wound. Observe the 
way in which the Administration has dealt with 
him. First, he was made general-in-chief of all the 
armies of the United States, then reduced to the 
command of the Army of the Potomac, then de- 
graded to the post of a quartermaster at Alex- 
andria, then suddenly and in fright made com- 
mander of the Army of the Potomac once more, 
then dismissed from that command as unceremo- 
niously and abruptly as one flings a torn envelope 
into a waste-paper basket ; and all within a single 
year. Such capricious changes are more like the 
shifting scenes of a novel or drama than like real 
life. But, wounding as such treatment must have 
been, we hear no complaint from General McClel- 
lan. He makes no appeal to the public, no pro- 
test against injustice, no demand for sympathy. 
If any expressions of impatience are wrung from 
him, it is because of his army, and not because 
of any thing done to, or suffered by, himself. 
He submits in silence to the will of the Adminis- 
tration; he discharges faithfully the duties of every 
position devolved upon him; he asks only for the 
privilege of serving his country. During the long 
period of his enforced idleness, not one word of 
complaint has been heard from him : he has made 
no proclamation of his wrongs, no denunciation of 
those who have wronged him. Yet this is not an 
a^e of self-renunciation and self-sacrifice : — 



POLITICAL HATRED. 371 

"Now our life is only drest 
For show, — mean handiwork of craftsman, cook, 
Or groom! We must run glittering like a brook 
In the open sunshine, or we are unblest." 

Our times are times of self-assertion and self-vin- 
dication : men push their own claims, vaunt their 
own services, sound their own trumpets. The vir- 
tues of manly silence, of dignified self-command, 
of magnanimous fortitude, which General McClellan 
has shown, are to be the more valued because of their 
rarity. 

And yet the future historian of the crowded 
period in which we live will have to record the 
fact that the services of this accomplished officer, 
patriotic citizen, and good man were denied to his 
country during a civil war unparalleled in history 
alike for the magnitude of its movements and the 
intensity of the passions by which it was sustained, 
in which all the energies of the people were taxed 
to the utmost limit of endurance, and not only 
their wealth, but their best blood, was poured out 
on behalf of the Union and the Constitution with 
a noble devotion which caused every patriot heart 
to swell with pride and admiration. And he will 
also record the further fact that, during the long 
period in which this man was languishing in in- 
action, civilian generals, grossly and notoriously in- 
competent, were allowed to play at the game of war, 
for political stakes, with the lives of our bravest 
and best for their counters. Such historian will 
find in the events which he relates fresh illustration 
of the bitterness of political hatred, the ferocity of 



372 SOURCES or support. 

partisan zeal, and the rank growth of low passions 
in high places; for a sullen and smouldering hate, 
which never goes out and never bursts forth into 
a generous blaze, is a low passion, which debases 
and degrades the breast which it haunts. And he 
will draw from them the further moral that there 
is a harmony and consistency in the works of Na- 
ture. The venom that chills and curdles the warm 
current of life in man is secreted only in creeping 
and cold-blooded creatures; and the inveterate 
malignity that never forgets or forgives is found 
only in base and ignoble natures, whose aims are 
selfish, whose means are indirect, cowardly, and 
treacherous. Anger is a fierce and sudden flame, 
which may be kindled in the noblest breasts; but 
in these the slow droppings of an unforgiving tem- 
per never take the shape and consistency of en- 
during hatred. The natural instincts of a generous 
heart shrink from an inveterate hater as the child 
shrinks from the snake in his path. The enemies 
of General McClellan, in the persistency and malig- 
nity of their attacks, furnish a key to unlock their 
own characters. As for him, " he will remember," 
to borrow what Burke said of Fox, ''that obloquy 
is a necessary ingredient in the composition of all 
true glory; he will remember that it was not only 
in the Eoman customs, but it is in the nature and 
constitution of things, that calumny and abuse are 
essential parts of triumph. These thoughts will 
support a mind which exists only for honor, under 
the burden of temporary reproach." And if de- 
traction has been the meed of patriotic faith, if 



SOURCES OF SUPPORT. 373 

persecution has been the reward of arduous ser- 
vice, if calumny has followed desert, General 
McClellan must find comfort in the reflection that 
his is no new experience, but that every genera- 
tion has had similar examples of the power of the 
weak over the strong, and the triumph, sometimes 
transient and sometimes enduring, of the low and 
base over the high and noble. How soon the 
future is to right the wrongs of the past, cannot be 
predicted; but he is sure what the verdict of time 
will be, and thus he may w^ait patiently till it 
shall be rendered. 



32 



APPENDIX. 



ORATION DELIVERED BY GENERAL McCLELLAN AT 
WEST POINT, JUNE 15, 1864, AT THE DEDICATION OF 
THE SITE OF A MONUMENT PROPOSED TO BE ERECTED 
IN MEMORY OF THE OFFICERS OF THE REGULAR ARMY 
WHO SHALL HAVE FALLEN IN BATTLE DURING THE 
PRESENT WAR. 

All nations have days sacred to the remembrance of 
joy and of grief. They have thanksgivings for success, 
fasting and prayers in the hour of humiliation and de- 
feat, triumphs and paeans to greet the living and laurel- 
crowned victor. They have obsequies and eulogies for the 
warrior slain on the field of battle. Such is the duty we 
are to perform to-day. The poetry, the histories, the 
orations of antiquity, all resound with the clang of arms ; 
they dwell rather upon rough deeds of war than the 
gentle arts of peace. They have preserved to us the 
names of heroes, and the memory of their deeds, even to 
this distant day. Our own Old Testament teems with the 
narrations of the brave actions and heroic deaths of Jew- 
ish patriots, while the New Testament of our meek and 
suffering Saviour often selects the soldier and his weapons 
to typify and illustrate religious heroism and duty. These 
stories of the actions of the dead have frequently sur- 
vived, in the lapse of ages, the names of those whose fall 
Avas thus commemorated centuries ago. But, although 
we know not now the names of all the brave men who 
fought and fell upon the plain of Marathon, in the pass 
of Thermopylse, and on the hills of Palestine, we have 
not lost the memory of their examples. As long as the 

376 



37G APPENDIX : 

warm blood courses the veins of man, as long as the 
Imman heart beats high and quick at the recital of brave 
deeds and patriotic sacrifices, so long will the lesson still 
incite generous men to emulate the heroism of the past. 

Among the Greeks, it was the custom that the fathers 
of the most valiant of the slain should pronounce the 
eulogies of the dead. Sometimes it devolved upon their 
great statesmen and orators to perform this mournful 
duty. Would that a new Demosthenes or a second Peri- 
cles could arise and take my place to-day ! for he would 
find a theme worthy of his most brilliant powers, of his 
most touching eloquence. I stand here now, not as an 
orator, but as a whilom commander, and in the place of 
the fathers, of the most valiant dead, — as their comrade, 
too, on many a hard-fought field against domestic and 
foreign foe, — in early youth and mature manhood, — moved 
by all the love that David felt when he poured forth his 
lamentations for the mighty father and son who fell on 
Mount Gilboa. God knows that David's love for Jona- 
than was no more deep than mine for the tried friends 
of many long and eventful years, whose names are to be 
recorded upon the structure that is to rise upon this spot. 
Would that his more than mortal eloquence could grace 
my lips and do justice to the theme ! 

We have met to-day, my comrades, to do honor to our 
own dead ; brothers united to us by the closest and dear- 
est ties, who have freely given their lives for their country 
in this war, — so just and righteous, so long as its purpose 
is to crush rebellion and to save our nation from the in- 
finite evils of dismemberment. Such an occasion as this 
should call forth the deepest and noblest emotions of our 
nature, — pride, sorrow, and prayer : pride that our country 
has possessed such sons ; sorrow that she has lost them ; 
prayer that she may have others like them, — that we and 
our successors may adorn her annals as they have done, 
and that when our parting hour arrives, whenever and 






ORATION AT WEST POINT. 377 

liowever it may be, our souls may be prepared for the 
great change. 

We have assembled to consecrate a cenotaph, which 
shall remind our children's children, in the distant future, 
of their fathers' struggles in the days of the great rebel- 
lion. This monument is to perpetuate the memory of a 
portion only of those who have fallen for the nation in 
this unhappy war: it is dedicated to the officers and 
soldiers of the regular army. Yet this is done in no class 
or exclusive sj^irit, and in the act we remember with reve- 
rence and love our comrades of the volunteers, who 
have so gloriously fought and fallen by our sides. Each 
State will, no doubt, commemorate in some fitting way 
the services of its sons who abandoned the avocations of 
l^eace and shed their blood in the ranks of the volunteers. 
How richly they have earned a nation's love, a nation's 
gratitude, with what heroism they have confronted death, 
have wrested victory from a stubborn foe, and have illus- 
trated defeat, it well becomes me to say ; for it has been 
my lot to command them on many a sanguinary field. I 
know that I but echo the feeling of the regulars, when 
I award the high credit they deserve to their brave breth- 
ren of the volunteers. 

But we of the regular army have no States to look to 
for the honors due our dead. We belong to the whole 
country, and can neither expect nor desire the General 
Government to make a perhajDs invidious distinction in 
our favor. We are few in number, a small band of com- 
rades, united by peculiar and very binding ties ; for with 
many of us our friendships v/ere commenced in boyhood, 
when we rested here in the shadow of the granite hills 
which look down upon us where we stand ; with others 
the ties of brotherhood were formed in more mature 
years, while fighting among the rugged mountains and 
the fertile valleys of Mexico, within hearing of the eter- 
nal waves of the Pacific, or in the lonely grandeur of the 



878 APPENDIX : 

great plains of the far West. With all, our love and con- 
fidence have been cemented by common dangers and 
sufferings, on the toilsome march, in the dreary bivouac, 
amid the clash of arms, and in the presence of death 
on scores of battle-fields. West Point, with her large 
heart, adopts us all, — graduates and those appointed from 
civil life, officers and privates. In her eyes we are all her 
children, jealous of her fame and eager to sustain her 
world-wide reputation. Generals and private soldiers, 
men who have cheerfully offered our all for our dear 
country, we stand here before this shrine, ever hereafter 
sacred to our dead, equals and brothers in the presence 
of the common death which awaits us all, perhaps on the 
same field and at the same hour. Such are the ties which 
unite us, — the most endearing which exist among men ; 
such the relations which bind us together, — the closest 
of the sacred brotherhood of arms. 

It has therefore seemed, and it is, fitting that we should 
erect upon this spot, so sacred to us all, an enduring 
monument to our dear brothers who have preceded us on 
the path of peril and of honor which it is the destiny of 
many of us to tread. 

What is this regular army to which we belong ? 

Who were the men whose death merits such honors 
from the living? 

What is the cause for which they have laid down their 
lives ? 

Our regular or permanent army is the nucleus which, 
in time of peace, preserves the military traditions of the 
nation, as well as the organization, science, and instruction 
indispensable to modern armies. It may be regarded as 
coeval with the nation. It derives its origin from the old 
continental and State lines of the Eevolution, whence, 
with some interruptions and many changes, it has attained 
its present condition. In fact, we may with propriety go 
even beyond the Revolution to seek the roots of our 



ORATION AT WEST POINT, 379 

genealogical tree in the old French wars ; for the cis-At- 
lantic campaigns of the seven years' war were not con- 
fined to the " red men scalping each other by the great 
lakes of North America/' and it was in them that our 
ancestors first participated as Americans in the large 
operations of civilized armies. American regiments then 
fought on the banks of the St. Lawrence and the Ohio, 
on the shores of Ontario and Lake George, on the islands 
of the Caribbean and in South America. Louisburgh, 
Quebec, Duquesne, the Moro, and Porto Bello, attest the 
valor of the provincial troops ; and in that school were 
educated such soldiers as Wasiiingtox, Putnam, Lee, 
Montgomery, and Gates. These, and men like Greene, 
Knox, Wayne, and Steuben, were the fathers of our per- 
manent army ; and under them our troops acquired that 
discipline and steadiness which enabled them to meet 
upon equal terms, and often to defeat, the tried veterans 
of England. The study of the history of the Revolution, 
and a perusal of the despatches of Washington, will con- 
vince the most skeptical of the value of the permanent 
army in achieving our independence and establishing the 
civil edifice which we are now fighting to preserve. 

The War of 1812 found the army on a footing far from 
adequate to the emergency ; but it was rapidly increased, 
and of the new generation of soldiers many proved equal 
to the requirements of the occasion. Lundy's Lane, 
Chippewa, Queenstown, Plattsburgh, New Orleans, — all 
bear witness to the gallantry of the regulars. 

Then came an interval of more than thirty years of 
external peace, marked by many changes in the organi- 
zation and strength of the regular army, and broken at 
times by tedious and bloody Indian wars. Of these the 
most remarkable were the Black Hawk War, in which our 
troops met unflinchingly a foe as relentless and far more 
destructive than the Indians, — that terrible scourge, the 
cholera ; and the tedious Plorida War. where for so many 



380 APPENDIX : 

years the Seminoles eluded in the pestilential swamps 
our utmost efforts, and in which were displayed such 
traits of heroism as that commemorated by yonder monu- 
ment to Dade and his command, — "wlien all fell, save 
three, without an attempt to retreat. '^ At last came the 
Mexican War, to replace Indian combats and the mono- 
tony of the frontier service ; and for the first time in many 
years the mass of the regular army was concentrated, and 
took the principal part in the battles of that remarkable 
and romantic war. Palo Alto, Resaca, and Fort Brown 
were the achievements of the regulars unaided ; and as to 
the battles of Monterey, Buena Vista, Vera Cruz, Cerro 
Gordo, and the final triumphs in the valley, none can 
truly say that they could have been won without the regu- 
lars. When peace crowned our victories in the capital 
of the Montezumas, the army was at once dispersed over 
the long frontier and engaged in harassing and danger- 
ous wars with the Indians of the plains. Thus thirteen 
long years were spent, until the present war broke out, 
and the mass of the army was drawn in, to be employed 
against a domestic foe. 

I cannot proceed to the events of the recent past and 
the present without adverting to the gallant men who 
were so long of our number, but who have now gone to 
their last home ; for no small portion of the glory of which 
we boast was reflected from such men as Taylor, Worth, 
Bradv, Brooks, Tottex, and Duxcax. 

There is a sad story of Venetian history that has moved 
many a heart, and often employed the poet's pen and 
the painter's j^encil. It is of an old man whose long life 
was gloriously spent in the service of the state as a war- 
rior and a statesman, and who, when his hair was white 
and his feeble limbs could scarce carry his bent form 
towards the grave, attained the highest honors that a 
Venetian citizen could reach. He was Doge of Venice. 
Convicted of treason against the state, he not onlv lost 



ORATIOX AT WEST POIXT, 381 

his life, but suffered besides a penalty which will endure 
as long as the name of Venice is remembered. The spot 
where his portrait should have hung in the great hall of 
the doge's palace was veiled with black, and there still 
remains the frame, with its black mass of canvas; and 
this vacant frame is the most conspicuous in the long line 
of effigies of illustrious doges ! 

Oh that such a pall as that which replaces the portrait 
of Marino Faliero could conceal from history the names 
of those, once our comrades, who are now in arms against 
the flag under which we fought side by side in years gone 
by ! But no veil can cover the anguish that fills our hearts 
when we look back upon the sad memory of the past 
and recall the affection and respect we entertained towards 
men against whom it is our duty to act in mortal combat. 
Would that the courage, ability, and steadfastness they 
have displayed had been employed in the defence of the 
" Stars and Stripes'* against a foreign foe, rather than in 
this gratuitous and unjustifiable rebellion, which could 
not be so long maintained but for the skill and energy 
of those our former comrades ! 

But we have reason to rejoice that upon this day, so 
sacred and so eventful for us, one grand old mortal monu- 
ment of the past still lifts high his head amongst us, and 
graces by his presence the consecration of this tomb of 
his children. We may well be proud that we have been 
commanded by the hero who purchased victory with his 
blood near the great waters of Niagara, who repeated and 
eclipsed the achievements of Cortez, — who, although a 
consummate and confident commander, ever preferred, 
when duty and honor would permit, the olive-branch of 
peace to the blood-stained laurels of war, and who stands, 
at the close of a long, glorious, and eventful life, a living 
column of granite against which have beaten in vain alike 
the blandishments and the storms of treason. His name 
will ever be one of our proudest boasts and most moving 



382 APPENDIX : 

inspirations. In long-distant ages, when this incipient 
monument has become venerable, moss-clad, and perhaps 
ruinous, when the names inscribed upon it shall seem, to 
those who pause to read them, indistinct mementos of 
an almost mythical past, the name of Winfield Scott 
will still be clear-cut upon the memory of them all, like 
the still fresh carving upon the monuments of long-for- 
gotten Pharaohs. 

But it is time to approach the present. 

In the war which now shakes the land to its foundation, 
the regular army has borne a most honorable part. Too 
few in numbers to act by themselves, regular regiments 
have participated in every great battle in the East and 
in most of those west of the Alleghanies. Their terrible 
losses and diminished numbers prove that they have been 
in the thickest of the fights, and the testimony of their 
comrades and commanders shows with what undaunted 
heroism they have upheld their ancient renown. Their 
vigorous charges have often won the day ; and in defeat 
they have more than once saved the army from destruc- 
tion or terrible losses by the obstinacy with which they 
resisted overpowering numbers. They can refer with 
pride to the part they played upon the glorious fields of 
Mexico, and exult at the recollection of what they did at 
Manassas, Gaines's Mill, Malvern, Antietam, Shiloh, Stone 
Eiver, Gettysburg, and the great battles just fought from 
the Rapidan to the Chickahominy. They can also point 
to the officers who have risen among them and achieved 
great deeds for their country in this war, — to the living 
warriors whose names are on the nation's tongue and 
heart, too numerous to be repeated here, yet not one of 
whom I would willingly omit. 

But perhaps the proudest episode in the history of tlie 
regular army is that touching instance of fidelity on the 
part of the non-commissioned officers and privates, who, 
treacherously made prisoners in Texas, resisted every 



ORATION AT WEST POINT. S'83 

temptation to violate their oath and desert their flag. 
OtFered commissions in the rebel service, money and land 
freely tendered them, they all scorned the inducements 
held out to them, submitted to every hardship, and, when 
at last exchanged, avenged themselves on the field of 
battle for the unavailing insult offered their integrity. 
History affords no brighter example of honor than that 
of these brave men, tempted, as I blush to say they were, 
by some of their former officers, who, having themselves 
proved false to their flag, endeavored to seduce the men 
who had often followed them in combat and who had 
naturally regarded them with respect and love. 

Such is the regular army, — such its history and antece- 
dents, — such its officers and men. It needs no herald to 
trumpet forth its praises ; it can proudly appeal to the 
numerous fields, from the tropics to the frozen banks of 
the St. Lawrence, from the Atlantic to the Pacific, ferti- 
lized by the blood and whitened by the bones of its mem- 
bers. But I will not pause to eulogize it. Let its deeds 
speak for it: they are more eloquent than tongue of 
mine. 

Why are we here to-day ? 

This is not the funeral of one brave warrior, nor even 
of the harvest of death on a single battle-field, but these 
are the obsequies of the best and bravest of the children 
of the land, Avho have fallen in actions almost numberless, 
many of them among the most sanguinary and desperate 
of which history bears record. The men whose names 
and deeds we now seek to perpetuate, rendering them 
the highest honor in our power, have fallen wherever 
armed rebellion showed its front, — in far-distant New 
Mexico, in the broad valley of the Mississippi, on the 
bloody hunting-grounds of Kentucky, in the mountains 
of Tennessee, amid the swamps of Carolina, on the fertile 
fields of Maryland, and m the blood-stained thickets of 
Virginia. They were of all the grade.^, — from the general 



384 APPENDIX: 

officer to the private ; of all ages, — from the gray-haired 
veteran of fifty years' service, to the beardless youth ; of 
all degrees of cultivation, — from the man of science to the 
uneducated boy. It is not necessary, nor is it possible, to 
repeat the mournful yet illustrious roll of dead heroes 
whom we have met to honor. Nor shall I attempt to 
name all of those who most merit praise, — simply a few 
who will exemplify the classes to which they belong. 

Among the last slain, but among the first in honor and 
reputation, was that hero of twenty battles, — John Sedg- 
wick, — gentle and kind as a woman, brave as a brave man 
can be, honest, sincere, and able: he was a model that 
all may strive to imitate, but whom few can equal. In 
the terrible battles which just preceded his death, he had 
occasion to display the highest qualities of a commander 
and a soldier ; yet, after escaping the stroke of death 
when men fell around him by thousands, he at last met 
his fate, at a moment of comparative quiet, by the ball 
of a single rifleman. He died as a soldier would choose 
to die, — with truth in his heart, and a sweet, tranquil 
smile upon his face. Alas ! our great nation possesses few 
such sons as true Johx Sedgwick. 

Like him fell, too, at the very head of their corps, the 
white-haired Mansfield, after a long career of usefulness, 
illustrated by his skill and cool courage at Fort Brown, 
Monterey, and Buena Vista, John F. Eeynolds, and Reno, 
both in the full vigor of manhood and intellect, — men 
who have proved their ability and chivalry on many a 
field in Mexico and in this civil war, — gallant gentlemen, 
of whom their country had much to hope, had it pleased 
God to spare their lives. Lyon fell in the prime of life, 
leading his little army against superior numbers, his brief 
career affording a brilliant example of patriotism and 
ability. The impetuous Kearney, and such brave gene^ 
rals as Richardson, Williams, Terrill, Stevens, Weed, 
Strong, Saunders, and Hayes, lost their lives while in the 



ORATION AT WEST POINT. 385 

midst of a career of usefulness. Young Bayard, so like 
the most renowned of his name, that "knight above fear 
and above reproach,^' was cut off too early for his country, 
and that excellent staff-officer. Colonel Garesche, fell 
while gallantly doing his duty. 

No regiments can spare such gallant, devoted, and able 
commanders as Kossell, Davis, Gove, SiMxMOns, Bailey, 
Putnam, and Kingsbury, — all of whom fell in the thickest 
of the combat, — some of them veterans, and others young 
in service, all good men and well-beloved. 

Our batteries have partially paid their terrible debt to 
fate in the loss of such commanders as Greble, the first 
t9 fall in this war, Benson, IIazzard, Smead, De Hart, 
Hazlitt, and those gallant boys, Kirby, Woodruff, Dim- 
MicK, and Gushing ; while the engineers lament the pro- 
mising and gallant Wagner and Cross. 

Beneath remote battle-fields rest the corpses of the 
heroic McRea, Reed, Bascom, Stone, Sweet, and many 
other company officers. 

Besides these were hosts of veteran sergeants, corporals, 
and privates, who had fought under Scott in Mexico, or 
contended in many combats with the savages of the far 
West and Florida, and, mingled with them, young soldiers 
who, courageous, steady, and true, met death unflinch- 
ingly, without the hope of personal glory. These men, 
^in their more humble sphere, served their country with 
as much faith and honor as the most illustrious generals, 
and all of them with perfect singleness of heart. Although 
their names may not live in history, their actions, loyalty, 
and courage will live. Their memories will long be pre- 
served in their regiments; for there were many of them 
who merited as proud a distinction as that accorded to 
the "first grenadier of France,'' or to that Russian soldier 
who gave his life for his comrades. 

But there is another class of men who have gone from 
us since this war commenced, whose fate it was not to die 



386 appendix: 

in battle, but who are none the less entitled to be menr 
tionecl here. There was Sumner, a brave, honest, chival- 
rous veteran, of more than half a century's service, who 
had confronted death unflinchingly on scores of battle- 
fields, had shown his gray head serene and cheerful where 
death most revelled, who more than once told me that 
he believed and hoped that his long career would end 
amid the din of battle : he died at home from the effects 
of the hardships of his campaigns. 

That most excellent soldier, the elegant C. F. Smith, 
whom many of us remember to have seen so often on 
this plain, with his superb bearing, escaped the bullet to 
fall a victim to the disease which has deprived the army 
of so many of its best soldiers. 

John Buford, cool and intrepid ; Mitchel, eminent in 
science; Plummer, Palmer, and many other officers and 
men, lost their lives by sickness contracted in the field. 

But I cannot close this long list of glorious martyrs 
without paying a sacred debt of official duty and personal 
friendship. There was one dead soldier who possessed 
peculiar claims upon my love and gratitude. He was an 
ardent patriot, an unselfish man, a true soldier, the beau 
ideal of a staff officer: he was my aide-de-camp. Colonel 

COLBURN. 

There is a lesson to be drawn from the death and ser- 
vices of these glorious men which we should read for the 
present and future benefit of the nation. War in these 
modern days is a science, and it should now be clear to 
the most prejudiced that for the organization and com- 
mand of armies, and the high combinations of strategy, 
perfect familiarity with the theoretical science of war is 
requisite. To count upon success when the j^lans or exe- 
cution of campaigns are intrusted to men who have no 
knowledge of war, is as idle as to expect the legal wisdom 
of a Story or a Kent from a skilful physician. 

But what is the honorable and holv cause for which 



ORATION AT WEST POINT. 387 

these men laid clown their lives, and for which the nation 
still demands the sacrifice of the precious blood of so 
many of her children ? 

Soon after the close of the Eevolutionary War, it was 
found that the confederacy, which had grown up during 
that memorable contest, was fast falling to pieces from 
its own weight. The central power was too weak ; it 
could only recommend to the different States such mea- 
sures as seemed best ; and it possessed no real power to 
legislate, because it lacked the executive force to compel 
obedience to its laws. The national credit and self-re- 
spect had disappeared, and it was feared by the friends 
of human liberty throughout the world that ours was 
but another added to the long list of fruitless attempts 
at self-government. The nation was evidently upon the 
brink of ruin and dissolution, when, some eighty years 
ago, many of the wisest and most patriotic of the land 
met to seek a remedy for the great evils which threatened 
to destroy the great work of the Bevolution. Their ses- 
sions were long, and often stormy : for a time the most 
sanguine doubted the possibility of a successful termina- 
tion to their labors. But from amidst the conflict of 
sectional interests, of party prejudices, and of personal 
selfishness, the spirit of wisdom and conciliation at length 
evoked the Constitution, under which we have lived so 
long. 

It was not formed in a day, but was the result of 
patient labor, of lofty wisdom, and of the purest patriot- 
ism. It was at last adopted by the people of all the 
States, — although by some reluctantly, — not as being 
exactly what all desired, but as being the best possible 
under the circumstances. It was accepted as giving us a 
form of government under which the nation might live 
happily and prosper, so long as the people should con- 
tinue to be influenced by the same sentiments which actu- 
ated those who formed it, and which would not be liable 



888 APPENDIX : 

to destruction from internal causes, so long as the people 
preserved the recollection of the miseries and calamities 
which led to its adoption. 

Under this beneficent Constitution the progress of the 
nation was unexampled in history. The rights and liber- 
ties of its citizens were secure at home and abroad ; vast 
territories were rescued from the control of the savage 
and the wild beast and added to the domain of civilization 
and the Union. The arts, the sciences, and commerce, 
grew apace : our flag floated upon every sea, and we took 
our place among the great nations of the earth. 

But under the smooth surface of prosi^erity upon which 
we glided swiftly, with all sails set before the summer 
breeze, dangerous reefs were hidden, which now and then 
caused ripples upon the surface and made anxious the 
more cautious pilots. Elated by success, the ship swept 
on, the crew not heeding the warnings they received, for- 
getful of the dangers they escaped in the beginning of 
the voyage, and blind to the hideous maelstrom which 
gaped to receive and destroy them. The same elements 
of discordant sectional prejudices, interests, and institu- 
tions which had rendered the formation of the Consti- 
tution so difficult, threatened more than once to destroy 
it. But for a long time the nation was so fortunate as to 
possess a series of political leaders who to the highest 
abilities united the same spirit of conciliation which ani- 
mated the founders of the Rej^ublic ; and thus for many 
years the threatened evils were averted. Time and long- 
continued good fortune obliterated the recollection of the 
calamities and wretchedness of the years preceding the 
adoption of the Constitution. Men forgot that concilia- 
tion, common interest, and mutual charity had been the 
foundation and must be the support of our government, 
— as is, indeed, the case with all governments and all the 
relations of life. At length men appeared with whom 
sectional and personal prejudices and interests outweighed 



URATIUN AT WEST POINT. o^^J 

all considerations for the general good. Extremists of 
one section furnished the occasion, eagerly seized as a 
pretext by equally extreme men in the other, for aban- 
doning the pacific remedies and protection afforded by 
the Constitution and seeking redress for possible future 
evils in war and the destruction of the Union. 

Stripped of all sophistry and side issues, the direct 
cause of the war, as it presented itself to the honest and 
patriotic citizens of the North, was simply this. Certain 
States, or rather a portion of the inhabitants of certain 
States, feared, or professed to fear, that injury would result 
to their rights and property from the elevation of a par- 
ticular party to jDOwer. Although the Constitution and 
the actual condition of the government provided them 
with a peaceable and sure protection against the appre- 
hended evil, they preferred to seek security in the de- 
struction of the government which could protect them, 
and in the use of force against the national troops holding 
'^ national fortress. 

To efface the insult offered our flag, to save ourselves 
from the fate of the divided republics of Italy and South 
America, to preserve our government from destruction, 
to enforce its just power and laws, to maintain our very 
existence as a nation, — these were the causes that com- 
pelled us to draw the sword. 

Rebellion against a government like ours, which con- 
tains the means of self-adjustment and a pacific remedy 
for evils, should never be confounded with a revolution 
against despotic power, which refuses redress of wrongs. 
Such a rebellion cannot be justified upon ethical grounds ; 
and the only alternative for our choice is its suppression, 
or the destruction of our nationality. At such a time as 
this, and in such a struggle, political partisanship should 
be merged in a true and brave patriotism, which thinks 
only of the good of the whole country. 

It was in this cause and with these motives that so 



390 APPENDIX : 

many of our comrades gave their lives ; and to this we are 
all personally pledged in all honor and fidelity. Shall 
such a devotion as that of our dead comrades be of no 
avail ? Shall it be said in after-ages that we lacked the 
vigor to complete the work thus begun ? — that, after all 
these noble lives freely given, we hesitated, and failed to 
keep straight on until our land was saved? Forbid it, 
Heaven, and give us firmer, truer hearts than that ! 

spirits of the valiant dead, souls of our slain heroes, 
lend us your own indomitable will, and, if it be permitted 
you to commune with those still chained by the trammels 
of mortality, hover around us in the midst of danger and 
tribulation, cheer the firm, strengthen the weak, that 
none may doubt the salvation of the Kepublic and the 
triumph of our grand old flag ! 

In the midst of the storms which toss our ship of state, 
there is one great beacon-light to which we can ever turn 
with confidence and hope. It cannot be that this great 
nation has played its part in history ; it cannot be that 
our sun, which arose with such bright promises for the 
future, has already set forever. It must be the intention 
of the overruling Deity that this land, so long the asylum 
of the oppressed, the refuge of civil and religious liberty, 
shall again stand forth in bright relief, united, purified, 
and chastened by our trials, as an example and encourage- 
ment for those who desire the progress of the human 
race. It is not given to our weak intellects to understand 
the steps of Providence as they occur : we comprehend 
them only as we look back upon them in the far-distant 
past. 

So is it now. 

"We cannot unravel the seemingly tangled skein of the 
purposes of the Creator : they are too high and far-reach- 
ing for our limited minds. But all history and his own 
revealed word teach us that his ways, although inscruta- 
ble, are ever righteous. Let us, then, honestly and man- 



ORATION AT WEST POINT. JJOl 

fully plaj^ our part, seek to understand and perform our 
whole duty, and trust unwaveringly in the beneficence 
of the God who led our ancestors across the sea, and sus- 
tained them afterward amid dangers more appalling even 
than those encountered by his own chosen jjeople in 
their great exodus. He did not bring us here in vain, 
nor has he supported us thus far for naught. If we do 
our duty and trust in him, he will not desert us in our 
need. 

Firm in our faith that God will save our country, we 
now dedicate this site to the memory of brave men, t^ 
loyalty, patriotism, and honor. 



INDEX, 



Alison, Sir A., quoted, 202. 
Antietam, battle of, 296. 
Arbuckle, Fort, 38, 39. 
Archduke Charles, 122, 367. 
Armies of Europe, report on, 70. 
Averill, Col., 268, 269. 

Ball's Bluff, disaster at, 114. 

Banks, Gen., 114, 164, 209, 211, 236. 

Barnard, Gen., 175, 189, 230, 231. 

Blenker, Gen., 165. 

Blucher, Marshal, 367. 

Bonaparte, Napoleon, 33, 35, 122, 228, 

357, 358. 
Bradford, Gov., 306. 
Brougham, Lord, quoted, 356. 
Brown, Judge, 346. 
Buckingham, Gen., 329, 
Budberg, Baron de, 62. 
Buell, Gen., 118. 
Bull Pasture Mountain, battle near, 

208. 
Bull Run, second battle of, 280. 
Burke, Edmund, quoted, 372. 
Burns, Gen., 249. 

Burnside, Gen., 280, 286, 300, 301, 336. 
Butler, Gen., 119, 121. 

Cameron, Secretary of War, 135. 

Carrick's Ford, fight at, 101. 

Casey, Gen., 223, 225. 

Cerro Gordo, battle of, 18. 

Chantilly, battle of, 281. 

Chapultepec, battle of, 27. 

Churubusco, battle of, 27. 

Clarendon, Lord, 61. 

Columbus, 56. 

Committee, Congressional, on the Con- 
duct of the War, 114, 128-131, 135, 
228, 232, 334. 

Contreras, battle of, 25. 

Corpus Christi, 42, 43. 

Confederate army at the close of 1861, 
133. 

Cooke, Gen., 244. 

Cooper, J. P., 33. 

Cossacks, 78. 

Couch, Gen., 223, 225, 254, 286. 

Cox, Gen., 98, 103. 

Crampton's Pass, battle of, 290. 

Crawford, Dr., 10. 

Crawford, Gen., 298. 

Cross Keys, battle at, 215. 

Ciirtin, Gov., 340, 341. 

D\XA, Gen., 299. 

Darling, Fort, attack on, 197. 

Davis, President, 60, 181, 195. 



Delafield, Col., 59. 
Dennison, Gov., 85. 
Dix, Gen., 114. 
Duryea, Gen., 212. 
Dutcher, Andrew, 338. 

Ellis,. Dr., quoted, 284, 285. 
El Penon, 23, 24. 
Estvan, quoted, 186, 188. 
Ewell, Gen., 213. 

Fair Oaks, battle of, 223. 

Ford, Col., 291. 

Franklin, Gen., 181, 191, 248, 250, 251, 

254, 286, 295, 296, 299. 
Fremont, Gen., 165, 207, 215, 236. 
French, Gen., 299. 

Gaines's Mill, battle of, 245. 
Galveston, 41. 

Garnett, Gen., 92, 93, 99, 101, 102. 
Geary, Gen., 211. 
Glendale, battle of, 250. 
Goldsborough, Admiral, 171. 
Gomard's Manual, 36. 
Grenville, Mr., quoted, 358. 

ILvLLECK, Gen., made commander-in- 
chief, 267. 
despatch to Gen. McClellan, 269. 
correspondence with Gen. McClel- 
lan, 271. 
unjust charge against Gen. Mc- 
Clellan, 274.. 
telegraphic conversation withGen. 

McClellan, 275, 276. 
despatch to Gen. McClellan, 304. 
official order to Gen. McClellan, 

312. 
letter to Gen. McClellan, 322. 
telegrams to Gen. McClellan, 326, 

328. 
order of dismissal to Gen. Mc- 
Clellan, official report comment- 
ed upon, 830, 331. 
Hanover Court-House, battle at, 220. 
Hardee, Gen., 311. 
Ilarkins, Major, 344. 
Harper's Ferry surrendered, 291. 
Harrison's Landing, 255. 
IlartsufT, Gen., 298. 
Haupt, Gen., 317. 
Ileintzelman, Gen., 128, 185, 223-225, 

240, 246, 248, 254, 279. 
Herodotus, incident from, 355. 
Hill, Gen., 102. 
Hitchcock, Gen., 267. 
Hodges, Lieut., 48, 52. 

393 



394 



INDEX. 



Hooker, Gen., 185, 223, 251, 252, 268, 

289, 297-299, 305. 
Huger, Gen., 194, 228, 229. 

Ingalls, Col., 243, 313. 

Jacksox, Gen., 208, 209, 212-215, 234. 
Johnston, Gen., 181, 195, 227, 229. 
Joinville, Prince tie, quoted, 167, 182, 
192, 223, 226, 230, 243. 

Kearney, Gen., 185, 223, 251, 252, 281. 
Keightley's History quoted, 140. 
Kellermann, Marshal, 202. 
Kelley, Col., 88, 91, 92. 
Kenley, Col., 209-211. 
Keycs, Gen., 189, 223, 224, 246, 247, 249, 
250, 254, 278. 

Lander, Gen., 91. 
Latrobe, J. H. B., quoted, 125. 
Lecomte, Col., quoted, 176, 189, 218, 228. 
Lee, Gen. R. E., 181, 195, 288. 
Lincoln, President, order on Gen. 
Scott's resignation, 115. 
message to Congress, Dec. 1861, 

127,137. 
issues an order for a general 

movement, 138. 
directs the plan of the campaign, 

139. 
letter to Gen. McClellan, 141. 
issues an order dividing the army 

into corps, 153. 
issues an order for the disposition 
,and movement of the army, 155. 
removes Gen. McClellan from the 
post of commander-in-chief, 159. 
interview with Gen.McClellan,165. 
transfers Blcnker's division to 

Fremont, 1C6. 
letter to Gen. McClellan, 178, 206. 
suspends Gei^. McDowell's move- 
ment, 207. 
despatches to Gen. McClellan, 218. 
interview with Gen. McClellan, 

281, 283. 
visits the Armyof the Potomac,308. 
removes Gen. McClellan from com- 
mand, 329. 
proclamation of Sept. 22, 1802, 333. 
Longstrect, Gen., 224. 
Lovcjoj^, Owen, resolutions offered by, 

190. 
Lyons, Sir Edward, 01 

Malveun Hill, battle of, 253, 254. 

Mansfield, Gen., 298. 

Marcv, Capt., 37-41. 

McCa'll, Gen., 235, 241, 241, 251, 252, 254. 

McClellan, Arthur, Capt., 9. 

McClellan, Crcorge, Dr., 9. 

McClellan, J. IL D., Dr., 0, C6. 



McClellan, G. B., birth and early educa- 
tion, 9. 

enters West Point, 10. 

enters the army as second lieu- 
tenant of engineers, 13. 

letter to his brother, 14. 

sails for Mexico, 15. 

takes part in the siege of Vera 
Cruz, 16. 

at Cerro Gordo, 18. 

adventure at Amozoque, 19. 

reconnoissances by, 23. 24. ' 

services in the Mexican War, 25-30. 

leaves Mexico for West Point, 34. A 

brevettedm-st lieutenant and cap- 
tain, 34, 35. 

lecture on Napoleon's campaign 
of 1814, 35. 

letter to his brother, 36. 

prepares a manual of bayonet ex- 
ercise, 30. 

ordered to Fort Delaware, 37. 

joins Capt. Marcj' in an expedi- 
tion to explore the Red River,37. 

attached to the staff of Gen. P. F. 
Smith, 41. 

letter to his brother, 41. 

letters from Texas, 42, 43. 

surveys the coast of Texas, 43. 

makes a report to Gen. Totten, 45. 

ordered on the Pacific Railroad 
survey, 45. 

letter to his mother, 48. 

letter to his brother, 52. 

explores the Yakima Pass, 54. 

reports to Gov. Stevens, 54. 

reports to the Secretary of War, 55. 

returns home, 56. 

sent on a secret expedition to tho 
West Indies, 56. 

draws up two reports on the pro- 
montory and bay of Samuna, 58. 

draws up report on raihvay, 58. 

made captain in the First Cavalry 
Regiment, 59. 

sent on a commission to observe 
the Crimean War, 59. 

sails from Boston, Gl. 

arrives in St. Petersburg, 63. 

letter from St. Petersburg, 63. 

arrival at Balaklava, C7. 

arrival at Paris, 60. 

retin-u home, 60. 

report on the armies of Europe, 70, 
80. 

resigns his commission, 81. 

made vice-president of the Illinois 
Central Railroad, 81. 

marriage, E2, 

president of the Ohio & Mississippi 
Railroad, 82. 

mrjor-gcneral of Ohio "Militia 
'\ oluntccrs," 85. 



INDEX. 



395 



McClellanjG.B., placed in charge of the 
" Department of the Ohio," 85. 

issues a proclamation to Western 
Virginia, 88. 

address to his soldiers, 90. 

letter to Gen. Scott, 94. 

proclamation, 95. 

address to soldiers, 96. 

despatch to Col. Townsend, 100. 

address to his soldiers, 102. 

summoned to Washington, 103. 

begins to organize the army, 105. 

addresses a memorandum on the 
war to the President, 106. 

appointedcommander-in-chief,116. 

issues an order thereupon, 116. 

receives a sword from the city of 
Philadelphia, 117. 

letters of instruction to Gen. Hal- 
Icck and Gen. Buell, 118. 

letters of instruction to Gen. Sher- 
man and Gen. Butler, 119. 

difficulties of his position, 121. 

interview with the Secretary of 
War, 136. 

exi)lains his plans to the Presi- 
dent, 136. 

letter to the Secretary of War, 112. 

goes to Harper's Ferry, 151. 

consults with division command- 
ers, 152. 

goes to Manassas and Centreville, 
158. 

removed from the post of com- 
mander-in-chief, 159. 

addresses a note to the President, 
160. 

issues an address to his sol diers,162. 

gives instructions to Gen. Banks 
and Gen. Wadsworth, 161. 

explains his plans to the War De- 
partment, 161. 

meets President Lincoln, 165. 

writes letter to Gen. Banks, 167. 

reaches Fortress Monroe, 169. 

deprived of control over Gen. 
Wool's command, 170. 

McDowell's corps detached from 
him, 171. 

besieges Yorktown, 175. 

at the battle of Williamsburg, 187. 

thanked by the House of Repre- 
sentatives, 190. 

telegraphs to the Secretary of 
War from Williamsburg, 203. 

telegraphs to the President, 203, 
206. 

receives despatches from the 
President, 218. 

at the battle of Fair Oaks, 225, 228. 

telegraphs to the President, 233. 

telegraphs to the Sccrctnry of 
War, 2S3. 



McClellan,G.B., joined by McCall, 2S5. 
begins movement to James Kiver, 

212. 
meeting of his corps commanders, 

246. 
exertions during the"SevenDays," 

250, 253. 
at the battle of Malvern Hill, 253. 
telegraphs to the Secretary of 

War, 258. 
address to liis soldiers, July 4, 

1862, 261. 
telegraph to the President, 262. 
letter to the President, July 7, 

1862, 262. 
protests against the removal of 

the Army of the Potomac, 269. 
begins removal of the army, 272. 
differences between him and Gen. 

Halleck, 273, 274. 
leaves James River, 277. 
arrives at Acquia Creek, 278. 
telegraphs to Gen. Halleck, 278. 
arrives at Alexandria, 279. 
telegraph to Gen. Halleck, 280. 
reduced in his command, 280. 
interviews with Gen. Halleck and 

the President, 281. 
telegraphs to Gen. F. Porter, 281. 
reassumes command of the Army 

of the Potomac, 283. 
effect upon the soldiers, 284. 
takes the field, 285. 
extracts from report, 286, 292. 
not responsible for surrender of 

Harper's Ferry, 296. 
at the battle of Antietam, 297. 
extract from report, 302. 
teletjraphs to Gen. Halleck, 304. 
thanked by Gov. Bradford, 306. 
general order on the President's 

Proclamation of Sept. 22, 1862, 

310. 
difference with the Administra- 
tion, 313, 314. 
letter to Gen. Meigs, 315. 
extracts from report, 319, 324. 
letter to Gen. Halleck, 325. 
extract from report, 327. 
removed from the command of 

the Army of the Potomac, 329. 
why removed, 333. 
farewell address to the army, 335. 
takes leave of his officers and the 

army, 336, 337. 
reception at Philadelphia and 

Trenton, 338. 
visit to Boston, 339. 
letter on behalf of Judge Wood- 
ward, 341. 
at the reception of the First New 

York Cavalry, 343. 
oration at West Point, 345. 



396 



INDEX. 



McClellan, G.B., speech at Lake George, 
346. 

extract from report, 348. 

defended against the charge of 
slowness, 358-363. 

generally successful, 364. 

beloved by his soldiers, 365. 

a master of strategy, 366. 

moral qualities, 368. 

unjustly treated, 371-373. 
McDowell, Gen., 172, 204-207, 212-214, 

216, 218, 221, 235, 236. 
McReynolds, Col., .343, 
Meagher, Gen., 299. 
Meigs, Gen., 314-316, 321, 322. 
Mcrrimac, 156, 194, 198-201. 
Mexicalcingo, 23, 24. 
Mexico, city of, 23, 28, 31, 34. 
Miles, Col., 291, 294, 295. 
Milroy, Gen., 208. 
Molino del Rey, battle of, 27. 
Mordecai, Major, 59. 
Morell, Gen., 241. 
Morris, Gen., 91, 95, 102. 
Mowry, Lieut., 48, 51. 
Myers, Col., 322. 

Naglee. Gen., 250. 

Napier,' Sir \Vm., quoted, 180, 358. 

Nelson, Lord, 3.3. 

Nelson's Farm, battle of, 250. 

Ney, Marshal, 367. 

Nicholas, Emperor of Russia, 66. 

Palo Alto, battle of, 13. 

Panmure, Lord, 61. 

Paris, 69. 

Paskievitch, Prince, 62. 

Pedregal, 25. 

Pegram, Col., 98, 99. 

Philippi, fight at, 91. 

Pierpoint, Gov., 92. 

Pope, Gen., 236, 279, 280. 

Porter, Gen. F., 130, 191, 220, 244, 250, 

252, 254, 279, 283, 300, 301, 337. 
Puebla, 19, 20. 

Radetsky, Marshal, 63. 

Raglan, Lord, 61. 

Reno, Gen., 290. 

Renshaw, Lieut., 56. 

Resaca de la Palma, battle of, 13. 

Reynolds, Gen., 241. 

Richardson, Gen., 128, 191, 226, 227, 

250. 
Rich Mountain, battle of, 99. ' n^,^ 
Rodgers, Capt. J., 197. 
Rodman, Gen. 300. 
Rosecrans, Gen., 95, 98, 99, 103. 
Russey, Col. de, 10. 



San Antonio 



' of, bG. '- 



San Cosme garita, 28. 
Saunders, Major, 37. 
Schalck, Emii, quoted, 256. 
Schenck, Gen., 208. 
Schomburgk, Sir R. H., quoted, 57. 
Scott, Gen., 23, 25, 31, 36, 115, 116. 
Sebastopol, 71. 

Sedgwick, Gen., 191, 227, 251, 299. 
" Seven Days," the, 240. 
Seymour, Gen., 241. 
Sherman, Gen., 119. 
Shields, Gen., 208. 
Simpson, Sir George, 67. 
Slocum, Gen., 244, 247, 251. 
Smith, Gen. P. F., 25, 27, 41-43. 
Smith, Major, 28, 30. 
Stanton, E. M., made Secretary of War, 
135. 

letter to Gen. Lander, 149. 

letter to the editor of the New 
York " Tribune," 149. 

letter to Gen. McClellan. 162, 204. 

instructions to Gen. McDowell, 
205. 

telegram to the Governor of Mas- 
sachusetts, 212. 
Stevens, Gen., 46, 54, 281. 
Stone, Gen., 114. 
Stoneman, Gen., 181, 244. 
St. Petersburg, 63, 66. 
Stuart, Gen., 236. 
Sumner, Gen., 226, 230, 240, 246, 248, 

251, 254, 286, .301. 
Sumter, Fort, 82. 
Sykes, Gen., 243. 

Taylor, Gen., 15. 
Totten, Gen., 17, 20, 43. 
Towusend, Gen., 329. 

Vancouver, Fort, 47. 

Vera Cruz, siege of, 16. 

Vienna, 68. 

Vincennes, 69. 

Virginia, embarrassing position of, 86. 

Virginia, AVestern, 87. 

Wade, B. F., 136. 
Walker, S. C, 10. 

Washington City, how defended, 167. 
Wellington, Duke of, 33, 356. 
West Point, Va., battle near, 191. 
West Point, N. Y., monument conse- 
crated at, 345. 
Williamsburg, battle of, 181. 
Winchester, battle near, 208. 
Woodward, Judge, 341. 
Wool, Gen., 170, 194, 208. 
Worth, Gen., 19, 24. 

YoRKTOWN evacuated, 181. 






i 




Zouaves, 76. 



LbS'25 . 



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